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Towards A Personal Ontology Of The Church:
The Church as Bride in the theology of Congar and Bulgakov
RPC Brown
Abstract
The primary identity of the Church as ‘Body of Christ’ in her relation with God is 
questioned. Understood somatically, since the Logos is the hypostasis of Christ, it fails 
to give the necessary ontological space for Creation to respond to God’s love.
Congar’s  ecclesial  ontology,  formulated  as  Body  of  Christ,  is  investigated.  His 
hierarchical  interpretation  of  the  relation  between  church  structure,  whose  ontos  as 
visible Body derives apneumatically from the incarnate Logos, and the Spirit,  which 
vivifies the mystical Body through faith and the sacraments, is drawn from the filioque, 
subordinating  the  Spirit  to  the Institution.  Souls  united with  God are  eschatological 
‘brides’, the reality for which the institution temporarily exists. Christ, or the Spirit, is 
the  ‘I’  of the Church,  which is  not  a  ‘person’.  Ultimately,  souls are  to be catholic, 
transparent to each other and God’s love. There is no explicit  relation of Church to 
Creation.
Bulgakov identifies  humanity as the hypostatic  centre  of  Creation.  In creating,  God 
kenotically gives away his own being (Sophia) establishing temporality and otherness. 
Humanity  is  spirit-embodied  earth,  hypostasising  created  Sophia,  drawn,  through 
deification by the Spirit, into communion with God. The Trinitarian communion of the 
Godhead is imaged in Creation as the kenotic, hypostatic transparency of the Church. 
The Incarnation is a synergism between the Logos and Mary, who thereby participates 
in the salvific activity of the Son and the Spirit, as Spirit-bearer. She is the ‘Bride’ in 
whom all others participate.
Congar’s  eschatology  and  Bulgakov’s  kenotically  hypostasised  Creation  proffer  an 
understanding of the Church as the invited  ‘yes’  of the personalised cosmos, reborn 
from Christ through the Cross, eschatologically irradiated by the Spirit with the glory of 
God,  unified  in  kenotic  love,  whose  communion  with  the  Trinity  as  the  ‘fourth’ 
hypostasis, ‘the Bride,’ proceeds through her nuptial union with the Son.
(300 words)
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Chapter 1 Introduction
 1.1 The Question
Andrei Rublev’s famous 15th Century icon of the Trinity pictures three figures around a 
table. In the very centre, but pushed towards the front, is the Eucharistic cup of the body 
and blood of Christ, the lamb that was sacrificed, the cup of communion. This is the 
centre around which the perichoretic movement of the Three revolves. The serene joy 
on their faces, the position of the chalice, and the bodily orientation of the three towards 
the outside (the contemplator) exudes a welcome. This extraordinary icon depicts an 
invitation to join the communion of the Godhead. But to whom is the cup offered?
If this icon reflects a glimpse into the true nature and purpose of the Gospel, the answer 
to its question is not as straightforward as might at first seem. It is framed in the context  
of  the  perichoretic  love  of  the  Trinity.  The  Father,  Son  and  Spirit  are  all  present, 
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signified by their  physical  gestures, the colours of their  robes, and their  background 
motifs. The identity of the invited fourth figure, however, is not given. Nevertheless, the 
icon sets some parameters. It is someone other than the three already present, competent 
of responding (that is, free), and capable of joining the communion (that is, personal or 
hypostatic).1 The most  obvious answer is  the one contemplating the icon, ourselves. 
However, this immediately raises the question of everyone else. What is the nature and 
mode of our participation in this perichoresis? More precisely, what is the relationship 
of the Church to God?
By framing it in the context of participation in the Trinitarian banquet, it will be noted 
that  the  question  is  at  once  eschatological,  ontological,  and hypostatic in  nature.  It 
concerns not only our relations with God, but also with each other, and with the rest of 
creation, which, St Paul claims, is groaning in labour, longing for its redemption and 
glorification  through  us.2 Somehow,  through  the  process  of  theosis,  the  whole  of 
creation is invited to this table. We are thrown into the search for an eschatologically 
defined ecclesiology that reveals the true nature of the Church as the invisible fourth 
person. The great existential  question behind the invitation,  then, is  ‘who are we, in 
relation to God, each other, and creation?’
Rublev’s (or more precisely, God’s) invitation to partake of the Eucharistic cup and join 
the  perichoretic  communion  of  the  Three  is  reflected  in  the  recent  exploration  of 
eucharistic  and  koinwniva (‘communion’)  ecclesiologies.  As  Metropolitan  John 
Zizioulas puts it
The Church as a communion reflects God’s being as communion in the way this communion 
will be revealed fully in the Kingdom.3
The purpose of our study is to offer a possible way of answering this question in the 
context of Trinitarian communion.
 1.2 Trinitarian Ecclesiology
Individualism…underlies the modern abolition of the other.4
Describing the Church in relation to the Trinity is not without difficulty. In particular, 
when the ontology of the Church is described in terms of koinwniva, or ‘communion’, as 
1 George Herbert’s poem, Love III, is called to mind.
2 Romans 8:19ff
3 Zizioulas, ‘The Church as Communion,’p8
4 Gunton, The One, The Three and The Many, p187
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a reflection of the  Koinwniva of the Trinity, John Behr sees several serious issues at 
stake. Firstly, the Church can become separated from God as its ‘reflection’. Put another 
way,
communion ecclesiology sees the Church as parallel to the ‘immanent Trinity’: it is the three 
Persons in communion, the one God as a relational being, that the Church is said to ‘reflect.’  
This results in a horizontal notion of communion, or perhaps better ‘communions,’ without 
being clear about how the two intersect.5
The critical point for Behr is that Christ, as the link between the Church and the Trinity, 
is not obviously present in this description.
Secondly,  to  describe  the  relations  within  the  immanent  Trinity  purely  in  terms  of 
koinwniva is an inappropriate abstraction that deviates from Cappadocian teaching by 
overemphasising  the  Three  as  hypostatic  persons,  isolated  from the  divine  relations 
revealed in the economy.6
His proposal is to use three scriptural images of the Church each of which suggests a 
relationship with each person of the Trinity: People of God, Body of Christ, and Temple 
of the Holy Spirit.  His principal point, however, is that understanding the Church in 
terms of the Trinity requires that we follow the economic revelation of the relations in 
the Trinity.
The Spirit, who proceeds from the Father, rests upon the Son, as a bond of love returned to 
the Father. It is in this specific pattern of communion (and not as imaging a communion of 
three divine Persons) that the Church, as the body of Christ and the temple of the Spirit, has  
her being...The Church is not just a communion of persons in relation, but the body of Christ  
giving thanks to the Father in the Spirit.7
In particular, he is critical of Zizioulas for stating  ‘the Church as communion  reflects 
God’s being as communion,’8 because this, paradoxically,  separates the Church from 
God since we are  left  with two,  parallel  communions.  Consequently,  ‘We have the 
Trinity and the Church.’9
Koinwniva, even if an ontological category, concerns relations between persons. This is 
important to note – it concerns relations. Much of the confusion appears to arise in the 
lack of distinction about which relations are in mind when koinwniva is being discussed. 
Behr is concerned about the  vertical relation between the Church and God, whereas 
5 Behr J, ‘The Trinitarian Being of the Church’, p68
6 A typical example can be found in D Edwards, ‘The Church as Sacrament of Relationships’.
7 Behr, ‘Trinitarian Being’, p69
8 Zizioulas ‘Church’, p8
9 Behr, ‘Trinitarian Being’, p70
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Zizioulas  is  speaking  of  horizontal relations  within  the  Church:  in  his  opening 
paragraphs he relates it directly to ‘the problem of church unity.’10
Behr’s concern is precisely that it is inappropriate to ‘map’ or image horizontal inner-
Trinitarian relations directly onto the Church. Rather they should define the nature of 
the vertical relation between the Church and God. He insists we remain faithful to the 
economic revelation of the Trinitarian relations.
Behr’s  point  perhaps  becomes  clearer  if  we  try  to  apply  the  economic  Trinitarian 
relations to the ‘horizontal’ relations within the Church as Zizioulas claims we should. 
If the Church is to reflect the relations of the Trinity, in what way should  ‘the Spirit, 
proceeding from the Father, resting upon the Son, as a bond of love returning to the 
Father’, shape the relations within the Church? For Zizioulas, who, or what, is the image 
of the Father in the Church, who is the Son, and who the Spirit? Such a conception 
would lead  to  entirely  inappropriate  and confusing hierarchical  distinctions  between 
persons within her.11
Nevertheless,  Behr,  in  seeing  Zizioulas’  koinwniva ecclesiology  as  resulting  in  a 
separation between Church and God, and his method of relating the three descriptors of 
the Church to a different person of the Trinity, shows he has misunderstood Zizioulas’ 
concern  with  church  unity.  Although  he  is  right  in  saying  that  the  nature  of  the 
processional  relations  within  the Trinity  cannot  be directly  used within  the  Church, 
Zizioulas is also right to say that the unity of the Church finds its source in the unity of 
God – of Trinitarian circumincession (Jn 15:11,22; Gal 4:4-6).
At the heart of this discussion is the nature of the Church’s relation with Christ. The Son 
is the Second Person of the Trinity, but the Son has also united humanity to himself. 
What, then, is the relation of this humanity to the Trinity, i.e. to the Son? For Zizioulas,  
the ontology of koinwniva deriving from the Trinity means that persons are constituted 
by their relations, and therefore Christ is ‘a “corporate person”, an inclusive being. The 
“head” without the “body” is inconceivable.’12 This, in turn, implies the nature of the 
Church’s relation with God through Christ as his ‘pneumatological’ body.
However,  and this  may  be  where  the  difficulty  lies,  Zizioulas  is  unclear  about  the 
precise nature of the Church’s relation to the Trinity.  He says  that  ‘the genitive “of 
10 Zizioulas, ‘Church’, p3
11 Nevertheless, it is Ignatius who, in the context of the Eucharist, says  ‘See that ye all follow the 
bishop, even as Jesus Christ does the Father.’ Smyrn. 8
12 Zizioulas, ‘Church’, p6
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God” shows clearly that the identity of the Church derives from her relation with the 
Triune God’,13 which has many aspects.  These he goes on to list,  the first  being to 
‘reflect in her very being the way God exists, i.e. the way of personal communion.’ But 
this is  not a description of the Church’s relation with the Trinity;  merely that she is 
called to be an image of it.
The second aspect relates to her being ‘of Christ’, which, he says, means she ‘cannot be 
a reflection of God’s way of being apart from the “economy of the Son,” i.e. the sonship 
given to us in Christ.’ However, what he has in mind here is the incorporation of the 
whole of creation into the redemptive order:  ‘in the sense of serving and realizing in 
herself God’s purpose in history for the sake of the entire creation.’14 Neither is this a 
description of the Church’s relation to the Trinity.
So we are left without a clear understanding of what Zizioulas considers to be the nature 
of the Church’s communion with the Trinity.
This,  however,  is  what  Behr  is  trying  to  elucidate  with the three descriptors  of  the 
Church as ‘people’, ‘body’, and ‘temple’. Tantalisingly, he always speaks of the Church 
using the feminine pronoun, ‘she’, and even refers to her as the bride in his exposition 
on the role of the Spirit in the Church as the body of Christ.15 But he does not develop 
the connection between ‘body’ and ‘bride’ any further.
Behr’s insistence throughout his article is the primacy of  ‘the body of Christ’ as the 
appropriate description of the Church. This is to be understood organically, as, indeed, 
described in various of Paul’s letters, and ontologically:
The identity is complete; it is not a loose analogy or metaphor: ‘You are the body of Christ 
and individually members of it,’ all, that is, who ‘by the one Spirit were baptized into the one 
body’ (1 Cor 12.27, 13). Christians are called to be ‘the one body,’ by living in subjection to 
the head, Christ, allowing his peace to rule in their hearts (Col 3.15). As members of his  
body, they depend for their life and being upon their head, and also upon one another: ‘we, 
though many,  are  one  body in  Christ,  and  individually members  of  one  another’ (Rom 
12.5).16
Yet for all this, a question remains as to whether the ‘Body of Christ’ metaphor was 
ever intended to describe the Church’s relation  to God, or is even adequate to do so, 
given that it  is not a  personal metaphor.  There is little  that could not be applied in 
Behr’s assessment to an understanding of the Church as the second Eve, being built up 
13 Zizioulas, ‘Church’, p7
14 Zizioulas, ‘Church’, p8
15 Behr, ‘Trinitarian Being’, p74
16 Behr, ‘Trinitarian Being’, p72
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from the second Adam’s (Christ’s) body. Most references to Christ as the head of the 
body can be perfectly understood as bridegroom-bride references, but using head/body 
language alone fails to capture the complete Edenic dependence of the bride’s creation 
from  the  bridegroom.  Furthermore,  Paul’s  letters  are  almost  exclusively  written  to 
address  issues  of  ‘building  up’  the  body,  that  is,  with  the  creation  of  the  bride,  in 
preparation  for  the future  wedding.  Much language of  ‘the  body’  therefore  remains 
applicable in the bridal metaphor; its complete dependence on Christ’s body, belonging 
to him, and obedience to him, can be understood in this context.
 1.3 Why ‘Bride’?
The New Testament describes the Church variously as fruit of the vine, flock, body, 
temple, bride, city and kingdom, among others. These are always in relation to Christ: 
he is the true vine, the shepherd, the head, the cornerstone, the bridegroom, the sun and 
the king. These metaphors, which are all singular nouns, provide clues to the nature of 
the Church’s being.17
The  papal  encyclical  Mystici  Corporis  Christi (1943) made  the  Body of  Christ  the 
primary way of referring to the Church. Indeed, in 1963 Afanassieff stated
Such a concept of the Church [the Body of Christ] has become a habit of thought and we  
never question it; we are more inclined to use it to furnish premises on which to build all  
theological discussions about the Church.18
Vatican  II,  while  endorsing  the  cyclical,  modified  the  description  of  the  Church  to 
prioritise  ‘The People of God’. To these two, many (including Bulgakov, Congar and 
Behr) have added a third, ‘The Temple of the Holy Spirit’, as a descriptor relating the 
Church to the third person of the Trinity, complementing the others.
 1.3.1 ‘The People of God’
The description of the Church as ‘The People of God’ is, perhaps, the most ambiguous. 
Notwithstanding its  primacy of  place  in  Lumen Gentium,  there  is  no corresponding 
relation to Christ in this mainly Old Testament (OT) descriptor, which only occurs three 
times in the New Testament (NT).19 In fact it rarely occurs in this form in the OT either, 
although clearly it forms a primary motif. Lumen Gentium implicitly acknowledges this 
17 Congar makes exactly this point, Diversity and Communion, p11. See, also, for example, Tait ‘The 
Two shall become One’.
18 Afanassieff, ‘The Church which presides in love’, p58
19 (Heb 4:9, 11:25; 1Pe 2:10, one of which is a historical reference to the OT nation of Israel)
14
by deferring to the description of the Church as the Body of Christ in the chapter (2) on 
‘The People of God’ when relating it to Christ.20
In a Trinitarian context, Behr defends its use as a means of relating the Church to the 
first  person of the Trinity.21 The designation  ‘of God’ relates  to the Church’s being 
‘called  out’,  as  in  the  etymology  of  ekklesia,  and  has  its  ground in  the  covenantal 
relationship between God and Israel. That covenant, for the Church, is specifically made 
anew in the body and blood of Christ (Lk 22:20). The Church is therefore called ‘a 
chosen race,  a royal  priesthood, a holy nation,  his own people’ (1 Pet 2.9). For the 
Church, the designation has a christological foundation. The  ‘unity’ of the Church is 
implicit in the singular collective noun, ‘people’. Moreover, because it derives from the 
OT, it  provides  a  continuous  narrative  that  can be taken back into  Genesis and the 
creation of Adam, in which the work of both Christ and the Spirit in the new creation 
are foreshadowed.
However, the designation itself gives little of this away, and is equally, even primarily,  
applied to Israel – it has no intrinsic relation to Christ. Furthermore, it lacks ontological 
specificity,  saying nothing about  the nature  of  new creation,  its  relation  to  God,  or 
relations between the members of the new covenant. Crucially, however, it fails to fulfil 
adequately Behr’s claim of relating the Church to the first person of the Trinity. Jesus 
taught his disciples to call  God,  ‘Father’. But to describe the Church as  ‘of God’ is 
simply to relate her possessively to the Godhead, not specifically the Father.
Given that the Church cannot be properly described without reference to Christ, it is 
questionable  as  to  whether  it  is  an adequate  ontological  title  for  her  at  all.  Indeed, 
Congar  identified  these  shortcomings  himself  and  counterpoised  it  with  the  more 
complete descriptor of the Church as bride.22
To describe the Church as Bride fulfils  all  the notions inherent  in  ‘People of God’, 
while remaining visibly christocentric.23 It designates the Church as belonging to Christ, 
and his new creation (taken from his flesh), provides continuity with the bridal motif in 
the OT narrative, including the creation story of Genesis, and intrinsically unites the 
‘people of God’ to each other as a coherent  ‘one’. But most  importantly,  it  has the 
20 Lumen Gentium, §14
21 Behr J, ‘The Trinitarian Being of the Church’, p3
22 Congar, This Church that I Love, pp29-34
23 The title of Bride or Spouse is the second title used to describe the Church in Lumen Gentium (§4). 
The first is ‘the kingdom of Christ’ (§3).
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ontological potential that allows her to respond to her calling, her ‘invitation’, with one 
voice, and name the first person of the Trinity ‘Father’, as the bride of the Son.
 1.3.2 ‘The Body of Christ’
The  Body  of  Christ  is  by  far  the  most  common  designation  for  the  Church,  both 
theologically  and,  at  least  within  the  Church  of  England,  liturgically.24 A  deeply 
ambiguous word, ‘body’ has many layers of semantic meaning: a biological unit of life; 
a physical entity; a corporate institution; a state or empire; an expression of catholicity;  
a sexual icon; a collection (of works or items); a piece of bread. It forms an intrinsic part 
of the description of the Church as bride, as well as body of Christ.
In the context of the Church, ‘the Body of Christ’ is normally understood in an organic 
and universal sense. For the last fifty years, it has also been the focus of two closely 
related  interpretations  in  particular:  koinwniva,  and  eucharistic.25 In  fact  Afanassieff 
contends that  all ecclesiologies of the Body of Christ can be reduced to two mutually 
exclusive  types  –  universal  (the  organic  conception),  and  eucharistic.26 The  former 
derives from the theology of Cyprian, but the latter, he says, is the earlier, present in the 
apostolic age and expressed in St Paul’s letters.27 He goes so far as to claim the notion 
of a universal church is alien to the NT. However, Afanassieff is concerned with church 
structure and inter-church relations. He has little to say directly concerning the Church’s 
relation to God. Nevertheless, it is worth noting the primary differences he sees between 
the two ecclesiologies.
Cyprian’s concept of the universal church as a body takes Paul’s image of the (local) 
church in which the individuals comprise its many members. Based on the model of the 
Roman Empire as a body, it redefines the image so that, instead of individuals,  each 
local church is a member of the Body of Christ. In this way the Catholic (i.e. universal) 
Church is a direct parallel to the Empire, with each area (congregation) comprising a 
part of the whole. Each member of the body (local church) is tied into the Catholic body 
by its bishop. Therefore each local church must have its own bishop to be part of the 
Body of Christ. If it becomes cut off from the whole, it is no longer a part of the body.  
24 Its first formal use in Lumen Gentium occurs in §7.
25 The latter is associated with de Lubac (Corpus Mysticum), the former with Zizioulas  (Being as 
Communion), although Zizioulas’ ecclesiology is also strongly eucharistic. In fact Khomiakov was 
the first to develop a full ecclesiology based on koinwniva, or ‘sobornost’ in Russian.
26 Afanassieff,  ‘The  Church’,  p82.  He  appears  not  to  consider  Khomiakov’s  non-organic,  non-
eucharistic communional ecclesiology.
27 Afanassieff, ‘The Church’, p58, p73
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The corollary  is  that  the  body is  the  less  for  this  loss.  Afanassieff  argues  that  this 
understanding requires a visible primacy to complete its internal logic.28
‘Eucharistic ecclesiology’,29 he claims, is the original theology of the church and offers 
a completely different interpretation of the meaning of ‘Body of Christ’. Working from 
1 Corinthians he concludes the ‘body’ is the eucharistic body of Christ, and 
the faithful become members of His Body by virtue of communicating in the Body of Christ. 
The indivisibility of Christ’s Body implies the fullness of the Church dwelling in each of the 
‘local’ churches.30
He goes on to argue that by virtue of this each congregation is wholly the Body of 
Christ,  and is  therefore  autonomous  and autocephalous.  Nevertheless,  there  remains 
only one Body: ‘One plus one is still one’.31 Christ’s manifestation in each local place is 
always complete. The universality of Christ’s Body, its fullness and its unity, is present 
in every Eucharist, which is presided over by its bishop. Therefore universality of the 
Church is  an interior  quality,  which cannot  be increased or diminished:  ‘Where the 
Eucharist is, there is the fullness of the Church;  vice versa, where the fullness of the 
Church is not, there no Eucharist can be celebrated.’32
De Lubac had already identified this early eucharistic, Ignatian ecclesiology in 1944, 
but not its  structural  implications.  McPartlan notes that  ‘strong elements’  of it  were 
included  in  Vatican  II,  with  the  implicit  acknowledgement  that  ‘a  communional 
structure of local churches’ is required,33 posing something of a challenge not just to the 
‘hierarchology’34 of the Roman Church, but also its definition of universality.35
De Lubac’s expression ‘the Eucharist makes the Church’,36 and still more, Afanassieff’s 
‘Where the Eucharist is, there is the fullness of the Church’, both recall the first ever use 
of the term ‘Catholic Church’ in patristic writing by Ignatius, but altered. In the context 
of bishops and the Eucharist he says,  ‘wherever Jesus Christ is, there is the Catholic 
Church.’37
28 Afanassieff, ‘The Church’, pp60-66
29 A term coined by Afanassieff, ‘The Church’, p73
30 Afanassieff, ‘The Church’, p74
31 Afanassieff, ‘The Church’, p75
32 Afanassieff, ‘The Church’, p76
33 McPartlan, ‘Ressourcement’, p401
34 A term used by Congar to describe the juridical preponderance of the Church in earlier years, Lay 
People, p44
35 Tavard GH, ‘Considerations’, p43
36 De Lubac, Corpus Mysticum, p88
37 Ignatius, Smyrn. 8 (90)
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Ignatius’ argument is against  docetism, insisting on the bodily resurrection of Jesus, 
which gives reality both to Christ’s presence in the Eucharist and to the bishop as the 
centre of unity in the church. But the alteration by Afanassieff from ‘Jesus Christ’ to 
‘Eucharist’ is subtle and profound, at a stroke delimiting the Church and turning it into a 
hierarchical  congregation  gathered  around  a  mediating  bishop:  there  is  no  church 
without a bishop. Although Ignatius insists on remaining united with the bishop, and the 
bishop  is  the  guarantor  of  a  ‘proper’  Eucharist,  this  is  not  the  same  as  saying  the 
Eucharist (and hence the bishop) make the Church. Christ’s presence makes the Church, 
one  form of  which  is  in  the  Eucharist.  Afanassieff’s  reinterpretation  raises  further 
difficult questions about the nature of the church when it is not congregating around a 
bishop or his (or her?) delegate for a eucharistic celebration. 
Irenæus’ description of the Church maintains a more balanced pneumatology,  ‘Where 
the Church is, there is also the Spirit of God and where the Spirit of God is, there are 
also the Church and all grace.’38 For him it is the presence of the Spirit that guarantees 
communion and Christ’s presence (‘where two or three are gathered...’, Mt 18:20), not a 
bishop or the Eucharist. 
Notwithstanding Afanassieff’s statement that there are only two fundamental ‘Body of 
Christ’  ecclesiologies,  and  Ratzinger’s  claim  that  ‘eucharistic ecclesiology  is 
fundamentally  the  same  thing  as  communion ecclesiology’,39 both  Johann  Möhler 
(1796-1838, German Catholic) in his early work and Alexei Khomiakov (1804-1860, 
Russian Orthodox) developed ‘communion’ ecclesiologies in the 19th Century that most 
certainly  were  not eucharistic,  but  Spirit-derived:  Gemeinschaft or  sobornost 
ontologies.40 Möhler  maintained  the  body  of  the  Church  (its  visible  offices  and 
structure) was the visible expression of the invisible unity of love, deriving from the 
activity of the Spirit.41 Khomiakov is much more ambiguous, although the sacraments 
are closely linked with the Church’s visible manifestation.42 For neither is the Eucharist 
the  ontological  centre  of  the  Church.  Rather  it  is  the  activity  of  the  Spirit  within 
believers  that  engenders  love  and  holiness,  leading  towards  the  catholicity  of  each 
person. This is where the unity of the Church is to be located.
Turning to the question of the ontological implications of describing the Church as the 
‘Body of Christ’, de Lubac identifies three meanings of term: the historical body; the 
38 Irenæus, Against Heresies. III.24.1 (68)
39 McPartlan’s words in ‘Ressourcement’, p402
40 See, for example, Himes, Ongoing Incarnation, pp66-72
41 Möhler, Unity, pp209-215
42 Bolshakoff, Unity, p154; Romanides, ‘Khomiakov’, p66
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sacramental body; and the ecclesial body, all three of which are intimately related.43 It is 
the third that concerns us here.
Paul uses the ecclesial definition of the body in two distinct but connected senses, each 
with its own purpose. Firstly, the emphasis is on the genitive, the Body of Christ. Here 
the  Church is  described possessively – it  is  his body;  it  belongs  to  him as  a  body 
belongs to a head, as a bride to a bridegroom. He is its ajrchv, its source. It is primarily 
used as a means of speaking about Christ’s authority over the Church.44
Secondly, the emphasis is on the noun, the  Body of Christ. In this sense it is usually 
used to  denote the nature of dependency in the relations  of members  to each other 
within a local  church.45 It  is  sometimes also used to portray an organic relationship 
between Christ and his members.46
Finally there are several instances where both these meanings are in view, and in most 
of these marriage or sexual union (which is the same thing, biblically)  is part of the 
hermeneutical context that links the two together.47
There is a vitally important reason for recognising these distinctions: Paul’s description 
of the Church as the Body of Christ, and Christ as her Head, can be, and often is, nuptial 
language  (probably  in  more  cases  than  is  usually  recognised).  This  being  the  case, 
Christ’s ‘Body’ is often, in Paul’s view, his bride. That is, implicit in adamic theology is 
the background of the Edenic creation story as prophecy,  with Christ  as the second 
Adam and,  of  necessity,  the  Church as  the  second Eve.  Christ’s  Body,  then,  has  a 
personal quality to the extent that Christ’s relationship with her is personal – he is her 
bridegroom (head) as she is his bride (body).
In terms of the Church’s eschatological relationship with God, this is significant. If the 
nuptial ontology of the Church as the Body of Christ is not recognised, her relationship 
with God becomes highly obscured. If ‘body’ language is only taken to mean ‘organic’ 
or somatic, what is the nature of the Church’s relation with the Father? Certainly, it is 
through Christ in that he remains the Son, but in what sense can the ‘body’ respond to 
its calling, to its invitation? The nature of love requires both freedom to respond and the 
ability to love in return. The Son, as God-man,  is already an intrinsic person in the  
Godhead. He was sent to save the world because of the Father’s great love (Jn 3:16), 
43 De Lubac, Corpus Mysticum
44 E.g. Rom 7:4; Eph 1:22-23; Col 1:18-19, 2:9, 3:15. 1 Cor 11:3ff is based on the same idea.
45 E.g. Rom 12:4ff; 1 Cor 12:12ff; Eph 2:16; 3:6; 4:4ff
46 E.g. Eph 4:15-16; Col 1:24; 2:19
47 E.g. 1 Cor 6:15ff; 1 Cor 10:16-17; Eph 5:23-30;
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and although he became fully human, he never stopped being the Second Person of the 
Trinity.  Indeed,  it  is  through  his  humanity  that  the  created  order  is  brought  into 
participation in God’s presence. But this participation is not and cannot be mechanical, 
which is  all  the somatic  ‘Body of Christ’  language offers us.  Where,  then,  is  there 
personal  and  ontological  space  for  the  world’s  response  to  God’s  love  if  it  is 
‘organically’ part of the Son, his ‘body’? Either we must say that the language of ‘Body 
of Christ’ is analogical (not metaphorical), in which case it is simply a useful tool, but 
has no ontological content. Or we can recognise its nuptial significance that allows the 
Church, through the Son, and in the Spirit, to respond to the Father, as the Son’s Bride. 
This is precisely why, when referring to the Church’s relation with God, Paul so often 
translates into bridal language.
Thus describing the Church as the Bride of Christ reveals the ontological content of her 
depiction as Christ’s Body.  The latter  remains  fundamental  with respect both to her 
generation, and to her eschatological  ‘completion’ in which Christ is her head in the 
mystical  marriage  of  the  great  wedding banquet.  In  both  cases  the  Edenic  creation 
narrative remains the prophetic context.
 1.3.3 ‘The Temple of the Holy Spirit’
We will  consider  this  description  later.48 For  now it  is  important  to  note  that,  like 
‘People of God’, on its own it bears no relation to Christ. Implicit in the genitive ‘of’ the 
Holy Spirit  is  the ‘not of’  Christ,  even though he is  the chief  cornerstone.  In New 
Testament usage the temple is almost always ‘of God’. Only once it is described as ‘of 
the Holy Spirit’ (1 Cor 6:19), where it is, in fact, a reference to the body as belonging to 
Christ’s bride, and not to a prostitute. In this case the indwelling Holy Spirit is the bridal 
gift that lays prior claim on the bride, who has been ‘bought with a price’.49
Neither is there any eschatological element in the description,  which is arguably the 
most important aspect of the Holy Spirit’s activity and presence in creation.
Again, the description of the Church as Christ’s Bride not only overcomes the absence 
of  any  relation  to  Christ.  It  also  implies  the  Holy  Spirit  as  the  hypostasising  and 
vivifying gift, the down-payment guaranteeing Christ’s return, the promise of the future 
wedding,  and  as  Christ’s  presence  in  his  absence.  Eschatology  and  pneumatology 
combine together in the bridal metaphor.
48 See Section 3.6.1, below
49 See Section 4.4, below
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 1.4 Metaphor as Ontology
 1.4.1 Metaphor
A common misunderstanding arises in the usage of language, particularly in relation to 
the function of ‘mere metaphors’, which are often interpreted simply as illustrations of 
some other, albeit complex, and to a certain extent potentially self-fulfilling, reality.50
Speaking of the way in which metaphors work in the ancient world, Preston shows how 
the image participates in the reality to which it alludes. In the narrative world, a word 
brings its referent into the present reality. In our own culture, stories still have the power 
to  induce  ecstatic  joy  and  excruciating  pain  through  participation  in  the  narrative. 
Referring to the description of the Church as Bride Preston states:
For  the  ancient  world,  or  that  part  of  it  we  are  concerned  with,  an  image  was  not  an 
illustration of some reality to which one had access independently of all images. An image  
was the reality itself expressed and represented.51
He goes on to illustrate the idea that words expressed do not contain thoughts, they are 
the expression of the thought, and this is reflected in the OT notion that God created 
through speaking words, and ultimately in The Word.52
Gunton contends that the modern misunderstanding of metaphor, often betrayed by the 
use  of  a  diminutive  adjective  before  it,  such  as  ‘mere’  or  ‘loose’,  derives  from 
Enlightenment  rationalism,  which  attempted  to  subordinate  language  to  reason.  But 
‘metaphor is an intrinsic feature of all human language’ in allowing the imagination to 
participate in knowledge. 
It [metaphor] enables not simply a human response to reality...but also dimensions of reality 
to come to human expression. That is to say, I would hold that metaphor is at the center, and  
perhaps is the chief vehicle of, human rational relation with reality.53
Metaphors achieve this by juxtaposing surprising concepts that allow new meaning, not 
originally present in either,  to emerge and transcend themselves.  Elsewhere,  Gunton 
quotes Steiner:
We have histories of massacre and deception, but none of metaphor. We cannot accurately 
conceive what it must have been like to be the first to compare the colour of the sea with the 
50 Eg. Dulles, Models, p18; Best, Body, p182; Behr, ‘Trinity and Church’, p3; Flynn, Vision, p93
51 Preston, Faces, p76
52 Preston, Faces, p77
53 Gunton, ‘Sacrifice’, p212
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dark of wine or to see autumn in a man’s face. Such figures are new mappings of the world, 
they reorganise our habitation in reality.54
This  ‘new  mapping’,  because  it  involves  the  imagination,  allows  knowledge  to  be 
experienced,  and thus  changes  our participation  in  reality.  It  enables  us to ask new 
questions of the reality before us.
This dynamic understanding of metaphor, that allows reality both to be questioned and 
to provide answers, has at  least  two fundamentally important  consequences.  First,  it 
allows for the possibility of encounter with the transcendental.  That is,  the being of 
reality that is otherwise beyond rational explanation can be perceived precisely because 
of its obliqueness.
To seek for a transcendental is to seek for those features of our language and experience by 
means of which reality at its most fundamental makes itself known to us: features that might  
be called ‘necessary notes of being,’ ‘the forms through which being displays itself.’55
The second follows on from the first. If the metaphor is competent to bear ontological 
weight,  albeit  indirectly,  that  is,  the  truth  about  a  being’s  being,  then  it  cannot  be 
something other than the reality itself: it must, at some level, participate in that being’s 
being.  But  it  does so through  ‘a  combination  of openness and mystery,  speech and 
silence’.56,57
Thus, metaphors are not  ‘models’.  Rather, they perform an ontological function.58 A 
model is always an approximation that seeks to explain certain attributes or replicate the 
behaviour of an entity or system. It is an aid in understanding, but always an external 
one. Unlike metaphor, it does not participate in the ontology or being of that system or 
entity. 
 1.4.2 Ontology
To speak of ontology implies the search for a timeless or eternal truth about the nature 
of  being,  a  transcendental  myth  ‘uncontaminated  by  time  or  becoming’.  But  as 
Macquarrie states, Christianity requires  faith, understood as a creative  freedom, in the 
historical event of Jesus Christ:
54 Steiner G, After Babel, p23, quoted in Gunton, Actuality, p50
55 Gunton, ‘Sacrifice’, p214
56 Gunton, Actuality, p38
57 Flynn,  describing  Congar’s  approach  to  the  Church,  concurs  on  the  necessity  of  metaphor  in 
theology, although, somewhat surprisingly does not mention Gunton in his discussion,  Vision of  
the Church, pp97-98
58 Cf. Dulles’ approach in Models of the Church, eg. p21
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Christianity  thus  becomes  the  religion  of  fallen  man,  that  is  to  say,  of  man  who  is 
irremediably identified with history and who has been driven out of the paradise of eternally  
recurring archetypes.59
Both  Hebrew  and  Christian  scriptures  continually  assert  that  God  constantly  acts 
irreversibly in history,  and this is the chosen medium of revelation of the Eternal to 
humanity.  History,  itself,  appears to be validated as the only legitimate  location  for 
Truth, for revelation of the Eternal.
This apparent dichotomy between history and ontology is, however, an expression of 
the antinomy inherent in the Incarnation: the eternal becomes present in time, infinity 
adopts particularity,  love dies on a cross. Theological endeavour must therefore also 
necessarily reflect this antinomy in its method and character if it is to remain true to its  
task of faith seeking understanding.
His dialectic between being and history, ideal and real, Absolute and nature, was what 
made Schelling attractive to a number of romantic theologians in the early nineteenth 
century. In particular, his identification of revelation as a synthesis of the two, the mode 
in which the ideal becomes present in history,  greatly influenced the young German 
Catholic,  Möhler.60,61 Participation  in  this  revelation,  and thus  the  ideal,  is  achieved 
through consciousness,  experience,  or spirit,  made accessible  by the presence of the 
Holy  Spirit.  In  Russia,  his  thought  was  also  deeply  attractive  to  the  Slavophiles, 
although  Khomiakov rejected his pantheistic tendencies and saw the Absolute as the 
Rational Will, creative activity, not an Idea.62
Unity of society, nation, or Church was a topic of widespread romantic interest. It was 
conceived in organic terms whereby different aspects were united to each other through 
organic  metaphors.63 The  nature  of  the Church’s  unity was a  major  theme for  both 
Möhler and Khomiakov. For Möhler the ultimate source of the unity of the Church was 
its history as experience,  since it is only through  experience that participation in the 
ideal as revealed in history can occur.
[H]istory...is an experiential science...The idea of the Church herself is the realisation of the 
Kingdom of God on earth. Therefore the history of the Church in the objective sense can be 
nothing other than the history of the realisation of the Kingdom of God on earth...This is the 
principle that preserves unity in diversity for us.64
59 Macquarrie, Religious Thought, p223
60 O’Meara, ‘Revelation and History’, p26ff
61 He was  also influenced  by Schleiermacher.  See Bolshakoff,  Unity,  p222 and Himes,  Ongoing 
Incarnation, p88
62 Bolshakoff, Unity, p54, p59
63 Erb in Möhler’s Unity, p51
64 Möhler, Unity, p34
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It is a history of love, achieved in the Church through the leading of the Holy Spirit 
through faith in Jesus.
For Khomiakov, who was familiar with, and borrowed much from, Möhler,65 it derived 
from the grace of God, dependent on the unity of God, but realised only in those who 
choose to submit to it. ‘Grace is given also to them that are disobedient and that make 
no use of it...but these are not in the Church.’ This unity is ‘a real and substantial unity, 
like that of many members in a living body.’66
In  both  cases  the  ultimate  unity  of  the  Church is  grounded  in  participation in  the 
Divine:  For  Möhler  it  is  the  Divine  Idea  of  the Kingdom of  God;  for  Khomiakov, 
Divine Grace. Because they were both strongly pneumatological and made the Holy 
Spirit  the  mediator  of  Christ’s  presence,  it  gave  rise  to  an ecclesiology that,  today, 
would  be  recognised  as  based  in  koinwniva,  communion  or  love.  For  Möhler  in 
particular, the bishop is in essence the visible embodiment of the unity of love.67
The  principal  difficulty  with  both  of  these  theologies,  however,  is  the  very  close 
identification of the Church with the Divine, blurring the distinction between created 
and  creator.  The  consequence  is  that  attributes  applicable  only  to  God,  such  as 
infallibility  and  absolute  holiness,  can  become  transferred  to  the  Church  in  an 
unqualified manner.68 Any sober and honest history of the Church, even when viewed 
from within, clearly shows this is not the case: a good theology of the Church has to be 
true to both her ontology and her history. It is a theme to which Congar gives space in I  
Believe in the Holy Spirit.
Möhler’s  emphasis  on  the  duality  of  structure  and experience  as  a  way of  relating 
history  and  spirit,  time  and  eternity,  real  and  ideal,  is  the  basis  for  Congar’s  own 
ecclesiology.  We will  see  this  exact  replication,  where  structure  and  institution  are 
fundamental for temporal continuity with the historic Incarnation, but the Holy Spirit 
makes  the  experience the  ultimate  present  and  eternal  reality  in  which  believers 
participate. For Congar, Institution has replaced, or is the ongoing manifestation of, or is 
the historic link with, Revelation.
65 Bolshakoff, Unity, p231
66 Khomiakov, cited in Bolshakoff, Unity, p142
67 Möhler, Unity, p218
68 This was certainly true for Khomiakov (Bolshakoff, Unity, p146), less so for Möhler who believed 
more in the unfolding of truth in time. It is interesting to note that Bolshakoff believes Khomiakov 
developed his position polemically, partly in reaction to the Anglican Prayer Book’s claim that the 
General Councils of the Church have erred. Unity, p147
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Both Institution and Spirit are intrinsic to the (temporal) Church, since access to the 
Divine is only achieved through the historically ordained institution as mediator of the 
Revelation  of  the  Divine  in  the  Incarnation,  but  the  relationship  between  them  is 
sometimes ambiguous.  By making the Institution  bear the ontological  weight of the 
Revelation, there is a particular difficulty when dealing with the eschatological reality 
of the Church, in which,  Congar admits,  the historical  and institutional aspects fade 
from relevance; it begs the question of their ontological significance.
Bulgakov’s approach to the problem of the intersection of time and eternity, real and 
ideal, is fundamentally different. Rather than seeing the Institution as the train in which 
the historic revelation is made present, he builds on Solovyov’s notion of Sophia. In this 
case  the  cosmos,  itself,  is  the  Divine  Idea  thrown into  temporality,  which  thereby 
becomes a created Idea: Divine and creaturely Sophia. The two are still bound together, 
particularly in  the Incarnation,  which  is  an act  of  both the  Son and the  Spirit.  But 
instead of history being the corridor of temporal reality that links the present to the past, 
Bulgakov finds it in the existence of the cosmos, or more precisely in that which directs 
the cosmos, and from which it emanates – creaturely Sophia. History is still important, 
but its importance derives from its manifestation of the underlying teleologic character 
of creation. Thus for Bulgakov, the Spirit draws us into the Divine, not through history, 
but  through  materiality,  whose  nature  has  been  essentially  transformed  by  the 
Incarnation.
One of the powerful advantages of the description of the Church as the Bride of Christ  
is that it establishes a continuing hypostatic metaphor of the relation between God and 
humanity from the opening creation narratives of Genesis to the closing sentences of 
Revelation. That is, it unites both ontology and narrative in a single metaphor in a way 
that  few other  descriptors  can.  It  opens up an ontological  and theological  vista  that 
encompasses  the  whole  of  the  Church’s  existence,  temporally,  cosmically  and 
ontologically,  identifying her with God, while  maintaining the necessary ontological 
distance between creator and created.
The covenantal relation of Israel with Yahweh in the OT, and the very notion of ‘love’ 
in  the  first  commandment,  is  interpreted  as  a  bridal  metaphor  by  many  of  the  OT 
prophets,  with  the  Promised  Land  as  the  dowry  gift  to  the  bride,  prefiguring  the 
redemption of creation.69 In the NT many of Jesus’ sayings, parables and actions take on 
a new and revealing light, including the two great sacraments of baptism and eucharist, 
69 eg. Jer 2:1,7
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when seen in the context of first century wedding and bridal customs, and many other 
metaphors receive a more dynamic interpretation,  especially those of the vine, body, 
temple and city. There is compelling evidence to suggest that this was the underlying 
metaphor behind much of the early church’s understanding of her relation with God and 
the development  of her christology,  in particular  both the union of the Church with 
Christ and her otherness in relation to him.70
But if the Church is truly, that is, metaphorically, Christ’s bride, called to participate in 
the communion of the Godhead, in what sense can she be said to be a person? And if a 
‘person’ over against  Christ,  does this threaten either the centrality of Christ,  or our 
existence as ‘persons’ within her?
 1.5 Theologians and Their Historic Background
Several major works cover the context and background of the lives and writings of both 
Congar and Bulgakov.71 A skeletal overview is presented here.
Yves Congar (1904-1995) and Sergei Bulgakov (1871-1944) were two of the pioneering 
ecumenists of the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches, respectively, of the 
Twentieth  Century,  each  in  their  own  unique  way.  The  theology  of  both  has  its 
intellectual  roots  in  the  romantic  German  Idealism of  the  late  Eighteenth  and early 
Nineteenth Centuries, especially that of Friedrich Schelling (1775-1854).
For Congar this influence came primarily through his work on  the early Nineteenth-
century German  Catholic  and romantic  idealist,  Johann Möhler  (1796-1838).  Himes 
claims Möhler ‘is the most important Catholic figure in the formation of ecclesiology as 
a field of systematic theology.’72 As a young man in his mid-twenties, already with a 
strong  sense  of  ecumenical  mission,  Congar  was  encouraged  to  study  Möhler’s 
70 There is extensive literature on this subject,  which cannot be explored here.  For the numerous 
biblical  themes  indicating  the  pervasiveness  of  the  metaphor  see,  for  example,  entries  under 
‘adultery’, ‘apostasy’, ‘banquet’, ‘bed’, ‘betray’, ‘body’, ‘bride, bridegroom’, ‘church’, ‘covenant’, 
‘daughter’, ‘feast’, ‘food’, ‘forsake’, ‘garden’, ‘garments’, ‘head’, ‘husband’, ‘idolatry’, ‘marriage’, 
‘promised land’, ‘prostitution’, ‘sex’, ‘vine’, ‘virgin’, ‘wedding’, ‘wife’, ‘woman’ in the Dictionary 
of  Biblical  Imagery (1998).  Other  important  and  relevant  images,  such  as  ‘love’,  ‘jealousy’, 
‘unfaithfulness’, ‘building’, ‘temple’ are either not listed in the Dictionary or have not considered 
the bridal dimension to these aspects . For Jewish marriage customs see Burrows M, The Basis of  
Israelite Marriage, 1938; Epstein LM, The Jewish Marriage Contract, 1927; Lewittes M, Jewish 
Marriage, 1994; Peterson G,  The Everlasting Tradition, 1995; Satlow, ML,  Jewish Marriage in  
Antiquity, 2001; Showers, RE, ‘Behold, The Bridegroom Comes’, 1990; Wight FH, Manners And 
Customs of Bible Lands, 1953.
71 On Congar see e.g. Nichols,  Yves Congar, 1989; Flynn (ed),  Yves Congar, 2005; Famerée,  Yves 
Congar, 2008. On Bulgakov (in English) see e.g. Evtuhov, The Cross & the Sickle, 1997; Nichols, 
Wisdom from Above, 2005; Williams, Sergii Bulgakov, 1999.
72 Himes, Ongoing Incarnation, p2
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ecclesiology. Undoubtedly he had a profound effect on Congar,73 although the latter was 
not uncritical of Möhler’s later heavy christocentricity.74 Nevertheless Möhler’s early 
vision  of  the  Church  continued  to  shape  Congar’s  understanding  of  her  nature 
throughout the rest of his life.75 His theology of the church is widely recognised to have 
undertaken significant development over the course of his life. His early ecclesiology, 
prior to Vatican II, is characterised by a heavy christocentricity, itself, and subordinate 
pneumatology that gave rise to a certain priority of Institution over communion. After 
Vatican II, the person and work of the Holy Spirit became increasingly important in his 
ecclesiology, tending to a much more integrated understanding.76
Bulgakov’s idealism was distilled from many sources, not least Khomiakov’s sobornost 
ecclesiology77 (credited as the first modern Russian theologian),  Vladimir Solovyov's 
(1853-1900)  cosmic  sophiology,78 and  Fyodor  Dostoevsky’s  (1821-81)  personal 
freedom,79 as  well  as  directly  from Schelling.80 He  was  one  of  the  most  important 
Russian theologians of the 20th century.81 After becoming disillusioned with Marxism he 
rediscovered his childhood faith, was ordained, and brought his immense intellect  to 
bear on exploring and explaining the positive content of the theology of the Orthodox 
Church  to  the  West.  His  great  theme  is  the  exploration  of  Creation’s  relation  and 
response to its Creator, much of which he expresses in terms of ‘sophia.’82 In 1930s this 
led to him becoming the focus of a fierce dispute concerning the role of ‘sophia’ in his 
theology, which in some circles still continues today.83
Congar was a key figure in the Ressourcement movement within Roman Catholicism.84 
The Twentieth Century was one of great turmoil, socially, politically, and intellectually, 
which both lead to the two world wars, and was driven by them. The Church was not 
immune in either  the East or the West.  The movement grew out of an impassioned 
73 See O’Meara, ‘Beyond “Hierarchology”’; Flynn, Vision of the World, p91
74 Congar, I Believe I, p154
75 Eg. O’Meara, ‘Revelation and History’
76 E.g. Groppe, Yves Congar’s Theology of the Holy Spirit, 2004
77 Eg. Nichols, Light, pp122-123
78 Eg. Valliere, Modern Russian Theology, pp237-240
79 Eg. Pain J, ‘Introduction’ in Bulgakov S, A Bulgakov Anthology, ppix-xiii
80 Eg. Williams, Bulgakov, p176
81 See, for example Nichols, Wisdom From Above.
82 So, for  example,  Thomas Hopko on Bulgakov states  ‘He was certainly convinced  that  a  main 
reason for the disasters he witnessed was truly heretical Christian teaching which split the Creator  
from His good creation, and surrendered the world – which God so loved that He sent his Son for 
its  salvation – into the hands of  the godless.’  http://www.monachos.net/forum/showthread.php?
8463-Sergius-Bulgakov (15 July 2011)
83 See, for example, Holy Trinity Orthodox School, NY, 
http://www.holytrinitymission.org/books/english/orthodox_church_s_bulgakov.htm (15 July 2011)
84 For an introduction to the life and work of Congar see, for example, A Nichols Yves Congar, and 
Famerée and Routhier Yves Congar
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desire to respond to the intellectual, ethical and social issues thrown up in the milieu of 
Modernism,  particularly  in  the  wake  of  the  Second  World  War,  although  its  roots 
belong in the Nineteenth Century.85 It moved away from what it saw as the aridity of the 
neoscholastic tradition to return to the sources of faith: scripture and the early church 
fathers, seeing this as the heart of Tradition rather than a shrill repetition of dogmatic 
statements.  It  was  a  Modernist  movement,  itself,  in  that  it  advocated  historical 
investigation over scholasticism, and thereby initially drew the ire of the establishment, 
which  perceived  it  as  a  threat  to  dogmatic  truth.  It  encompassed  liturgical  reform, 
ecumenism, a renewal of ecclesiology, Tradition, mission and ministry, and affirmation 
of  the  laity,  all  of  which,  despite  the  original  antagonism  of  the  establishment, 
ultimately found expression and validation in the Second Vatican Council.
These were the themes driving the Ressourcement theologians, not least Yves Congar.86 
But their endorsement was not won without great personal cost. Several of the leading 
theologians of the movement, including Congar, found themselves at the centre of bitter 
controversy, lost their academic posts, had their publications withdrawn from libraries 
and were banned from teaching. Congar, himself,  although now acknowledged as  ‘a 
pioneer of church unity and a champion of the laity’,  and that  ‘careful study of his 
contribution  to  church  reform  shows  him  to  be  an  architect  of  the  contemporary 
church,’87 found himself exiled and stripped of his teaching responsibilities. However, 
he  always  saw himself  as  a  servant  of  the Truth  and the Church,  with a  deep and 
unquenchable, although often tried, love of both.
If central Europe continued in a state of upheaval, Russia had been no less so in the 
earlier part of the century. Russia saw herself as the last bastion of the free Orthodox 
Church after most of the remaining Orthodox countries had fallen under Ottoman, and 
hence Muslim, rule. On the other hand she had an ambiguous relationship with central 
Europe. As Louth explains, she remained separate from, and critical of, the modernity 
sweeping across central Europe in the 18th and 19th Centuries, while at the same time 
wanting  to  engage  with  it.88 It  was  for  this  reason  that  Tsar  Peter  the  Great,  the 
archetypal ‘Westerniser’, uprooted the Russian capital from Moscow and defied nature 
by conquering the ‘hostile and inhospitable’ environment of the ‘swampy shores of the 
Baltic’ to build his surreal ‘artificial city’ in a ‘secular assertion of divine power’.89
85 See Flynn’s ‘Introduction’, Ressourcement, pp1-19
86 See Famerée and Routhier, Yves Congar, e.g. p7
87 Flynn, ‘Yves Congar and Catholic Church Reform’, p99
88 Louth, ‘French Ressourcement Theology and Orthodoxy’, in Ressourcement, p497
89 See Shragin’s ‘Introduction’ in Landmarks, esp. ppxii-xviii
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Part of the reaction against this abandonment of Russian tradition found expression in 
the Slavophile movement, which developed between 1820s-40s, of whom Khomiakov 
was a central figure.90 Nichols summarises the essence of this ecclesiology as sobornost, 
or communality,  found preserved in the pure culture of the Russian peasants, whose 
society, as communes, or obshchina, derive, it is held, from the untainted synthesis of 
biblical Judaeo-Christianity and the Byzantine church.91
The different streams of Russian thought inevitably clashed in the early 1900s, in the 
midst of which Sergei Bulgakov emerged as one of the most important Marxist thinkers. 
But Bulgakov embodied the different streams in himself:92 he was not only influenced 
deeply  by  the  German  Idealism  of  Schelling,  but  also  by  the  slavophilism  of 
Khomiakov,93 and the sophiology of Solovyov.94 The latter two, Macquarrie maintains, 
were both fundamental conceptions of the Orthodox church introduced by Bulgakov to 
Western theology.95
In his early thirties Congar met Bulgakov, then in his mid sixties, in Paris in 1936 for a 
series  of  conversations.96 However  those  conversations  proceeded,  there  is  little 
evidence of any substantial impact of Bulgakov’s sophiology, or the cosmic vision it 
encapsulates, on Congar’s theology until much later in his life, unlike Bouyer who was 
greatly influenced by it.97 Congar’s passion in his ecclesiology, which derives from a 
deep drinking of the Scriptures and the Early Church Fathers as well as Aquinas, is to 
affirm the importance of people, individual human beings, as the objects of God’s grace 
and love. This is the end for which the Church exists. His concern led him into a form 
of ecumenism that was at all times generous and understanding and aided towards the 
openness observed in Vatican II.
The other principal theologian included in this dialogue is Claude Lionel Chavasse, a 
relatively  little  known  Irish  Anglican  clergyman,  contemporary  with  Congar,  but 
publishing at the same time as Bulgakov. Chavasse was the eldest of four boys, born in 
1897 in County Cork, Ireland to Henry Chavasse and Judith Fleming.98 After serving as 
90 Bolshakoff, Unity, p37
91 Nichols, Light from the East, pp115-118
92 See Meerson, ‘Personality’ in Russian Religious Thought, p139
93 Khomiakov’s statement ‘The cosmos is the creation, the thought of God, and in itself it  is the  
complete and perfect harmony of beauty and bliss’ (cited in Bolshokoff,  Unity, p132) could have 
been written by Bulgakov.
94 See, for example, his comments cited by Kornblatt in Divine Sophia, p4
95 Macquarrie, Religious Thought, p205
96 Congar, Dialogue Between Christians, p17
97 Although he is still referring to Bulgakov in 1980, eg I Believe, Vol 3, p62
98 http://www.thepeerage.com/p36472.htm#i364717  , last viewed 27/02/2013
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a Lieutenant in the Royal  Field Artillery during the Great War he studied at  Exeter 
College Oxford, graduating in 1922. He went on to study at Sorbonne University Paris 
and St Stephen’s House Oxford, before graduating again from Exeter College in 1925. 
He was ordained priest in 1929, married in 1932, had two daughters, and was a friend of 
CS Lewis.99 He served in a number of incumbencies in both Ireland and England and 
published at least eight books on subjects including local history,  prayer, liturgy and 
biblical studies. His best-known publication is The Bride of Christ: An Enquiry into the  
Nuptial Element in Early Christianity (1940), which is referred to by Congar and is 
considered by many as the standard defence for the biblical case for a nuptial theology 
of the church. He died in 1983.
 1.6 Secondary Literature
In 2003 the Librarian of the Bibliothèque du Saulchoir could find no comprehensive or 
up-to-date bibliography for Congar beyond the late 1980s.100 Nichols confirmed nothing 
had been written on his ecclesiology of the Church as  ‘Sponsa Christi’.101 Since then, 
writing on Congar has proliferated, although still little has been written on his ecclesial 
ontology.  For example,  Flynn’s edited collection of papers on Congar,  entitled  Yves 
Congar: Theologian of the Church, appeared in 2005, but it contains nothing on his 
ontology  of  the  Church,  despite  its  title.  Similarly,  in  the  recently  published 
Ressourcement (edited by Flynn and Murray, 2012) the theme of ecclesial ontology is 
mostly absent, although there is an article by Saward on the ‘personality’ of the Church 
in the writing of Journet.102
In his relatively brief introduction to Congar Nichols makes the point that in his early 
ecclesiology, as exemplified in the collection of articles in  Mystery of the Church, he 
introduced a  distinction,  which  some found over-schematic,  between  ‘structure’  and 
‘life’.
If  the  first  [i.e.  ‘structure’]  is  bound up  with  the  founding activity  of  the  Son,  and  his 
continued activity in his signs and offices, the second [i.e.  ‘life’] depends more closely on 
the Spirit.103
The principal criticism is the distinction this introduces between clergy and laity, with 
the latter being poor reflections of the former. It is certainly a similar assessment to that 
99 Green and Hooper, Lewis, p132
100 Personal communication, 20 February 2003
101 Personal communication, 22 February 2003
102 Saward J, ‘L’Église a ravi son cœur’
103 Nichols, Yves Congar, p55
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found  in  this  thesis.  However,  our  investigation  explores  the  implications  of  this 
christocentricity on the ontology of the Church. The disastrous ontological distinction 
this introduces between clergy and laity, incidentally not present in the early Möhler, is 
not in view here. Rather it is the nature of the Church’s relation with Christ and the 
Trinity, and with time and creation.
In the first systematic account of Congar’s ecclesiology, MacDonald (1984) claims this 
distinction  between  structure  and  life  forms  a  constructive  dialectic  that  remains 
throughout his writings. Indeed it was fundamental to Congar’s project of church reform 
by  enabling  him,  through  ressourcement, to  balance  tradition  and  communion.104 
However, while this schematisation has been widely recognised, MacDonald has been 
criticised  for  imposing  it  too  rigidly  onto  Congar’s  theology,  not  least  by  Congar 
himself in his forward to the thesis.105
Kizhakkeparampil  (1995)  claims  that  these  two  aspects  derive  from  Congar’s 
trinitarianism,  whereby  the  structure  continues  the  mission  of  the  Son  and  the 
sacraments and life promulgate the mission of the Holy Spirit. The two are therefore 
inseparable. This, he says, is the heart of the ecclesiology of Vatican II.106
Flynn’s monograph on Congar’s ecclesiology, Yves Congar's Vision of the Church in a  
World of Unbelief (2004) recognises that Congar was not a systematician, and that his 
writings were occasional, yet proposes a unity to it. The theme of unbelief provides the 
foil  for  this  unity.  Particularly  in  terms  of  ‘the  relations  of  the  spiritual  with  the 
temporal’  in the Church, Congar was reluctant  to be pinned down, since it  was, by 
definition,  a  mystery.  Flynn,  however,  states  that  ‘the  mystery  of  the  Church  is 
understandable since a mystery is neither mythical nor incomprehensible.’107 He goes on 
to say that ‘the provision of an adequate definition of the Church is in fact fundamental 
for  Congar’s  theology’  and that  ‘it  concerns  the  essential  nature  of  the  Church;  its 
structure;  mission;  ministry;  relationship  to  the  world  and  to  other  Christian 
communities.’  Further,  he  considers  ‘new  evaluations’  are  necessary  ‘because  of 
profound shifts of perspective in these areas of Church life which are not unaffected by 
rapid changes in modern society.’108 
104 MacDonald, Ecclesiology
105 MacDonald, Ecclesiology, pxxii
106 Kizhakkeparampil, Invocation
107 Flynn, Vision, p87
108 Flynn,  Vision,  p88.  The fact  that  he considers  ‘other  Christian communities’  to  be outside the 
‘essential nature of the Church’ is telling.
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While the theme of unbelief might provide a unifying motivation for Congar, it has no 
ontological significance for ecclesiology. And why something should remain a mystery, 
if it is fully understood and comprehended, is a mystery in itself! It is apparent from 
Flynn’s somewhat transient and limited scope of  ‘the essential nature of the Church’ 
that his interest is not in the Church’s relation with God, which, arguably, is unchanging 
and defines her esse, but rather, as he clarifies, with a definition ‘on the anthropological 
plane.’
On  the  other  hand,  Groppe’s  impressive  study  (2004)  on  the  developing  role  of 
pneumatology  in  Congar’s  ecclesiology  does  touch  on  issues  of  ecclesial  ontology. 
Referring  to  his  1963  collection  of  papers,  Sainte  Église,  she  maintains  that  even 
Congar’s early understanding of the Mystical  Body is  not ontological,  but precisely 
mystical,  and the relationship between Christ  and his body should be understood in 
terms of  ‘espousement’.109 English translations, she says, misrepresent Congar, when, 
for example  ‘un seul l’Aimant’ is translated as  ‘a single being’, or  ‘une seule réalité’ 
(sic)  as  ‘a  single  entity’.110 Notwithstanding  the  language of  head and body,  ‘Jesus 
Christ and the church are analogously related’ and ‘the church is united to Jesus Christ 
only operationally (per operationem, in operatione)’.111
Like everyone else Groppe recognises the disruption in Congar’s ecclesiology between 
the  hierarchy  and  the  mystical  body.  Following  Famarée,  she  points  out  that  the 
operation  of  grace,  which  is  causal  for  the  Church,  is  exercised  by  the  apostolic 
hierarchy through the delegated authority of Christ,  thereby giving her the power of 
self-constitution.  ‘This  exercise of power stands in  pronounced disjunction from the 
indwelling  of  the  Spirit  in  the  human  person,  disjoined  from any  consideration  of 
pneumatological anthropology, for members of Christ’s body can never cause grace.’ 
Given that these powers operate through ordained men, and are external to them, ‘there 
is significant incongruity between the anthropology and the ecclesiology of the mystical 
body theology.’112
Groppe is right to point out this ‘incongruity’. Nevertheless, she misrepresents Congar’s 
ontology  of  the  Mystical  Body  in  denying  its  existence.  Considering  Möhler’s 
ecclesiology, he describes the Church as  ‘Mystical body of Christ and living spiritual 
organism.’113 And  the  language  of  ‘espousement’  she  uses  instead  requires  the 
109 Groppe, Yves Congar, p117
110 Groppe, Yves Congar, p117 , p120 footnotes
111 Groppe, Yves Congar, p120
112 Groppe, Yves Congar, p120
113 Congar, ‘Sur l’évolution’, p212, translated by Flynn in Vision, p92
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subjectivity  of  two parties.  This  is  echoed  in the  phrase  ‘un seul  l’Aimant dans  le 
Christ’, which, even if mistranslated as ‘a single being’, certainly implies ‘a single One 
who loves’. In fact Groppe appears to interpret  ‘espousement’ in terms of individual 
brides  for she immediately continues,  ‘this  language emphasizes  that  the life  of  the 
mystical body is a life of communion among free persons.’114 By reducing the language 
of head and body to the level of analogy she not only denies an important aspect of 
Congar’s own ecclesiology, but also robs the Church of one of her most important terms 
of self-identification: the Church is not like the Body of Christ, she is his Body (Bride).
Groppe’s assessment of the structure/life duality in Congar’s early ecclesiology is that 
the Church becomes a tertium quid, neither human nor divine: ‘the church thus appears 
as  an  autonomous  entity  –  it  is  not  Jesus  Christ,  nor  the  Holy  Spirit,  nor,  strictly 
speaking, the human persons who compose it.’115 She denies that this is a consequence, 
as claimed by Famarée,  of Congar’s christocentrism and incarnationalism.  Rather,  it 
results  ‘from the  incomplete  convergence  of  the  anthropological  and ecclesiological 
dimensions of Congar’s approach at this time.’116
This may well be true in terms of a lack of systematisation, but Famarée is nevertheless 
right theologically. Congar is quite explicit in saying that the apostolic hierarchy has its 
authority  and  power  directly  from  the  Father  through  the  incarnated  Son,  without 
reference to the Spirit, as we shall see.117 There is, therefore, despite Congar’s claims to 
the contrary cited by Groppe, an apneumatic  ontological  foundation to  the Body as 
identified by Famarée.
Beal’s is the most recent study of Congar’s ecclesiology (2011). She suggests that the 
pursuit of a ‘total ecclesiology’ is an appropriate interpretive lens for a comprehensive 
reading of Congar’s ecclesiology.118 This phrase refers to the peculiarly Roman Catholic 
problem of trying to find a way of including Christians in the definition of the Church. 
However, it does little to address the relation of the Church to God.
There is a paucity of literature published in English on Bulgakov’s theology, most of 
which is on his sophiology. The few ecclesiological studies focus on his ecumenism: 
there is almost nothing on his ecclesial ontology, even though it is now over ten years 
since The Bride of the Lamb was published in English translation (2002).
114 Groppe, Yves Congar, p117
115 Groppe, Yves Congar, p122
116 Groppe, Yves Congar, p122
117 Eg. Congar, Mystery, pp148-149
118 Beal, In Pursuit Of A "total Ecclesiology", 2011
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One of the earliest defences of Bulgakov’s sophiology in English is Barbara Newman’s 
sympathetic  but  critical  paper  in  1978,  in  which  she demonstrates  the  patristic  and 
biblical background to his ‘innovation’. Catherine Evtuhov’s  The Cross & The Sickle 
(1997)  is  the  definitive  biography  of  Bulgakov’s  life  up  to  1920,  shortly  after  his 
ordination  to  the  priesthood,  tracing  his  intellectual  development  through  these 
formative  years.  Rowan  Williams’  excellent  Sergii  Bulgakov:  Towards  a  Russian  
Political Theology (1999) includes the earliest translations of some key Bulgakov texts, 
with keen introductory commentary. The focus is on his earlier writings although there 
is a significant section on the first book of his great trilogy, The Lamb of God. This was 
followed in 2000 by Valliere’s examination of Modern Russian Theology, almost half of 
which  is  devoted  to  Bulgakov.  He  also  looks  at  Bulgakov’s  political  development 
before sympathetically exploring the ontological and ecclesiological implications of his 
sophiology,  particularly  its  relation  to  creation,  in  his  great  trilogy.  Several  of  his 
observations  are  echoed in this  study,  but he does not examine the ontology of the 
Church. Gallaher’s MDiv thesis (2003) explored Bulgakov’s integrity as man, priest, 
and theologian through his ecumenical ecclesiology. Nichols provides a useful overview 
of his life and particularly his thought in 2005, but, not surprisingly for a primer, there is 
nothing on his ontology. Complementary to this, in 2006, was Arjakovsky’s Essai sur le  
père  Serge  Boulgakov  exploring  Bulgakov’s  appeal  as  a  person  among  those  that 
encountered him. Also in 2005 a special edition of St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 
(49, 1-2) was published with an exclusive focus on Bulgakov. This included a fresh 
translation of his difficult paper ‘Hypostasis and Hypostaticity’, and a paper by Plekon 
on his ecumenism. In 2007 Nikolaev produced a thesis comparing the ecumenism of 
Bulgakov  and  Florovsky.  Seiling’s  thesis  (2008)  explores  the  place  of  Bulgakov’s 
sophiology as a development of Solovyov to address critically the inherent weakness of 
pantheism  in  German  Idealism.  Gallaher’s  second  thesis  (2010)  investigates  the 
‘problematic’ of freedom of God to create, and yet the need of love to go beyond itself 
in Bulgakov, Barth and Balthasar.
 1.7 Method – Systematic Theological Conversation
This study uses a comparative method to advance a discussion in systematic theology 
concerning the relationship of the Church to God, and specifically whether the Church 
needs to be considered as a person in that relationship, distinct from the persons of the 
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Godhead.  It  is  not  a  discussion  primarily  concerned  with  historical  context  and 
development either of particular theologians or of their theologies.
The texts for this study have been chosen because they theologically engage with the 
topic  of  interest,  namely  the  ontology  of  the  church.  They  are  not  the  only  texts 
published by these authors that  do so,  or even necessarily the most  comprehensive. 
Indeed, Congar’s writing is not systematic but occasional. Because of this any attempt 
to  develop  an  understanding  of  his  ‘total  ecclesiology’  must  consider  not  only  the 
extraordinary  expanse  and  multi-faceted  approaches  he  adopts  in  his  vast  array  of 
different articles and books, but also the significant development of his thought through 
time. Particularly in Congar’s case, this means the investigation in hand will not arrive 
at a definite ‘position’ that reflects his ecclesiology.
However, as Congar, himself, says, referring to Aquinas, theology is  ‘participation in 
eschatological knowledge’. It is therefore always partial, provisional, or in Gadamer’s 
words, ‘proleptic’ in character.119 John Behr says the same in his contribution to the US 
Lutheran/Orthodox Dialogue in 2003:
The full, perfect, identity of the Church, therefore, is not something located in the ecclesial  
bodies  and  structures  of  the  past,  to  be  recovered  by  archaeology,  but,  as  Florovsky 
intimates,  in  the  future,  in  the  eschaton,  where  Christ  will  be  all  in  all,  an  orientation 
maintained by remaining in faithful continuity with the ‘faith delivered once for all to the  
saints’ (Jude 3) regarding Christ, the coming Lord.120
This is a crucial point. Because ontology is future oriented, so is theology. This does not 
mean theology is ahistorical.  On the contrary,  it  only progresses by  ‘standing on the 
shoulders  of  giants’  that  have  gone  before.  But  theology  is  not  a  branch  of  social 
science. It seeks the truth that confronts it in the person of Christ, who is both the origin 
and  destination  of  the  Church,  to  answer  the  questions  of  today.  If  theological 
conversation can  only be conducted with a thorough knowledge of the socio-historic 
background to each author, and the circumstances in which they wrote each text,  no 
conversation could take place. Similarly,  if, before engaging with a text, it has to be 
located at a particular moment in a theologian’s pilgrimage, we would have to wait until 
the author was dead before responding.121 Even if we could achieve a perfect knowledge 
of this  background, how would it  advance our  theological task? In fact,  theological 
conversation has been taking place for millenia without this modern pre-condition.
119 Congar, Diversity and Communion, p169
120 Behr, ‘Trinitarian Being’, p80
121 Indeed, this was the late Professor Colin Gunton’s belief (Personal conversation, 1998)
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The proleptic nature of theology means,  however, that, while historical circumstance 
can to a certain degree inform us of the author’s original intent, their reason for writing, 
and some of the influences being exerted upon them, we are by no means constrained by 
that history in our engagement with a given theological text. This is particularly the case 
when the investigation is systematic, rather than historical, in character, and the subject 
ontological,  rather  than  phenomenal,  in  nature,  since  we  are  seeking  revealed 
‘eschatological  knowledge’.  It  is  therefore  always  a  legitimate  task  to  enquire  and 
engage with the  text before us in  an open theological  conversation of faith  seeking 
proleptic  understanding: theological  enquiry is an eschatological  task concerning the 
fulfilment of historical revelation.
The texts chosen for engagement have not, therefore, been selected as ‘representative’ 
of a particular stage or time in the authors’ thinking. Of course they do sit within a 
historical  context,  and  are  the  product  of  the  authors’  experience,  learning,  and 
theological journey so far. However, the primary interest in this study is not to form a 
view of a person, or to chart their development, or even circumscribe their theology. It 
is, rather, to engage in a systematic manner, and draw out the ontological implications,  
with what has been written. History and circumstance, where they are known, of course 
allow more  direct  access to the author’s original  intention.  However,  once a text is 
written down it acquires a life of its own, as it always has done throughout history, and 
its meaning is no longer under the control of its author. Macquarrie cites Gadamer:
Not occasionally only, but always, the meaning of a text goes beyond its author. That is why 
understanding is not merely reproductive but a creative act as well.122
 1.8 Thesis Outline
Congar’s principal metaphor for the Church is ‘the Body of Christ’, which he takes in 
an almost exclusively organic or somatic sense, even when referring to the Mystical 
Body. In the first section of Chapter 2 the ontology of the Church as Christ’s ‘body’, as 
expressed in his early theology in The Mystery of the Church, is questioned, particularly 
in its relation with God and consequent relation between hierarchy and people.
He  also  addressed  the  question  of  the  Bride  of  Christ  in  its  relation  to  the  Body 
metaphor,  as  developed  by  von  Balthasar,  but  was  much  more  nervous  about  this 
description.  The second section  of  Chapter  2  explores  this  nervousness  in  his  1970 
paper ‘La personne, Église’.
122 Gadamer HG, Truth and Method, p264, cited in Macquarrie, Religious Thought, p385.
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Congar later revised his pneumatology, giving it a much more prominent position in his 
ecclesiology in the 1979-80 trilogy, I Believe in the Holy Spirit. As part of this process 
he rehearsed his ontology of the church, but was inconsistent in doing so. The third 
section of Chapter 2 investigates this revision as he applies it to his christology and then 
ecclesial ontology.
Bulgakov entitled  the third volume of  his  systematic  theology,  on the  Church,  The 
Bride of The Lamb. However, his approach is tangential. He begins by exploring the 
concepts of creation, personhood (hypostasis) and freedom in relation to God. He then 
develops  his  incarnational  and  soteriological  theology  as  the  ground  for  his 
ecclesiology,  which  culminates  in  his  description  of  the  Church  as  Christ’s  bride. 
Because the notions of creation and personhood are so central to this thesis, Chapter 3 
follows Bulgakov’s programme of development.
Ultimately, the foundation for any ecclesiology must be grounded in Scripture. Chapter 
4 questions the easy modern dismissal of the bridal metaphor as underlying much of 
‘body’ metaphor usage in the NT. The is done through a critical engagement with the 
work of Claude Chavasse.
Chapter  5  draws the  study together  and presents  an  outline  for  the  possibility  of  a 
personal ontology of the Church in her relation with God.
Chapter 6 recapitulates the main findings and concludes the study.
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Chapter 2 Congar’s Ontology of the Church
 2.1 The Church as Body of Christ
 2.1.1 Introduction
Yves Congar published a collection of studies in the book The Mystery of the Church 
written over a period spanning 20 years between 1937 and 1956.123 His ecclesiology is 
widely recognised as being more christocentric before Vatican II, and more pneumatic 
after.124 Although these articles come from the prior period, they nevertheless represent 
a  comprehensive  apologetic  on  the  nature  of  the  Church  as  ‘the  Body  of  Christ’. 
Concerning the second study of the book, entitled ‘The Church and its Unity’, Congar 
states:
Our intention in reproducing this study is to present, mainly for Christians separated from us, 
a comprehensive view of the mystery of the Church, in which the different elements of the  
mystery are justly proportioned, those which are derivative or secondary being set forth in 
the light of the primary and principal ones from which they proceed.125
Here  we  explore  Congar’s  ontology  of  the  Church  as  the  Body of  Christ  in  these 
articles, particularly in its relation to God, and consider this ecclesiology as he uses it to 
draw out the reality it represents.
 2.1.2 The Body of Christ
If Congar was asked to describe the Church in a single sentence,  he may well have 
given this answer:
The glory of God is the Church, mankind united to Christ by faith and love, become his body 
by Baptism and the Eucharist,  a single body bound together in filial  obedience and self-
giving, living in holiness by his Spirit.126
This statement contains all the major strands of Congar’s understanding of the Church: 
the Mystical Body united to Christ, brought into being and sustained through faith and 
love; the sacraments which form the link between the Visible Church and the Mystical 
Body, establishing the latter; unity achieved through submission to a hierarchy acting on 
behalf of the Son; and the presence of the Holy Spirit giving life to the whole.
123 Congar, YMJ, The Mystery of the Church, 1960
124 Eg Nichols, Yves Congar, p61; Famerée and Routhier, Yves Congar, p149
125 Congar, Mystery, p.vii.
126 Congar, Mystery, p20
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His  description  of  the  Church revolves  almost  exclusively  around  the  term  ‘body’. 
Primarily this is seen as the Body of Christ, that is, as the single, organic body of which 
Christ is the head.
This Church is, in the first place, the Body of Christ; it forms, with him, a single entity, a  
single beneficiary of the good things of God.127
Deriving from the encyclical Mystici Corporis of June 1943, he defines the Church as a 
body made up by an alliance of two distinct and necessary components.
The first  of  these  is  the  external  and visible  structure  of  the  Church.  This  element 
comprises the continuity of the physical apostolic succession, and hence authority, of 
Christ’s apostles. It is analogous to the physical component of an organic body. This is 
‘the Church of law’.128
The second element is the presence of the Holy Spirit in the Church. Congar describes 
the Holy Spirit  (as does Traditional  Catholic  theology)  as the  ‘soul’  of the Church, 
acting as the life-giving principle of the body.129 This is ‘the Church of love’.130
Thus the Church is ‘constituted by a double mission’, one deriving from the historical 
Christ, the other from the experienced Holy Spirit.
The presence of the Holy Spirit, according to Congar, is inward and invisible, working 
in the souls of people. This inward and invisible working gives rise to a third element in  
the Church: the Mystical Body of Christ. We shall explore of these components in turn: 
the visible body, the Holy Spirit, and the mystical body.
 2.1.3 The Visible and External Body – the Apostolate
The  visible  and  external  body of  the  Church comprises  the  Church  as  hierarchical 
institution. It derives from Christ’s historical selection, appointment, and institution of 
the Twelve, and the delegation of his own authority to them, in order to continue his 
work as his agents after his physical departure. This delegation of authority and mission 
is  continued through the Apostolate.  It  forms  the temporal  link with  the Incarnated 
Christ of history. The Church as Institution is therefore necessarily hierarchical, which 
constitutes the ground of unity of the Church. The Spirit works with the Apostles, but 
has a separate and distinct, although closely related, mission.
127 Congar, Mystery, p68
128 Congar, Mystery, p185-186
129 Congar, Mystery, p34
130 Congar, Mystery, p185-186
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The Church is an institution prior to a community of believers for the reason that it only 
exists because Christ,  ‘in the time of his earthly life’, instituted it to bring salvation to 
humankind.
It comprises three fundamental elements, from which it derives its structure:131
1. the deposit of faith, passed on directly from Christ, himself;
2. the deposit of the sacraments of faith instituted by Christ, primarily those of baptism 
and Eucharist;
3. the apostolic powers, as delegated by Christ, that bring both faith and the sacraments 
of faith to the people.
These elements do not constitute the Church apart from the role of the Spirit – indeed 
the Spirit vivifies them within the Church. However, the Institution is not constituted by 
or founded upon the Spirit.
The importance  of the visible  institution  derives  from its  historical  connection  with 
Christ in his earthly ministry. That is, it forms the continuous link with the Revelation 
of the Divine in history.
The real meaning of the apostolate and the hierarchy is that they ensure, in the visible order  
in which we live and where the Body of Christ is to be realised, that all comes from the one  
single event of the Incarnation and Pasch of Christ.132
Thus  the  Institution  is  called  upon  to  bear  the  ontological  weight  of  the  Divine 
Revelation  through  time.  It  is  possible  because  Christ  invested  in  them  the  same 
authority the Father invests in Christ. This authority is the authority of God, himself, 
and is directly related to Christ’s Incarnation, and not to his baptism. It is an important  
distinction, because, despite the Incarnation being an event of the Holy Spirit, Congar 
sees it as an act of the Word as distinct from the Spirit.
The apostolate  is  closely linked with  Christ’s  life  for  us  in  the  flesh –  with  his  visible 
presence of those days, his powers and activities. It belongs to the sphere of the Incarnation,  
of the coming of the Son of Man, whose own mission it continues. Christ, in the discourse 
after  the  Last  Supper,  emphasises  this  important  aspect,  saying  that  he  now  sends  his 
apostles as the Father had sent him... In fact, from the Father to him and from him to them, it 
is one and the same mission that flows and, in consequence, also the powers belonging to the 
mission... – the same mission which is, in the same degree, a mission of love.133
131 Congar, Mystery, p154
132 Congar, Mystery, p159
133 Congar, Mystery, pp148-149
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Note there is no mention of the Spirit in the activity of Father – Son – Apostolate. It is  
this fundamental distinction of the Incarnation from the work of the Spirit that leads 
directly  to  his  distinction  between  the  historic,  visible  Church  and  the  invisible, 
Mystical Church. Congar’s christology can be seen at work here, for, although he is at 
pains to relate the work of the Spirit to the visible Church, and indeed sees the two as  
necessary for the life of the Church, yet, because Christ himself is not constituted by the 
Spirit, neither is the apostolate:
The mission  of  the  Holy  Spirit...is  not  a  consequence,  like  that  of  the  apostles,  of  the 
Incarnation, the coming of the word in the flesh, which it was to continue, but is bound up  
with  Christ’s  redemptive  acts,  with  his  passage  to  the  Father  and  particularly  with  his 
glorification in heaven…It is a distinct mission; he himself is another Paraclete, a Person 
distinct from Christ and one sent on a new mission which cannot be equated with that of the 
Incarnate word, though in close connection with it. (italics added)134
The distinction between Christ – apostolate – history, and Spirit – experience – mystery 
inevitably results in the dualism of visible/invisible Church.
So there are, at work in the Church, activities performed, as it were, vicariously for  that of 
Christ – the action of the Spirit, invisible and interior, and that of the apostolic body, visible 
and exterior.135
The christological emphasis in Congar’s theology of the Incarnation implies Christ’s 
being sent is independent of the Spirit. If the Spirit is not involved in the sending of the 
Son,  Christ’s  authority  as  one  sent  by  the  Father  is  also  passed  on to  the  apostles 
without reference to the Spirit.
The one sent represents the person of his master and has the same authority;  he is to be  
received in the same way as the master himself, from whom he has a power of attorney and 
whose function he exercises  in  his  absence.  This  is,  undoubtedly,  the whole  idea of the 
apostolate instituted by Christ.136
The purpose of authority is to wield power within the body. It is no surprise, therefore, 
to find this also passed on directly to the apostles. He states that ‘Christ was endowed 
by God with his power, in order to reconcile us and reunite us with him, in one body 
consisting of all the redeemed.’137 This power of reconciliation vested in Christ is, again, 
independent  of  the  Spirit.  Indeed,  although  he  has  ‘accomplished  in  himself  our 
redemption’ and sent his Spirit  ‘along with’ the apostles,  ‘he acts in the Church only 
through his apostles or jointly with them.’
134 Congar, Mystery, pp149-150
135 Congar, Mystery, p79
136 Congar, Mystery, p149
137 Congar, Mystery, p79
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First there took place the imparting to Christ of the fullness of the Godhead and of Christ’s 
fullness  to  the  Church  and,  corresponding  to  this,  there  is  another  process,  the  visible 
mission...: the Father sends the Son, the Son sends the apostles. So we must always bear in 
mind that Christ's promise to be ‘with you all days even to the consummation of the world’ 
(Mt. 28:20) is fulfilled in two ways: he is in the Church by his Spirit, his Pneum`a v, and he is 
present by his power. He is in his Church as animating it, by a spirit of holiness, to eternal  
life; he is there as acting in it through the agency of men invested with spiritual powers for  
the purpose of bringing his work to fulfilment. (italics added)138
The  Spirit  does  have  a  role  in  the  economy  in  animating  the  Church  and  in 
appropriating Christ’s reconciliation to the ‘souls of men’. Indeed, Congar goes to great 
length to stress that the presence of the Spirit is vital to the Church’s existence, as we 
will see in the next section.
Visible and external unity resides in the Institution by virtue of the historical continuity 
of the apostolate. If all comes from the single event of the Incarnation, and the incarnate 
Son  delegates  his  authority  to  his  apostles,  then  unity  resides  strictly  in  their 
continuation throughout the Church’s existence. It is essential, therefore, to demonstrate 
that this was, indeed, the case in the NT. Here Congar sees the apostolic college of the 
church in Jerusalem as the original seat of authority, and hence unity.139
The conception of the visible body connected to its head via history finds expression 
ultimately in the primacy of the Pope as the vicarious representative of the absent head, 
to whom authority and obedience are therefore due. The unity of this body derives not 
from communion, but obedience to the See of Peter.140
For Congar, the Church as the organic or somatic body of Christ must be visibly, that is  
objectively, connected to him in history. The temporal linearity of apostolic succession 
is precisely what connects the body to its head. If this succession is broken, the body 
becomes disconnected from its head since there is no longer a continuous channel of 
authority and power to mediate the Divine Revelation from the Father to the Son to the 
apostolate through history.
One important question this raises concerns the nature of temporality. Nothing comes 
from God that is not ontological, since he is life and love. By tracing the authority and 
power of the apostolate back through the Son to the Father Congar is endowing the 
Institution with an exclusive ontology of its own. Famerée identifies the same concern 
but relating to the self-propagating nature of the apostolate in its causal dispensation of 
138 Congar, Mystery, p79
139 Congar, Mystery, p83
140 Congar, Mystery, p84, p95
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grace.141 This  ontology  persists  through  time  in  the  form  of  apostolic  succession 
commencing from the Incarnation. Of all that the Incarnation encompasses, history, or 
rather strict chronology, is being made to bear the ontology upon which the existence of 
Christ’s  body  as  the  visible  body  in  the  created  realm is  dependent.  Chronology, 
historical  continuity,  is  the  fundamental  aspect  of  created  order  assumed  in  the 
Incarnation  that  effectively ensures the salvation of the rest  of creation.  The crucial 
point being affirmed is the temporal embeddedness of the Revelation accomplished in 
the Incarnation, and hence the affirmation of the goodness of creation.142
The question remains as to whether this backward-looking approach ultimately succeeds 
if that which is temporal is, in the future, found to be temporary. It is not the same as the 
‘re-membering’ of historical events through participation, in which time is transcended 
through the Spirit, such as Passover, baptism and the Eucharist, which are thereby not 
eclipsed  but  fulfilled  in  the  eschaton.  If  the  visible  Body,  dependent  as  it  is  on 
chronology,  ultimately  has  no  permanence,  where,  then,  is  the  affirmation  of 
createdness? By investing the material significance of the Incarnation, that is, the visible 
body’s ontology, in a Spirit-independent conception of history it risks jeopardising the 
salvation of the entire created order. 
The absence of the Spirit from this process creates further difficulties: it gives rise to 
two strains of ontology in the Church, one originating from the Son and residing in the 
apostolate, independently of the Spirit, and the other originating in the Spirit’s activity 
within the (already instituted) Church. These ontologies are reflected in the different 
modes  of  unity  in  each.  The  unity  of  the  visible  body derives  from authority  and 
obedience. That of the mystical body derives from the Spirit and charity.143
But why should there be one ontology for the visible, historical world, and another for 
the  invisible  spiritual  realm?  This  is,  perhaps,  the  greatest  difficulty  with  Congar’s 
ecclesiology. He claims that both reflect the theology in the economy yet there appear to 
be  two  economies  at  work,  one  of  which,  that  of  the  visible,  historical  world,  is 
temporary. Furthermore the ontological continuity from Father to Son to apostolate is, 
141 Famerée, L’Ecclésiologie, pp414-5
142 A point noted by Webster, ‘Purity and Plenitude’, p50
143 Williams recognises the presence of a duality here but sees them working in parallel. Indeed, she 
advocates seeing Congar’s dualities of  ‘laity and clergy,  hierarchy and communion, church and 
world’ as antinomies. However, she does not press any further to question the implied ontology of 
such a view. ‘Congar’s Theology of the Laity’, p144, p154
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as Webster implies, in danger of too close an identification between creator and created, 
between Christ and his Church.144
Underlying Congar’s ecclesiology of the visible body is a fundamental conception of 
the nature of the Trinity. The relationship of the Spirit to the Son, is reflected in the 
relationship of the apostolate to the Spirit. As the Spirit has no role in sending the Son, 
and is purely subservient to him, the implication is that the Spirit is not involved in this 
aspect of the Father’s relation with the Son. Apart from the Scriptural problems this 
raises, it becomes difficult to see the nature of the Spirit’s relation with the Father and 
the Son in the immanent Trinity: in what way is the economy reflecting the theology? 
The danger here, of course, being that if the Spirit’s role in the Trinity is only in relation 
to  the  economy,  then  the  Spirit  (and  therefore  the  nature  of  the  Trinity  itself)  is 
contingent upon creation.
A further aspect of this relation is the nature of the unity of God. Unity in the visible 
body derives from obedience to the authority of the Pope as head of the apostolate. That 
authority derives from Christ, who receives it from the Father. Unity in the Godhead 
therefore derives from the  authority of the Father, rather than the communion of the 
Trinity.
However, if the Son reveals the Father’s nature as one of love and koinwniva, giving up 
his Son for love of the world through the Holy Spirit, and as the Son lays down his life  
for the world out of love and in the power of the Spirit, then a very different view both 
of the Father’s wielding of authority, and the nature of Trinitarian unity emerges. Here 
the  koinwniva of  the  Trinity  reveals  the  unity  of  God  as  one  of  perichoresis  or 
circumincession.  In  this  case  the  Church’s  unity  would  not  be  defined  through 
obedience to a Vicarious Head, but in communion around the Pope as a living icon of 
the catholicity of the Bride. That is, as an icon of Mary.
 2.1.4 The Invisible and Interior Soul – the Holy Spirit
The institution of the Church resides in the office of the apostolate. It is the work of the 
Spirit  to  impart  the  spiritual  benefits  of  the  visible  sacraments  ministered  by  the 
hierarchy.
144 Webster, ‘Purity and Plenitude’, pp62-63
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The Spirit does not only join in with the ministry in its work, but intervenes to establish and 
consecrate it, or rather to bring about interiorly and in reality the consecration imparted in a 
visible manner by the ministers already instituted.145
2.1.4.1 The Spirit of Christ
The unity of the body deriving from obedience is an external and visible unity. However 
the Church has an interiority that is invisible. The Spirit of Christ is the single spirit that  
animates the Body of Christ and is the source of unity or singularity in the invisible 
body in Christ.146
Congar  sees Pentecost,  the sending of the Spirit,  as the culmination of the work of 
Christ, the conclusion of the Pasch.147 The Spirit is sent by Christ to indwell the Church, 
animating it and being its very life force. However, he is clear that the Church precedes 
the giving of the Spirit, although almost as an as-yet inanimate body. His description, 
with the language of building up and finally giving the breath of life, is reminiscent of 
the creation of Adam and Eve in Genesis 2, although this is not a connection he makes 
explicit.
The Lord had settled the elements which were to make up the Church in the course of his  
public life.  He instituted the apostolic office and made choice of the Twelve, giving the 
primacy to Peter.  He made known the mystery of God as proclaimed in the Gospel;  he 
instituted the sacraments. Thus, gradually, the structure of the Church was built up. Then, at  
the end of the Paschal fifty days, he gave it its living principle, the Holy Spirit.148
The Spirit brings to the Church, or rather is for the Church, both its soul and its law. By 
this, Congar means both the Church’s animation, or source of life, and its principle of 
life. He does not mean, with respect to the law of the Church, law in any juridical sense 
– that is the domain of the Apostolate.
What is the law? It is the order authoritatively decreed by the head of a community,  and  
giving it its form of life, its rule of collective living; and so it harmonises and adjusts the  
conduct of individuals to make of them a social unity. It is at once clear that when, as is the  
case with the Church, we are dealing with a community whose aim is salvation, whose life is  
of the spirit, the law is much more than something imposed by external force. As regards 
Christians, this law is chiefly the Holy Spirit in their hearts.149
Here we see the non-institutional role of the Spirit, whose activity is at the level of the 
individual, working in each one to bring about a single entity, a community of salvation. 
145 Congar, Mystery, p161
146 Congar, Mystery, p69
147 Congar, Mystery, p10
148 Congar, Mystery, p21
149 Congar, Mystery, p22
45
Thus, by ‘law’, he means law in terms of the pattern of life, of being, like the soul to the 
body.150
‘Law’, here, might be described in much the same way as the means by which the form 
and growth of a human body are determined by the genetic information stored within it. 
Although Congar does not use these exact terms, this is certainly the idea he has in 
mind.151
We might  press this  analogy further, and say that,  in much the same way that each 
individual cell contains the identical genetic information as every other cell within the 
body,  yet  those  same  genetic  data  inform each  cell  as  to  its  own particular  form, 
function, and place within the body. So it is with the Holy Spirit, who enters the heart of 
every individual within the Church, distributing gifts to enable each to perform his or 
her own unique function, and making the body one.152
The pattern of this genetic information, one might say, or DNA, derives from Christ 
himself. It is according to the pattern of Christ that each individual is growing, and it is 
into  Christ’s  Body  that  the  entity  called  the  mystical  Body  is  growing.  It  is  the 
interiority of the Spirit in each individual that, for Congar, is essential to the unity, or 
koinwniva of the Body.
First of all, he [the Holy Spirit] distributes to individuals and imparts to them interiorly the 
numerous gifts flowing from the riches of Christ, our Head. St. Paul, describing the work of 
the Holy Spirit in forming the mystical Body, enumerates the different and complementary 
gifts he distributes (1 Cor 12: 4-11).153
This ‘genetic blueprint’ might be seen as being the grace of Christ. In his exploration of 
the  ecclesiology  of  Thomas  Aquinas,  Congar  describes  Christ’s  grace,  and  our  in 
sharing in it, in explicitly Platonic terms.
[I]n the world of grace a kind of Platonism is valid for Christ contains in Himself the fullness  
of  the  species  grace,  in  a  way similar  to  that  in  which the archetype  of  Man,  in  Plato, 
contains the fullness of the human species. So that if other individuals are to receive grace 
too, they may only do so in dependence on Christ and, if these be men whose unique Saviour 
is  the  God-given Christ,  they may only receive it  from Christ  and in  virtue of  sharing,  
participating, in His own grace.154
He attributes this sharing in grace directly to the work of the Spirit, but this  ‘species 
grace’, as he refers to it, is not the same as the work of the Holy Spirit. Grace may be 
150 Congar, Mystery, p23, p32
151 Congar, Mystery, p23
152 Congar, Mystery, p23
153 Congar, Mystery, p23
154 Congar, Mystery, p104-105
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given or bestowed by the Spirit, but as a gift of Christ coming from outside, as it were, 
almost as an entity, or series of entities, with its own existence, ontology even.155
All graces come, as from their first and proper cause, from God, and from God the Holy 
Ghost by ‘appropriation’; our fashioning is in the likeness of God, of His Holy Trinity, the 
heart of which is our end and goal and the work of the same God in us; because a work of  
love, it is in a special sense said to be the work of the Holy Spirit and it likens us to Him.156
The distinction Congar makes between the fullness of grace in Christ and the fullness of 
the human species in Plato’s archetype of Man is illuminating in its difference: Christ is 
not presented as the archetypal Man, in whom dwells the fullness of humanity. Instead 
he contains the fullness of ‘the species grace’ as if it is an attribute or property naturally 
alien to humanity.157 This begs the question as to what, then, Congar means when he 
refers, above, to the imago Dei in the context of grace: what is ‘the likeness of God’ in 
which all  humanity is  fashioned,  and how does  it  relate  to  this  ‘grace’  that  is  only 
available in Christ?
2.1.4.2 The Indwelling Spirit and the Members
The  action  of  the  Spirit  is  to  bring  Christ’s  ‘grace’  to  individuals.  Christ,  in  his 
humanity, is the true cause or pattern of grace because it is only in him, as a person, that 
divinity and humanity are joined together. ‘Grace’ is a divine attribute made available to 
humanity only through the conjoining of the divine and human natures in Christ, the 
God-man, the communicatio idiomatum, but appropriated to us by the Holy Spirit. 158
The Spirit thus  ‘appropriates’ the grace of Christ to each individual, distributing gifts 
and causing the whole to be built up into a unitary body. Referring back to the genetics 
analogy one might say that the Spirit acts as the DNA molecule for each cell (person) in 
the body (church), while Christ is the  ‘genetic fingerprint’ carried by the DNA. This 
building up is of love.
This communion,  brought into being by charity,  which unites men in the very degree in 
which they are united to God, is, undoubtedly, what constitutes the Mystical Body. Charity 
makes Christ live in us and unites us, one to the other, all together, in God.159
155 Congar’s anthropology of grace here is completely at odds with that of Bulgakov, explored later. 
The alien nature of ‘the species grace’ to human nature, as something that comes to it from outside, 
stands  in  direct  contrast  to  Bulgakov’s  understanding  of  ‘god-manhood’ in  which  humanity, 
reflecting the image of God, is therefore the proper recipient of grace. He explores the ‘ontology of  
grace’ in an extended passage in The Bride (pp294-314).
156 Congar, Mystery, p108
157 Congar, Mystery, p105
158 Congar, Mystery, p108-109
159 Congar, Mystery, p128
47
Like history,  materiality,  or physicality,  is implicitly excluded from the realm of the 
Spirit, for that is the realm of the apostolate. The Spirit’s work, for Congar, is entirely 
spiritual in the interior sense. Indeed, he describes the Kingdom of God in such spiritual  
language that there appears to be an almost  Platonic dualism behind his thinking in 
which the material world does not participate, is extraneous.
We speak of the Holy Spirit in particular as dwelling in us, of man as the temple of the Holy  
Spirit (cf. 1 Cor 3:16; 6:1); in fact, he is so deeply present in the depths of the soul as the  
indwelling God that, in a manner, he works within us our most personal and inward acts, he 
prays  in  us  (Rom 7:26).  The  really  fervent  soul  desires  that  God  himself  should  make 
himself its prayer, joy, peace, and love to such a degree that it should no longer be the soul 
that acts, but God. This presence of God and his all-embracing action is promised to us at the 
very end, in the Kingdom of God which will be wholly interior and where God will be ‘all in 
all’(1 Cor 15:28); that will be the work of the Holy Spirit finally perfected.160
Furthermore, this interiorisation belies a deep-rooted individualism in Congar, despite 
his insistence on both the institutional Church and the mystical Church as the body of 
Christ. Indeed it is, perhaps,  because of his heavy emphasis on the description of the 
Church as a body that the interiority of the Spirit in the individual tends to lead to the 
submergence of the person into an impersonal entity.
This  ‘disappearance’ of the soul, in terms of personal action, can be detected in other 
places, for example where Congar describes the nature of loving.
If I love with the heart of God, my love proceeds from a source where there is no question of 
myself and another, but of the Father, of Christ, and of the members of his Body; it is an 
image of the love Christ himself bears for his Church. Strictly speaking, it is no longer a  
matter of another person, but of members of a single body.161
The  tendency  in  these  passages  is  a  subsuming  of  the  person  into  something  else, 
against which Congar’s spiritual individualism has no power to mitigate. It is the single 
‘body’  that  is  the  ultimate  ontos of  his  ecclesiology,  of  which  individuals  are  but 
members. Although he wants to convey the reality of communion, the difficulty lies 
precisely in the inability of the language of  ‘body’ to do so. Communion requires the 
participation of persons, but the description of the Church as ‘body’ fails in this regard, 
as evidenced by Congar’s own summary:  ‘strictly speaking, it is no longer a matter of 
another  person, but members of a single body.’  Here the  ‘person’ is  precisely what 
ceases to exist.
Thus,  despite  his  intention,  the  Holy  Spirit  is  in  danger  of  becoming  the  agent  of 
depersonalisation under the burden of the  ‘body’ metaphor.  The members of a body 
160 Congar, Mystery, p24
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serve functional roles, not personal ones: there is not the space is such a metaphor for 
inter-personal relations.
2.1.4.3 The Animating Spirit and the Body
The functional role of the Holy Spirit indwelling individuals is one aspect. The Spirit is 
also the Church’s soul: the gift of God’s own life to enable the body to live. 162 Here, 
Congar follows Augustine in identifying in the Spirit two discrete and complimentary 
functions – not only is the Spirit the indwelling one, but also animating the one. 163
He finds the same two-fold action of the Spirit  in the writings of Thomas Aquinas, 
where the Spirit  is the principle or matrix  of unity since it not only acts within the 
interior of each individual, but also indwells the Church.
The Church is  one living body,  not  only because a single soul  [the Holy Ghost]  dwells 
therein and makes a temple of it, but also because a single soul,  namely,  the theological  
virtues, which are divine life immanent in men, quickens its members inwardly.164
It is at this point that Congar senses danger in the analogy between human body and 
soul and the Church and the Holy Spirit  – continuing the analogy would lead to an 
identification of the Church with God, since soul and body comprise a single being. It is 
important to note that this is precisely the context, exploring the relationship between 
God and the Church, in which he introduces, almost for the first and last time, the idea 
of the Church as the  Bride of Christ, as a means of separating the Church both from 
Christ and the Spirit.
St Augustine’s comparison is, however, not to be pressed too far… Though the Holy Spirit is  
the soul animating and indwelling the Body of Christ, he does not make up, with this Body, a 
physical and substantial whole, as does our soul with our body. It is more a matter of a union 
between two realities, the Spirit and the Church, each having its own subsistence – a kind of  
marriage as if between two persons. In Scripture, the description of the Church as the Body 
of Christ is completed and, in a sense, corrected by its being also spoken of as the Bride of 
Christ. The two form one flesh, not by physical union – for then the Church would be strictly 
identical with Christ, impeccable even in its individual members and, like him, worthy of  
adoration – but a spiritual union. The Church is the mystical Body of Christ. The Holy Spirit 
is  its  intimate guest,  ever faithful,  really given to it,  close and enduring. He works in it  
without ceasing. It is not substantially united to him as Christ’s humanity, taken from Mary,  
is united to the Word of God. The coming of the Holy Ghost at Pentecost was not, strictly  
speaking, an Incarnation. The Church has the Spirit, but it is not itself the Spirit. Yet the  
Pentecost gift is so entire, so perfect and complete, the Church is so dependent on the Spirit  
for all that it is, that the Fathers looked on the two passages of the Creed, [credo] in Spiritum 
Sanctum and Sanctam Ecclesiam Catholicam, as forming in reality one single article.165
162 Congar, Mystery, p32
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164 Congar, Mystery, p101
165 Congar, Mystery, p35-36
49
In  distancing  the  Holy  Spirit  (and Christ)  from the  Church  he  acknowledges  ‘each 
having its own subsistence.’ Extraordinarily he describes the relation between the Holy 
Spirit and the Church as ‘a kind of marriage as if between two persons’. The subsistence 
of the Church, defined in its relation to Christ and the Spirit, is essentially personal.
‘The coming of the Holy Ghost at Pentecost was not, strictly speaking, an Incarnation.’ 
Elsewhere, Congar is even more emphatic that the institutional Church, however much 
indwelt  by  the  Spirit,  is  not  an  Incarnation,  or  even  a  continuation  of  Christ’s 
Incarnation. Again, it is in exploring the relation of the Church to the Spirit that the 
need to distance them arises and the personal nature of the Church is introduced. He 
refers to the her as ‘spouse’, a ‘collective person’, a ‘subject in its own right’, a ‘quasi-
person’, and as having ‘an intersubjective ontology.’ 166
It  should be apparent  from this  need to switch metaphor  that  the description  of the 
Church as the somatic body of Christ is incapable of making sense of her relation to the 
Trinity. In the quotation above, Congar acknowledges that, in this context, the  ‘body’ 
language must be understood in sponsal terms: ‘the mystical Body of Christ’ explicitly 
means the union of the Church with Christ as his bride, where ‘the two form one flesh, 
not by physical union...but a spiritual union.’ That is, when speaking of the relation of 
the  Spirit  to the  Church,  rather  than  the  function of  the  Spirit  in the  Church,  the 
metaphor has to change: in relating the Church to the Third Person he names her as the 
spouse of the Second.
The basis for this personal relation between the Church and the Holy Spirit is that of the 
inner Trinitarian relationships.
The foundation of the union between the Holy Spirit and the institutional Church is the union 
between the Holy Spirit  and Christ.  This union, deriving from the mystery of the divine 
being, of the eternal relations in God, of the consubstantiality and circumincession of the 
divine Persons, was proclaimed, as regards Christ, at his baptism and, as regards the Church 
and the apostolate, at Pentecost, their baptism by the Holy Spirit.167
It is worth spending a moment considering the theological implications of the body and 
bride metaphors  here,  as Congar resorts  naturally  to  the somatic  body relation.  The 
perichoretic understanding of the inner Trinitarian relations initially appears to stand at 
odds with his interpretation of the Father’s relationship with the Son in his institutional 
ecclesiology, in which the Spirit plays no role. However, it is important to note that he 
identifies the ‘eternal relations in God’ between the Spirit and the Son as proclaimed at 
166 Congar, Mystery, p170-171
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Christ’s baptism, not the Incarnation. At his baptism the Spirit descends on the already 
incarnated  Son,  just  as  at  Pentecost  the  Spirit  descends  on  the  already-instituted 
apostolate  –  ‘the  institutional  Church’.  For  Congar,  ‘apostolate’  and  ‘institutional 
Church’ are the language of the somatic body extending from Christ as its head, even 
though the Acts  2 account  implies  the  presence  of others,  including women,  in  the 
house at Pentecost. This apneumatic identity between Christ and his visible body, and 
thus  the  relation  of  the  already-instituted  apostolate  and  the  Spirit,  is,  he  says,  a 
reflection  of  the inner  Trinitarian  relations  between Christ  and the Holy Spirit.  The 
institutional Church is still prior to the Spirit, just as the Son is in the Trinity. Behind the 
scenes a subordinationist interpretation of the filioque is at work.
However, the nature of the union between the Church (apostolate) and the Spirit is still  
not  clear.  Congar  talks  of  the  Spirit  as  being  the  communication  of  life  within  the 
Trinity, which constitutes the Trinity:
[H]is role in regard to us is explained by his own nature, the ‘economy’ by the ‘theology’. 
The Holy Spirit as he is, in God, the final term of the communication of life from the Father 
– which communication constitutes the Trinity – is also God’s innermost communication to  
man.168
Concerning the Church as Christ’s somatic body this makes little sense. If the Church is 
not a continuation of his Incarnation, but nevertheless the body of which he is the head, 
what is relationship of that body to the Spirit, and why should it be defined by the inner 
Trinitarian  relations? These  relations  are  between  persons,  however  that  term  is 
construed. But if the Church is a body, it is not a person. Christ is the personal head 
with whom the Holy Spirit interrelates. The Church’s relation with the Holy Spirit must 
therefore be  mediated through Christ if it is to be a reflection in the economy of the 
theology.  Yet Christ  sends the Holy Spirit  upon his Church. Indeed the Holy Spirit 
mediates Christ to the Church, not vice versa. Neither can the relation of the Holy Spirit 
to the Church be purely somatic-functional (i.e. one that only vivifies and engifts) if he 
is to be understood in some sense as a Person, albeit  one who always detracts from 
himself to reveal the other (Christ, and through him, the Father).
So  Congar’s  theology  here  is  quite  different  from the  institutional  theology  of  the 
apostolate.  If  the  Spirit  is  the  one  who  communicates  life  from  the  Father,  thus 
constituting the Trinity, then the Son is the one who receives the Father’s life through 
the Spirit. This is the reason that the Spirit’s role in the economy is to communicate 
God’s life to us, since in the economy the Church, as the body of Christ, is equivalent to 
168 Congar, Mystery, p24
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the Son in the inner-Trinitarian relations.  However,  if  the Son is  constituted  by the 
Father’s  life  communicated  through the  Spirit,  then  what  is  the  Spirit’s  role  in  the 
Incarnation, if not the same? Yet despite his own ‘theology’, Congar does not give the 
Spirit a constitutional role with respect to the Son in the ‘economy’. There appears to be 
an incoherence between his theology of the perichoretic relations in the Trinity and his 
economy of the Incarnation, and hence his ecclesiology.
The reason for this appears to be an inconsistency in his (Orthodox) interpretation of the 
inner relations of the Trinity and the filioque. Despite his assertions, his ecclesiology is 
dependent on a hierarchical christology and Trinity, in which the Spirit proceeds from 
the Son as well as the Father, and hence is subordinate to both. It is precisely for this 
reason that  the  Spirit’s  role  with  respect  to  the  institutional  Church (deriving  from 
Christ’s Incarnation) is non-constitutional and only works in the Church through the 
hierarchy.
The institutional Church, the Church in its outward structure, is wholly dependent on, and 
continuous  with,  the  Incarnate  Word  and  the  messianic  energies  in  which  the  apostolic 
powers share. The Holy Spirit, the Spirit of the Son, sent by him and proceeding from him, 
gives force and efficacy to these powers both when exercised in proclaiming the faith and in  
celebrating the sacraments of faith. (emphasis added)169
Nevertheless, the Spirit of Christ, as the soul of the body, is also the mode in which 
Christ, himself, is present to the Church.
Our Lord…founded it [the Church] by giving its very being and life, promising it his Spirit  
to animate and assist it. He announced that, in virtue of living within it, we would have in it  
truth and life,  because he would live in it himself,  who is the way and the truth, by his  
Spirit.170
The Spirit is the source of all the actions of the Church, and the source of its unity. The 
purpose of the Spirit is to do the work of Christ, and hence his gifts must come under 
the rule of the hierarchy, the latter being Christ’s vicarious presence.
Just as the Holy Spirit has no radical autonomy, but is sent to do the work of Christ, to bring 
to mind what he said, the gifts imparted by the Spirit have no other end than to build up the 
body of Christ. Consequently, they have to be assimilated to the rule of apostolicity, which is 
that  of  continuity with the work done by the incarnate Word,  under the double form of 
apostolicity of doctrine and apostolicity of ministry.171
So the Holy Spirit is both God giving himself to dwell within the Church as its soul, and 
also the animating of the Church through the interior life of each individual, in order to 
build the whole into one body, the Body of Christ. The Spirit has no ‘radical autonomy’, 
169 Congar, Mystery, p182
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and ultimately all its works must be subject to the rule of the apostolate, or hierarchy,  
since the Spirit proceeds from Christ and the hierarchy is Christ’s vicarious presence in 
his somatic body.
 2.1.5 The Mystical Body
The Mystical  Body exists in the spiritual (invisible) dimension and is that which is, 
ultimately, the real Body of Christ. This is the Body that the institutional body exists to 
build up. Congar’s concern is to arouse and enable faith and love of God, and to see this 
love expressed as the corporate response of humanity to God’s love for us.
All this, organisation, laws and customs, rites and sacraments, works and joint efforts of  
every kind, has but one end, to further, beyond all human possibility or likelihood, a life of 
faith and love hidden in God with Christ. All this ceremonial observance, the whole build-
up, exists for no other cause than to arouse in the world faith and love for Christ and God. 
The claims made by the Church…all [have] one aim, to unite souls to God by making them, 
through faith, the sacraments of faith, and love, living members of the mystical  Body of 
Christ.172
So what, then, is the Mystical Body? What does it comprise and what is its goal? It is 
the work of Christ appropriated to individuals by the Holy Spirit, both invisibly in their 
hearts, and visibly through the sacraments. It is the return of the first Adam, through re-
creation, to the image of God in Christ, although if we listen attentively we will not hear 
anything  about  the  redemption  of  the  created  material  order,  itself,  other  than  as  a 
temporary means (in the sacraments) of ministering the Holy Spirit’s presence.
The purpose on which he [Christ] is henceforth engaged is to recapitulate in himself,  for the 
glory of the Father, all the world he has gained over, the populus acquisitionis (1 Peter 2:9), 
to take up into himself all that pertains to the first Adam, so that, made to the image of God  
and re-created to that of Christ, it may return to the model after which it was fashioned.  
Now,  this  work  of  recreation  is  performed  by  Christ  through  his  Spirit  in  an  invisible 
manner, but he does it also by visible means, by the sacraments, as we have seen, and by the 
ministry of men.173
‘All the world’ that Christ has gained is identified with ‘the populus acquisitionis,’ and 
the purpose of the work of Christ is a  ‘return’ to the first model. There is little of the 
Orthodox vision of growth in wisdom, maturity,  and divinisation.  Furthermore,  it  is 
‘invisible’  because it is a work of the Spirit. Here lies one of the great weaknesses of 
Congar’s pneumatology – the realm of the Spirit is invisible. Recreation is visible only 
in the sacraments  ‘and the ministry of men’. He seems to be unable or unwilling to 
accommodate  the  free  work  of  the  Spirit  outside  the  Institution  and  in  the 
transfiguration of the material world.
172 Congar, Mystery, p95
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However,  this  is  not  to  say that  the  Mystical  Body is  something  different from the 
visible Church, rather, it is the visible Church itself, he insists.174
The mystical Body, however, being the ontological reality of the visible Church, gives 
the  latter  its  ground  of  being,  and  it  is  from  this  that  the  sacraments  derive  their 
reality.175 Indeed, ‘the Church is, of its essence, sacramental.’176
While the Mystical Body gives the Visible Church its ontological reality,  the Visible 
Church  exists  to  build  the  Mystical  Body.  So  there  exists  a  kind  of  mutual  co-
dependence of the one upon the other.
The principal aim of the Church is to nourish and maintain the Christian life. This is 
‘union with Christ, which is the interior life of the individual soul.’ However, it is lived 
and  acquired  socially  in  the  Church –  it  is  a  spiritual  life  ‘of  a  social  and strictly 
ecclesiastical nature.’177
This ‘life in Christ’ is an ‘ecclesiastical communion’ that has ‘three chief elements’ that 
are ‘served and directed’ by the hierarchy:178
1. Faith – which is expressed and nourished in dogma and liturgy
2. Sacraments of faith – especially baptism and the Eucharist
3. Love – which is strengthened and sustained by submission to law.
A corresponding threefold power is invested in the hierarchy, namely: the magisterium 
(faith), the priesthood (sacraments), and pastoral governance (love).
The first  two of  these  elements  are  the  activation  of  the  first  two components  that 
constitute the institutional church, which acts as their repository.179 To these Congar has 
added  a  third  –  ‘love’  –  which,  interestingly,  has  no  apparent  counterpart  in  his 
institutional composition of the Church.
The Mystical Body is established through faith (plus sacraments) and love. Congar uses 
these two components to express the constitution of this body, explaining the statement 
of Ignatius:
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Faith, which is the flesh of the Lord, and love, which is the blood of Jesus Christ.180
If the flesh and blood of the Lord are seen to refer to the Mystical Body, the ontological  
Body, then this statement begins to make sense, since it is by faith that the Mystical 
Body is established.
Now it is by faith that we open up and deliver our lives to Christ and that his life begins to  
develop in us… The Mystical Body is, from beginning to end, a re-creation of humanity in  
Christ, a re-creation of humanity to the image of God.181
This results in more than a life led in accordance with Christ’s, more than the realisation 
of a life led on his account. For Congar, it is  ‘the continuation of his life in ours, and 
therein lies the whole mystery of his Mystical Body.’182
Faith is the entry into this body and Christ’s entry into us: it is ‘God’s outlook engrafted 
onto us’. Charity, then, is how Christ lives in us: ‘through charity, his heart beats within 
us.’183 From here it can be seen how charity is  ‘the blood of the Lord’, according to 
Ignatius.
Nevertheless, despite his insistence that the visible and mystical bodies are one and the 
same, in fact they remain different:
[T]hose who are truly the friends of Our Lord are the most living members of his Mystical  
Body. For the same reason, the Mystical Body does not consist in exterior manifestations or 
ceremonies, however valuable or striking they may be. But it is when a small child, a humble  
lay-sister, a working mother whose life is taken up with ordinary daily chores, when people 
like this,  unnoticed by the world, love God with all  their heart and live a life of ardent  
charity, then the Mystical Body is realised and increased in stature.184
Congar’s pastoral passion for people is apparent here. In view is the sanctification of the 
Holy Spirit  in the lives and actions of ordinary people,  a recognition that the Spirit 
transcends the boundaries of the visible and institutional Body – the Mystical Body is 
actually  something  different  from the  visible  Body.  It  ‘does  not  consist  in  exterior 
manifestations or ceremonies, however valuable or striking they may be’ – the Visible 
Body does  require  such manifestations,  since  these  are  the  continuation  of  Christ’s 
earthly  ministry,  instituted  by him;  the  Mystical  Body is  ‘realised  and increased  in 
stature’  by  acts  of  love  and  charity,  ‘unnoticed  by  the  world.’  Unfortunately  this 
compounds the dualism he is trying to overcome.
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Thus the Mystical Body has a substance other than that of the visible Body, and, being 
derived  from the  work  and presence  of  the  Spirit,  ‘God himself’,  has  an  ontology 
derived from the Spirit’s presence which the visible Body does not. This is reflected in 
Congar’s eschatology, to which we will turn in the next section.
Nevertheless, the fact that the indwelling of Christ, the transformation of souls, is all 
achieved by the singular Holy Spirit causes it to be a single Mystical Body.
If  we form a single body and,  as it  were, a single being who loves in Christ,  that is so 
ultimately, because we are all interiorly animated by one and the same soul; and, at a deeper  
level still, because the same charity, animating the whole body, is spread abroad in it and  
upheld by a single living Being who is the Spirit of Christ, the ultimate principle of the unity 
of the Mystical Body – ‘one body and one Spirit’ (Eph. 4:4).185
Once again Congar comes close to making the Church a subject,  ‘a single being who 
loves in Christ.’186 But what is the relation between this  ‘single body’ and the  ‘single 
being’? Are they the same description of the Church? That is, is the ‘single body’, with 
Christ as its head, the  ‘single being’, a corporate Christ? Or is the  ‘single being who 
loves in Christ’ in some sense other than Christ, himself?
This  unity is  different  to  the unity of the Visible  Church which,  as noted above,  is 
achieved through submission to the apostolic hierarchy. The unity of the Visible Church 
derives from physical continuity with Christ in his earthly ministry:  the unity of the 
Mystical Body derives from the Spirit’s indwelling the hearts of individuals and love. 
The two are related through the sacraments, and it is at this point that Mystical Church 
and the hierarchy are seen as co-dependent.
The  Mystical  Body  itself  is  not  a  reality  in  all  respects  spiritual,  invisible  and 
inapprehensible to sense. It is brought into being in intimate and organic connection with a  
visible Church, something institutional and social in character. The ‘sacrament’ is the point 
at which the two aspects meet and unite, the category wherein is expressed the necessary 
conjunction of the Mystical Body and the visible Church. The latter, throughout its whole 
being, is but the sacramentality of the unique mediation of Christ dead and risen.187
It is not just that the sacraments form the link between two entities – the Church Visible 
and the Mystical Body. Commenting on the ecclesiology of Thomas Aquinas, Congar 
identifies two aspect to the relationship.
(1) the Church-as-Institution is the very mode of being of the Mystical Body and of the new 
life in Christ; (2) she is the Sacrament of the ministry, that is, the instrument of realisation of  
the Mystical Body.188
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The visible Church is the physical form of the spiritual reality, which is the Mystical 
Body. In this sense, the visible Church is itself actually a sacrament.189
[T]he  Church-as-Institution  is  the  sacrament  of  the  Cross,  the  sacrament  of  the  unique 
mediatiorship of Christ Crucified. Again, she is the sacrament, the effective sign and giver of  
the gift of new life and of union of men in Christ their Saviour.190
Although  the  visible  Church  is  the  sacrament  of  the  Mystical  Body  of  Christ,  a 
sacrament  is  temporary and does not  exist  for itself  – it  is  a  means to  an end. For 
Congar,  the  visible  body ultimately  exists  only  for  the  purpose  of  building  up  the 
Mystical Body, which is wholly interior, within individual souls.191
At several points Congar gives to the Mystical Body a sort of quasi-personhood. This he 
does primarily, as noted earlier, when separating the Church from the Spirit, and refers 
to the Church as a  ‘her’, the Spouse of Christ.192 In referring to her in this way he is 
aware there is  an ontological  issue related to  the personhood of the Church,  for he 
continues  ‘this is not the place to try and work out what is the inmost reality of this 
body  or  quasi-person  which  is  the  Church.’  Indeed,  he  explicitly  states  that  the 
relationship between the Holy Spirit and the Church implies the existence of an inter-
subjective ontology.193 Some years later he returned to address the nature or  ‘inmost 
reality’ of this ‘quasi-person.’194
For Congar, the ‘aim’ of the Church is to unite souls with God, but the restriction of the 
Spirit  to the invisible  realm results  in its  absence from the visible.  He is  careful  to 
balance the interiority of the ‘Christian life’ with its social dimension, but this, with its 
‘three chief elements’ of faith, sacraments and love, remains ‘strictly ecclesiastical’ and 
under the auspices of the apneumatic hierarchy. Apart from the temporary sacraments 
uniting  the visible  to  the invisible,  there appears  to  be no role  for  the Spirit  in  the 
material. One is left wondering, what has happened to the physicality of the resurrection 
and its relation to the Holy Spirit, and the promise of the transformation of our bodies 
along with the rest of creation (Romans 8)?
A further difficulty arises directly from the somatic interpretation of the body metaphor 
whereby  the  individual  soul  becomes  subsumed  as  an  ordered  ‘member’  into  the 
overarching  ‘body  of  Christ’.  The  purely  functional  and  structured  nature  of  each 
189 Congar, Mystery, p111, p114
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member’s relation the other bears down with an almost tyrannical ordering in which 
each person is ultimately valued only for their place in the body. It is seen most clearly,  
although in a different context,  in Groppe’s criticism of the incongruity in Congar’s 
anthropology in which ‘the exercise of power stands in pronounced disjunction from the 
indwelling of the Spirit in the human person.’195 The ‘body’ metaphor is not competent 
to bear the ontological nature of personal relations that reflect the love of God. There is 
no space for freedom, no sense of personal release, of the fulfilment and the protection 
of each one’s personhood, for love, all of which are ontological aspects of the Church’s 
and  each  person’s  being.  There  is  no  necessary  place  for  the  subjectivity  of  each 
‘person’ as a reflection of the subjectivity of God. Nor is it clear how any such personal 
subject could relate to the impersonal  ‘Body of Christ’,  the supposed bearer of their 
identity in their relation with God.
 2.1.6 Eschatology and The Church
Eschatology, although present, is not a dominant aspect of Congar’s ecclesiology. His 
key theme is the consummation of all humanity into Christ. He understands this to be 
the meaning of  Christ’s  title  as Alpha and Omega.  In his  Incarnation,  Christ  is  the 
Alpha. He is the new Adam, and he alone, through his death and resurrection establishes 
the Church. Thus, he is the first, and the head, of the Church. But he is also the Omega,  
in that the whole of the Church, which constitutes  his body,  is united to him.  Thus 
Christ as the Omega includes the whole Church.
Christ is, at once, the Alpha and the Omega (Rev 1:8; 21:5; 22:13), and this well expresses  
the unity of the term with the beginning. But he is the Alpha himself alone, although he is so  
for our sakes, whereas he is the Omega together with us or we are so together with him, as  
forming a single body with him who is its origin.196
The Church, as she exists temporally in the physical realm, is, as we have seen, built up 
by the two agents who act on Christ’s behalf in his absence:
Christ…builds up his Church by means of his apostles and his Spirit. These might also be 
called the agents whom he has empowered to execute his work in the time of his absence, his 
‘vicars’, in fact.197
The institutional aspect of the church, the apostolate, is the human agent continuing the 
mission of the Incarnation. The nature of ‘agency’, of executing Christ’s work ‘during 
195 Groppe, Yves Congar, p120
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his absence’, indicates that the apostolate, and therefore the hierarchy of the Church, is 
temporary.
[The relationship of these two agents (apostles and Spirit) to the Incarnation itself and its 
end]  may be expressed in  two propositions:  (1)  what  brings  to  pass  the  work of  Christ  
proceeds from Christ himself in his Incarnation and (2) connects the seed with its fruit, the  
source to its fullness, the Alpha that is Christ acting alone for our sakes to the Omega which 
we are to be with and in him, from him and for him. Thus, the agents of Christ’s work have a 
backward-looking relationship (if we may so express it) to his Incarnation in time and a 
forward-looking one to its consummation at the end of the world. They function in fact, 
throughout the whole of the interval between the two comings of Christ and this is, precisely, 
the time of the Church.198
By the term ‘Church’, here, we are to understand the visible Church, as opposed to the 
Mystical Body of Christ. This interval between the two comings of Christ, the time of 
the Church, the time of agency, implies that such agency will no longer be required. 
Although Congar describes the Holy Spirit as an  ‘agent’ and a  ‘vicar’ of Christ, the 
Spirit will nevertheless remain on Christ’s return:
[The apostles] were set up, in every respect, by the mandate given to them and, once they 
have discharged it, they will have nothing more to do as regards our access to God. The Holy 
Spirit and Christ, on the other hand, always retain their role in our regard. In heaven, Christ 
remains our high priest for ever. The Holy Spirit is always the living water; he is not merely 
a  ‘vicar’,  he  does  not  simply  exercise  a  ‘ministry’  of  the  Incarnate  Word,  he  is  not  an 
‘instrument’…his agency is very different from that of the apostles.199
This temporary nature of the institutional Church is one of the keys to understanding 
why the reality of the Church does not lie with the visible Church, however much it is 
bound  up  with  it.  Congar’s  ontology  of  the  Church  is  ultimately  defined  as 
eschatological, and lies with the Mystical Body of Christ. All the physical aspects of the 
Church’s existence, the sacraments and the hierarchy, will pass away leaving only souls 
interiorly indwelt  by the Holy Spirit who binds them together into the one Mystical 
Body of Christ.
This leads to an important criticism in his ecclesiology: the absence of the Spirit’s role 
in the Incarnation leads directly to his absence from the created order in his ontology of 
the Church. By locating the eschatological reality of the Church in the mystical union of 
each individual  soul with Christ  Congar exposes himself  to the charge of docetism, 
since the materiality of the Incarnation appears to be, ultimately, irrelevant.200
198 Congar, Mystery, p154
199 Congar, Mystery, p158
200 Cf.  Hanvey  J,  ‘In  the  Presence  of  Love’,  who  believes  Congar  does bring  creation  into  the 
eschaton.  However,  he claims too much for Congar by reading his later pneumatology into his 
earlier work and placing insufficient emphasis on Congar’s eschatological ontology. There is no 
explicit place for creation in his ecclesiology or eschatology per se; he rarely mentions it and it is 
difficult to reconcile with an ontology of interiority without a much more robust anthropology, such 
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 2.1.7 Conclusions
The  primary  description  of  the  Church,  for  Congar,  is  the  Body of  Christ.  In  The 
Mystery of the Church it takes two forms: visible and institutional, and invisible and 
mystical.
This dualism derives philosophically from the influence of German Idealism through 
Möhler, and theologically from his apneumatic christology. History is the mediator of 
the  objective  (visible  and  exterior)  Revelation  of  the  Son  of  God,  carried  in  the 
apostolate.  The  Spirit  is  the  mediator  of  the  subjective  (invisible  and  interior) 
experience. The subjective Spirit is subordinate to the objective Son, and therefore the 
apostolate. 
The hierarchy has its ontos as the visible Body of Christ. It derives its authority and 
institutional  nature from its  institution  by Christ  and the continuation  of his  earthly 
ministry.  It is seen as prior to the indwelling of the Spirit, and, as Christ’s vicarious 
representative,  is to be obeyed. It exercises juridical power and authority,  and is the 
causal  channel  of  grace,  independently  of  the  Spirit,  and,  through  this  authority, 
maintains the unity of the Body of Christ.
The Mystical Body of Christ is realised by the Spirit. It is invisible and interior and is  
linked to the visible Body primarily through the sacraments. The strong emphasis on the 
interiority of the work of the Spirit in the hearts of individuals and the temporary nature 
of the visible Church seems to leave little room for the rest of creation. It appears to 
relegate  Christ’s  createdness  to  the  level  of  instrumental,  implying  the  ultimate 
irrelevance of God’s creation. One is left wondering if there is in Congar, in his early 
theology at least, a hidden docetism.
The priority of the institutional Church over the Spirit can be traced back, ultimately, to 
Congar’s interpretation of the  filioque clause. The hierarchy envisaged in the Trinity, 
where the Spirit is seen to proceed from, and hence is subordinate to, the Father and the 
Son,  translates  into  the  Church,  where  the  Spirit  is  subordinate  to  (although 
exceptionally not always limited by) the apostolate, Christ’s vicarious representative.
This hierarchy is temporary, awaiting Christ’s second coming when its vicarious action 
will no longer be required. The Spirit’s action, however, will continue to communicate 
God’s life to the individuals who make up the Mystical Body of Christ, and it is this, 
rather than the hierarchy, that will remain. The Mystical Body is therefore the true body 
as Bulgakov’s.
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of Christ. It is where the ontology of the Church is to be found, although it is only built 
up, and realised, through the visible, institutional Church in this age. The building up is 
achieved  through the  sacraments  and the  action  of  the  Holy Spirit  in  the  hearts  of 
individuals under the auspices of the hierarchy.
There are several consequences to this understanding of the procession of the Spirit 
from the Son relating, in particular, to the constitution of personhood, or hypostaticity. 
Firstly, Congar states that the Spirit is the communication of the Father’s life to the Son 
in the Trinity. If true, each Person in the Trinity is involved in the constitution of the 
two Others. But it is not at all clear how this is reflected in his interpretation of the 
procession in the economy.
Secondly,  if the Spirit does not play a role in the Son’s constitution in the theologia 
(which is his interpretation of the Spirit’s  procession from the Son), neither can the 
Spirit take the role of establishing  ‘personhood’ in the economy. This is reflected in 
Congar’s almost exclusive description of the Church as a ‘body,’ the functional role of 
the Spirit  as the one who joins individuals  together for the purpose of creating that 
single Body, and, at the same time, indwells this Body as its soul. One of the most 
important deficiencies in the metaphor of the Church as ‘Body’ is that there is very little 
room for the establishment of persons as particular, hypostatic, free beings. The identity 
of the Church with Christ  as his body leaves no space for the  ‘I-Thou’ relationship 
necessary for personal freedom: with a single head-body there is only an ‘I’. This failure 
to  safeguard  personal  hypostatic  space  in  the  Church  can  be  seen  as  a  direct 
consequence of the non-hypostatic role of the Spirit in the economy, itself deriving from 
the  non-hypostatic  role  of  the  Spirit  in  a  filioque-based  interpretation  of  the  inner-
Trinitarian relations.
Thirdly, it is difficult to see how Spirit’s present ‘functional’ role in the Mystical Body 
of Christ translates into the ‘personal’ nature of the Church as Bride on Christ’s return. 
The  fact  that,  scripturally,  the  Spirit  communicates  God’s  life  (as  seen  at  Christ’s 
Incarnation  as  well  as  his  baptism)  strongly  suggests  that  the  Spirit  does play  a 
constitutional and hypostatic role in the Trinity, and hence in the relation of the Father 
with the Son, and must therefore also do so in the economy, both in the present and 
eschatologically. It would appear, then, that the implications of Congar’s interpretation 
of the filioque clause, in which the Son’s relation with the Father is  not subject to the 
Spirit, do not make sense of his assertion that the Spirit constitutes the Trinity as such.
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For Congar, then, the Church is the Mystical Body of Christ. ‘Body’ is to be understood 
in a somatic, rather than a sponsal, sense. But ultimately the somatic identity fails to 
allow the Spirit ontological space to hypostasise either the Church or her ‘members’: it  
is  incompetent  to  bear  the  ontological  markers  of  personhood:  love,  freedom, 
subjectivity.  It is for this reason, when relating the Church to God, he resorts to the 
description of her as Bride, not only in relation to Christ, but surprisingly also to the 
Spirit. 
The Mystical Body persists into the eschaton but here his primary description changes 
to  ‘Bride’. Nevertheless we are left with no clear understanding of what it means to 
name her thus. We know she is eschatological, we know she is distinct from the Holy 
Spirit, and by definition, from Christ. We know she will not be hierarchical, at least in a 
structural sense. However, if her ontology is eschatological, this must inform her present 
reality. But in Congar’s own admission, we do not know the Church’s inner esse, what 
is the ontology of the Bride of Christ.
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 2.2 The Church as Bride of Christ
In 1970 Congar entered the then current debate in the Catholic Church concerning the 
question of the nature of the personhood of the Church. His contribution, entitled The 
person  ‘Church’,  reviewed  the  question  chronologically  starting  with  Fathers, 
particularly  Augustine,  moving  on  to  Aquinas,  then  through  the  early  modern 
theologians Cajetan, Bellarmin and Nazarius, and so into the contemporary scene.201
The earliest discussions, beginning with Origen, centred on Christ’s declaration to Paul 
in  Acts  ‘I  am Jesus whom you are persecuting’.  These discussions  reflected  on the 
identity between Christ and his ecclesial  body.  Affirmation of this identity,  or more 
exactly this unity, is frequently found in the Fathers at the end of the 4 th Century: Hilary, 
Gregory of Nyssa, Chrysostom, and Augustine.
Augustine, through the application of Tyconius’ first rule concerning the transferability 
of Scriptural reference between Christ and the Church, identified the two as the same 
person. His argument revolved around the Church as the Body of Christ, and Christ 
being the ‘I’ of the Church as its head, together forming a single ‘mystical person’. This 
identity was developed in the West, particularly by Aquinas, was founded primarily in 
the hypostatic union of the two natures of Christ, and was soteriological in nature: that 
is, Christ’s merits are passed on to his body because he is its head. The place of the 
Spirit in this discussion of christology, soteriology and the Church was not generally 
considered.
In  reviewing  the  historical  development  of  the  personhood  of  the  Church,  Congar 
continually questions the apparent moves to describe the Church, or the Body of Christ, 
as a person  other than Christ, for in this case, how could Christ be described as the 
hypostasis of the Church?
Despite  the  fact  that  Chardon,  in  1647,  postulated  the  idea  that  grace formed  the 
subsistence of  the Church,  giving it  a  quasi-personal  unity,202 it  was not  until  more 
recently that the role of the Spirit was explored in relation to the Church’s subsistence. 
Cathala, in 1912, described the Holy Spirit as the bond that unites the Church into a 
truly divine-human whole,  prefiguring the later  writing of Maritain.  The first  recent 
attempt  in  Roman  Catholic  theology  to  define  the  hypostasis  of  the  Church  was 
201 Congar, ‘La personne “Église”’1971
202 Congar, ‘La personne’, p623
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undertaken by Mura in 1936. However Journet, in 1969, undertook the most extensive 
investigation of the personhood of the Church to date. He spoke of a parallel between 
the relationship of the Word and Christ, and the Spirit and the Church, which is, at its  
highest, a dialogue between the Word and the Spirit. Congar describes Journet’s thesis:
Journet  attempted  to  harmonise  the  Augustinian  theme  of  Caput  et  corpus,  Sponsus  et  
sponsa = uno caro, Christus totus = una persona, and the Thomist usage of  una persona 
mystica to explain, soteriologically, how Christ’s merits count for all men, and finally the 
theme of the subsistence of the mystical Body formulated by Cajetan, Nazarius, etc. One 
thus  ends  up  appropriating,  either  the  Holy  Spirit,  or  perhaps  Christ,  as  a  subject  with 
attributes or the transcendent support of the Church. But more than this, in relying on these 
classical authors, Journet has clearly specified in which sense one is able to speak of a proper  
and  constitutive  personhood  of  the  Church  herself,  owing  to  an  abstraction  which 
differentiates her from her divine sources. She is thus a collective, supernaturally created 
person, which only exists in her members and which, nevertheless, is not reducible to them 
and  represents  a  reality having  specific  properties  such  as  unity,  holiness,  catholicity, 
apostolicity, indefectibility, and in certain of its acts, infallibility.203
Although Congar describes Journet here as predicating to the Church a form of proper 
personhood, he does not concur with his assessment. Instead, he addresses the question 
‘who is the Church?’, rather than ‘what is the Church?’, by turning to the thought of Urs 
von Balthasar, where the Church is described as the person whom Christ has called his 
Bride.204
 2.2.1 Summary of Balthasar’s ‘Who is the Church?’205
Like Congar, Balthasar’s eschatology is personal in the individual sense: each soul will 
be united with God. This individuality defines the ontological  nature of the Church, 
which, institutionally, although prior, exists temporarily for this end. Also like Congar, 
the  institutional  ‘body’  metaphor  takes  precedence  over  the  personal  nuptial  one 
because  it  extends  directly  from the  Incarnation.  Again,  like  Congar,  the  Spirit  is 
subordinate to Christ because ‘spirated’ by him, operating within the already constituted 
Church.
Unlike Congar, Balthasar gives a central role to Mary as co-redemptrix, in whom all 
participate to receive grace, and whose consciousness all must come to share. In this 
sense she is the central focus of the bride. Also unlike Congar, he defines the hierarchy 
in masculine terms as seed-bearers (able to confect the seed of the Eucharist) and the 
rest of the Church (laity) as feminine seed-receivers. Based on the ancient usage of the 
203 Congar, ‘La personne’, p627
204 Balthasar, ‘Who is the Church?’, 1991
205 Summary of an unpublished 12,000 word essay, ‘Balthasar and the Spouse of the Word’.
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bridal metaphor to refer both hypostatic union of the two natures in Christ and to the 
Church, he gives to the Church a mediatorial between God and the World.
Balthasar recognises the importance of the bridal metaphor in giving personal space to 
creation in its response to God. However, the ‘body’ metaphor, because incarnational, 
carries more weight for him. So the ‘I’ of the Church, ontologically, is the ‘I’ of Christ, 
not the ‘I’ of Mary.
For Balthasar, ontologically there are brides, not a bride. They form a single bride to the 
extent that they share in Mary’s consciousness and grace. But the presence of the Spirit,  
whose  role  in  the  Trinity  is  to  be  the  opposition  (love)  that  distinguishes  them as 
persons, is the guarantee that the personhood of each individual will be protected.
 2.2.2 Congar’s Response to Balthasar
In his summary of Balthasar’s thought, Congar’s concern is to understand how, and to 
what extent, the person-Church is a single entity that the Holy Spirit can then, as in the 
Trinity, unite with Christ as his Bride.206 The Spirit is primarily, for Congar, the bond 
uniting the Father and the Son. And, as in the theologia so in the œconomia, the Spirit is 
the bond uniting the Bride to Christ. However, in order for the Spirit to unite two such 
persons,  they  must  already be  constituted  as  persons:  their  union presupposes  their 
distinction as different persons, even as in the case of husband and wife.
The Church must therefore be a single entity capable of being united with Christ. The 
question then is  ‘how is the Church a single entity?’ What is the basis of the unity of 
believers that enables it to act as a person? The union that takes place between distinct  
believers, as explored by Balthasar, is based on the reception of grace and the exercising 
of obedience after the manner of Mary. It is in this common reception and response that 
the union between individuals is established, and thus the body of Christ realised:
The unity of the person-Church as Bride…is realised as an imitation and a prolongation of 
the attitude originating in Mary by a multitude of people who participate in Christ by grace 
and thus form his body.207
206 Congar, ‘La personne’, p629. Cf. the current Catholic catechism in which the Church, as a type of  
Mary, produces ‘sons of God’ through union with the Holy Spirit in baptism: ‘At once virgin and 
mother, Mary is the symbol and the most perfect realization of the Church: “the Church indeed . . .  
by receiving the word of God in faith becomes herself a mother. By preaching and Baptism she 
brings forth sons, who are conceived by the Holy Spirit and born of God, to a new and immortal 
life.  She herself  is  a  virgin,  who keeps  in  its  entirety and purity the faith  she  pledged  to her 
spouse.”’ In Catechism of the Catholic Church., p128, #507, quoting Lumen Gentium, 64, cf. 63
207 Congar, ‘La personne’, p629
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It  is  on this  already-constituted  body,  or person-Church,  that  the Spirit  then acts  to 
complete this attitude by making it a response to Christ’s invitation, thus uniting the 
Church with him. It is unclear from Congar’s interpretation here whether he sees the 
Spirit as the agent in the initial reception of grace by the individual believers, or whether 
‘grace’  is  received as something separate  from the activity  of the Spirit.  It  is  clear, 
however, that the major activity, or at least the most explicit activity, of the Spirit is in 
bonding the Bride with Christ as it bonds the Father with the Son.
If this analysis of the situation is correct, that the unity of the Father and the Son is 
established by the presence of the Spirit as the bond or  ‘love’ between them, we are 
faced with several difficulties. Firstly, the relationship between the Father and the Son 
has, itself, an ontology: that of the Spirit. The Spirit in this case  is the  ecstasis of the 
Father and the Son towards each other. There is no relationship between the Father and 
Son without the Spirit.  To say that the Father loves the Son is to say that the Spirit 
unites them.
Secondly,  since  the  union  between  Father  and  Son  implies  their  distinctiveness  as 
persons, the hypostasis of the Spirit, who appears not to be united to either as a person, 
is unclear. If the Spirit is hypostasised as a person, then, given the ontological nature of 
the relationship between the Father and the Son, the question arises as to the nature of 
the ‘bond’ that unites the Father and the Spirit, and the Spirit and the Son as persons. In 
what sense is it possible to say that the Father loves the Spirit, or that the Spirit loves the 
Son? Is it true to say that the relationships within the theologia are ontological, or does 
the ontology rest with the  persons comprising the Trinity,  the relationships being the 
consequence of the ecstatic movement of each person towards the others? And if this 
latter is the case, then what is the nature of the unity of the Godhead? Is it based on the 
relationships or the perichoresis of the Three, or in the ousia of God? In what sense can 
the oneness of God be said to be properly ontological? These are questions that, on the 
whole, remain unaddressed in Congar’s thesis, but are important because the answers 
will define the nature of human relationships, and the role of the Spirit both within the 
Church and between the Bride and Christ. Although Balthasar does speak of the role of 
the Spirit within the Church, and its involvement in the relationship between Christ and 
his  Bride,  and  bases  these  formulations  on  the  role  of  the  Spirit  in  the  Trinitarian 
relations, Congar does not apply them to his own analysis.
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 2.2.3 The ‘Personhood’ of the Church
In going on to consider the nature of the personhood of the Church, Congar engages 
with  two  contemporary  Catholic  thinkers:  J  Maritain,  described  as  a  Christian 
philosopher, and Louis Bouyer, a theologian who was greatly influenced by Bulgakov’s 
sophiology.208 Both published works in 1970 addressing this question,209 and both came 
to similar conclusions, although from different perspectives. Congar cites Bouyer’s own 
explication of the nature of the Church’s person and unity with reference to the unity 
and persons of the Trinity:
We can and must stress that this personality attributed so often to the Church in Scripture  
only exists in our human persons arriving at their perfection, a bit like the personality of God 
himself only exists in the three divine persons. This explanation of the personality of the 
Church helps  us  to  understand that  our  persons,  in  entering the Church,  far  from being 
blended into one another altogether in Christ, prepare to find in their union with him and 
their unity in him, brought about by the Holy Spirit, one supernatural super-existence, and as 
such, eternally, not only in the sense of perpetual duration, but in an effective participation in 
the actual life of the divine persons.210
Bouyer’s  ‘personality’ of the Church is eschatological,  but also, in its affirmation of 
participation  in  the  communion  of  the  godhead,  strongly  Orthodox,  reflecting  the 
influence of Bulgakov. On the face of it, he appears to be saying that the personality 
attributed to the Church resides, and remains, in its individual members, in the same 
way that the ‘personality’ of God resides in the individual members of the Trinity. We 
can be confident, therefore, that our  ‘personhood’ will not be lost through  ‘blending’ 
with Christ and others.
On the other hand, however, he does appear to be endorsing the existence of a single 
‘personality’ for both the Church and God. Furthermore, it is not entirely clear whether 
this  ‘personality’  remains  in  the individual  (‘only exists  in  our  human persons’),  or 
whether it comes into existence eschatologically, i.e. does he mean  ‘only exists  when 
our human persons arrive at their perfection’? It is also not clear whether ‘personality’, 
as he is using it,  refers to  ‘personal characteristics’  (i.e. behaviour, personality traits 
etc.), or whether he has the more ontological concept of ‘personhood’ in mind. From the 
line of his argument, it would appear that the persons of the Godhead remain distinct 
(therefore we as persons in our unity with Christ and the Church will remain distinct), 
but the  ‘personality’  (behaviour) of God results from the summation of those of the 
persons of the Trinity. In taking this line, he would be arguing against the existence of 
208 McPartlan P, ‘Who is the Church?’, Fn 52, p286
209 Maritain J, De l’Église du Christ, 1970; Bouyer L, L’Église de Dieu, 1970
210 Bouyer L, L’Église de Dieu, p603
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some aspect of God superior to, or prior to, the persons of the Trinity. The corollary is 
that there is no aspect of the Church superior to its members. Nevertheless, he goes on 
to refer to the  ‘one supernatural super-existence’, which is a unity with Christ, lifted 
into  the  divine  life  of  God,  but  whether  this  unity is  merely  attributed  a  collective 
‘personality’ or it has some ontological basis (and hence may considered in some sense 
to be a ‘person’) remains ambiguous.
Bouyer sees the Spirit as the agent of unity in the Church, but his reference to ‘the three 
divine persons’ as the fundamental basis of the Godhead suggests that he founds the 
unity of God in the perichoresis of the distinct persons of the Trinity, again reflecting 
Orthodox influence. The Spirit is the one responsible not only for the Church’s union 
with  Christ  but  also  for  its  unity  in  him.  The  purpose  of  the  Church,  and  its 
‘personality’, is ‘in an effective participation in the actual life of the divine persons’.
However, there are difficulties in mapping the nature of Trinity directly onto the nature 
of the Church. Firstly, the Church only exists in and through the second person of the 
Trinity,  and of whom he is the head, and who is, himself, the image of the invisible 
God211. It is therefore not quite so straightforward to correlate the nature of unity in the 
Godhead directly to the nature of unity in the Church.212 Secondly, while the Trinitarian 
God may be assigned a single  ‘personality’ (e.g. God is kind, loving, just, generous, 
merciful etc.), the Trinity has never been spoken of as a single person in the way that 
the Church is in the NT. The Trinity is rather spoken of as one God in three persons. If 
the principle of the unity of the Church is the same as the principle  of unity in the 
Trinity, then, although a ‘personality’, in the sense of personal characteristics, may be 
assigned to the Church, it could never be constituted as a single ‘person’ as such, for the 
same reason that the Trinity could not be said to be a single person.
Personalities are not the subjects of relationships: only persons can be that. Bouyer is 
clear that the single  ‘personality’ of God does not constitute God as a single person, 
since he says that the personality ‘only exists in the three divine persons’. So if all that 
can be said of the Church is that it has unity and a personality in the same way as the 
Godhead then that is insufficient to constitute it as a person who can be the subject of a 
relationship. The analogy between the unity of the Church and the unity of God thus 
poses a problem for the Church’s relationship with God, for the Church is not called to 
have a single relationship with ‘the Trinity’, despite the latter being homoousios with a 
211 Col 1:15-18
212 Although cf Eph 4:3-6
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‘personality’. Rather, it is called to have relationships with the persons of the Trinity, to 
be the Body and Bride of Christ, thus to call God ‘Father’, and to have this through the 
Spirit.  This  multiplicity  of  relationships  indicates  a  multiplicity  of  persons,  one  of 
whom is the Church. To have a single personality, and base the unity of the Church on 
the unity of the Trinity, is therefore insufficient to explain the reality of the relationships 
to  which  the  Church  is  called.  It  also  begs  the  question  of  terminology:  what  is  a 
‘personality’ if it can be possessed by an entity (e.g. the Godhead) that is not, in itself, a 
‘person’? The difficulty  of the question is  compounded because the French term  la  
personnalité is used to mean both ‘personality’ and ‘personhood’.
Congar summarises Bouyer’s understanding of the Church in terms of ‘a single being’ 
(un être unique). He identifies Bouyer’s insight into the eschatological ‘completion’ of 
each faithful person through their participation in the Church without threatening their 
identity in any way. In this sense, the analogy with the persons of the Trinity is helpful:
The person ‘Church’ is therefore constituted by the gifts of grace made to people, but in such 
a way that they make them all participate in a single being that transcends the individuals  
without detracting from them: quite the opposite, it completes their personal being. Further, 
Fr Bouyer sees in this whole, as such, the fruit of God’s intention. It is this that we will 
become. But this design of God, he says, is his Wisdom, which is identified with the Son of 
God and yet is distinct from him in so far as it concerns us and recovers the realisation of the 
mystery of Christ in us. Fr Bouyer attempts to assimilate here the great sophiological insight 
of the modern Russian Orthodox theologians.213
The ‘modern Russian Orthodox theologian’ with the ‘great sophiological insight’ is, of 
course, Bulgakov.
Congar’s description of Bouyer’s conception of the constitution of the person ‘Church’ 
starts with ‘the gifts of grace,’ and this reception of grace is the foundation of the unity 
to which the individuals are raised. Once again, the question of the relation of this grace 
to the Spirit is not unveiled.
Although Congar refers here to Wisdom, and touches upon its role in the Church, it 
goes  no further.  He does not  take up the  ‘great  sophiological  insight’  into his  own 
exploration of the nature of the Church, despite his own conversations with Bulgakov 
held in the winter of 1936.214 However this was still very early in his theological career.
Maritain’s concern, on the other hand, is to ground the full truth of expressions such as: 
‘the Church is the Bride of Christ (Eph 5:23f), the Church is holy, the Church renders 
worship to God, the Church speaks, teaches, “do not look at our sins, but at the faith of 
213 Congar, ‘La personne’, pp632-633
214 Congar, Dialogue Between Christians, p17
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your Church.”’215 The fact that these acts and properties are attributed to the Church, 
Maritain maintains,  requires her to have a created personhood (personnalité) that  is 
properly her own. This personhood is something God confers on the Church in response 
to the grace that animates her and through which she carries the image of Christ, which 
he sees in the hearts of the individual members. 
In her unity and universality, or other similar property through which the invisible grace of  
Christ animates his vast human organism, the Church carries in her the image of Christ, and 
offers it before God who sees the invisible and discerns the grace within the depths of the  
hearts. Through this image the immense multitude of the members of the Church who live in 
his life, is clothed by an individual configuration, in such a way that, in consideration of the 
individuality of the image of Christ, she is able to receive a subsistence of her own as if she 
were an individual.216
The nature of personhood conceived by Maritain is substantial  and ontological.  It is 
different to the nature of an individual, and is something conferred on an individual by 
God’s calling the individual  into existence as a subject or person. Maritain uses the 
example  of Peter  and Paul as ones called  to  life  by God,  presumably through their 
calling by Jesus, although this is not explicitly stated. It is in this calling by God that the 
individual is made a subject or person, and thus receives a subsistence that constitutes 
them as such:
The  individuality  of  the  image  of  Christ  carried  by  the  Church  is  an  analogue of  the 
individuality of the substantial nature possessed by each one of us; and just as in calling  
Peter or Paul to life (à l’éxistence) God confers on such individual nature the subsistence 
which constitutes it as a subject or person, in the same way, in calling the Church of his Son 
to  life  God  confers  on  her,  by  this  image  which  he  sees  in  her,  a  subsistence  which 
constitutes a whole multitude of human beings as a subject or person.217
Maritain uses the calling of God to define the basis of the nature of personhood. Peter 
and Paul were called by God out of death, and thus non-existence, into life (this is the 
meaning of  à l’éxistence) and, as part  of this birth, were given new names by God. 
Thus, it is the naming by God that constitutes the existence of a being as a ‘person’ (as 
in the sacrament of baptism). Such an understanding is a long way from Balthasar’s 
‘spiritual centre of consciousness of free and rational acts,’ but is an image that draws 
directly from the biblical nature and history of personhood.
Maritain, however, goes beyond the simple ‘calling’ to identify ‘personhood’ in terms 
of a subsistence that is conferred upon a nature, thus endowing it almost as an entity that 
is  transferable.  The  Church,  however,  is  not  an  individual  upon  which  such  a 
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subsistence can be conferred. Instead, the grace in the hearts of the individuals reflects 
the image of Christ, and it is this reflection of the singular image of Christ that God 
sees. It is on this basis, this singular reflected image of Christ, that God then confers the 
subsistence of personhood on the Church. Congar summarises it thus:
Maritain knows very well that the Church is not an individual substance, but a communion 
of persons, and that its unity is therefore that of a multiplicity. But charity and the fact that, 
by it, each faithful one reflects the single image of Christ Jesus, confers on this multiplicity a  
supernatural unity sufficiently real for it to play the part of an individual spiritual nature, on 
which God confers the seal of personhood (personnalité), such that she is able to say ‘I’.218
However, Congar is hesitant about the ontological nature of personhood as described by 
Maritain.  More  precisely,  he  remains  unconvinced  that  there  is  an  ontological 
subsistence that defines an individual as a subject or person beyond that of the existence 
of  the  physical,  real  individual.  He  describes  Maritain’s  view  of  the  ontology  of 
personal reality and subsistence in these terms:
J Maritain works with a certain analysis of the structure of a personal reality in which an 
individual human nature must, in order to become a personal subject, receive an ultimate 
determination that one calls subsistence, an abstract term to which J Maritain gives as a very 
vivid  equivalent  ‘liberating  actuation’.  The  subsistence  is  the  ontological  foundation  of 
personhood (la personnalité). In fact, this notion of subsistence plays a role in Maritain’s 
position on the person-Church. It is in effect a distinct principle of the individual substance 
of rational or spiritual beings from which the multitude forms the Church. It is thus able,  
uniquely, to bring to an end the plurality of these substantial beings and found one original 
person (personnalité).219
Congar’s  two  concerns  are  that,  firstly,  there  appears  to  be  no  safeguard  to  the 
personhood of  the  individual  ‘substantial  beings’,  in  that  they  are  subsumed  in  the 
subsistence of personhood endowed upon the Church to make her a person. Secondly, 
this notion of the subsistence of personhood, as something distinct from the individual 
substance, was one of which Aquinas was unaware. It was introduced as a concept at 
the beginning of the 14th Century but resisted by Thomists  at the time because they 
would not allow any distinction between an individual rational substance and a personal 
subject. Individuals are created as such by God, and they are thus inherently subjects. 
Congar is explicit in working with the Thomist definition of a person, which itself is 
derived from Boethius:
St Thomas followed the definition of person given by Boethius: naturae rationalis individua 
substantia (an  individual  substance  of  rational  nature).  The  subject  adds  nothing  to  the 
individual substance. It is nothing other than the concrete individual who, among material 
beings, carries, more than simply its essence, the principles that comprise an individual: its  
incommunicability follows from this individuation of form, its life (received) enabling an 
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individual substance endowed with ‘accidental’ properties: such a being is able to subsist by 
itself (un tel être peut subsister par soi).220
The concrete, material individual is thus the substance of a person, and the life of such 
an individual has already been received from God in order for it to exist. There can 
therefore be nothing added to it that will change its subsistence. Its subsistence as a 
subject is already defined in the fact that it has been given its existence by God. This act 
in itself, it is held, constitutes the individual as a subject, and hence a person. A person 
is defined materially, and anthropocentrically, as  ‘any individual substance of rational 
nature’.
There are two aspects to this definition of person that need further consideration. The 
first,  and most  important,  is  that  Congar  seems  to  be  working  exclusively  with  an 
understanding  of  ‘life’  (‘l’éxistence’)  as  temporal,  in  the  here  and  now:  individual 
beings subsist  by themselves  in the present.  The existence of the  naturae rationalis  
individua substantia, that is, a person, is sufficient for him to define the presence of 
‘life’, even life received from God. The fact that such a ‘person’ will die, will be subject 
to eternal judgement, does not seem to have a bearing on the definition of ‘life’, or of 
‘person’, thus begging the question of the role of baptism.
However, Maritain makes it plain that he is referring to the change that takes place 
when an individual is  ‘called’ by God. The calling of Peter and Paul to life, to which 
Maritain refers, could possibly refer to their creation as individuals in their mothers’ 
wombs. However, in this case there is nothing different between the created individual 
and the ‘subsisting’ person, since they would both come into existence through the same 
creative act of God. Rather, it is much more likely to refer to their calling by Jesus 
Christ through reception of the Holy Spirit and baptism. In being called by Christ and 
receiving the Spirit, they are recognised, and called by God to ‘life’.
This recognition by God has clear implications for the eschatological existence of the 
one being called, rather than merely the temporal existence. Bouyer, too, refers, in the 
passage cited earlier, to the eschatological completion of the members of the Church as 
persons.  Recognition  of  this  change  in  the  eschatological  status  of  a  being  has 
ontological implications since ‘life’ is being conferred through the Spirit, and, while it 
may not be correct to refer to such a change in terms of ‘receiving a subsistence’, the 
concept of an ontological change conferred at baptism must be right. Bouyer describes 
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this  ‘life’ as eternal,  ‘not only in the sense of perpetual duration, but in an effective 
participation in the actual life of the divine persons.’221
The ontological difference is identified from its soteriological effects: the ‘faithful’ will 
pass through the judgement of God and sin will cease to exist. The call to eschatological 
‘life’ thus confers on the subject an eschatological ontology that they did not have prior 
to  baptism,  which  is  associated  with  the  presence  of  the  Holy  Spirit  as  the  down-
payment  guaranteeing  that  which is  to  come (2 Cor 1:22,  5:5;  Eph 1:14).  It  is  this 
ontological change in the nature of the life received that Maritain links to his concept of 
person. In order for a subject to be defined as a person, they must have been called to 
receive the eschatological life. In other words, for Maritain, it is their  eschatological 
existence, not their temporal existence or their ability to receive attributes, that qualifies 
them as a person.
The second aspect  that  needs  further  consideration  relates  to  this,  and concerns  the 
definition of ‘subject’, or more pertinently ‘person’.
Congar does not want to trace the complex history of the meaning of the word ‘person’. 
However, early in his paper he identifies in Augustine two senses of the word when 
speaking of Christ and the Church as one and the same ‘person’. One meaning refers to 
personification, to condition or role (Tyconius speaks of ‘office’); the other refers to a 
real  subject  with  attributes.222 He  introduces  the  discussion  by  quoting  Augustine’s 
description of the first rule of Tyconius:
The first is about the Lord and His body, and it is this, that, knowing as we do that the head 
and the body – that is, Christ and His Church – are sometimes indicated to us under one 
person (for it is said to believers, ‘Ye then are Abraham’s seed,’223 when there is but one seed 
of Abraham, and that is Christ), we need not be in a difficulty when a transition is made from 
the head to the body or from the body to the head, and yet no change made in the person  
spoken of. For a single person is represented as saying, ‘He hath decked me as a bridegroom 
with ornaments, and adorned me as a bride with jewels;’224 and yet it is, of course, a matter 
for interpretation which of these two refers to the head and which to the body, that is, which 
to Christ and which to the Church.225
He notes that, whereas Tyconius speaks in terms of ‘body’, Augustine is resolute in his 
use of the term ‘person’ in describing both Christ and the Church, although the  ‘I’ of 
both is always the same  ‘I’ of Christ.  It is the nature of the unity,  as conceived by 
Augustine, of Christ and his Church as una caro, unus homo, Christus integer (totus),  
221 Bouyer L, L’Église de Dieu, p603
222 Congar, ‘La personne’, p615
223 Gal 3:29
224 Is 61:10 (LXX)
225 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, III.31.44
73
una persona that enables him to speak of the two as one, and thus transfer the attributes 
of one to the other. This unity is mystical, that is to say ‘spiritual-real’, and is the reason 
that Augustine does not speak of two persons.226 The ontological quality with which this 
person is identified as ‘real’ is its ability to have attributes.
Much later in his discussion, and as previously noted, Congar uses Boethius' definition 
of person,  naturae rationalis  individua substantia, as employed by Thomas. And, as 
with  Balthasar’s  definitions  of  person  and  of  marriage,  it  is  an  anthropocentric 
definition: that is, it makes no explicit reference to dependence upon God, but instead 
relies on nature and reason.  The concrete individual substance forms the ontological 
basis for the existence of a person:  ‘its [the individual’s]  incommunicability follows 
from this individuation of form’, and ‘such a being is able to subsist by itself’.227 The 
theological  integrity  of  this  definition  derives  from  the  dignity  of  distance  and 
independence bestowed on the creature by the Creator.
For  Congar  ‘the  Church  is  a  living  organism,  animated  and governed by the  Holy 
Spirit’.228 It  is  singularly  thus  not able  to  subsist  by  itself,  it  is  not  an  individual 
substance, and it does not have a rational nature. According to this natural definition, 
therefore, the Church cannot be construed as a person, or even a subject.
The reliance upon nature and reason for theological categorical definitions, however, 
has its own weaknesses. The greatest of these lies precisely in its anthropocentricity: it 
remains  closed  to  the  possibility  of  theocentric  categories,  which  nevertheless  may 
impinge upon the same realities the natural definitions are attempting to describe: the 
distance between creation and Spirit is in danger of becoming too wide.
‘Personhood’  is  one  such  example.  The  question  concerning  whether  the  Church 
constitutes a person, as such, could be asked in these theocentric terms: is she one that is 
addressed as a  ‘thou’ by God? Is she  ‘named’ by God? Has eschatological life been 
conferred upon her? Is she an object of God’s love? Has the Spirit been given to her? 
Does she respond to God’s call and does she address God as ‘Father’? If we can answer 
‘yes’ to these questions, then we must hold the possibility that she is recognised, and 
thus constituted, by God as a person. This may raise other difficulties, such as the nature 
of the unity of the Church, and the members’ own existence as persons in relation to the 
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Bride,  but  these  difficulties  in  themselves  cannot  be  used  to  deny the  existence  of 
another reality.
 2.2.4 The Church as ‘One’
The foregoing discussion addresses questions around personhood, but the second part of 
the  Thomist  definition  of  ‘person’,  requires  that  a  substantial  unity,  an  individual 
substance, must be demonstrated. The creedal formula confesses the Church as  ‘one’, 
but  does  this  mean  a  substantial  unity?  Congar  therefore  goes  on  to  address  the 
question: in what sense is the Church one? If the idea of an accidental ‘subsistence’ is to 
be avoided, what constitutes the unity of the Church? What is the relationship between 
the faithful and the ‘person’ of the Church? The question is important for him because 
there is still a sense in which ‘she [the Church] constitutes a certain person, irreducible 
to the pure sum of her individual members.’229
In addressing these questions, Congar refers to the nature of created humanity. Grace 
plays a pivotal role here, but grace, according to Aquinas, is not a ‘created substance’. 
Rather it is the ‘supernatural form according to which man is created’.230 All humanity 
is  created,  and  even  re-created,  according  to  this  supernatural  form,  which  is 
ontologically  ‘accidental’, but by which all are ontologically constituted. Grace, then, 
effectively constitutes the imago dei, as Congar implies when he says:
This supernatural form of existence [i.e. grace] has its exemplary and efficient cause in the 
Holy Trinity and in the holy humanity of Christ  (who is  the instrument  or organ of the 
Godhead).231
However, although all humanity is created according to this supernatural form called 
‘grace’, there is a ‘new and supernatural form of divine sonship, “in Christ Jesus”’ by 
which the faithful exist. It is this latter, also brought about by the ontological action of 
grace, that forms a  ‘profound unity’ known as the Body of Christ, but not because it 
receives a personal ‘subsistence’.
According to Congar, grace acts at the level of the individual. It is the action of grace in 
us that enables ‘each individuated substance that is a human person’232 to exist in a new, 
supernatural way. But we are not the proper or adequate subjects for this grace – we 
only have grace ‘accidentally’: we only participate in it as it is communicated to us, by 
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the Holy Spirit,  through its proper and adequate subject – Christ.  We have, perhaps 
residually, just what is sufficient to allow this grace to attach itself to us, such that it is 
able  to  enliven  our  own,  individual  actions,  and  divinise  them,  or  make  them 
supernatural.  Thus,  even  though  we only  have  grace  accidentally,  it  constitutes  the 
ontological  basis  for  new life  in  us.  Furthermore,  since  Christ  is  the  only true  and 
adequate subject of grace, grace is only communicated to us as far as we participate in 
him: he is the transcendent subject of grace.
Congar argues similarly for the  ‘means of grace’ in the Church. The effects of grace, 
including the presence of Christ as the true celebrant of the sacraments, consecration, 
‘merit’, and the communion of saints, are all attributable to the virtus Spiritus sancti, the 
work of the Holy Spirit. And even though these may be counted ‘among the dowry put 
up by Christ for his Bride’, nevertheless, they do not belong to the Church, and do not 
remove the need for ‘a perpetual current intervention of Christ and the Holy Spirit, nor 
of the corresponding epiclesis’.233
Thus, just as in the individual, Christ is the transcendent subject of grace participated in 
through the Holy Spirit, bestowing him or her accidentally, but ontologically, with new 
life, so in the Church Christ bestows grace through the presence of the Holy Spirit to 
effect new life through the sacraments and other ‘means of grace’. However, this does 
not constitute the Church as a person. It is simply to recognise that, since we are not the 
proper or true ontological subjects of grace, it is only through our participation in these 
‘means of grace’ in the Church that Christ is mediated to us by the Holy Spirit. This is 
the means through which we are recreated according to the form of grace and receive 
new life. The Church, herself, is therefore the instrument of grace – one that does not in 
any sense ‘possess’ grace, but nevertheless through whom grace is accessed.
In  this  conception  of  new  life  through  grace  Congar  sees  the  truth  of  Maritain’s 
‘mystical subsistence’ without having to resort to any notion of ‘subsistence’. It is in the 
contingent nature  of  the  Church’s  existence  that  its  subsistence,  and  hence  its 
personhood, exists:
For any operation of grace that occurs in her, the Church is entirely suspended by her divine 
causes, has her existence and her consistence by them. It is this, not something else, that is  
the mystical subsistence. It is in this sense that one is able to assume the traditional themes of 
the  una persona, Christu et Ecclesia and to say, with various modern authors:  ‘Christ, the 
Lord, is properly the one to speak the I of the Church’.234
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For Congar, it is because the Church is contingent on God for her very existence that 
she cannot be considered to be constituted as a person. Her subsistence exists in her 
‘suspension’ by God. The oneness of the Church is derivative upon the oneness of God 
– this is the testimony of Scripture and Tradition – and therefore it cannot  ‘subsist by 
itself’:
In Scripture and in Tradition, the ecclesiological or community’s unity is unceasingly related 
to the fact of the absolute unicity of God, of Christ, of the Holy Spirit.: Eph 4:4-6; 1 Cor 8:6; 
12:6ff (only one Spirit); 10:17 (only one bread); 2 Cor 11:2 (engaged to  eni andri); John 
10:16 (only one flock because there is only one Shepherd). The principle of unity is put as 
God, not properly in the Church herself, where it is only derived and consequent. But the  
gifts which form her, while only having a specific unity in the Church, find, in their divine or 
christological cause, a principle of personalisation.235
The force of Congar’s argument lies in the contingent nature of the Church’s existence 
and unity. Both are derivative from God and are therefore not intrinsic to herself. Her 
subsistence is contingent upon her ‘divine causes’, and, as a consequence, she cannot be 
described as a person. The argument derives from the Thomist understanding of the 
individual  or  person,  whose existence  and oneness  is,  by definition,  substantial  and 
independent. The extent to which personalisation can be spoken of with respect to the 
Church and  ‘the gifts  which  form her’  is  the extent  to  which  they derive  from the 
personal nature of Christ himself.  It  is Christ who is the  ‘I’ of the Church, and the 
Church can  only be  spoken of  in  terms  of  ‘personhood’  in  so  far  as  she  shares  in 
Christ’s personhood. Just as her subsistence is derivative from its divine causes, so too 
her personhood is derivative from Christ’s participation in her by the bestowal of his 
gifts, of himself.
However,  if  the  contingent  nature  of  eschatological  life,  itself,  and  hence  personal 
ontology,  is  fully  recognised,  then  the  ability  to  ‘subsist  by itself’  ceases  to  be  an 
adequate  definition  of  a  person,  as  previously  discussed,  since  no  person can  exist 
eschatologically outside Christ, and without the gift of life bestowed by the Spirit. In 
this case there would be no persons at all outside the Trinity: all eschatological life is 
contingent upon God. The possibility for defining the Church, contingent as she might 
be upon God’s grace, the presence of the Holy Spirit, and Christ’s gift of himself to her,  
as a ‘person’ must remain a possibility.
Congar moves on to discuss the purpose or plan of God for creation, and in particular, 
for the Church. He cites Romans 8:28-30 in which Paul expresses the intention of God 
to reproduce the image of his Son in those whom he has called:
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We know that with those who love him, God works together in all things for their best, with 
those that he has called according to his intention. For those he knew in advance, he has also 
predestined to reproduce the image of his Son, in order that he might  be the eldest of a 
multitude of brothers; and those whom he has predestined he has also called; those whom he 
has called, he has also justified; those whom he has justified, he has also glorified.
It is in the reproduction of this image that those who are called become sons of Gods 
and hence brothers of his Son. But the reproduction of the image of God’s Son is not in 
the faithful individually. Those who are called are not called to reproduce ‘images’ of 
his Son, but ‘the image’ of his Son. That is, it is the faithful together that reproduce a 
single image of the Son. As Christ has taken on our earthly form, so we are called to be 
conformed to, to participate in, his heavenly body of glory:
The purpose of God has its own unity. [H]ere St Paul considers, not the faithful individually,  
but the whole of the children of God destined for glory, in short, the Church. The plan of 
God  has  in  view  the  gathered  ones:  chapters  9-10  [of  Romans]  that  follow  our  text  
demonstrate it well. Now this plan is ‘to make possible a participation in the “form” of his 
Son’. He who has taken our form or earthly image, our form of humility and of servitude (1 
Cor 15:49; Phil 2:7), calls us and elevates us to carry the image of his heavenly state, to 
become con-formed, suvmmorfoi, to his body of glory (cf. 1 Cor 15:49; Phil 3:21).236
Thus there is, in this purpose of God, a unity in that ‘for those he knew in advance, he 
has  also predestined  to  reproduce  the  image  of  his  Son.’  This  image,  which  is  the 
purpose  of  God,  is  a  single  image.  ‘Participation  in  the  “form”  of  his  Son’  is  a 
participation in the singularity of this image. Congar sees Maritain as being correct, 
therefore, in founding ‘the unity of the person-Church in the identity of Christ himself, 
whose faithful reflect his image.’ It is in the reflection of this image by the Church that 
it  forms  a  single  entity:  there  is  only  one  who  is  foreknown,  called,  justified,  and 
glorified,  and it is therefore only as the faithful participate in, are conformed to, his 
image, that they share in God’s purpose and thus receive the grace of sonship. But it is 
Christ’s  sonship in which they share by participating in his image.  It  is his  identity 
whose image they reflect, and it is Christ’s identity of sonship (filiation) in which the 
unity of the Church resides.
This unity is that of the grace of sonship which has been given to many brothers since the 
First-Born (Rom 8:29; Col 1:15, 18; Rev 1:5), by him and in him, and which constitutes 
them as his co-inheritors (Rom 8:17; 1 Pe 3:7) of the patrimonial goods of God.237
It is at this point that the wideness of Congar’s love, and his longing for the whole of 
humankind, shines through. For he sees, in this participation in the image of the Son, the 
calling of all humanity through baptism so that, together,  ‘all those who participate in 
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human  nature,  once  regenerated  in  Christ  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  reflecting  in  a 
unanimous way the glory of God (cf. 2Cor 3:18) will be able to say: “Our Father”’. This 
is the basis of the missionary imperative of the Church.
The  purpose  of  God  is  begun  and  completed  in  Christ,  and  we  participate  in  that 
purpose in so far as we participate in him. The Church is the realisation of that purpose.  
Christ is the principle of the unity of the whole and this unity is real because of him. 
However,  ‘it is realised in a multitude of persons and elements,’ and Congar will not 
allow it  to  ‘have  a  substantial-personal  unity  other  than  that  of  the  various  human 
people’ that comprise it. Thus he can refer to the Church as an ‘aggregate’:
Its unity is a unity of an aggregate, analogous to that of any society. But, on the one hand, 
this society is supernatural and, on the other, the  ‘aggregate’ is not here simply a resultant 
one:  it  is  not  merely visualised by the intention of a  human founder or chief.  It  has its 
consistence, and in this sense, its subsistence in the intention or purpose of God, who is the 
creator and realiser of that which he plans.238
The reality of the Church is found in the purpose of God. That is, its existence as an 
entity  resides  in  God’s  intention  and it  has  no independent  or  substantial  existence 
outside or without reference to this. Thus God is  ‘both the creator and realiser of that 
which he plans.’
Personhood, for Congar, exists only at the level of the individual, the substantial. It is 
not part of the language of the unity of the Church. The unity of the Church resides in 
the purpose of God, as  defined,  and participated  in,  in Christ.  The effects  of grace 
operate at the level of the individual, but form part of a whole. It is the gifts of grace, 
emanating from God by the Son and through the Spirit, realising the purpose of God in 
humankind, that give the Church her unity and subsistence. The gifts of grace are the 
fruit of the missions of the Son and the Spirit, and while their effects are the realisation 
of the singular purpose of God, Congar refuses to assign an ontological status to the 
unity  and  subsistence  which  derive  from  them  –  the  Church  is  not a  hypostasis. 
However,  he will  allow her a  ‘personality’  in the same sense that  a human,  secular 
institution can be said to have a personality, even if the Church’s exceeds that of the 
secular  institution’s  by virtue of being the product  of God’s will  rather than human 
wills. He summarises his position:
The person-Church is the one and whole reality visualised efficaciously by the unique and 
whole purpose of God. Grace or ministries  only exist in individuals, and yet the Church is 
something more than the material sum of these: she is the expression of a single and whole  
Purpose, sovereignly efficacious. It is this that gives her a personality that passes beyond the 
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moral personality of a social or political body, the Academy, for example, or France. For 
such bodies are only the result of individual wills submitting to a certain idea more or less  
defined,  whereas the Church is  the realisation of an efficacious will  or  a conceived and 
willed efficacy by Him whose action penetrates all reality more intimately than one is able to  
conceive and exists in her, causing her to exist according to the purpose that generated her.  
The Church is not a person, she does not have a created ‘subsistence’, she does not have an 
existence that ends in an individual spiritual nature. She is not a hypostasis. Nevertheless, 
she has a claim to personality which exceeds the moral personality of a natural society: the  
reality of this claim consists in being the expression visualised and granted efficaciously by 
the purpose, the election, the initiative of the Covenant of God. (His italics)239
It is clear that Congar is not at ease even with Balthasar’s definition of the Church, who 
comes much closer to defining her as a person, although still denying her a hypostasis. 
In this categorical denial of any ontological form of personhood for the Church is his 
first reference to the eschatological nature of personhood: ‘she is not a person, she does 
not  have  a  created  “subsistence”,  she  does  not  have  an  existence  that  ends  in  an 
individual spiritual nature.’ ‘Person’ is equated to an eschatological reality in the form 
of  ‘an individual spiritual nature’.  This is not a theme he takes up elsewhere in the 
paper, and seems, in its strident tone, simply to be a way of denying Maritain’s claim 
for the personhood of the Church based on eschatological existence. However, in listing 
‘person’,  ‘created  subsistence’,  and  ‘individual  spiritual  nature’  as  parallels, 
explanations  of  why the  Church  is  not  a  person,  Congar  has  introduced  the  latter, 
principally in its eschatological form, into the notion of personhood as the measure of 
ultimate reality.  For Congar, that which will exist in the eschaton will be  ‘individual 
spiritual natures’.
 2.2.5 Eschatology and Unity: From Institution to Divine Will
Although this idea of the ultimate reality in the eschaton consisting of ‘individual souls’ 
united  with  God  is  not  strong  in  this  paper,  it  nevertheless  exists  in  his  earlier 
writings.240
In defining ontology in these eschatological terms, Congar begs the question,  What is 
the  purpose  of  the  Church’s  existence?  What  is  the  nature  of  her  presence  in  the 
eschaton?  Is  she to  be Christ’s  Bride  on his  return,  or is  she simply the temporary 
vehicle of salvation for her constituent members?
It  is  clear  the  primary  eschatological  existence  for  Congar  has  been,  and  remains, 
human souls, constituted as such by their individual union with God. The institutional 
Church is a temporary structure that exists to enable the salvation of souls. In his later  
239 Congar, ‘La personne’, p637-8
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writing,  Congar  moves  away from the  language of  Visible  and Mystical  Bodies  of 
Christ, with less emphasis on the institutional naure of the Church.
This is perhaps seen most clearly in his discussion on the unity of the Church where 
Congar does not once refer to obedience, the Pope, or the Institution. Instead, he now 
founds the unity of the Church in the single purpose of the Covenant of God. Congar 
has changed his perspective from incarnational to eschatological, from Institutional to 
divine election. In so doing, he has broadened out the possibilities of who comprises the 
Church,  becoming  much  more  open and much  less  definitive.  Congar  would  never 
denounce the structure of the Church as unnecessary or irrelevant. Indeed, he still sees 
the  Institution  as  fulfilling  the  purpose  of  God.  However,  he  no  longer  sees  the 
Institution as the source of the unity of the Church – this he now places in the singleness 
of God’s intention for humankind.
Coupled with this change in the  source of the Church’s unity is a diminution in the 
substantial nature of the Church’s unity. We have seen how Congar is strenuous in his 
denial of any hypostasis of the Church in his later writing. But in his earlier writing he 
is much less insistent. Indeed, in referring to the Church as ‘Bride’, he positively assigns 
to the Church her own subsistence.241
The marriage to which he refers is a description of the Spirit’s relationship with the 
Church, rather than her union with Christ. Nevertheless, he brings in the description of 
the Church as the Bride of Christ in order to support his description of her as a person 
‘having its own subsistence’, and he affirms the union between Christ and his Bride 
with the citation of Genesis 2:24.
Congar’s  move from seeing the cause of unity in  the Institution  (deriving from the 
Incarnation), to the divine will of God (and hence the eschaton) sits much more easily 
with his  understanding of the salvation of individual  souls.  In his  earlier  writing he 
struggled  with  two  strains  of  ontology  within  the  Church,  which  resulted  in  his 
conception of the Visible Body and the Mystical Body of Christ as distinct, although 
mutually  constitutive,  entities.  The  former  was  associated  with  apostolic  authority 
passed down from Christ, while the latter was associated with the interior work of the 
Spirit in the souls of individuals. By relocating the Church’s unity in the will of God, 
which is eternal, rather than the Institution, which is temporary, he has overcome the 
241 Congar, Mystery, p35-36
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difficulty  of  finding grounds  for  the  continuity  of  the  unity of  the  Church into  the 
eschaton, and hence given it an ontological reality, if not a substantial one.
 2.2.6 The Bride of Christ
In the final section of the paper,  having dismissed any ontological  dimension to the 
Church’s  personal  existence,  Congar  asks  the  inevitable  question  ‘is  the  [sublime 
quality of Bride of Christ] nothing more than a symbol?’ In answering he affirms that it 
is more than a symbol  ‘precisely because it is the reality that responds to the election 
and purpose of the Covenant of God,’ and the notion of response requires one capable 
of responding. In so far as there is an  ‘other’ that is called upon to respond, Congar 
identifies it as ‘humanity’. In so far as this ‘humanity’ actually responds, i.e. is elected 
and chosen, it is the Church, the Bride. Congar acknowledges that, implicit in God’s 
choice, in his calling and election of the Church, there is another ‘person’ who is made 
the object of that choice, who is the object of God’s love:  ‘The one who says bride 
speaks first of another person who is made the object of a choice, by love.’ The quality 
of ‘bride’, however, does not pre-exist the naming of the other as ‘bride’. The other is 
constituted as a bride purely in response to the choice made by the one.
The Bride, as such, does not pre-exist the choice which constitutes her election and that gives 
her the quality of Bride. The initiative is entirely God’s: as a sign of which Eve was said to 
have been taken out of Adam, the woman from the man (cf. Gen 2:23; 1 Cor 6:7-8).242
However, although it is true that the Bride, as such, does not pre-exist the choice which 
constitutes her election, it is equally true that the quality of ‘Groom’ cannot pre-exist the 
response  of  the  bride.  Response  is  an  action  that  follows  a  prior  action,  and  is 
consequent upon it. In the case of the Church the action upon which her response is 
consequent is God’s election, God’s choice of her. This choice is an act of grace by God 
in that he chose her as tarnished and purified her. Yet as Congar says, this response is a 
‘free response of faith and love: it brings something that would be absent if she failed to 
give it.’ Indeed, ‘the realisation of the purpose of God [is] dependent on this response of 
love at the same time as being the gratuitous initiative of God.’ At this point in the 
discussion, Balthasar would draw heavily upon Mary as the one who offers the perfect 
response  of  humanity  to  God,  in  whom  all  our  responses  are  completed,  and  her 
complete absence from Congar’s exploration of the Church as person, until his final 
paragraph,  is  intriguing.  However,  despite  using  personal  language  of  gift,  choice, 
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response and love, with the Church as both object and subject, Congar insists that this 
language is analogical rather than metaphorical – there is no person who is this ‘Bride’.
But this Bride, who is  like another person,  is not another thing, more like a community of 
saints than an institution… All are brides (toutes sont épouses) but they are seen and wanted 
as such by God as members of the Bride who is the Church, that is, in the body of the single  
and whole intention of the Covenant. There is no hypostasis of the Church-Bride other than 
the whole reality, an expression of the intention of grace, of election and covenant of which  
we have spoken. (Italics added)243
The notion that ‘all are brides’ is a strange one that appears neither anywhere else in the 
paper, nor in the NT. Congar offers no explanation for its origin nor of its defence – he 
simply states it.244 However, it is a common theme among patristic writers at least from 
Tertullian onwards.245 At its heart, it concurs with his notion of the individual union of 
each believer with Christ through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. This makes some 
sense with his notion of ‘person’ as individual substance, and attempts to take seriously 
the  personal  description  of  Christ  as  ‘groom’,  which  would  otherwise  simply  be 
analogical. However, the idea that each individual soul is a bride of Christ, i.e. that there 
are  ‘brides’  of  Christ,  is  not  NT teaching,  did not  exist  before  the 3rd century,  and 
indeed, runs counter to the exclusive usage of the term as a description of the whole 
Church.246
The  difference  between  metaphor  and analogy that  Congar  draws  implicitly  in  this 
passage, and throughout the latter part of the paper, forces the issue of personhood to 
the fore. In saying that the Bride is ‘like’ a person, but ‘is not another thing’ (n’est autre  
chose), he separates out the necessity of defining  ‘bride’ as coincident with  ‘person’. 
That  is,  he  is  taking  a  term  used  as  the  subject  of  the  most  intimate  of  human 
relationships, and removing the content of personhood from it. The ‘Bride’ no longer is 
a person, but is like a person. He has introduced a gulf between the two terms such that 
there is no longer any interdependence between them, only similarity. It is difficult to 
see what is left in the term ‘bride’ once the substance of personhood has been removed 
from it.
The corollary of this position is that the description of Christ as ‘Groom’ also becomes 
devoid of personal, and hence relational, content. For if the bride is not a person, then 
243 Congar, ‘La personne’, p639
244 There is, however, a reference in a footnote to compare with a passage by Chavasse in The Bride of  
Christ, pp83-85. See p184, below.
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neither can the groom be a ‘person’ in his relationship with her. The entire relationship 
becomes one of analogy, and the terms  ‘bride’ and  ‘groom’ do not  participate in the 
relationship between Christ and the Church.
However, the language, particularly of the NT, seems to speak in more definitive terms 
of the relationship between the two: Congar appears to be in danger of imposing his 
philosophical presuppositions onto the text. Gunton suggests that, with reference to talk 
about symbolism and analogy,
to begin with the concrete relationships expressed in the New Testament metaphors, is to  
centre  attention  on  the  way in  which  theological  language  actually  has  been  used  and, 
perhaps, should or may be used now.247
In this context, it is to allow the relationship expressed in the metaphor of Christ and 
Church as Groom and Bride to define the true nature of the content of both ‘groom’ and 
‘bride’, and hence also ‘marriage’, rather than predefine the nature of the relationships. 
Centring attention on the relationship reveals that the nuptial language of both the Old 
and New Testaments expresses both something concrete about God’s relationship with 
humanity,  which is revealed definitively in Christ, and the true nature of the human 
relationship of marriage, of which Christ’s relationship with the Church becomes the 
referent.  Thus,  when  Jesus  refers  to  himself  as  a  ‘bridegroom’  in  the  gospels,  he 
describes himself as the bridegroom in reference to whom all other bridegrooms are to 
be  understood.  That  is,  he  is  the  one  to  whom  the  most  intimate  of  all  human 
relationships must refer in order to understand the significance of their existence. Not 
only  is  he,  in  this,  the  source  of  the  significance  of  the  term,  but  he  is  also  most 
supremely a person, since this is the most intimate of human relations (Gen 2:24).
Furthermore, Christ being named as ‘groom’ supposes the existence of one to whom he 
will be united as ‘bride’. Just as Eve was created as Adam’s bride from his body, so the 
Church comes into existence as she is taken from Christ’s body on the cross, in baptism, 
and the Eucharist, as the Fathers understood. In the same act that she is created from 
Christ’s body, she is created as his bride. That is, she is created from his body in order 
to be united to him as his bride, so that they may become one body. This is the nature of 
communion. Adam was a  ‘man’ before Eve was created, but only a  ‘man’ as distinct 
from an ‘animal’, i.e. generically. He became ‘man’ as distinct from ‘woman’ only as 
Eve was created, and he was husband only in so far as he was united with his bride.  
Hence both the bride and groom are mutually constitutive of each other as such, in their 
247 Gunton, Atonement, p48
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relation to each other, just as the Father and the Son are mutually constitutive of each 
other as such – there can be no ‘Father’ without a Son to name him such, and no ‘Son’ 
without a Father to name him such.
In his final paragraph Congar offers Mary as the  ‘excellent personal realisation of the 
response of the Church, and even of all humanity, to the offer of the bridal union of 
God.’  He testifies  to the personal  joy and spiritual  benefits  over many years  of the 
liturgical use of the Magnificat as a song inseparably of both Mary and of the Church,  
seeing them as having ‘the same heart and the same voice’, being
spiritually the same person, being the same term and reality of the same design of grace, one 
in a personal and perfect way, the other in a collective way, as in the beautiful phrase of H 
Rahner calling the Church ‘the Mary of the history of the world’.248
His reticence to refer to Mary in the course of his discussion, in contrast to Balthasar  
who leans heavily upon her as the one in whom all participate, derives from his more 
individualistic definition of salvation, in terms of the uniting of individual souls to God. 
Mary is nothing more than the prime example whom all are to emulate. She is nothing 
like Balthasar’s co-redemtprix, woven into the fabric of salvation and the dispenser of 
grace to the rest of the Church. Hers is not, for Congar, the consciousness in whom all 
participate,  however  much  her  response  is  the  ‘excellent  personal  realisation  of  the 
response of the Church, and even of all humanity.’
Throughout this paper and earlier writings, Congar does not draw out the relationship 
between the two metaphors of the Church as Christ’s Body and his Bride. We have seen 
that there has been a tendency in Catholic ecclesiology over the years, as described by 
Congar,  to  dwell  heavily  on  the  metaphor  of  the  Body.  However,  a  shift  towards 
describing the Church as Bride coincides with a greater emphasis on the role of the 
Spirit in the Church and in its relation with Christ. Balthasar struggles deeply with the 
relationship between the two, and finds a form of solution in the uniting of the (male) 
Institution  as  representative  of  Christ  with  the  (female)  receptivity  of  the  Church, 
primarily  in  the Eucharist.  Congar  does hint,  in  several  places,  at  the nature of  the 
relationship between the two, especially with reference to Gen 2:24. But there is little in 
the main text that develops this relationship.
In a  footnote towards  the  end of  the paper,  Congar  cites  an extended quotation  by 
Bossuet, the 17th Century French Bishop of Meaux, who, as well as being outspoken 
against Protestants, led the Catholic Gallican stand against the Roman ultra-montanist 
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insistence on supreme papal authority over France. In this reference, which Congar says 
one can never tire of citing, he draws together for the first and last time the relationship 
between the metaphors of the Church as Body and Bride. It is worth quoting in full 
because it reaches the heart of the significance of the relationship between them:
Man chooses his bride, but he is formed with his members: Jesus Christ, the particular Man,  
chose the Church;  Jesus-Christ,  the perfect Man, was formed and completes his forming 
every day in the Church and with the Church. The Church as Bride belongs to Jesus Christ  
by his choice; the Church as Body belongs to Jesus-Christ by a deeply intimate operation of 
the Holy Spirit of God. The system of election through the promises of engagement, appear 
in the name of Bride; and the mystery of the consummated unity through the infusion of the 
Spirit, is seen in the name of Body. The name of Body makes us see how the Church belongs 
to Jesus Christ; the title of Bride makes us see that she was estranged from him, and that it is  
willingly that he seeks after her. Thus the name Bride makes us see unity through love and 
will; and the name  Body compels us to hear unity as natural: such that in the unity of the  
body something most  intimate is apparent,  and in the unity of the bride something most  
sensitive and most tender. Fundamentally this is only the same thing: Jesus Christ has loved 
the Church and he has made her his bride; Jesus Christ has accomplished his marriage with 
the Church, and he has made her his body. Thus the truth: Two in one flesh, bone of my bone  
and flesh of my flesh (Gen 2:23). It is this which was said to Adam and to Eve; and this is  
(says the Apostle) a great sacrament between Jesus Christ and his Church (Eph 5:32). Thus 
the unity of the body is the final seal which confirms the title Bride.249
In this passage Bossuet explicitly identifies the metaphor of ‘body’ as the completion, 
the ‘final seal’ of the ‘one-flesh’ union of Christ and the Church, which ‘confirms the 
title Bride.’ He speaks of this union as ‘accomplished’, in the past tense, with perhaps 
an over-realised eschatology, and in doing this loses the eschatological richness of the 
parabolic and Eucharistic references to the wedding feast. Nevertheless, he does identify 
the coincidence of the two metaphors in both the OT and NTs. The question he leaves 
unresolved is whether these are metaphors to be understood as relational, and therefore 
personal, or, with Congar, they remain purely allegorical.
 2.3 Ecclesiology in ‘I Believe in the Holy Spirit’
 2.3.1 Christology Revisited
As we have seen, in his earlier work Congar identified the real Church, the ontological 
Church, with the Mystical Body of Christ  or the Bride of Christ.  This reality exists  
eschatologically  but  is  made  present  interiorly  and  sacramentally.  His  distinction 
between the sending of the Son by the Father as separate from the work of the Holy 
Spirit  lead  to  a  direct  distinction  in  the  Church  between  the  Instituted  Body 
commissioned by Jesus, and the Mystical Body generated by the Spirit. However, the 
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criticism was made that in this dualistic view the absence of the created order from the 
Mystical Body, other than sacramentally, relegating Christ’s createdness to the level of 
instrumental.
Congar responded to this criticism in his work I Believe In The Holy Spirit, where he 
explicitly acknowledges the problems introduced by his dualistic approach, particularly 
with respect to the division between the work of Christ and the work of the Spirit.250
He addresses the imbalance by revisiting his christology in the first volume, since, he 
states, ‘our first task is ecclesiological’251 – the point being that ecclesiology must start 
in christology: if the christology is right, the pneumatology, and thus ecclesiology, will 
follow.
His grounding is explicitly biblical.252 He therefore starts with a survey of the Spirit in 
the Old Testament, going on to look at the Spirit’s relationship to Jesus in the New, 
followed by a brief résumé of the Tradition. His concern is to identify the role of the 
Spirit  in the Incarnation,  and in particular,  the relationship of the Incarnation to the 
Baptism of Jesus, for this is where he perceives the problem with his earlier theology.
2.3.1.1 The Word and Baptism
Congar maintains that Jesus’ baptism is the decisive moment in his mission: it is not 
simply an annunciation, since this is, for example, where Mark locates the beginning of 
his gospel.253
There  are  ‘two missions’,  that  of  the Word and that  of  the  Spirit.  The  relationship 
between them is defined by the activity of the Spirit at Jesus’ birth and his baptism. We 
shall turn to the mission of the Word shortly, but the mission of the Spirit is proclaimed 
at Jesus’ baptism:
This is the beginning of the eschatological period characterised by the gift of the Spirit to a 
people of God with a universal vocation. At his baptism by John the Baptist, Jesus is marked 
out and dedicated as the one by whose words, sacrifice and activity the Spirit enters the  
history  of  mankind  as  a  messianic  gift  and,  at  least  as arrha or  earnest-money,  as  an 
eschatological gift.254
Eschatology is the domain of the Spirit, even at Jesus’ baptism. However, despite the 
use of the term,  arrha, Congar does not at any stage explore the imagery behind the 
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term, which naturally relates to the bridal concept of Jewish dowry. Understanding the 
gift of the life-giving Spirit in this sense opens a new dimension to the relation between 
the missions of the Word and the Spirit, both in terms of messianic and eschatological 
gift: Jesus receives the Spirit in order for humanity to become wedded to God through 
Christ by the Spirit.
Congar’s focus at  the moment,  however,  is  on the relation  of Jesus’ baptism to his 
incarnation. In the gospels, therefore, the baptism of Jesus is the anointing by the Spirit 
of God, when he was ‘called and sent as the Messiah and that Messiah is described as 
having the characteristics of a prophet, as a king in the line of David and his house... 
and also as the Servant.’255
The  purpose of Jesus’ baptism, and this is the mission of the Spirit,  is  for us to be 
baptised in the same Spirit.256 This is why Congar talks in terms of the Spirit ‘entering 
the  history  of  mankind…as  an  eschatological  gift.’  The  mission  of  the  Spirit  is  to 
sanctify the people of God as the people of God. Although the Spirit was active in the 
conception of Jesus, this was under the old disposition, in which the Spirit’s activity 
was as the Spirit-Breath of creation and life. At his baptism a new mission of the Spirit 
was inaugurated:
A new communication or mission was initiated in the event of his baptism, when he was 
declared the Messiah, the one on whom the Spirit rests, who will act through the Spirit and 
who, once he has become the glorified Lord, will give the Spirit.257
This mission of the Spirit is more than a baptism of power. It is the very essence of 
Jesus’ sacrificial mission. ‘It was for this reason that the Word became Jesus Christ.’ 
The giving of God’s Spirit to the world is at the heart of the purpose of the Incarnation.  
It is the Father’s gift to the world to usher in the new creation through the death and 
resurrection of Christ, to make his people holy and thereby acceptable to him – as the 
bride  of  his  Son.  Jesus’  sacrifice  on  the  cross,  prefigured  in  his  baptism,  is  thus 
undertaken through the Spirit.
It  would undoubtedly be claiming too much if we were to say that the baptism of Jesus 
contained the whole doctrine of his substitutive death, but there can be no doubt...that Jesus 
came to be baptised and that he experienced the event with the intention of offering himself  
and being open to God’s plan for him... Jesus in fact saw his death as a ‘baptism’ (Mk 10:38; 
255 Congar, I believe, Vol.1, p17
256 Congar, I believe, Vol.1, p20
257 Congar,  I believe, Vol.1, p16. See also p45: ‘The communication of the Spirit to the disciples is 
therefore not a total replacement for Christ, but rather a transmission of his prophetic mission (in  
the full sense of the word), which consists of being the one who proclaims the message of God… It  
is possible to say that Christ transmits to his apostles the presence of the Spirit that he received in  
the Jordan.’
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Lk 12:50). He offered himself to God as a spotless victim through the ‘eternal spirit’, that is,  
the Holy Spirit. His sacrifice was the consequence of this baptism, and his glory was the 
consequence of his sacrifice.258
Having established the centrality of Jesus baptism to his mission as Messiah and the 
mission of the Spirit, he links the baptism, and hence anointing by the Spirit, to Jesus’ 
birth. In particular, he links two announcements. Firstly, the declaration in Luke-Acts 
that Jesus was announced as the Messiah (i.e. the ‘Anointed One’) to Mary (Lk 1:31-
33), to the shepherds (Lk 2:11), and by Simeon (Lk 2:26) at his birth. Secondly, the 
declarations made by Peter in Acts that Jesus was ‘made both Lord and Christ’ (2:36)259 
and  that  ‘God  anointed  Jesus  of  Nazareth  with  the  Holy  Spirit  and  with  power’ 
(10:38)260.  That  which  Jesus  was  announced  to  be  at  his  birth  was  fulfilled  in  his 
baptism: ‘the revelatory and soteriological part played by Christ cannot by separated 
from what he was constituted to be from the beginning.’261 Therefore the Spirit was 
involved  in  sanctifying  Jesus  from the  beginning.  In  discussing  the  contribution  of 
Heribert Mühlen, he summarises it thus:
It is not that Christ was not made holy at the moment of his conception. It is rather that this  
sanctification should not be attributed to the hypostatic union as such, that is, the mission of 
the Word, but to the Holy Spirit. The mission of the Spirit is the consequence in time – ‘in 
the fullness of time’ – of his eternal procession ‘from the Father and the Son’, as the term of 
their  mutual  love,  first  in  Mary’s  womb  and  then  in  the  Church,  whose  supernatural 
existence is connected with the Spirit of Jesus.262
Notwithstanding his dubious use of the filioque clause (Bulgakov uses exactly the same 
event  to  demonstrate  that  Spirit  in  not subordinate  to  the  Son but  is  sent  from the 
Father),  this  is  a  remarkable  shift  in  Congar’s  christology  and  pneumatology.  The 
sanctification of humanity is here accomplished by the Holy Spirit in uniting the Word 
with  humanity.  Not  only  so,  but  the  ‘supernatural  existence’  of  the  Church is  now 
‘connected with the Spirit of Jesus’ rather than the direct mission of the Word, in the 
same way that the Spirit was the agent of the Incarnation.
The mission of the Word, then, as indicated above and in distinction to the mission of 
the Spirit, is the assumption of humanity. That is, that although the sanctification and 
anointing of Jesus are the work of the Spirit, and his sacrifice is made effective through 
the Spirit, nevertheless the actions performed by Jesus are attributed to the Word, or 
Son, because he was the subject of Jesus’ humanity:
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because  of  the  hypostatic  union,  the  Word  or  Son  of  ‘God’  is  the  principle  of  Jesus’  
existence and the metaphysical subject to which his actions are attributed.263
So  there  are  the  two  missions,  that  of  the  Word  and  that  of  the  Spirit.  However, 
although the Spirit is active in the Incarnation, it is at Jesus’ baptism that the Spirit’s 
mission, his ‘pouring out’, his ‘coming’, is inaugurated for us.
2.3.1.2 The Spirit and Incarnation
The form of the distinction Congar makes between the mission of the Word and of the 
Spirit relates to the procession of the Spirit as defined in the filioque. As the mission of 
the Word in the Incarnation precedes that of the Spirit at Jesus’ baptism in the economy, 
so  this  order  reflects  the  procession  of  the  persons  in  the  immanent  Trinity.  The 
procession of the Spirit from the Son means that the Son takes humanity to himself, and 
that humanity is secondarily sanctified:
Thomas [Aquinas] distinguished two aspects, following one another not in time, but in logic 
and by nature, the first relating to the assumption of a human nature by the Word and the  
second to the Spirit who fills that man-God with gifts of grace.264
The essential thing is to respect the two missions,  of the Word and of the Spirit,  on the 
pattern of the succession which derives from the procession within the Trinity.265
In other words, the Son accomplishes the Incarnation, the assumption of humanity, the 
hypostatic  union ontologically  prior  to  the sanctification  of  that  humanity,  which  is 
subsequently  accomplished  by the  Holy  Spirit.266 So  although  he  acknowledges  the 
activity of the Holy Spirit in the Incarnation he does not consider this to be an integral 
part  of  the  Incarnation  for  us.  Rather,  it  is  the  work  of  the  Spirit  under  the  old  
disposition, in which he was God’s active Breath in creation:
There is no doubt that the Spirit was active before Jesus’ coming, under the old disposition. 
It was by the Spirit that Mary conceived Jesus, whose quality of ‘son of God’ is mentioned  
by Luke (1:35), in whose gospel it refers, not to Jesus’ pre-existence, but to his conception  
by the Holy Spirit.267
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266 ‘It  is the Spirit  who, by activating in Mary her capacity as a woman to conceive (and thereby  
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Thus, on the basis of the filioque, Congar defines the hypostatic union itself solely as an 
act of the Word. In trying to define distinct missions of the Word and the Spirit he has 
driven an ontological wedge through the work of the Spirit, with (exterior) creation on 
one side and (interior) sanctification on the other.
He translates this succession directly into the structure of the Church:
Ought  we,  then,  not  to  recognize  a  similar  order  in  the  Church…by stressing  the  real  
connection  between the  Church  and the  Incarnation  as  such? Was  the institution of  the 
Twelve by Jesus (see Mk 3:14) not  followed by the sanctification and animation of  the 
apostles  by  the  Spirit  of  Pentecost?  And  was  the  institution  of  the  sacraments  and  the 
delivery of the message of the gospel not followed by the making present of those gifts of the 
covenant by the Spirit?268
It is perplexing that these comments follow so soon after his insistence that the ministry 
of Jesus is carried out in the context of his anointing by the Holy Spirit in his baptism. 
When Congar asks ‘Was the institution of the Twelve by Jesus not followed by the 
sanctification and animation of the apostles by the Spirit at Pentecost?’ we want to reply 
‘Did not the institution of the Twelve, itself, follow the anointing of the Messiah at his 
baptism?’269 Or is Congar trying to suggest that, because the Spirit had not yet  been 
poured out at  Pentecost,  he was not involved in,  or did not sanctify,  the actions  of 
Christ,  including  his  teaching  and  the  institution  of  the  sacraments?  His  line  of 
reasoning only makes sense if one is to see certain actions of the anointed Christ, such 
as his calling and appointing of the Twelve, teaching etc., as actions of the Word and 
not the Spirit, whereas other actions, such as his baptism and death on the cross, pertain 
to the ministry of the Holy Spirit. Certainly the Spirit had not yet been poured out when 
the Twelve were called. However, to suggest this was therefore an act of the incarnate 
Word,  without  the  involvement  of  the  Spirit,  is  to  reduce  Christ’s  baptism and his 
anointing by the Holy Spirit to a purely instrumental act. It has no effect on his ministry 
other than to make his sacrifice efficacious for others.
And yet this does not accord with his own earlier statements concerning the role of the 
Spirit in the life of Jesus:
Pentecost was for the Church what his baptism was for Jesus, that is, the gift and the power  
of the Spirit, dedication to the ministry,  mission and bearing witness...The coming of the 
Spirit at Jesus’ baptism, then, is clearly seen as his anointing for his messianic ministry. That  
anointing is both royal and prophetic.270
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In this and other passages Congar is quite clear that, although ‘because of the hypostatic 
union,  the  Word  or  Son  of  “God”  is  the  principle  of  Jesus’  experience  and  the 
metaphysical subject to which his actions are attributed,’271 they are also all actions of 
the  Holy  Spirit,  and  undertaken  through  his  anointing  and  empowering.  These 
statements represent a development in Congar’s pneumatology noted by others.272
It makes little sense, then, to separate out the institution of the Twelve, Jesus teaching, 
the institution of the sacraments etc. as part of the mission of the Word, which is only 
subsequently anointed by the Spirit at Pentecost.
Congar may be attempting to give concrete space to the mission of the Spirit in the 
economy by indicating the connection between the activity of the Word and the Spirit. 
However, these statements, made in the first volume of I Believe, sound remarkably like 
the earlier Congar, where he stressed the distinction between the activity of the Word 
and the Spirit. This followed through into his ecclesiology as the distinction between, 
and, indeed, primacy of the activity of the apostolate over that of the Spirit, again based 
on the  hierarchical  inner-Trinitarian  relations  expressed  in  the  filioque clause.  They 
seem very difficult  to reconcile with the more integrated pneumatology found in the 
second volume, where he stresses the involvement of the Holy Spirit in the institution of 
the Church:
Irenæus expressed the derivation of the Church from the two missions, that of the Word and  
that of the Breath, in a poetical manner in the image of the two hands of God… [He] also 
showed the apostles as instituting and founding the Church by communicating to believers 
the Spirit that they had received from the Lord: ‘That Holy Spirit that they had received from 
the Lord is shared among and distributed to believers; in this way they instituted and founded 
the Church’...  This must mean that the Spirit did not come simply in order to animate an  
institution that was already fully determined in all its structures, but that he is really the ‘co-
instituting’ principle.273 (Italics added)
If it is true that the Twelve were instituted by Jesus – with the cooperation of the Holy 
Spirit (Acts 1:2) – did the succession in their ministry not begin with the initiative of the 
Holy Spirit, at least in the historical form of a mono-episcopacy?274
In these passages there is no hierarchical distinction between the work of the Word and 
the Spirit.  Instead,  there is  seen a  mutuality  in  which the work of  the Spirit,  while 
distinct from that of the Word, is seen as an integral part of Jesus’ life and mission. It is, 
perhaps,  telling  that  in  both  his  earlier  Christology  and  his  comments  above  from 
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272 E.g. Groppe, Yves Congar
273 Congar, I believe, Vol.2, p9
274 Congar, I believe, Vol.2, p10
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Volume 1, the priority and hierarchical nature of the Institution over the Spirit occurs 
within the context of relating the nature of the Church to the relations in the Trinity in 
the light of the filioque clause.
It is also interesting to note that it is when referring to Irenæus that Congar appears to 
come  closest  to  this  mutuality  between  the  activities  of  the  Word  and  Spirit.  In 
discussing  the  relationship  between  the  Institution  of  the  Church  and  the  Spirit, 
particularly in relation to pneumatic activity, he recognises the Spirit as ‘the principle 
giving life to the Church and faith.’
He quotes the passage from Irenæus ending ‘Where the Church (ecclesia) is, there is 
also the Spirit of God and where the Spirit of God is, there are also the Church and all 
grace. And the Spirit is truth.’275 Here, there is no Church without the Spirit, just as there 
is no life in the flesh without the breath of God. It is not so much that there are two 
distinct missions, one of the Word and one of the Spirit, but that both are active in the 
one mission of God, the one act of creation. The Word creates the body, as it were, and 
the Spirit breathes life into it, although this is not how he interprets it. Rather, he sees 
the Spirit and the Church as ‘conditioning’ each other. There is still a mutuality in the 
relationship between the two, but he sees them in ‘dialectical tension’.276
He makes the Irenæan concept of the Spirit as the breath of life in the Church more 
explicit in an endnote, where he refers it to not only the renewal of the faith handed 
down  from  the  apostles,  but  also  the  making  present  of  that  faith  in  the  local 
community, both of which are the activity of the Spirit.277
2.3.1.3 Conclusion
In conclusion, Congar has moderately redefined his understanding of the nature of the 
Incarnation through reviewing his pneumatology. He sees a progression of the work of 
the  Spirit  in  creation  from  exterior  (‘the  old  disposition’)  to  interior  (‘the  new 
disposition’), with the Incarnation being the event that divides the two. The Incarnation, 
rather than being solely a work of the Word, is now a joint work of the Word and the 
Spirit, but in a way that separates (or joins) the two dispositions of the Spirit. The Spirit  
overshadows  Mary  to  create  the  human  being  in  her  womb  (in  keeping  with  its 
operation under the old disposition) that the Word then unites to himself. The Word has 
275 Irenæus, Against Heresies, III.24.1
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now entered  the  world  and the  new disposition  has  begun.  This  humanity,  now in 
hypostatic union with the Word, is then sanctified by the Holy Spirit. The sequential 
description refers to ontological  priority rather than temporal,  but at  all  times is  the 
activity  of  the  Spirit  strictly  subservient  to  that  of  the  Word,  in  keeping  with  the 
theology of the filioque.
The Incarnation, itself, is announced in the Scriptures from the beginning as a messianic 
mission, that is, Jesus is to be the Christ, the ‘anointed one’, a work of the Spirit. The 
mission  to introduce the Kingdom of God into the economy,  the mission of Christ, 
however, is only inaugurated at his baptism, which prefigures his saving death on the 
cross. Thus Christ’s Incarnation, his anointing by the Spirit, his baptism and his death 
are all linked pneumatologically. However, Christ’s baptism and anointing by the Holy 
Spirit occur in order to make his sacrifice efficacious for us after Pentecost.
Congar is ambiguous, if not contradictory, in the way he sees the operation of the Spirit 
in the life and ministry of Jesus. At one point he speaks of Jesus teaching, healing, 
ministering,  proclaiming the Gospel in and through the anointing action of the Holy 
Spirit as a consequence of his baptism. But later he goes on to say that the institution of 
the Twelve, Jesus’ teaching, and the sacraments are all actions of the mission of the 
Word as distinct from that of the Spirit, which anoints them later at Pentecost. This is 
the pattern of the institution of the Church, he says, because of the hierarchical theology 
of the filioque.
Congar refers to the filioque to support his understanding of the Spirit as ‘the term of 
their  [the  Father’s  and  the  Son’s]  mutual  love,’278 that  is,  the  Spirit  is  mutually 
constitutive of the Father and the Son. However, his ecclesiology seems to lapse back 
into a linear trinitarianism that gives an ontological priority to the work of the Son over 
any activity of the Spirit.
The consequence  is  that,  despite  all  the  promise  of  a  more  coherent  and integrated 
ecclesial ontology, we are left with the old fundamental and dualistic division between a 
temporary,  exterior and visible Body and an eternal but interior, mystical Body. The 
unity  of  the  former  still  derives  from  obedience  to  a  juridical  authority  derived 
apneumatically from the mission of the Word, while the unity of the latter is derived 
from  the  singularity  and  interiority  of  the  Spirit.  As  long  as  the  Church  in  its  
constitution remains juridically, that is pneumatically, connected with Christ, it can only 
278 Congar, I believe, Vol.1, p24
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be described in terms of his body. The ontological space required for the Other remains 
absent.
It appears that, as far as Volume 1 of I Believe is concerned, Congar has failed to fulfil 
the promise of his own pneumatological corrective. More importantly, he has failed to 
provide an integral place for the entire created order in his ecclesiology, relegating it to 
the instrumental in the temporariness of sacramentality. All stems from his theology of 
the filioque.
 2.3.2 The Person ‘Church’ and ‘the Bride’
Congar does not devote much space in the trilogy either to the notion of the Church as a 
‘person’ or as ‘bride,’ although both have specifically titled sections within Volume 2. 
His passage ‘Is the Church a person?’ comprises one side,279 while ‘The Church as the 
Bride’ comprises two.280 Clearly these are not major concerns in this work, even though 
the first part of the second volume is dedicated to exploring the relationship between the 
Spirit and the Church.
Nevertheless,  he  re-positions  certain  aspects  of  his  ecclesiology.  In  particular,  his 
question concerning the personhood of the Church arises in the context of church unity 
residing in the singularity of the Holy Spirit. His pastoral concern has led him away 
from his earlier dependence on juridical authority as the basis of unity, which he sees as 
crushing  the  gifts  of  the  individual.  The  Spirit  is  the  gentler  and  enlivening,  but 
transcendent, source of unity.
The Spirit, who is both one and transcendent, is able to penetrate all things without violating 
or doing violence to them.281
Congar’s language here is future-based, concerned with ‘becoming’: the Spirit ‘brings 
about unity’ rather than it being imposed. The Spirit is associated with the eschaton, is 
‘an  eschatological  reality’,  being  the  ‘arrha or  earnest-money’,  his  presence 
guaranteeing our participation in the future kingdom of God. He refers to the Spirit as 
one who indwells each person, enabling them to participate in a mutual indwelling:
[The Spirit] is the extreme communication of God himself, God as grace, God in us and, in 
this  sense,  God  outside  himself...  This  communication  and  interiority  do  not  lead  to  a 
merging together. It is rather a state of indwelling – God dwells in us and we dwell in him. 
There is no confusion of persons. This is the way in which there is a realisation of the mutual  
279 Congar, I Believe, Vol.2, pp19-20
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interiority of the whole in each which constitutes the catholic sense: kath’ holou, being of a 
piece with the whole. The Spirit enables all men to be one and unity to be a multitude.282
There is a dynamic sense of unity established through the Holy Spirit in these passages 
which was not present in his earlier writing, while retaining an ontological basis of that 
unity. The oneness of catholicity derives from the being of God, using the trinitarian 
relations  to  protect  the  distinctiveness  of  each  person.  His  concept  of  ‘catholic’ 
interiority  strongly  suggests  the  influence  of  Zizioulas,  to  whom  he  dedicates  an 
appendix at the end of this section.283 The unity of the Church here is based not on the 
apostolate, nor primarily on God’s ‘will,’ but on the Spirit’s presence as ‘God outside 
himself,’ although he does still refer to God’s ‘purpose’ and the ‘mystery of the will’ of 
God as related to the Church’s unity.284 This leads him directly to talk of the Spirit’s 
relationship with the Church in the traditional sense as the ‘soul’ of the Church as the 
Body of Christ, reminiscent of his Mystical Body theology in Mystery.285
2.3.2.1 The Church as Person
It  is  from here that  he raises the question of whether  the  Church is  a  ‘person’.  He 
acknowledges that the Church has its own reality, is, indeed a subject with attributable 
properties; he names unity, holiness, catholicity, apostolicity, and indefectibility. So he 
asks:
Should we say therefore that the Church has a created personality which is peculiar to it, or  
should we rather say that Christ is the ‘I’ of the Church or that the Spirit is its supreme  
personality or its transcendent ‘I’?286
Although he believes that such a proposition can be accepted, both of these possibilities 
lead to seemingly insurmountable difficulties in interpreting relations with respect to the 
biblical witness. It is important to note here that Congar’s basic point of reference is 
Scripture,  rather  than  inherited  Tradition  or  Mariology.  One  reason  is  that  in  and 
through Scripture there exists a close connection between the Word and the Spirit.287 He 
goes on to ask
If Christ is the ‘I’ of the Church, how can the Church be his bride? And if the Holy Spirit is  
the ‘I’ of the Church, how can it be the Body of Christ?288
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Nevertheless, Congar notes, there is a oneness pertaining to the Church that, time and 
again, is related in Scripture back to the oneness of God, Christ and the Holy Spirit. 
Although he does not explore the oneness of God in this context, it should be apparent 
that the doctrine of the unity of God must here play a crucial role in defining the nature 
of the unity of the Church. For example, is the unity of God based on his substantial  
unity, his ousia, or on the perichoretic relations of the three hypostases? The answer to 
this question leads to two very different understandings of the nature of the unity of the 
Church.
But in answering his own question about the personhood of the Church, Congar remains 
ambiguous. On the one hand he states
By appropriation the Holy Spirit is the subject who brings about everything that depends on 
grace  or,  as  C  Journet  said,  the  supreme  and  transcendent  effective  personality  of  the 
Church.289
But he then goes on immediately to qualify this by saying that the Holy Spirit is not 
consubstantial with us; the Son, however, is. The Son’s humanity,  made holy by the 
Spirit, is the source of grace so that the Son, together with the Spirit, are the ‘authors of 
the Body.’ However, the humanity is Christ’s alone, personally, ‘homogeneous with its 
members.’ For this reason it is his body, not the Holy Spirit’s.
So we are left with the impression that the Church is in some sense a ‘person’, but we 
have no clear understanding of who the ‘I’ of the Church is for Congar. In some senses 
it is the ‘I’ of the Holy Spirit, and in others it is the ‘I’ of Christ. What he is careful not 
to admit is the possibility of some other ‘I’.
The  consequence  of  this  position  is  that,  in  relation  to  God,  there  remains  no 
autonomous response from Creation to God’s call or invitation. The ‘I’ of Christ is the 
‘I’ of the Son, the Word, and the ‘I’ of the Spirit is that of the Third Hypostasis. So in 
both cases the unity of the Church, or the ‘I’  that  responds to the ‘Thou’ of God’s 
invitation, is always already a part of the already-constituted Trinity.  This leaves the 
difficulty of Creation’s freedom to respond to Christ, which is precisely the point of the 
bridal language employed in the Gospels, by Paul, and by John. The wedding feast, the 
presentation  of  the  bride  to  the  bridegroom,  and  the  call  of  the  bride  to  ‘come’ 
correspond to the beckoning of Creation by the One who has taken its substance and 
redeemed it. It is for exactly this reason that Bulgakov places such heavy emphasis on 
289 Congar, I believe, Vol.2, p20
97
the response of Mary in the Annunciation: she represents the free, personal response of 
Creation to God’s invitation.
2.3.2.2 The Church as Bride
It is in the context of ‘holiness’ that Congar comes to the Church as ‘bride.’ The only 
two locations that he observes referring to the Church, as such, as being ‘holy,’ rather 
than individuals (e.g. ‘saints’) are Ephesians (5:26, 27) and 1 Corinthians 3:16ff. The 
first of these names the Church as ‘bride’, the second as ‘temple.’ These, then are the 
two categories under which he explores the Church’s ‘holiness.’290 However, even here 
he sees these descriptions as primarily individualist:
The Church, then, is a bride and a temple, but strictly speaking every believing soul is a  
bride, and every believer is a temple; this is in the New Testament291 and is proclaimed again 
and again by the Fathers.292
This insistence on the priority of the individual for Congar is worth noting. He claims 
that  the  Fathers’  understanding of  the  catholicity  of  the  Church in  each believer  is 
evidence that the individual is the primary referent for the description of ‘bride’ and 
‘temple’:
At least since Origen, whose influence was very great, but even before him – Hippolytus, for 
example – the Fathers and other early authors said that ‘every soul is the Church.’ Every soul  
is a bride and every soul is a temple. The liturgy passed from one to the other and from the  
singular to the plural, using the singular first.293
Congar’s reference to 2 Cor 11:2 as his sole Scriptural text in support of the notion that 
the individual soul is the bride is extraordinary,  since in the Greek Paul quite clearly 
equates the plural ‘you’ to the singular ‘holy virgin,’ not the plural ‘holy virgins’ which 
his interpretation would require. Likewise, his Scriptural references to the temple are 
either collective (‘you’ [plural] are the ‘temple’ [singular], never ‘temples’ [plural]), or 
else refer to the physical body of the Christian, never the soul. These texts are much 
more persuasive in demonstrating the opposite notion, that the church in each place is a 
singular ‘temple’ or ‘virgin,’ in which each person participates.
290 cf. Bulgakov’s rubric in which the Church is complementarily ‘Body’ and ‘Temple’, in relation to 
Christ and the Spirit, respectively,  and thirdly as ‘Bride’ pertaining to the Church in distinction 
from Christ and the Spirit.
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also 2 Tim 1:14’
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Indeed, Congar cites 2 Cor 11:2 (along with Eph 5:25-27, 29-31 and Tit 3:5-7) as the 
‘most important New Testament texts that are in some way related to the theme of the 
Church as the bride.’294 He goes on to elucidate the principal themes of the wedding 
between Christ and the Church, a Tradition which he has ‘studied with great love.’ The 
most important of these is the notion of election and the importance of response:
It [the Tradition] sees it [the mystery of that wedding] as an election of grace, by means of a 
choice and an appeal and by means of an anticipatory love.295
It is clear that he recognises the fundamental element of free response, ‘choice’ and 
‘appeal’, in the concept of the nuptial metaphor. The election, following Augustine,296 is 
achieved through the ‘marriage’ of human nature with divine nature in the incarnation 
in Christ.
Christ assumed soiled human nature and purified it, by making it his betrothed or bride.297
Purification is achieved through his baptism and the death on the cross. But this still 
leaves the aspect of the free ‘response’ to Christ’s election.  Baptism and crucifixion 
‘communicate his Spirit  to the Church, the new Eve.’ This ‘new Eve,’ he says,  ‘the 
Church as the bride,’ firstly through the baptism and gift of the Spirit,  and secondly 
through the Eucharist,
becomes the Body of Christ and with him forms, spiritually and mysteriously (or mystically), 
‘one flesh’.298
Congar is here using the metaphor of the Church as bride in a primary sense, not in the 
derivative, Augustinian sense.299 The ‘new Eve’ is created from the side of Christ, and 
in  response to him (although he does not explicate  this),  through the Spirit  and the 
sacraments,  becomes the  Body  of  Christ.  This  is  now seen,  not  as  a  biological  or 
organisational metaphor, but a nuptial and personal one in the sense of Genesis 2, ‘the 
two shall become one flesh.’ This is a reversal of Augustine’s theology in which the 
Church is formed through participating in Christ’s  body,  and thus becomes also the 
bride. In this sense the bride, for Congar, here, is the primary ontological referent for the 
Church:
From the  time  of  Tertullian  onwards  at  least,  the  Fathers  of  the  Church  and  the  early 
Christian  writers  have  been  unanimous  in  seeing  this  [Genesis  1  and 2]  as  a  prophetic 
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announcement of the wedding between Christ, the new Adam, and the Church, the new Eve, 
when, from the pierced side of Jesus, fallen into the deep sleep of death, came water and  
blood, the sacraments, baptism and the Eucharist, which built up the Church, the marriage of 
the Cross and the marriage of the Lamb!300
The act of  becoming is an ongoing process, begun at the Pentecost (=baptism in the 
Spirit) and completed at the eschaton. For Congar the wedding has already taken place 
in the Incarnation, but the purification of the bride, her joining to Christ to become his 
Body, the ‘one flesh’ of Genesis 2, only commences at Pentecost. He states 
the wedding has been celebrated and the Church is the bride, but she is not yet the perfectly  
pure bride inaugurated by baptism.301
The two aspects of ‘purification’ and ‘becoming one flesh’ with Christ, becoming his 
body, are identical. Purification has not yet been achieved, and becoming one body with 
Christ has yet to be completed. Although Congar is careful not to say that the Church is 
becoming  progressively  more  holy,  he  does  hold  to  the  Catholic  teaching  of  the 
progressive understanding of the Church required to make sense of the doctrine of papal 
infallibility.
Nevertheless, his approach raises potentially difficult questions concerning the efficacy 
of Christ’s work on the cross. Is the Church not already sanctified by Christ’s sacrifice, 
or does she have to add something more? How is she to become ‘the perfectly pure 
bride’ if she is not already so through the work of Christ? How are we to understand the 
historical life of the Church before the eschaton?
Congar  is  trying  to  find theological  space  for  the  reality  of  the  Church’s  historical 
brokenness. Christ’s work on the cross is not incomplete for Congar, rather it is the 
consummation of the marriage that is  incomplete,  because the bride is not yet  fully 
formed. This eschatological aspect to the completion of the nuptials is fundamental for 
him. Time and again he refers to the Spirit as arrha, ‘earnest-money,’ a down-payment 
in anticipation of the full marriage that is to come.302
She is tempted, in her sinful members, to join other bridegrooms (see 1 Cor 6:15ff). The 
union that should be consummated in one spirit (or Spirit) is still  imperfect. The Church 
must also experience an Easter event of death and resurrection in the power of the Spirit. Her  
wedding  will  only  be  perfect  eschatologically.  She  aspires  to  that  perfection.  She  only 
possesses the first-fruits of the Spirit as earnest-money.303
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When he states ‘the wedding has been celebrated and the Church is the bride’ he is 
referring to the Jewish betrothal celebration that takes place up to a year  before the 
actual wedding. After this the couple are considered to be legally bound to each other 
(hence Joseph was going to ‘quietly divorce’ Mary, Mat 1:19). As part of the betrothal 
celebration the bridegroom gives the gifts, the  arrha,  that constitutes his promise to 
return for the bride and complete the wedding. In this sense the Spirit is the reminder of 
Christ’s promise to return, being the comfort of his presence in his absence. Thus the 
parousia  of  Christ  is  his  return  for  the  bride,  with  whom he  left  the  Spirit  as  his 
presence. The wedding will then be fully consummated at the wedding feast, when the 
bride will become ‘one flesh’ with Christ, and thus his body with him as the head.
His  statement  that  ‘the  Church  must  also  experience  an  Easter  event  of  death  and 
resurrection  in  the  power  of  the  Spirit’  is  not  one  that  he  has  made  before  and is 
theologically  quite  loaded,  but  again,  does  not  elaborate.  Nevertheless,  it  is  worth 
considering briefly.
Death and resurrection pertain to the brokenness of sinful nature: it is through being 
clothed with Christ in baptism that the sinful nature dies and the promise of eternal life 
through the resurrection is given. Accompanying this is rebirth through the Holy Spirit: 
being born again of water and the Spirit (Jn 3:5). This is, theologically, being born into 
the Church. Thus the Church comprises post-baptismal creation. The gift of the Holy 
Spirit from the other side of death by the resurrected Christ is the guarantee of safe 
passage  through  death  into  the  resurrection  to  eternal  life.  Indeed,  this  is  already 
accomplished sacramentally  in  baptism.  Congar’s  assertion  that  the  Church,  herself, 
must go through this process is therefore tantamount to a claim that the Church, as the 
new Eve born from the side of Christ on the cross, is still a ‘fallen’ Eve, not just an 
incomplete one. That is, she is still clothed in the brokenness of sinful human nature. It 
is only the presence of the Holy Spirit as the guarantee, the ‘arrha or earnest-money,’ 
that  will  carry her through her own ‘Easter.’  Resurrected flesh does not need to go 
through death a second time.
Theologically this must be what Congar is implying, rather than the ‘Easter’ of each 
individual. On the other hand, however, he might be referring to the Church having to 
pass through death, herself, to be resurrected. But what would this mean? If she is none 
other than those who comprise her, and not some tertium quid, she could only face her 
Easter in each of her participants, together. However, he does not spell it out. If he had, 
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it  is  questionable  that,  even as a cardinal,  it  would have been accepted  as Catholic 
teaching.
 2.4 Conclusion
In many ways Congar’s later ecclesiology is more pneumatic than his earlier. Then, his 
principal understanding of the visible Church was a juridical institution, held together in 
unity through the apostolate, and indwelt by the Holy Spirit, to give life to the Mystical 
Body of Christ, an invisible concept with an eschatological ontology.
However the conclusion of the analysis  of his revised christology in Volume 1 of  I  
Believe (Section  2.3.1.3,  above)  suggested  that,  although  there  were  aspects  of  his 
christology and pneumatology that were revised, the revision was ambiguous. At one 
stage it appeared as though his pneumatology would interpenetrate every aspect of his 
christology, but then it seemed to revert to a subordinationist relation under the auspices 
of his application of the filioque clause.
The pneumatology expressed in Volume 2 appears, in many ways, to be much more 
radical. The second chapter is entitled The Holy Spirit makes the Church one: he is the  
principle  of  communion.  The  Spirit  is  now  the  source  of  unity,  prior  even  to  the 
apostolate:
[Augustine] was able to say, on the one hand, that it is necessary to be in the Body of Christ 
in order to have the Spirit of Christ and, on the other, that one has the Spirit of Christ and 
lives in that Spirit when one is in the Body of Christ. This is of decisive importance, since, if  
the Spirit is received when believers are  together, it is not because there is one body that 
there is only one Spirit – it is rather because there is only one Spirit of Christ that there is 
only one body, which is the Body of Christ.304
Previously the Church’s unity derived from the nature of the visible Body of Christ, 
because  the  apostolate  was  instituted  by  Christ  himself.  Thus  obedience  to  the 
apostolate was the criterion for unity. The Spirit was always the source of unity in the 
Mystical Body. However, the shift in emphasis means this is now ontologically prior to 
that  of  the  visible  Body,  which  derives  its  constitution  from  the  Spirit.  The 
pneumatology of the two volumes is difficult to reconcile.
Accompanying this transmutation in pneumatology is a much more tentative approach 
to the Church’s history. It is clear that, for pastoral reasons, Congar wants to take the 
Church’s history seriously, especially her faults and shortcomings. For him this means 
304 Congar, I believe, Vol.2, p15
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these  faults  have  to  be  incorporated  into  his  ecclesiology.  This  he  does,  almost 
surreptitiously, by acknowledging the broken or incomplete nature of the Church as she 
awaits her own Easter and resurrection, although it is unclear what he means by this.305
This broken Church is on the road to holiness and purity but has not yet arrived. These 
lie, eschatologically, on the other side of resurrection. The Holy Spirit is the ‘arrha or 
earnest-money’ given to the Church as the promise of what is to come. The Church’s 
imperfection is the consequence of the incompleteness of her nature and also that ‘she 
only possesses the first-fruits of the Spirit.’ She has yet to experience ‘resurrection in 
the  power  of  the  Spirit.’306 For  Congar,  the  Church’s  ontology and fullness  is  now 
purely eschatological:
According to the Bible, the truth of all things is found at the end, but it is envisaged at the 
beginning.307
The Spirit is the one who draws the Church towards purity and fullness, which gives 
rise to the struggle between the ‘now’ and the ‘not yet’.308 She has an eschatological 
ontology, and in this context he is prepared to give her a notional personhood, but not 
an autonomous one. She can be either the ‘I’ of the Spirit, as bride, in response to the 
‘Thou’ of Christ, or she can be the ‘I’ of Christ, as his body, in response to the ‘Thou’ 
of the Father. In either case the ‘I’ of the Church is already an ‘I’ in the hypostatic  
Trinity. The question is whether creation, itself, has any free and personal relation with 
the triune God, whether there is any one (Jn 17:11) who may respond to the invitation to 
communion  with  God.  He  comes  very  close,  with  his  understanding  of  interior 
catholicity,  to defining an ontological (communional) unity in the image of God, but 
does not take the last step. Ultimately for Congar, therefore, the Bride of Christ does not 
really exist – it is metaphorical language without a corresponding ontology, unless that 
ontology exists purely at the level of the individual: there are ‘brides’ but not a ‘bride.’
305 Congar, I believe, Vol.2, p56
306 Congar, I believe, Vol.2, p56
307 Congar, I believe, Vol.2, p56
308 Congar, I Believe, Vol.2, p57
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Chapter 3 The Ontology of the Church in  
Bulgakov’s ‘The Bride of the Lamb’
 3.1 Introduction
In 1945, the year  after  Bulgakov’s death,  The Bride of  the Lamb was published.  It 
represents the last volume of his great dogmatic trilogy On God-Manhood 309 and deals 
with anthropology, ecclesiology and eschatology. It was translated into English for the 
first time by Boris Jakim in 2002. The first volume of the trilogy,  The Lamb of God, 
concerning Christology, was published in 1933 (translated by Jakim, 2008). The second 
volume, The Comforter (1936), was on the Holy Spirit and pneumatology (translated in 
2004, again by Jakim). He considered The Bride the most important of the three.310
In describing this last volume Jakim says:
The Bride of the Lamb, Bulgakov’s last major theological work, is the greatest sophiological 
work  ever  written.  A  masterpiece  of  mystical  theology,  it  is  the  crowning  glory  of 
Bulgakov’s  theology  (and  one  of  the  crowning  glories  of  twentieth  century  Christian 
theology in general), the most mature development of his sophiology.311
Yet in his time, and still  today,  Bulgakov was a controversial  figure upsetting many 
Orthodox theologians.
The main cause of the opposition was his sophiology. It came to a head in the Sophia 
Affair in 1935-36, in which his sophiological writings were condemned as heretical by 
the Moscow Patriarchate and the synodal Church (Russian Orthodox Church in Exile), 
but defended by his own bishop, Metropolitan Evlogy, the Russian exarch in Paris.312
Although Bulgakov’s trilogy follows a definite structure, Logos – Spirit – Church, his 
writing is anything but systematic. It certainly follows paths but he does not attempt to 
systematise his thinking in gathered passages. Instead, the reader must be very careful 
not to think they have  garnered the whole of his thinking on a particular subject just 
because they have read a section with that subject as its title!  Furthermore,  Jakim’s 
translation suffers from some over-zealous editing whereby several long sections of the 
309 This  is  the  preferred  transliteration  of  Prof  A Louth  (pers.  comm.).  Valliere  (Modern  Russian 
Theology) prefers to translate the title as ‘On the Humanity of God,’ while both Jakim and Williams 
(Bulgakov) use the translation  ‘On Divine Humanity.’ The Russian word  bogochelovechestvo is 
rendered God-manhood throughout this thesis.
310 Bulgakov, Bride, p.xvii
311 Bulgakov, Bride, p.xiii
312 For an informative description of the affair see Williams, Bulgakov, p172-181
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Russian  original  have  been  excised  without  any  indication  of  their  presence  in  the 
English. Such sections could have been preserved in appendices and their absence is a 
loss. As it is, only those with access to the Russian original (or French) will even know 
of their existence.
For Bulgakov, all we can know about God, and therefore ourselves, is revealed to us in 
the  totality  or  wholeness  of  his  revelation  through  the  Son and  the  Spirit,  through 
Sophia. Nuances and alternative perspectives therefore continually illuminate different 
aspects  of that  interrelated  whole.  Furthermore,  his  writing is  permeated  throughout 
with such enormous as well as poetic conceptualisation that it often defies reduction.313 
Describing Bulgakov’s writing in the first volume of the trilogy,  The Lamb of God, 
Rowan Williams says ‘these pages are likely to drive a strict scholastic to drink!’314
In contrast to the christological bias introduced in the filioque theology of Congar and 
Balthasar,  Bulgakov insists  on the  unity of  the work of  the  Word and Spirit  in  all  
aspects  of  creation,  revelation,  redemption  and new creation.  This  unity of  the  two 
‘hands of God’ allows him to develop a fully hypostatic anthropology, and explore the 
unity of humanity in personal terms without losing the uniqueness of each person under 
and essentially functional structure. We will therefore explore his anthropology as it is 
foundational for his understanding of the Church.
Like much of the previous section on Congar, most of this study is based on the English 
translations.  To  the  extent  that  these  sometimes  fail  to  capture  the  exact  technical 
content  of  Bulgakov’s  thought  this  is  a  weakness.  However,  for  particularly  dense 
passages the Russian original has been consulted. In most cases this has confirmed the 
high standard of the English translation.
 3.2 Hypostasis, Spirit, Nature, Soul and Body
Central to Bulgakov’s theology are the notions of hypostasis, nature and spirit. He gives 
them specific technical meanings born out of his merging of Greek patristic thought, 
Russian  Sophiology,  and  German  Idealism.  It  is  worth  clarifying  their  definitions 
although Bulgakov, himself, somewhat frustratingly does not always strictly adhere to 
their technical content.315
313 For example, in speaking of life beyond death he describes infants who die at or soon after birth as  
those who ‘enter the world only to leave it immediately, as a bird grazes a water surface with its 
wing.’ Bulgakov, Bride, p370
314 Williams, Bulgakov, p168
315 Sometimes this is a weakness of the translation, other times not.
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In his paper ‘Hypostasis and Hypostaticity’ he attempts to elucidate what he means by 
the term  ‘hypostasis.’ Meerson summarises the distinction between hypostasis, nature 
and spirit thus:
Personalising,  after  Florensky,  the  Patristic  concepts  of  ousia and  hypostasis,  Bulgakov 
maintains  that  personality  (both  human  and  divine)  is  a  spirit  who  has  personal  self-
consciousness, which he terms as  ‘hypostasis,’ and nature which he terms  ‘ousia.’ Their 
indivisible unity constitutes the life, or existence, or personality.316
However, it is unclear from Meerson’s description whether  ‘personality’ comprises a 
spirit (= hypostasis) plus nature or whether  ‘personality’ is the same as ‘spirit,’ which 
comprises hypostasis plus nature. In fact ‘spirit’ for Bulgakov is the personal being that 
exists as the union or combination of the personal hypostasis in its own nature. For 
Bulgakov, there can be no spirit without a hypostasis and its nature.
The hypostasis and the nature do not exist separately but compose one living spirit.317
‘God is Spirit’ (Jn 4:24). The nature of every spirit consists in the indivisible union of self-
consciousness and self-being or self-foundation, of hypostasis  (uJpovstasi~,  persona) and 
nature  (fuvsi~,  natura). Outside of self-consciousness spirit does not exist; every spiritual 
being is aware of itself as I, is I.318
An example of Bulgakov’s lack of precision in his use of terminology can be seen here 
where he says ‘the nature of every spirit consists in the indivisible union of...hypostasis 
and nature.’ Nature is a union of hypostasis and nature? Such laxity sometimes makes it 
difficult to follow the content of his reasoning.
However, from the above it follows that, for Bulgakov,  ‘person’ and  ‘hypostasis’ are 
not coincident. ‘Hypostasis’ refers to the self-aware aspect of a personal being, not that 
being in itself. In Bulgakov’s terms ‘person,’ in the common usage of the term of being 
plus its nature, would appear to be identical with ‘spirit.’
Spirit cannot exist without its own nature or ‘substance,’ but this nature does not define 
the  limit  of  what  a  spirit  is,  since  nature  of  itself  has  no  self-awareness,  no 
consciousness. ‘Nature’ or ousia becomes hypostasised, becomes aware of itself, by its 
spirit. It is the ‘indivisible unity’ between self-awareness, or hypostasis, and its nature 
that constitutes the spirit, and is therefore coincident with Meerson’s term ‘personality.’ 
However ‘personhood’ would be a better term than ‘personality’ since the latter is used 
to describe the characteristic features of a person rather than referring to the being of a 
person itself. In this definition, person and spirit become identical in content, although 
316 Meerson, Trinity, p172
317 Bulgakov, Lamb, p183
318 Bulgakov, ‘Hypostasis and Hypostaticity’, p18
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the latter term refers more to the ontology than the relationality of the subject implied in 
the former.
If ‘spirit’ and ‘person’ are to be identified with each other, however, the question arises 
as to whether a ‘person’ necessarily has a ‘body.’ When Bulgakov speaks of ‘spirit’ he 
does  not include  ‘body,’  although  when  referring  to  ‘nature’  he  sometimes  does, 
depending on the context. In this case ‘person’ and ‘spirit’ are not coincident since we 
cannot know a person other than as embodied spirit. Having said this, Bulgakov argues 
that, in the Chalcedonian definition of the Incarnation, the divine nature of the Logos 
coexisted with the human nature in a human body.
It  is impermissible to narrow and thus distort  the general  idea of the body of Christ  by 
asserting that a body is proper to Christ only according to humanity, as the garment of flesh 
that He, though He Himself is bodiless, puts on for our sake and for our salvation. Such a 
supposition is  ontologically contradictory,  for  what  is  essentially bodiless  cannot  put  on 
corporeality.319
The fact that the divine nature could take on human flesh demonstrates that there is a 
kenotic compatibility between divine nature and corporeality. Since bodies are proper to 
spirits in the creaturely Sophia, it follows that some form of ‘spiritual body’ cannot be 
alien  to  Divine  Sophia,  to  God.  A  ‘body’  must,  therefore,  be  an  expression  of  the 
‘nature’  of the spirit.  He elucidates this  further is his doctrine of the Church as the 
‘Body’ of Christ (see Section 3.6.1, below).
In his discussion of ‘soul’, which he sees as the ‘nature’ or ousia of the spirit, Bulgakov 
clarifies the distinction between ‘soul’ and ‘spirit:’
The difference between soul and spirit consists in the fact that the soul is  not hypostatic, 
whereas  the  spirit  is...The  soul  corresponds  to  the  spirit’s  nature.  The  soul  lives  and is 
hypostasised by the spirit (and, in this sense, the soul is not the spirit’s hypostasis but its  
hypostaticity, or more precisely, its hypostasisability).320
The distinction is further clarified in his discussion on death. Death divides the spirit 
and the soul on the one hand from the body on the other. However, the soul belongs to 
the created realm,  to creaturely Sophia,  as the spirit’s  bodily  ‘energy.’  This relation 
between the spirit and the soul in death, the inseparability of the two, is the guarantee 
that creation will pass through the state of death to be resurrected.321
319 Bulgakov, Bride, p259
320 Bulgakov, Bride, p80
321 Bulgakov, Bride, pp354-356
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 3.3 Sophia, Hypostaticity, and ‘Humanityness’
In 1924 Bulgakov produced a paper that set out to explain his sophiology and answer 
the charges of ‘heresy’ concerning a fourth hypostasis.322 He presented it in London in 
1932 to the Fellowship of St Alban and St Sergius, and although he later claims that it 
became ‘out of date’ he nevertheless continued to cite from it. It contains some of his 
most  profound thinking on the nature of Sophia in its  relation to God and creation, 
particularly concerning God-Manhood. While it is, in many places, ‘dizzyingly dense’ it 
nevertheless expresses some important aspects of Sophia.
Of  particular  interest  is  the  theme  described  by  the  translators  as  ‘the  distinction 
between  the  being of  God as  love  and his  immersion  into  nothingness  resulting  in 
creation or Created Sophia.’ 323 The theme relating to Sophia as the ‘eternal feminine’ or 
as  the  ‘actively  passive  entity,’  ‘hypostaticity,’  is  also  of  interest,  since  it  directly 
impinges on the relationship between God and the Church.
Later  on  we  will  encounter  Sophia  as  an  object  of  love  and  also  the  apparently 
oxymoronic notion of ‘impersonal love’ (see section 3.6.2). This can only be understood 
in terms of what Bulgakov refers to in Russian as  ipostasnost’.  This difficult  word, 
coined by Bulgakov, receives various different translations. The original translator of 
the  paper  in  1932,  Bateman,  uses  ‘personality’  but  most  agree  this  is  inadequate. 
Williams  suggests  ‘hypostaseity/hypostatic  existence/hypostatic  character’,324 Jakim 
chooses ‘hypostasisedness,’325 while Gallaher and Kukota opt for ‘hypostaticity.’326 For 
the sake of  clarity  all  quotations  of  the word (including Jakim’s)  are  here rendered 
‘hypostaticity.’
Williams describes the meaning of the word as  ‘the capacity for being hypostasised, 
being concretised in an active subject, as opposed to existing directly as an agent or 
subject or hypostasis.’327 But this seems to miss an important thrust in Bulgakov’s usage 
of the term, which Gallaher and Kukota identify as ‘actively passive.’ What is meant by 
this  is  an almost  wilful  act  by a  nature to  be receptive.  Bulgakov uses  deliberately 
ambiguous language to imply this ‘active passivity:’
322 Bulgakov, ‘Hypostasis’
323 Bulgakov, ‘Hypostasis’, pp7-8
324 Williams, Bulgakov, p165
325 Bulgakov, Bride, p39
326 Bulgakov, ‘Hypostasis’, p14
327 Williams, Bulgakov, p165
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[Hypostaticity]  is the capacity to hypostasise oneself,  to belong to a hypostasis,  to be its 
disclosure, to give oneself up to it. This is the special hypostatic state, not through one’s own, 
but through another hypostasis, hypostasisation through self-surrender.328
Without  going into  the  technical  detail  of  the  verbs  used  here,329 there  is  an active 
reflexive element that suggests a striving, with an implicit, but hidden  ‘will’ as borne 
out by his reiteration later in the paper:
In  the  final  reckoning,  all  creation  has  a  human  hypostasis,  but  it  itself  possesses  only 
hypostaticity, a capacity and a striving to hypostasise itself in a multi-unity of hypostases.330
In his later writing he appears to leave behind this ‘active passivity’ in favour of a more 
clear-cut distinction between the passive impersonality of  ‘nature’ and the active and 
personal willingness of hypostasis. For example, in its usage in  The Bride, the word 
seems to be much closer to William’s rendering, that is, simply the passive property of 
having  the  potential  to  receive  a  hypostasis,  or  needing  a  hypostasis  to  become 
complete, to become a ‘thou.’
The creaturely Sophia as the world soul...is subjectless, does not belong to anyone, is without 
master,  as  it  were.  As  such,  she  is  deprived  of  the  fullness  of  creaturely  being  that  is 
postulated by her as the soul of the creaturely world and consists in hypostaticity.331
Nevertheless, the concept of the receptivity of Sophia is still  important,  and Sophia, 
even in The Bride, is the recipient of love as expressed here:
This [hypostaticity] is the power of love; however, it is a passive, feminine, self-surrender in 
the acceptance of love, but without the capacity to become active, it’s [love’s] hypostatic 
centre. That is what the mystics call ‘eternal femininity.’332
The difficulty is that, although in his later work he wants to leave the notion of some 
form of desire or implied will in ‘hypostaticity,’ his wish to retain Sophia as a passive 
object of love carries within it a contradiction (seen in his reference to ‘feminine’ and 
‘self-surrender’),  since to  be an object  of genuine love there must  be a beloved,  as 
Bulgakov admits:
To belong to God-Love as his object, content, idea is possible only to a living reality, which 
gives  itself  up  to  that  love,  albeit  passively,  not  as  a  hypostasis,  but  nevertheless  
hypostatically, in the image of a hypostasis, as a self-hypostasising principle.333
328 Bulgakov, ‘Hypostasis’, p28
329 See Bulgakov, ‘Hypostasis’, p15
330 Bulgakov, ‘Hypostasis’, p38
331 Bulgakov, Bride, p82
332 Bulgakov, ‘Hypostasis’, p29
333 Bulgakov, ‘Hypostasis’, p29, p30
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But what is the ‘image of a hypostasis?’ And how can something non-hypostatic behave 
in a hypostatic manner? Although Bulgakov tries to defend such an idea in the paper 
this passive activity of Sophia is quietly dropped in the later writings. However, it still 
remains prominently in his conception of the Church as ‘body’ in The Bride, where the 
Church, as Sophia, Divine and created, that is, as the ‘nature’ or ‘body’ of Christ, is the 
object of God’s love.
The other aspect of Sophia that has immense implications relates to its nature. Taking 
his  notion  of  God-Manhood  to  its  logical  conclusion,  Bulgakov  proclaims  that,  as 
Divine Sophia is to God, so creaturely Sophia is to humanity. That is, that the whole 
cosmos of creation, which has its foundation in creaturely Sophia, is humanity’s nature, 
or is, as he calls it  ‘humanityness,’ since it is hypostasised by humanity.  This theme 
runs unchanged throughout Bulgakov’s theology.
In its integral substance the world is humanityness and mankind is the living centre-point of 
the world, its ‘god’ (in his predestination).334
and in The Bride
The creaturely world is a cosmo-anthropic world, or man is a microcosm. The humanness of  
the world is  revelation’s  fundamental  and generalising truth about  creation...  Having the 
creaturely Sophia as his nature, as the source and foundation of his life, the creaturely god, 
man, received also his own personal spirit.335
Divine Sophia is God’s own nature, his ‘Glory’ or shekinah. He is its hypostasis. But in 
yielding his Sophia to temporality and finitude, to creation, God has ‘yielded his throne 
in creation’ to man. Creaturely Sophia has become man’s nature, and man has replaced 
God as its centre, as its ‘creaturely god.’336
 3.4 Creation and Hypostasis
 3.4.1 Freedom and Creation as Eternally Completed Act
Tracing the theme of creation in Genesis 1, Bulgakov sees the Six Days of creation as 
forming one account, but a parallel account of creation of a different sort is found on the 
Sixth Day. The indication of this is given in Gen 1:26 (God’s council concerning the 
creation of man  ‘in our image, after  our likeness’), and in Gen 2:7 (the dual act of 
creation of man out of dust and breath).
334 Bulgakov, ‘Hypostasis’, p31
335 Bulgakov, Bride, p85
336 Bulgakov, ‘Hypostasis’, p31
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Bulgakov’s talk of ‘becoming’ in relation to the creaturely Sophia introduces the notion 
of  time,  temporality.  In  this  regard  he  distinguishes  between  two types  of  eternity: 
divine  and creaturely.337 There is,  he says,  a  fundamental  distinction  between them: 
divine eternity refers to the infinity and unchangeableness, the absoluteness, of God – it 
has no beginning or end, as such categories belong to temporality. Creaturely eternity 
refers  to  the  unending process  of  becoming,  which  does  have  a  beginning,  and by 
definition, refers to a process in time. The latter, which might scientifically be referred 
to as semi-infinite, or semi-eternal, is a category of temporality: the former is its ground. 
The two are, therefore, categorically different. Concerning divine eternity he states:
Eternity  and time  are  not  two parts  of  one  temporal  process,  but  belong to  two totally 
different categories. Divine eternity does not precede time, but is its foundation, and by no 
means can it be situated in the temporal process.338
Concerning creaturely eternity he says:
The creation called to being by God is indestructible and endless, and in this sense the world  
does not know an end, is ‘eternal’.339
Considering  the  testimony  of  the  Bible  on  divine  eternity,  Bulgakov  refers  to  the 
temporality and limited duration of certain OT facts and institutions that are ascribed the 
notion  of  eternity,  such as  eternal  law,  eternal  priesthood.  These  have  clearly  been 
superseded, so the description of ‘eternal’ must refer to some other concept than ‘never-
ending’. Instead, he says
Such institutions, which attest to direct indications and actions of God’s hand in the life of 
humanity, have a sacred and, in this sense, divine character. Taking into account its different 
nuances,  ‘eternal’ is used here as a synonym for  ‘divine.’  ‘Eternity’  is synonymous  with 
God’s activity, manifestation, or energy. It is the ladder between heaven and earth.340
The divine eternity of God is also a way of speaking of his omniscience. God beholds 
all of creation as a completed act.341
The discussion at this point in The Bride concerns the notion of predestination, which, 
Bulgakov claims, ‘annuls the world’s originality and creaturely freedom, and transforms 
the human world into a world of things.’342 On the face of it, such a statement appears to 
contradict  his claim for the omniscience of God. The discussion of predestination is 
337 Bulgakov, Bride, p467
338 Bulgakov, Bride, p226
339 Bulgakov,  Bride, p382. He qualifies this by saying the ‘mode of being that became proper to the 
world after the fall at the beginning of our time or this age is transitory and has an end: the image of 
this world passes away’ but that ‘the cosmos [will be] transformed, not abolished but transfigured.’
340 Bulgakov, Bride, p468
341 Bulgakov, Bride, p227
342 Bulgakov, Bride, p227
111
beyond our scope here, but Bulgakov’s formulation of the relationship between God’s 
omniscience  and creaturely  freedom provides  an  example  of  the  outworking  of  the 
relationship between Divine and creaturely Sophia.
Divine  Sophia,  being  divine,  exists  in  God’s  eternity.  It  contains  all  potential 
possibilities within it – it is the Wisdom of God. Thus:
One can and must  say that eternity contains all the content of time. There is and can be 
nothing in time that  does not  have its  foundation in eternity,  in the Divine Sophia,  who 
reveals herself in the creaturely Sophia, in the world.
Everything that is, that can be, has its roots in the Divine Sophia. For it to be otherwise,  
something new, something outside God, would have to be created. Some  other force, 
i.e. god, would have to bring into existence something that previously was not.
But  this  determination in  the  Divine  Sophia  has  nothing  to  do  with  causal 
predestination,  ‘where  freedom is  in  fact  annulled  and  eternity  is  equated  with  the 
beginning of  time.’  Bulgakov insists  that  creaturely  freedom can determine  its  own 
mode of existence, can create something  ‘new’, that creation does not follow a  ‘pre-
determined’ temporal path.343 This is not a contradiction with the determination of the 
Divine Sophia since all possibilities already exist in the Divine Sophia as the pleroma, 
the  fullness  of  God.  The  problem posed  by  classical  ideas  of  predestination  arises 
precisely due to the confusion of equating divine eternity with unending temporality, 
which renders God subject to time. Rather, creaturely freedom is the fulfilment in the 
creaturely Sophia of the determination in Divine Sophia:
In divine eternity there is a determination that covers the whole reality of the world and all 
the possibilities contained in it. All these possibilities are actualised by creaturely freedom, 
which, like all creative activity, contains something new in this sense. But it is new only for 
creation, not for God.344
This  notion  of  fulfilment  is  key  to  understanding  the  being  of  creation.  Creaturely 
Sophia is the temporal outworking of Divine Sophia. Creation has its very being in the 
wisdom of God and cannot be separated from it.345
Understanding the relation of temporality to eternity in this way, we can turn to the 
conception of humanity within Creation. All the possibilities of Creation are contained 
within the Divine Sophia, which is eternal. But Bulgakov also claims that all creation is 
complete  in that  Creation was completed on the sixth day,  including the entirety of 
343 Although this is constrained by the origin and limits of freedom.
344 Bulgakov, Bride, p227.
345 Bulgakov, Bride, p227-8.
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humanity. This creation takes place supratemporally, prior to the creation of temporality 
but within the creaturely Sophia.346
 3.4.2 Humanity as a Created Whole
Although at  first  sight Bulgakov’s claims about the creation of humanity may seem 
esoteric, he derives them from an investigation of the Incarnation which, he says ‘has 
never  been  posed  and  never  been  discussed  in  theology’  and  thus  constitutes  ‘an 
anthropological lacuna in christology.’347
The  question  is  this:  if  the  Chalcedonian  creed  is  right,  that  Christ  is  ‘perfect  in 
humanity...truly man...consubstantial with us according to humanity’, how and in what 
sense is ‘the assumption of the elements of the human bodily and psychic nature [to be] 
equated  with  the  assumption  of  the  human  nature  in  its  entirety,  of  the  whole  old 
Adam’?348 In other words, how can Christ redeem all of humankind?
The question goes to the heart of the nature of humanity and its creation in the image of 
God.  Bulgakov has  already insisted that  God is  first  of  all  personal349 and likewise 
human  nature  does  not  exist  apart  from  its  hypostatic  form,  i.e.  concrete  personal 
existence. This is a vitally important axiom for Bulgakov’s anthropological arguments:
No human nature exists that has being wholly independent of hypostatic concretisation, as if 
prior to or  outside of  it. Humanity as nature is found only in the fullness and presence of 
hypostases.  Nature  and  hypostasis  can  be  separated  or  opposed  only  in  abstraction  (en 
epinoia); and in itself, this separation or opposition does not correspond to any reality.350
The question of the assumption of human nature in the Incarnation takes on a different 
urgency in the light of this axiom. If human nature, as some ‘thing’, does not exist,  
what, or more correctly,  whose, human nature does Christ assume? In what does the 
homoousian relationship of Christ with the rest of all humanity consist?
This is a fundamental point to understand in Bulgakov’s anthropology – humanity, each 
human being consists  in a human nature united with a human hypostasis.  However, 
although human nature and human hypostasis are inseparable in existence, they each 
have very different  properties  that  correspond to different  modes of adoption in the 
Incarnation (which is, of course, how we consequently understand them in creation).
346 Bulgakov, Bride, p113.
347 Bulgakov, Bride, p109
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Assumption of flesh and bones, i.e. corporeality, or psychic nature, although essential, 
is not enough since these attributes are unique to each person – no-one else shares my 
body or thinks the same thoughts as me. They are similar between people, but not the 
same, i.e. they are homoiousian. Neither is it acceptable to say that only those who have 
lived prior to the Incarnation are in some sense incorporated in Christ, for his work of 
redemption  applies  to  all  human  beings,  past,  present,  and  future.  For  Christ’s 
homoousian relation  with  all  humanity  to  be  ontological  Bulgakov  insists  that  the 
possibility of an integral humanity must therefore exist.351
It follows from this that humanity as a whole is already complete. That is, creation is 
already complete, including the creation of humanity.  If human nature does not exist 
independently of hypostasis, then there can be no ‘generic’ human nature to assume, or 
one that is not associated with a hypostasis. Otherwise, how can those who come after 
Christ, i.e. those not yet born, be included in him? All hangs on this ‘if’. Bulgakov’s 
answer is that they cannot and for this reason they must all already be created. There is 
thus a fixed and finite number of human beings. The point of the Sabbath is that God 
rested after the completion of the work of creation. The fact that human beings are still 
being born, he states, does not contradict this, since the creation of humanity took place 
supratemporally,  not  before  time,  but  beyond  time  and  for  time,  and  is  realised 
temporally. Otherwise the creation of humanity would be ongoing and infinite, which 
means there is no possibility of its fullness or completion,352 and if it does not yet exist 
as a whole ‘the Incarnation of God is also impossible.’353 The consequence of all this is 
that Christ assumes the humanity of each concrete person in his Incarnation.
In  some  sense,  humanity  exists  independently  of  these  limitations  of  time,  or 
supratemporally.  The  assumption  of  the  integral  humanity  signifies  not  the  abstract  
assimilation of certain human properties, corporeal and psychic, but the concrete assumption 
of me, you, them. In general, humanity does not exist abstractly and impersonally. It exists  
only as mine, yours, ours, theirs. It consists of the totality of all particular human persons.  
The Lord took His humanity not from impersonal nature but from each of us personally. He 
thus became one with His humanity, introducing it into His own hypostatic being. And only 
on this basis can it be said: ‘Christ lives in me.’354
So  humanity  is  a  complete  and  finite  hypostatic  multiplicity.  But  not  only  this, 
Bulgakov says it is also a ‘hypostatic multi-unity’ - the integral Adam, ‘the all-person, 
351 Bulgakov, Bride, p109
352 Bulgakov draws a fundamental distinction between human beings and creatures, denying the latter 
any  concept  of  personhood,  and  therefore  capable  of  infinite  reproduction  without  ‘creating’ 
anything new. Bride, p122.
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in the image of the one but trihypostatic God.’355 Everyone is a part of this ‘all-person’, 
a part of the whole. But the whole also exists in every person:
Humanity,  like  each  individual  human  being,  must  not  be  understood  as  a  series  of 
individual  units,  attached one to  the  other  by virtue of  a  kind of  similarity.  It  must  be 
understood only as a whole: the entire natural Adam lives in every human being. Every 
person is a point on the surface of this sphere, connected by a radius to the centre. The whole 
and a particular variant, the genus and an individual, exist with one existence, are inwardly 
one.356
He  attributes  an  ontology  to  this  all-unity,  but,  it  seems,  no  form  of  personal 
personhood, describing it in terms of a generic Adam. Indeed, it appears to have a prior 
ontology to our own, and upon which our own ontology as persons depends. It does 
have  a  ‘personal-generic  self-consciousness’  in  which  all  humanity  participates.  He 
describes it as a ‘higher reality [that] penetrates into and is realised in our consciousness 
only weakly and in a limited way.’ But this generic self-consciousness is ‘determined 
from the depths of man’s being and constitutes the very foundation of this person.’ In 
this way, Bulgakov says that we are all  actually connected with the original, generic 
Adam.
In this sense, Genesis 1:27-28 speaks of the creation of man in general, or of the all-man. It 
does not speak of the creation only of a particular person: ‘God created man in his own  
image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them.’... Here the  
entire second chapter speaks of the all-man in general. Only in chapter 3, after the fall, does 
the particular man Adam appear, and then Eve (3:8-9, 12, 17, 20-21).357
Despite  describing  it  as  a  ‘person’  it  is  not  clear  from  his  description  how  this 
‘hypostatic multi-unity’ or ‘all-person’ relates to his previous assertions that there is no 
such thing as non-hypostatic human nature, which, he says, can only exist as concrete 
hypostatic  male  or  female.  To  claim  that  there  is  a  generic  Adam  with  a  generic 
consciousness that has a higher reality than hypostatic human being is a bold one, unless 
the claim centres on the inherent humanity in the Second Person of the Trinity,  but 
Bulgakov does not say this. The generic Adam is created humanity, in its independence 
from the Divine. However, it is difficult to see how there can be  any form of human 
hypostasis that does not have a material body without succumbing to a dualistic creation 
of the Cartesian sort.  Furthermore,  it  is clear that this understanding of a finite  and 
completed humanity could not co-exist with any notion of biological evolution.358
355 Bulgakov, Bride, p110
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The  link  between  each  empirical  hypostatic  person  and  the  generic  all-person  in 
Bulgakov’s thinking serves two primary purposes. One is that Christ, in the Incarnation, 
takes  the personal  humanity of each and every human being ever created.  Thus his 
assumption of humanity is effective for all. The second is linked to the first in that, as 
all share the humanity of the first Adam, so too all share in his sin – original sin.
 3.4.3 Humanity as the Hypostasisation of Creation
Creaturely Sophia is the soul of creation. However, the very act of creation ‘throws her 
into the state of becoming’ and creaturely Sophia is ‘kenotically diminished’ precisely 
because in this act she ‘falls out of the fullness of hypostatic life in which the Divine 
Sophia lives in the Holy Trinity.’359 This kenoticism of creaturely Sophia is crucial to 
understanding the rôle of humanity in Bulgakov’s theology: not just his sophiology, but 
his understanding of creation, incarnation, redemption, and glorification. To grasp the 
importance of this move, we must focus on the being of Divine Sophia.
Divine Sophia, as the world of God’s being, finds her fulfilment in the hypostases of the 
Trinity – she  ‘is hypostasised from all eternity by the Holy Trinity in its hypostases. 
Hypostatic being is an attribute of the Divine Sophia; she presupposes it in herself.’360 
Divine Sophia, as such, is not a hypostasis, does not have a hypostasis of its own. She 
exists  in  God  with  the  ontological  potential  to  be  that  which  is  fulfilled  by  the 
hypostases of the Trinity, and is so fulfilled from eternity by them.
Taken out of this life and ‘thrown’ into nothingness she becomes creaturely Sophia, but 
devoid of any hypostasis, devoid of that which gives her any personal shape. In other 
words, she remains unfulfilled, or as Bulgakov puts it, as a predicate without a subject, 
waiting for the subject through whom she might participate in a hypostasis,  become 
hypostasised and thus be fulfilled, while at the same time giving life to that subject.361
She contains within herself the potential for individuation, for multiplicity, indeed, for 
personal being, since she is created out of, founded upon, Divine Sophia. Yet in herself, 
in  her  kenotic  ejection  or creation,  she remains  unhypostasised.  Creation,  in  and of 
itself, Bulgakov maintains, is incapable of hypostasisation, since this is a property of 
spirit, not creation.
This lack of subject in nature, however, is overcome in man,  who is the supracreaturely  
principle in the world, for he has a spirit that proceeds from God and a hypostasis, which,  
359 Bulgakov, Bride, p82
360 Bulgakov, Bride, p83
361 Bulgakov, Bride, p82
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albeit created, is in the image of God. In this sense, man is the hypostasis of the creaturely 
Sophia, which is multiple in the hypostases of the human race.362
This duality of man – comprising both creation in the image of God and God-breathed 
spirit, means that he is open both to God and to creation. He is created precisely in order 
to hypostasise creation, to lead it into its fulfilment, to be the hypostasis of creation that 
participates in communion with God, through the reception of divine life, and hence the 
divinising of creation. He is the created god of creation, its king, its prophet, and its 
priest, the cosmic centre of creation, created to enable its temporal ‘becoming.’
As both a created spirit and a spirit who is divine according to his source, man is open both 
to divine life,  in which he participates by virtue of his deification, and to the creaturely 
Sophia, whose hypostasis he is. In this sense, he is created as a creaturely god in nature, as a  
god by grace. His reception of divine life is the action of the Image of God in him... Gratia 
is,  of  course,  supernaturalis,  insofar  as  it  enables  man  to  commune  with  God;  but  this 
communion with God corresponds precisely to the natural human essence, which is created 
to be a receptacle of grace. And in this sense the original Adam was, before his fall, already 
the king of the world, the high priest and prophet by the power of God acting in him; and in 
this sense he was a god-man in the process of becoming.363
Hypostatic  being,  therefore,  is  the  central  element  of  man’s  being,  defining  his 
mediatorial  rôle  between  the  entire  expanse  of  cosmic  creation  and  its  fulfilment 
through glorification,  divinisation and communion with God. Humanity is created to 
fulfil  all  the  potential  that  exists  in  creaturely  Sophia,  which  is  achieved  through 
humanity’s  hypostasisation.  Humanity,  personal  being,  is  the  subject  for  which  the 
predicate  of  creaturely  Sophia  longs,  while  the  latter  is  the  predicate  that  gives 
existence, life to the subject. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of humanity’s 
hypostatic being for creation in Bulgakov’s theology. It forms the crux around which 
the rest of his theology revolves. The whole Sophia project finds its resolution in terms 
of its hypostasisation, first by Adam (and all of humanity in him), and subsequently in 
the redemption through Christ (and Mary). In non-sophianic language we might say that 
as the Trinity hypostasises the  ousia of God, so humanity hypostasises  the  ousia of 
creation.
However, an important difference exists in the hypostasisation of the two Sophias. This 
difference  arises  due  to  the  mode  of  created  Sophia’s  creation.  Divine  Sophia  is 
hypostasised by the Divine Hypostases as she belongs to those hypostases – is in one 
sense  the  ousia of  God,  is  God.  However,  created  Sophia,  being  Divine  Sophia 
submerged into nothingness and thus being created out of nothing, is created  out of 
Divine Sophia. That is, she is created.
362 Bulgakov, Comforter, p211
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Human personhood, on the other hand, comes not from the Divine Sophia, but from the 
Person of God, since personhood, personal spirit can only come from a Person, never 
from something impersonal.
The creation of the world therefore consists of two acts and necessarily has two sides: the 
creation of creaturely nature as the creaturely Sophia and the creation of new, creaturely 
persons, capable of hypostasising this nature, of being the subjects of the creaturely Sophia.  
This act of creation of personal spirits refers not to Sophia but to the very Person of God.364
The consequence of this is that, with reference to Gen 2:7, the human spirit,  human 
personhood, ‘has not a creaturely but a divine origin, even though it is created, that is 
even though it is determined to being for creatures or in connection with the creation of 
the world.’ This difference in origins between creaturely Sophia and the human spirit 
means that, even though they were created for each other, they do not ‘own’ each other 
in the way that the Divine Hypostases own the Divine Sophia.
Although personality (the personal spirit) lives in the creaturely Sophia and has her as its 
own  ‘nature’ or the world, it does  not itself belong to Sophia, but is given to her as her 
subject...  [The  Divine  Sophia]  is  hypostasised  by  the  Divine  Person,  belongs  to  God, 
whereas [creaturely Sophia] is entrusted to creaturely,  human persons (as well as angelic  
ones), is independently hypostasised by them.365
The point of this  ‘entrusting’ is that the creaturely Sophia still  belongs to God as his 
creation. Nevertheless, He gives up his place as the hypostatic centre to humanity in 
order for it to become fully autonomous.366
 3.4.4 Hypostasis and Personal-Centredness
Bulgakov maintains that the hypostatic nature of humanity is derived from that of the 
Holy Trinity. God in himself is three hypostases, not more, not less. Three is the divine 
hypostatic fullness.367 The kenotic self-giving love of God extends ecstatically into the 
‘nothingness’ out of which creation is made to give himself  hypostatically,  and thus 
create a ‘fourth’ hypostasis.368
The  Holy  Spirit  is  the  hypostasising  agent  who  goes  out  from God to  ‘ignite’  the 
creaturely  hypostasis  capable  of  a  response of  love.  Thus the  ‘fourth’  hypostasis  is 
called into existence as the creaturely response of creation to communion with God. 
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This ‘multihypostatic’ hypostasis can, in some sense, be considered as a single, united 
hypostasis, and Bulgakov seems to oscillate between the singular and the plural.369
Although the  ‘fourth’ hypostasis  exists as unique personal beings, each with its own 
characteristics  in  concrete  and  particular  hypostases,  they  all  share  an  integrity.  
Otherwise  the  Second  Person  of  the  Trinity  could  not  have  efficaciously  assumed 
‘human flesh.’ Indeed, this unity has ontological priority over individuality.
This individuality of personal being is not its supreme and definitive determination. On the 
contrary, this being is subordinate to the power of integrity, of unity in the whole, where  
one’s soul must be ‘lost’ before it can be saved, where the corn of wheat must die before it  
can bring forth fruit. This being becomes fully itself when it  loses its individuality.  This 
individual, qualified ray, which hitherto has shined only in its own colour, now begins to 
shine with the light of the pleroma and participates in the wholeness in which God is all in  
all.370
These lines are from the  ‘Creation’ chapter in  The Bride and yet  they are based on 
Jesus’ comments referring to his coming passion (Jn 12:24). Applied, they are normally 
taken to refer to the necessity for spiritual death (in baptism) before new life in the spirit 
can begin, prefiguring the bodily resurrection. Here Bulgakov remarkably applies them 
to original creation, affirming the kenotic nature of ‘becoming’ as the intended original 
task of hypostatic love in creation. Thus he sets out the work of redemption as seamless 
and contiguous with the original task set before creation.
The hypostatic singularity is of crucial  importance for Bulgakov’s soteriology.  Since 
Christ’s humanity is efficacious, for all human hypostases that have been, are, and will 
be, a similar unity must have existed with Adam. This is why Christ is referred to as the 
Second Adam in the Scriptures.
Ontologically,  this  personal-generic  self-consciousness  is  determined  from the  depths  of 
man’s  being  and  constitutes  the  very  foundation  of  his  person.  Just  as  Adam  is  the 
‘progenitor’ of the  whole human race and bears in himself  all of humankind, is connected 
with all of humankind, so the sons and daughters of Adam all bear him in themselves, are, in 
this sense, Adam himself in his multi-unity.371
Thus  the  inter-connectedness  of  the  original  Adam  extends  throughout  the  human 
population in time and space, the notion of the catholicity of every person.372
The divine and human hypostases are comparable in that both comprise ‘equi-hypostatic 
I’s’ qualified by unique hypostatic abilities373
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He goes on to ask in what ways are human individuals thus qualified. Having modelled 
his understanding of hypostasis  on the Trinity,  his response is, perhaps surprisingly, 
anthropocentric: the fundamental qualification of humanity is gender – male and female.
He derives the basis of this gendered distinction on the pattern of creation in Genesis 1, 
in which male and female are created in the image of God. Bulgakov argues that, since 
creation  is  an act  of the Father  through the Spirit  and the Son, this  dyad being the 
Revelation  of  the  Father,  we are  compelled  to  understand the  creation  of  male  and 
female  in  God’s  image  as  being  in  the  image  of  the  Son and  the  Spirit:  as  in  the 
economic, so in the immanent. Thus we understand maleness as being in the image of 
the Son and femaleness in the image of the Spirit.
These male and female principles in which is imprinted the image of the Divine Sophia, of 
prototypical  humanity,  are  the  differentiation  and  unity  –  expressed  in  the  language  of 
creaturely being – of the Logos and the Holy Spirit in Sophia. From the image we ascend 
here to the Proto-image and understand it.374
The  ‘unity’  to  which  he refers  is  the  dyadic  nature  of  the revelation  of  the  Father. 
Together, Logos and Spirit are the ‘God-manhood’ of which creaturely humanity is the 
reflection  in  the  creaturely  Sophia.  Although  the  Second  and  Third  Persons  of  the 
Trinity are distinct and differentiated, it is their  togetherness that reveals the Father in 
the Divine Sophia. Likewise, it is the togetherness of the distinct and differentiated male 
and female natures that form the image of God.
But  this  ‘togetherness’  Bulgakov  also  considers  to  be  a  kind  of  super-hypostatic 
hypostasis, which appears to be different to the ‘multihypostatic’ hypostasis of Adam. 
In  this  case  it  is  a  more  generic  hypostasis,  or  ‘I,’  that  corresponds  to  God’s 
hypostatically undifferentiated ‘I:’
We have here, first of all, a  hypostasis in general,  a personal I, without distinction as to 
whether this pure I-ness is given to male  or female.  As I,  the divine hypostases are not  
distinguished among themselves and equally enter into the triunity of the trine I.375
What, or who, is this  ‘personal I’? Bulgakov never answers the question, but it must, 
following his logic, have a parallel answer to the same question asked of God: who is 
the personal ‘I’ of God? The OT answer to this question was the divine tetragrammaton, 
Yahweh. However, Bulgakov understands this name, not to be the personal name of the 
undifferentiated Trinity. Instead he interprets it as the name of the Logos. 376
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An answer to the question therefore remains elusive. Does God ever speak as the Divine 
‘I,’ or is God’s ‘speech’ always just one of the revealing hypostases? Likewise, is there 
a single response to God from the  ‘personal I’ of hypostasised creation,  or is it  the 
singularity of a harmonic chord?
‘God-Manhood,’  the overarching title  of Bulgakov’s systematic  trilogy,  in its  origin 
refers to the Incarnation, to the God-man, Jesus Christ. However, since the Incarnation 
is a work of both the Logos and the Spirit, so too ‘God-manhood’ is an aspect of the 
dyadic relationship between the Logos and the Spirit.  God-manhood is the  union of 
Divine Sophia with creaturely Sophia in Jesus. The foundation of the union, itself, is 
their  common sophianicity,  creaturely Sophia being the created image of the Divine 
Sophia.377 It is the uniting of the heavenly and earthly Adam, of Divine and human 
natures. This is the bi-unity of Divinity and nature. God-manhood exists in heaven as 
the ‘eternal foundation of the world’,378 but in creaturely Sophia is actually a temporal 
process, a becoming, a fulfilling.  ‘It is the revelation of the Logos by the Holy Spirit, 
Their inseparable bi-unity.’379 
In  order  for the Incarnation  to take place,  for Divinity to  be united  with humanity, 
creaturely humanity must be compatible with the Logos in whose image it is made. The 
Divine Sophia therefore contains  within it  the eternal  Humanity that  pertains  to the 
Logos  and  that  forms  the  basis  of  the  Incarnation.  Conversely,  creaturely  Sophia, 
created humanity, contains within it the image of the Divine Sophia that enables it to be 
hypostasised by the hypostasis of the Logos.
The Logos is the pre-eternal God-Man as the Proto-Image of the creaturely man. The Logos 
is the demiurgic hypostasis whose face is imprinted in the Divine world, as in the Divine 
Sophia, by the self-revelation of Divinity through the Logos. The hypostasis of the Logos is 
directly connected with Sophia. In this sense the Logos  is Sophia as the self-revelation of 
Divinity;  He  is  her  direct  (although  not  sole)  hypostasis...Sophia  is  also  the  heavenly 
humanity  as  the  proto-image  of  the  creaturely  humanity;  inasmuch  as  she  is  eternally 
hypostasised in the Logos, she is His pre-eternal God-manhood.380
A more nuanced position is expounded in both the later works, The Comforter and The 
Bride, which  ascribe  a  greater  emphasis  to  the  gendered nature  of  the  Spirit’s 
hypostasis. Here, the Divine Sophia is the dyad of the two Hypostases together that are 
the eternal God-manhood, which is also described as the Proto-Image.381 The emphasis 
lies on the gendered bi-unity of the Logos and the Spirit together being the Revelation 
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of the Father in the God-manhood. The Logos still remains as the content of the God-
manhood and the Spirit as the one that gives life, actualises it.
This God-manhood is different to that which unites Divine and creaturely Sophia. The 
eternal God-manhood is that in whose image creaturely humanity is made. In this sense, 
since Divine Sophia is hypostasised by the Logos and the Spirit, Bulgakov can refer to 
the Divine Sophia  as eternal  God-manhood. Again, we understand the nature of the 
eternal God-manhood from its image in creation.382
Thus God-manhood in Bulgakov refers to two separate, but intimately related entities. 
In the first place (chronologically, not ontologically), it refers to the Incarnation, to the 
two natures of Divinity and Humanity united in one Person – Jesus Christ. In the second 
place (which is  ontologically prior),  it  refers to  that  aspect of God in whose image 
created humanity is made. In The Lamb this eternal Humanity is described as the eternal 
‘God-Man’. In a memorable phrase that speaks of the eternal orientation of God towards 
his created image, and of that image reflecting back towards God, he says
The God-manhood and the God-Man, that is, the humanity of Divinity and the divinity of 
humanity, are given pre-eternally in God.383
 3.4.5 Hypostasis and Gender
Bulgakov introduces the notion of gender in the Second and Third Hypostases as the 
two spiritual principles that characterise them in  The Lamb. This correlation between 
the Word and the Spirit is, he says, reflected as the correlation of the male and female 
principles in the creaturely human world. They are reflected in all human trans-gender 
relationships,  such as  mother-son;  sister-brother;  bride-bridegroom;  wife-husband  as 
well as daughter-father. The correlation of the Holy Spirit with the female principle is 
found most clearly at the end of St John’s Revelation where  ‘the Spirit and the Bride 
say, Come’ (22:17). Here the relationship between the Logos and the Spirit is expressed 
as a personally qualified form of love
a ‘qualification’ that can be expressed in creaturely language by analogies of forms of love 
between the male principle and the female principle (and it is of course self-evident that  
anything having to do with sex or, in general, with sensuality must be excluded here). And  
just as the hypostasis of the Logos is the hypostasis of Christ, made incarnate in a male  
infant and reaching maturity as a ‘perfect male,’ so the hypostasis of the Spirit is most fully 
revealed for us in the Mother of God and becomes a reality for us in the Church, which is the  
‘Spirit and the Bride.’384
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The  primary  distinction  between  male  and  female  in  creation,  Bulgakov  maintains, 
cannot be reduced to any common factor ‘humanity’. It is the most basic element that 
distinguishes  or  ‘qualifies’  individuals.  It  is  a  distinction  as  fundamental  as  the 
distinction between the hypostases in the Trinity.  Indeed, the distinction is read back 
into the hypostases of the Trinity, with maleness derivative upon the hypostasis of the 
Son, and femaleness derivative upon the hypostasis of the Spirit, as indicated above. 
Thus, Bulgakov ‘engenders’ (rather than ‘sexes’) the Trinity.
What is this  individual qualifiedness and to what  does it  refer? In the first  place, as we 
already know, two types of persons, which together express the image of God in man, are  
fundamentally separate: male and female (‘male and female created he them’ [Gen 1:27]), 
who are created in the image of the hypostasis of the Son and the Holy Spirit385
In relation to the Father, however, Bulgakov does not want to ascribe any notion of 
gender. Although the gendered language of  ‘Father’ is used for the first person of the 
Trinity  this  is  not  to  be  understood  in  such  a  manner.  Rather,  we  do  not  have 
appropriate language to speak of personal being in an ungendered way.386
Perhaps  sensing  some  reticence  in  an  over-gendered  understanding  of  the  two 
hypostases of the eternal God-manhood in the Logos and the Spirit, Bulgakov wants to 
ensure a distinction between created ‘maleness’ and ‘femaleness’ and their counterparts 
in the Divine Sophia.
Of course, here we must set aside the specific qualities of the male and female principles 
according to which they exist in the creaturely world in the images of the male and female 
genders.  One  must  instead  understand  them  as  images  of  one  and  the  same  spiritual 
principle, Sophia, in the fullness of its self-revelation, in the image of the Second and Third 
hypostases.387
But introducing this distinction inevitably leads to the question as to what, then, is the 
nature  of  the  image?  In  what  principles  or  characteristics  does the  image  reside, 
especially since we have read this gender back from the œconomia to the theologia? His 
answer is that the ‘maleness’ of the Logos corresponds to content; the ‘femaleness’ of 
the Spirit corresponds to life and love. He describes the relation between these attributes 
in the Divine Sophia and creaturely Sophia, in the created male and female spirit, as 
parallel (‘not more and not less than a parallel’). Their parallel is found in the human 
spirit,  where  maleness  corresponds  to  thought  and  idea,  and  femaleness,  to  life, 
receptivity, creation, beauty.
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The Holy Spirit is life, and love, and the reality of the Word, even as the Logos is, for Him 
[sic], the determining content, word-thought and feeling, Truth and being in Truth – as the 
Beauty of self-revealed Truth. All these interrelations have a parallel (not more and not less 
than a parallel) in that the bi-unity of the human spirit in which the male, solar principle of  
thought, logos, is united with the female principle of reception, creative accomplishment,  
beauty.388
The human spirit,  Bulgakov claims,  is  a bi-unity,  comprising both male and female 
elements.  If  this  is  a  parallel  correspondence between Divine Sophia and creaturely 
Sophia, the  ‘bi-unity of the human spirit’ is a unity of two distinct elements  ‘without 
confusion and without separation’. This unified spirit exists in each individual human 
person.
The human sophianic spirit is a male-female androgyne, although, in fact, every individual 
human being is only either male or female; that is, despite this androgynism of the spirit,  
every individual human being experiences being according to only one of these principles, in 
relation to which the other principle is only complementary.  And this androgynism is the 
fullness of the image of God in human beings.389
However  this  poses  an  important  question  concerning  the  relation  between  Divine 
Sophia and its image in the creaturely Sophia, for in the Divine Sophia the male and 
female principles are hypostasised in the Logos and the Spirit.  Their  bi-unity in the 
eternal  God-manhood  is  a  bi-unity  of  two  distinct  hypostases.  However,  if  in  the 
creaturely Sophia the bi-unity exists in a single hypostasis, an individual human being, 
this  would  lead  to  a  fundamental  lack  of  correspondence  between  the  Divine  and 
creaturely Sophias.
Furthermore, if the bi-unitary nature of the human spirit, as expounded by Bulgakov, is 
correct, the nature of the created ‘image of God’ as male and female hypostases, upon 
which he develops his understanding of the gendered nature of the Logos and Spirit, is 
called  into  question.  In  what  sense  are  the  created  male  and female  hypostases,  as 
individual human hypostases each with its own bi-unitary spirit, the image of God? If 
we  are  to  understand  that  the  Logos  and  Spirit  are  gendered  by  reading  from the 
creation of the economic ‘male and female’ into the immanent Sophia, how are we then 
to read back from the Divine Sophia this bi-unitariness of the individual human spirit? 
Conversely,  if  the  male  and  female  elements  are  combined  in  a  single  human 
hypostasis, how are we to read a gendered hypostatic nature into the Divine Sophia?
Bulgakov does not appear to answer these questions.  Instead,  he goes on to use the 
hypostatic differentiation of male and female in the Divine Sophia as the ground for 
388 Bulgakov, Comforter, p186
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needing both a male and a female hypostasis to redeem and fulfil the created Sophia, 
created humanity.390
 3.4.6 Hypostasis and Finitude
So far Bulgakov has defined two aspects to creaturely hypostasis: I-ness, and gender. 
The third, which distinguishes it from divine hypostasis, is its finitude. This limiting 
means that the features or themes of an individual, which, in all their multiplicity are all 
contained within the Divine Sophia, are not repeated in any other individual, making 
each one unique.
Every person has his own theme of being which does not repeat other themes, although it is 
consonant with them.  This theme is  God’s thought about  creation, about its  place in the 
sophianic pleroma. All of these themes, whose possibility is implanted in the ‘integrity’ of 
the Divine Sophia, become ‘substrates,’ or hypostases, in personal being. And there cannot 
be a hypostasis without a specific theme, or an empty I, so to speak, an I that does not have  
its own individually coloured nature.391
For  Bulgakov,  then,  the  uniqueness  of  each  individual  being  resides  in  the 
unrepeatability  of  his  or  her  attributes,  of  their  particular  combination  of  ‘gifts’  or 
personal characteristics.  This uniqueness is  a function of creaturely finitude,  in that, 
were each individual infinite, then these  ‘themes’ would be common to all and there 
would be no uniqueness. This raises the question about the differentiation between the 
Son and the Holy Spirit, since their  ‘content’ is infinite and therefore identical: what 
distinguishes the Logos from the Holy Spirit? For Bulgakov their difference lies in their 
mode of generation:
These two hypostases differ, as hypostatic centres, in their how, but not in their what; and in 
this sophianicity of theirs,  in the pleroma, both hypostases contain all  of their creaturely 
images.392
As hypostatic centres, as persons, the Logos and the Holy Spirit  differ only in their 
‘how’, their generation, that is, in their relationship with the Father. This is important 
for Bulgakov goes on to map male and female hypostases onto the Logos and the Holy 
Spirit, respectively, the latter being the images from which the former derive.
Returning to  creaturely hypostases,  it  is  the combination  of  this  differentiated  finite 
theme of attributes along with the equal  ‘I-ness’ of each creature that constitutes the 
uniqueness  of  each  creaturely  hypostasis.  Thus,  creaturely  personal  uniqueness,  for 
Bulgakov,  is  ultimately  defined,  to  put  it  rather  crudely,  by  a  person’s  abilities  or 
390 Bulgakov, Comforter, p187
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characteristics,  rather  than  any  particular  relationship with  God.  This  is  odd  given 
Bulgakov’s  insistence  on the recognition  of  the God-manhood  of  God,  the  intrinsic 
personal orientation of God towards humanity, and his criticism of Thomist and other 
‘proofs’ of God as mechanical. It does, however, reflect the classical definitions of God 
in  terms  of  his  attributes,  and hence  the  characteristics  of  humanity  in  terms  of  its 
attributes; perhaps in this Bulgakov is closer to traditional western definitions of God 
than he would be willing to admit.
However, these themes that define the uniqueness or calling of each person, and into 
which each person freely enters with a greater or lesser degree of conformity, or even 
resistance,  are  all  contained  within  the  hypostasis  of  either  the  Son  or  the  Spirit, 
depending on whether the person is male or female. In the same way that the Son and 
the Spirit hypostasise the pleroma of the Divine Sophia, so male and female hypostasise 
creaturely Sophia, all male and female hypostases being contained, as it were, in the 
hypostases of the Son and the Spirit.
The image of God in human hypostases is determined by the divine hypostases of the Logos 
and the Holy Spirit,  which hypostasise  the pleroma,  the  Divine Sophia,  from which the 
creaturely Sophia also acquires her image...in this sophianicity of theirs, in the pleroma, both 
hypostases contain all of their creaturely images. They are all-hypostases, or more precisely, 
the one proto-image of any hypostaticity, which in itself is thereby transparent for the Logos 
and the Holy Spirit. This proto-image is precisely the one true hypostasis. All humankind in 
the male image is the one hypostasis of Christ, is Christ; it finds its hypostases in Christ’s  
hypostasis, reflects and is reflected in His hypostasis. All humankind in the female image is 
the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit, which is revealed, becomes transparent, in the image of the  
Mother of God and, in this sense, is manifested in Her hypostasis.393
Bulgakov  makes  a  critical  move  in  his  understanding  of  hypostatic  being  that  is 
reflected in this passage (among others), and contained in the words ‘or more precisely’. 
The move is from  ‘they’  (the Logos and the Holy Spirit),  who together are the  ‘all 
hypostases’, to ‘the one proto-image’. This one ‘proto-image’, which he describes as the 
proto-image of  ‘any hypostaticity’,  now becomes  ‘precisely the one true hypostasis’, 
which,  itself,  becomes  the  basis  for  introducing  a  similar  concept  in  the  creaturely 
Sophia.  He has moved from the many to the one,  simply describing it  as an act of 
precision, which he confirms in the next sentence of the paragraph:
These two images of human all-hypostaticity are united in one creaturely God-manhood, just 
as in the heavens, in the Holy Trinity, they are united in one Heavenly God-manhood.394
393 Bulgakov, Bride, p97
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 3.4.7 The Two and the One
What is the relation between the Logos and the Holy Spirit on the one hand, and the  
‘one true hypostasis’, this  ‘Heavenly God-manhood’, on the other? It is important to 
note, in this connection, that this ‘hypostasis’ is not to be equated with Divine Sophia, 
which is not the proto-image. In this he differs from his forbear, Solovyov.
The proto-image is that which hypostasises the Divine Sophia – it is the unity of the 
Logos and the Holy Spirit. But Bulgakov does not elaborate on the nature of this ‘super-
hypostasis’. Is it a  ‘person’ in the sense of the persons of the Trinity? Is it a  ‘who’? 
Does it have a name and a centre of consciousness? If not, in what sense is it ‘the one 
true hypostasis’?
Bulgakov’s  treatment  of  these  relationships  displays  similarities  with  those  of  the 
German Idealists, although with very important differences. One such similarity is seen 
in the positing, for example by Schelling, of the coming together of the opposition of 
Subject and Object to form the Absolute, or Reason: ‘I give the name of Reason to the 
absolute Reason or to Reason in so far as it is conceived as the total indifference of the 
subjective and objective.’395
Although Schelling is referring to the categories of ideal and real, the notion of thesis 
and antithesis  coming  together  to  form a  higher  synthesis  is  certainly  part  of  what 
Bulgakov is doing with male hypostasis, female hypostasis, and supra-hypostasis. The 
overcoming of the differences between male and female, Logos and Spirit, is achieved 
in the combination of the two, not just in the oneness of their revelation of the Father, 
but  metaphysically,  in  the  ‘dual-unity’  of  a  single  hypostasis  of  the  Divine  Sophia 
(which,  as  we  will  see  later,  is  reflected  in  a  single  all-human  hypostasis  in  the 
creaturely Sophia). It is important to note that this combination, as with the German 
Idealists,  does  not  obliterate  the  different  entities  by  making  them into  some  new 
‘mixture’ or being. They still continue to exist, but united in their difference to form a 
higher reality – for Schelling, the Absolute or Reason. However it is not the hypostasis 
of the Trinitarian God, as we might expect.
Bulgakov calls this hypostatic unity the  ‘Heavenly God-manhood’. But this does not 
answer the question. In The Lamb of God, he says the following:
395 Schelling FWJ, quoted in Copleston F, Philosophy, p123.
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The Divine Sophia, as the pan-organism of ideas, is the pre-eternal Humanity in God, as the 
divine proto-image and foundation for man’s being.396
Here he refers  to  Divine  Sophia  as  the  ‘proto-image’,  but  it  is  clear  that  he  is  not 
referring to the same ‘proto-image’ as in The Bride. Rather it is the Logos, personally, 
that is the both the Proto-Image and the hypostasis of the Divine Sophia. This appears 
to be a different thesis to that expressed in The Bride. However, he goes on to discuss 
the relation of the Holy Spirit in the God-manhood in a passage that is fundamental to 
understanding the relation between the Logos and the Spirit.397
The relation between the Logos and Spirit is that of content and actualisation, of word 
and  breath,  which  together  reveal  the  Father.  The  Holy  Spirit  is  the  ‘transparent’ 
hypostasis offering the Son to the Father and the Father to the Son in a movement of 
love. Thus, each of the hypostases in the Holy Trinity only knows the other through its 
relation with the third: the Father  ‘sees’ the Son through the Spirit, the Son ‘sees’ the 
Father through the Spirit, and the Spirit is known to the Father and the Son through his 
mediatorial role of love. The relations in the Holy Trinity are therefore dynamic without 
any  egocentrism,  and  the  Divine  Sophia  is,  through  the  actualisation  of  the  Spirit, 
always  a  personal  movement  and never  a  static  centre.  But  more  than  that,  it  is  a 
personal movement with  content,  with self-emptying kenosis, that is,  love,  which of 
necessity  must  always  involve  the  Other  in  its  own  self-understanding,  and  thus 
identity. In referring to the role of the Palamite distinction between divine essence and 
divine energy, Williams describes it thus:
It [this distinction] enables us to conceive Sophia neither as the divine nature in itself nor as  
a mythological individual, but as an aspect of the divine nature in action, in relation.398
He goes on:
Spirit  is the union of an act of self-awareness, conscious independent existence, with the 
‘nature’ of which it is conscious; neither term in this union is real, concrete, without the  
other, so that there is no actually existing ego without the concrete ‘what’ that it thinks. But 
equally, there is no individual and isolated unit of ego-plus-nature, because the ‘I’ exists only 
with another ‘I’.399
The principle of interdependence of hypostatic identity is central to Bulgakov, as is the 
inseparability  of  personal  being  from its  essential  content  or  ‘nature’.  Although the 
Logos  is  the  hypostatic  centre  of  the  Divine  Sophia,  is  its  true  hypostasis,  it  is  a 
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hypostasis actualised or realised through the Holy Spirit. The Logos is described as, and 
is,  the  God-Man,  the  concrete  hypostatic  centre;  the  Holy  Spirit,  however,  is  the 
actualising or breathing of this content and is identified as God-manhood. Thus, it is the 
inseparable dyad of Logos and Spirit that together establish the hypostasis of the Divine 
Sophia,  although  the  existence  of  such a  supra-hypostasis  is  not  mentioned  in  The 
Lamb.
The discussion is taken no further in  The Comforter, where the view set out in  The 
Lamb is clarified and expanded in relation to the role of the Holy Spirit and the Word as 
the dyadic-unity of Divine Sophia. This, despite a 12-page section on the dyad of the 
Word and the Spirit in the Divine Sophia exploring the hypostatic relationships.400
The passage under consideration in  The Bride,  then,  brings something new into the 
discussion – that of a supra-hypostasis, ‘the one true hypostasis.’ This is different to the 
hypostases of the Logos and the Holy Spirit, and does not occur in  The Lamb or  The 
Comforter. One might have expected its identity to derive from Genesis 2:24, ‘and the 
two become one flesh.’  However,  Bulgakov never  refers  to  Genesis  in  this  regard. 
Rather, his logic extends from a theological interpretation of the Incarnation, which acts 
as a path or reflection in the economy to the reality in the immanent.
The definition of divine nature as pre-eternal Humanity or God-manhood (which in this 
case is the same thing) is conceived as a reflection from the creaturely world, from 
creaturely humanity.  In this sense this definition is only an  analogy,  but one that is 
understood realistically: that is, not only are all the distinctions of state preserved, but 
the identity of being is also preserved. We know man only as a creature, and therefore it 
may seem arduous to ascend from the creature to the understanding of God. However, 
we can also take the reverse path of ‘that which is above is also below’; that is, taking 
Divinity  as  the  point  of  departure,  we  can  understand  man  as  the  cryptogram  of 
Divinity.401
In this case, it is the relationship between Mary and Jesus in the Incarnation that forms 
the  ‘cryptogram’ for the relationship between the Logos and the Spirit in the Divine 
Sophia.
However,  Bulgakov  elaborates  on  the  operation  of  the  ‘Proto-image’  or  supra-
hypostasis in the economy where, he says,  ‘this positive all-unity of the hypostasis is 
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realised in the Church.’402 He does this by exploring Paul’s claim in Galatians 3:28 that 
in  Christ  there  is  neither  male  nor  female.  He  uses  the  passage  as  a  foil  for 
demonstrating  the  action  of  the  genderless,  or  perhaps  supra-gendered,  ‘supra-
hypostasis.’ The question he poses is interesting in that it suggests the difficulty he is 
facing with his thesis of the fundamental ontological distinction between male reflecting 
the Logos and female reflecting the Holy Spirit:
How can one reconcile this dual-unity of the human hypostasis in Christ and the Mother of  
God, or the Logos and the Holy Spirit, with Scripture’s testimony that in Jesus Christ ‘there 
is neither male nor female’ (Gal 3:28)?403
This affirmation, that ‘in Christ’ there is no male or female, comes about, he claims, due 
to the operation of love, whereby hypostases are ‘overlaid’ on each other: ‘The law of 
the identification of different things, which is love, operates here,’404 he says. Therefore 
the ‘all-hypostasis’ is identified with Christ.
All of humankind has one all-human hypostasis, one all-hypostatic name: Christ, who in the 
Incarnation was indivisibly united with the Mother of God.405
However, this is only in the sense that Christ, as the Logos incarnate, is the content in 
which  all  human  nature is  encompassed,  in  contrast  to  human being or  hypostasis, 
despite the fact that elsewhere he has insisted that human nature does not exist except 
hypostatically. Referring to Gal 3:28 he says
One  must  first  indicate  that,  in  this  case,  it  is  a  question,  strictly  speaking,  not  of  a 
hypostasis,  male  or  female,  but  of  humanity,  of  human  nature,  as  such,  which  in  holy 
baptism is clothed in Christ, becomes Christ’s humanity by the power of His humanisation or 
incarnation.406
Here,  Bulgakov  associates  baptism with  the  Incarnation:  the  Logos  is  clothed  with 
Mary’s humanity in the Incarnation, so to be clothed with Christ in baptism means to be 
clothed with Christ’s incarnated flesh, thus making baptism a work of Jesus and Mary, 
Word and Spirit. It is only because of the incarnation that baptism, being clothed with 
Christ, salvation, is available to human nature.
Biblically, theologically, and liturgically, however, baptism has always been associated 
with Christ’s death on the cross and his resurrection.407 There is no mention of the cross 
anywhere in this discussion of baptism and being clothed with Christ.
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Theologically, baptism is actually the reciprocal of the incarnation: in the incarnation 
Christ became clothed in fallen human flesh; in baptism a person becomes clothed with 
the Christ of new creation, post-resurrection and post-ascension: ‘God became man so 
that man might become god,’ both being a work of the Spirit. The fallen flesh assumed 
by Christ at his incarnation had to be transformed through obedience and by undergoing 
death, resurrection and ascension before humanity could be saved by being clothed in it. 
Of course, Christ’s death, resurrection and ascension cannot, in one sense, be separated 
from his incarnation, and indeed presuppose it. But neither can they be conflated with it 
as Bulgakov is here attempting to do. The cross in the Gospels and in the theology of 
Paul stands as a cosmic fulcrum, bringing to completion the telos of sinful flesh. As 
such it is not the same as incarnation. It is from the other side of the grave that Christ  
offers his resurrected body back to the Church through the Spirit. There are stronger 
grounds  for  linking  the  Eucharist  with  the  Incarnation  than  baptism,  since  in  that 
sacrament one does become a bearer of Christ in the flesh, but the Eucharist also is a 
sacrament of the Cross, since in that, too, the broken body of Christ is transformed by 
the Spirit into the post-resurrection flesh of the risen Christ.
Baptism,  of  course,  is  a  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  the  latter  being  the  incarnating 
hypostasis, so Bulgakov rightly says that to be clothed in Christ is a work of the Trinity.  
And it  is  the  case  that  the  Holy  Spirit  brought  about  the  incarnation  of  the  Logos 
through Mary, and that the same Spirit clothes us in Christ. But it seems over zealous to 
link baptism to Mary.
Bulgakov links this being clothed in Christ not only with the Church being the body of 
Christ, and thus the incarnation of God, but also the Temple of the Holy Spirit. Since 
the Logos is the male image and the Spirit is the female image, being clothed in Christ 
means belonging to, and ontologically being, a part of the Church. The ‘life-in-Christ’ is 
thus a work of both the Word and the Spirit. He concludes the paragraph:
And in the light of this life-in-Christ of all of humankind, the difference between male and 
female does not hold.
However, this conclusion does not obviously flow from the preceding section. The logic 
appears to be that, because being ‘clothed in Christ’ in baptism is an act of the Trinity, 
or more specifically of the incarnated Logos and incarnating Spirit, it is an act of both 
the  male  and  female  hypostases.  In  the  sense  that  this  being  ‘clothed  in  Christ’, 
accomplished by both the Word and the Spirit, creates the Church, which is both the 
Body of Christ (male) and the Temple of the Holy Spirit (female), it includes both male 
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and female within it. More than that, although he is not explicit at this point, it also 
means that  both male  and female  principles  are  involved in  the  ‘clothing’  of every 
hypostasis in baptism, and therefore the hypostatic differences between them  ‘do not 
hold.’ Later, Bulgakov goes on to explore the spiritual anthropology of a person and 
there describes each hypostasis as being comprised of both male and female principles, 
but with different degrees of emphasis.
Nevertheless,  given his fundamental ontological distinction between the genders, the 
conclusion  is  far  from  convincing,  since  clearly  there  are  both  male  and  female 
hypostases in the Church and they never stop being hypostases, even in baptism. If the 
differences between them ‘do not hold’ in baptism, the question arises as to why they 
should be of paramount significance elsewhere. It is also unclear why, if the gender 
difference  is  so  theologically  important,  Paul  lists  it  third  in  the  same  verse  after 
Covenantal/ethnic (Jew and Greek) and social (slave and free) differences.
It is also difficult to reconcile this mapping of the creaturely images of maleness onto 
Christ  and femaleness  onto  the  Spirit  with  Bulgakov’s  insistence  on  the  bi-unitary, 
androgyne  nature  of  the  human  spirit  expounded in  The Lamb.  However,  with  this 
strongly  gendered  interpretation  it  seems  inevitable  that  he  is  going  to  run  into 
difficulties  when it  comes to a traditional  understanding of the efficacy and the all-
sufficiency of the redeeming work of Jesus Christ. How can a male Jesus save women? 
Come to that, how can he save anyone? The latter question he goes on to explore in the 
pages subsequent to this passage.
 3.5 Soteriology – Incarnation and Savrx
The soteriology of the Church is based on the following premises of an axiomatic character:  
(1)  the  unity  of  the  human  race  in  Adam  and  his  fall  from his  original  state;  (2)  the 
commonality of sin-tainted nature inherited by all, together with the personal guilt of every 
person through his personal participation in this sin; and (3) the redemption accomplished by 
Christ, with restoration not only of Adam but also of every individual through the healing of 
original sin by the sacrament of baptism.408
Mary plays a key role in the fabric of Bulgakov’s soteriology. There are several reasons 
for  this.  First,  she  is  required  as  the  female  hypostasis  to  compliment  the  male 
hypostasis in Christ. Second, she provides creaturely Sophia’s autonomous response to 
the love of God. Third,  her assumption and presence in heaven is the guarantee for 
humanity’s survival of the process of deification.
408 Bulgakov, Bride, p403
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However, there is a fourth reason, which has to do with the nature of the humanity 
adopted  by Christ,  his  flesh,  savrx.  For  Christ  ‘was the  New Adam,  in  whom was 
restored the integral virginity of the first man in his sophianicity.’409
Despite his repetition of St Gregory the Theologian’s maxim ‘that which is not assumed 
is not redeemed’, Bulgakov states that the flesh adopted by Christ, although weakened 
by the fall, was, itself,  received in a pre-fallen manner and thus devoid of the sinful 
passions.  The  following  extract  is  taken  from  his  paper  ‘The  Eucharist  Dogma,’ 
published in 1930, three years before The Lamb.
The Lord,  in receiving human flesh,  unites His Divine corporeality,  Sophia,  Glory,  with 
human creaturely corporeality. He adopts this human corporeality genuinely and wholly with 
the exception of sin, that is, the damage caused to the state of this corporeality by Adam’s 
fall.  Born of the Virgin,  without  male  seed,  the Lord adopts Adam’s  body such as it  is 
outside the Fall. The Lord lives in the midst of the sin-damaged world, but this damage has  
only an outer impact on His life, not an inner one. So, He shares with all humankind the need  
for food, which is no longer provided to human beings directly from the tree of life and the  
trees of paradise, but is earned in the sweat of the face. The Lord needs clothing and shelter 
(although He constantly goes without it). He becomes fatigued and suffers. But His body 
remains pure and immaculate; sinful tendencies are foreign to it; it is not subject to sickness 
and  it  is  free  of  the  inevitability  of  natural  death,  for  the  Lord  accepted  death  on  the 
cross...Thus, The Lord received corporeality of the not-yet-fallen Adam in his birth from the  
Virgin, and He lived by the life of this body.410
The reference to the  ‘integral virginity of the first man’ is to the primal state of man 
before  the  fall.  In  The  Comforter he  describes  this  as  the  state  in  which  sexual 
reproduction and fleshly union was united with the spiritual principle of syzygy. The 
union of the spiritual eros of male and female was the true friendship that, before the 
fall, accompanied the fleshly bi-unity expressed in the biblical injunction that ‘the two 
should become one flesh’ (Gen 2:24). This union reflects the spiritual-corporeal nature 
of humanity as incarnate spirit, in which the fleshly union, with its relation with the 
animal world, is ‘transcended by the presence of the spiritual principle in man and by 
its harmonising spiritualising power.’411
This harmonisation of sex and spirit was ‘the most difficult of tasks’ for pre-fallen man, 
since the relationship between them was  ‘unstable’. It was precisely this relation that 
disintegrated with the fall, described in the words of Gen 3:7 ‘Then the eyes of both of 
them were opened and they realised that they were naked.’ Bulgakov expresses it thus:
This  change  can  be  expressed  as  follows:  in  man,  sex  was  awakened as  a  rebellious, 
autonomous element, an element of desire and passion which not only was not subject to the 
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spirit but which subjected the spirit to itself: ‘and thy desire shall be for thy husband’ (Gen 
3:16); and such also became the desire of the husband for the wife. Sexual life in man lost its 
initial harmony and took on a tragic character.412
It is the presence of spirit in man, as a spiritual-corporeal being, that causes the resulting 
loss of ‘innocence’ to characterise the sexual life of humanity, whereas the absence of 
spirit in the animal world means that for animals it remains ‘innocent’. Nevertheless, the 
differentiation  between  male  and  female  is  not  just  a  fleshly  difference  –  it  is  an 
essential qualification of the spirit of man, which is why, in its essential nature, eros is a 
spiritual love.413
Eros is designed to be the passionate human response to the Holy Spirit, since it is a  
reflection of  ‘the presumed presence of the male and female principles in Revelation 
itself,’ and is thus the means of receiving gifts from God through the Spirit:
The intensity of eros as the spiritual energy of inspiring love is the fiery element which seeks 
to  be  overshadowed  by the  Holy Spirit  and  which  receives  Him (sic),  inasmuch  as  the 
following principle is valid with regard to the gifts of the Holy Spirit: ‘Ask, and it shall be 
given you: seek, and ye shall find’ (Mat 7:7)414
The language concerning sexual  life  in  man as  described in  The Comforter (1936), 
originally created to be united with eros and thus transcended in the spirit before the 
fall, and awakened to rebellious autonomy and disruption by the fall, is very different 
from that written in The Lamb three years previously (1933), where he says:
Begetting through fleshly union was only a consequence of original sin; it replaced spiritual 
begetting, which is unfathomable for us and which remained unrealised by man before the 
Fall.415
Eating is an ontological relation with the world; it is communion with the flesh of the world,  
a communion established by God in paradise and not abolished in the Heavenly Jerusalem 
(see Rev 22:2), whereas sex and sexual conception, sexuality in general, entered the world 
with the Fall, as a principle of mortal and damaged life.416
In The Comforter Bulgakov describes the act of sexual union as a fundamental part of 
the fleshly, incarnated nature of original, i.e. pre-fallen, humanity:
In the first man, the animal function of reproduction was united with the spiritual principle of  
syzygy as the spiritual eros of the male and female principles. This was  friendship in the 
proper sense of the word.417
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And ‘they shall be one flesh’ (2:24). Thus from the beginning, spiritual love for the  ‘help 
meet’ is joined with fleshly union in fulfilment of the commandment to multiply.418
He goes  on to  say that  ‘a  connection  is  preserved with the animal  world’,  an  idea 
directly at odds with his illustration of ‘eating’ demonstrating a valid relationship with 
the world in  opposition  to  his  vehemently negative  approach to  ‘sexual  conception, 
sexuality in general’ which ‘entered the world with the Fall’ in The Lamb. Here, human 
reproduction prior to the fall was intended to result from an unknown form of spiritual 
union in which bodily or fleshly union was absent.
In The Comforter the emphasis is distinctly on the disruption between the flesh and the 
spirit. Sex as a passion, opposed to the spirit, is what is awakened in the fall, not the act  
of  fleshly  union  resulting  in  reproduction.  This,  he  now  says,  was  originally  an 
expression of the union of spiritual eros of male and female.
The  identification  of  this  development  in  Bulgakov’s  thinking  is  important  since  it 
strikes at the heart of the nature of the flesh adopted by the Logos in the Incarnation. In 
The Lamb he describes how the flesh of the Logos taken from Mary is different to our 
humanity. He insists that
having assumed only the sinless ‘likeness of man,’ man’s flesh, but not its sin, the God-Man 
thus could not receive into His nature that which is the centre of the whole power of sin and 
which, at the same time, is unnatural for man, for it exists only within the limits of the life of 
sin and selfhood.419
Included in this exclusion from what is assumed by the Logos is everything related to 
sex and sexuality (although not the spiritual distinction between the male and female 
essences),  since Bulgakov maintains  that  this  entered the world  ‘with the Fall,  as a 
principle of mortal and damaged life.’
Therefore, all that is connected with the proper life of sex as such does not belong to the 
nature of Adam received by the New Adam in its original state. To be sure this nature was 
received  by Him in  the  diminished  state  proper  to  fallen  man.  However,  this  reception 
extended only to  ‘sinless passions,’ and the sexual life is not one of them. In this respect, 
Christ was different from the entire human race, for in Him the natural chastity and virginity 
of the race were restored. (his italics)420
Bulgakov insists that the flesh inherited by the Word from Mary was free from original 
sin. It was still authentic  ‘common human flesh’, despite Jesus not having an earthly 
father,  precisely because,  he says,  sexual reproduction,  which requires a father,  is  a 
consequence of the fall,  and is  therefore not ontological  to man.  Nevertheless,  both 
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original  and personal sin were absent  from it.  In this  regard Bulgakov refers  to the 
‘likeness’ (oJmoiwvmati) of sinful flesh in Romans 8:3 to indicate its difference from our 
flesh.
This ‘difference’ Bulgakov introduces between Christ and the rest of humanity stands in 
contrast to St Gregory’s maxim. Elsewhere he attempts to explain it:
Christ’s humanity is the inner human condition of every human being, about which it can be 
said that  nihil  humanum est  a  Christo alienum (nothing human is  foreign to  Christ)  (of 
course, not in the sense of the empirically given, sinful state of humanity, but in the sense of 
its nature).421
The  reason Bulgakov  is  insistent  on  Christ’s  assumption  of  ‘sinless’  flesh,  and  the 
absence of ‘sinful flesh,’ has to do with the relationship between the latter and original 
sin: ‘sinful flesh,’ for Bulgakov, means participating in original sin. For Christ to have 
actually had sinful flesh, therefore, would mean that he participated in original sin, that 
he knew sin. The point he is making is that Christ actually assumed fallen, or weakened, 
flesh, and in this sense it was ‘like’ sinful flesh, but crucially it was not actually ‘sinful’ 
flesh because then Christ would have been contaminated by sin.
The obvious soteriological dilemma that arises from this, then, is the question: how is 
humanity rescued from its  depravity if  the Saviour  does not  share in that  depravity 
which results from original sin and its consequent passions, even if his assumed state is 
a ‘diminished’ one ‘proper to fallen man’?
Bulgakov’s answer lies in Mary, since her flesh was not free from the burden of original 
sin. Instead, in preparation for the Incarnation, it was purified by a combination of the 
descent of the Spirit upon her, and her own personal sinlessness through ‘the power of 
her personal freedom,’422 in order that the flesh taken by the Logos was, while fallen, 
free from sin. She therefore constitutes other half of Christ’s Incarnation, making up 
what was lacking of our nature in Jesus’ own flesh. She thus becomes a fundamental 
part of the soteriological matrix since she does share our sinful flesh, and, through her 
ascension, guarantees our salvation. A significant amount of space is therefore devoted 
to Mary in all three volumes of his systematic theology, in addition to a whole volume 
of his mini-trilogy.
The Logos could take His flesh from the Virgin Mary only because She gave it, desiring to 
become  the  creaturely  Sophia,  the  sophianic  Mother  of  Christ’s  humanity,  which  must  
possess the fullness of sophianicity.  That  which was lacking for this  even in the Virgin 
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Mary’s humanity (because She too was burdened by the weight of original sin) was provided 
by the Holy Spirit, who descended upon Her at the Annunciation.423
He  explicitly  states  this  in  a  footnote  critical  of  the  Roman  Catholic  doctrine  of  the 
Immaculate  Conception,  in  a  section  dealing  with  the  unity  of  humanity  in  relation  to 
participation in original sin, and thus redemption:
The separation of the Mother of God from the human race by the mechanical ‘privilege’ of 
being free of original sin contradicts this love [that unites us with Christ, Jn 13:34] and, in a  
certain sense, does not exalt but diminishes her holiness.424
And  in  speaking  of  the  nature  of  Christ’s  flesh  in  relation  to  Adam’s  pre-fallen 
humanity he states:
If the Lord’s body were identical in all its properties with the body of the first Adam, it  
would really have differed from our body: and the salvation of man by Christ’s assumption 
of  our  essence  would  have  remained  unrealised  (a  similar  dogmatic  misunderstanding 
characterises the Roman Catholic doctrine of the ‘immaculate conception’ of the Mother of 
God, which in effect breaks the connection between Christ and our humanity).425
Bulgakov  has  introduced  a  subtle,  but  crucial,  distinction  between  original  sin  and 
fallenness,  the latter  being the  consequence of  the former,  and not identical  with it. 
Christ’s human nature, while free from original sin, was still a fallen nature: i.e. Christ 
bears the consequence without the cause. It was, therefore, sinless flesh.
Although the God-Man, the ‘only one without sin,’ received His flesh from the Virgin Mary 
by the Holy Spirit and was therefore free of original sin, nevertheless even this sinless flesh 
is not Adam’s original essence, for it is weakened and burdened by the  consequences of 
original sin.
In the God-Man, the fallen and infirm human essence, subjecting itself to the divine essence, 
becomes harmonious with and obedient to it.426
However, although Christ adopted this ‘fallen and infirm human essence,’ he did not do 
so through the fallen course of hereditary transmission, from parents to children through 
sexual reproduction. Instead, he received it in a manner that bears some resemblance to 
the way in which reproduction was intended before the fall:
In order to redeem the entire human essence and to transform the entire human race, the Lord 
had to assume human flesh. This flesh was Adam’s, but He took it not from the fallen Adam 
but  in  another  manner:  ‘in  the  likeness  [homoiomati]  of  men’ (Phil  2:7).  Christ  did not 
assume the human essence in the manner that every man has it; His assumption of the human 
essence  was  not  limited,  truncated,  or  egocentric  –  in  a  word,  it  was  not  individual or 
atomistic. He assumed it in the manner in which it was possessed by the original Adam, who 
came out of the hands of the Lord.427
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The  argument  for  Bulgakov  revolves  around  the  issue  of  the  universality  of  the 
effectiveness of redemption.  For this reason it  is important  that Christ’s flesh is not 
limited by individualism, which Bulgakov sees as being the primary consequence of the 
fall. Prior to the fall the first Adam was a particular person, ‘a concrete I’, but he was a 
perichoretic man – ‘the entire human race with all its possible persons effectively lived 
in  him.’  Persons  were  intended  to  be  ‘transparent  for  one  another:  all  in  all  and 
everyone in all. That is the ontology of personality.’ After the fall ‘humanity knows the 
personality  only  as  individuality.’  ‘With  the  Fall  the  image  of  all-humanity  was 
obscured in Adam; he became an individual who could beget only individuals.’428
There is a dilemma here, for if Christ was to adopt ‘fallen flesh’ in the ordinary manner 
two consequences follow: first, he would have to take on the personal burden of original 
sin – sinful flesh – but sin cannot co-exist with divinity, nor does it belong to the proper 
state of humanity,  so this is impossible. Second, redemption could not be universally 
effective if the flesh adopted belonged to atomistic fallen humanity. Instead, the Logos 
had  to  assume  fallen  flesh  firstly  without the  burden  of  personal  original  sin,  and 
secondly in a way that pre-empted the atomisation of humanity in order for his salvific 
work to be universal.
Bulgakov’s answer to this lies again in Mary. In answer to both the problem of original 
sin and the consequent atomisation of humanity, Mary’s agreement to be the ‘handmaid 
of the Lord’ means that she conceives spiritually, without a father:
Original sin is transmitted precisely through human conception, and with it are transmitted 
bad multiplicity, egocentrism, and limitation.429
Christ  therefore  receives  not  only his  ‘fallen  flesh’  from Mary,  but  does  so  in  the 
manner in which reproduction is supposed to have taken place before the fall, thus not 
receiving original sin, or its consequent atomisation.
More  than  this,  however,  Christ  also  needed  to  receive,  not  just  a  pre-atomistic 
humanity, but a full and universal one. This, also, he received from Mary:
The proper nature of the Most Holy Theotokos with Her personal and generic holiness was 
restored in its sophianicity and purified and integrated to such a degree that the descent upon 
Her of the Holy Spirit could occur, communicating perfect sophianicity to her. When the 
Most Holy Virgin Mary gave birth to the Lord, She bore within Herself the image of Sophia; 
She was the personification of the creaturely Sophia. The fruit of Her birth-giving was thus 
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the sophianic man, the New Adam, who was distinguished from all men by the form of his 
humanity.430
Bulgakov maintains that this humanity is identical with ours except for its universality, 
although as with many of his statements,  it  can be drastically modified or qualified 
elsewhere in his work:
This was the true humanity, identical with the humanity of each of us (which is why we are 
Christ’s ‘brethren’ [Heb 2:12]), but it differs from our humanity by the fact that it excludes 
no one and includes everyone, by the fact that it is not limited by anything but bears the 
image of chaste and wise Integrity. And it was the Virgin Mary who gave this to Her Son.431
The obvious question arises as to how, then,  sinful flesh, that is, not just  ‘weakened’ 
flesh, but flesh burdened with original sin (if such a distinction exists), is redeemed if 
not assumed by the God-Man. In discussing the work of Christ Bulgakov states that
by a  free act  of  His will  Christ  received into His  sinless  humanity the  sinful  humanity,  
centred in Adam.432
This is not an apparent adoption of human sin, but actually the sin of all humanity, past 
present and future, which he can receive presumably because he has assumed the pre-
fallen, pre-atomised humanity of the first Adam, although Bulgakov does not explicitly 
state this. He goes on
‘The  Word  was  made  flesh’ (John  1:14),  but  this  flesh  is  already  sinful  flesh,  which, 
although it is free of personal sin in Him in virtue of His sinlessness, nevertheless remains in 
its sin. Through His humanity this sinful flesh becomes also His flesh. And in taking upon  
Himself  the  sin  of  the  world,  the  Righteous  One  is  equated,  in  the  eyes  of  God,  with 
sinners.433
How the ‘taking up’ of sins of the world by the Redeemer is accomplished remains a 
mystery,434 although  the  human  nature  he  adopts  belongs  to  each  of  us  personally. 
Nevertheless, the assertion that  ‘through His humanity this sinful flesh becomes also 
His flesh’ does not seem to correspond with his earlier insistence that Christ’s humanity 
was  ‘free of original  sin, nevertheless even this  sinless flesh is not Adam’s original 
essence.’435
There is much confusion in terminology here, for Bulgakov can say at one time that 
Christ adopts ‘sinless flesh,’ and at another, as here, that he takes ‘sinful flesh,’ and at 
other times that Christ did  not take  ‘sinful flesh,’ only the  ‘likeness’ of sinful flesh! 
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When he speaks of ‘sinful flesh’ in relation to assumption by Christ he does not mean 
the opposite of  ‘sinless flesh.’ Rather,  ‘sinful flesh’ means  ‘fallen flesh’ and does not 
connote the presence of original sin, merely flesh that is weakened by original sin – that 
carries the consequence without the cause, as it were, unlike the rest of us who carry 
both the cause (we participate in original sin) and its consequence. On the other hand, 
‘sinless flesh’ in this context also means ‘fallen flesh,’ but is another way of saying that 
original sin is not present in it.
Notwithstanding this confusion, Bulgakov is insistent that Christ’s flesh is not the same 
as ours for he does  not experience the same temptations as those common to fallen 
humanity,  such  as  sexual  temptations.  The  nature  of  the  humanity  adopted  by 
Bulgakov’s Christ is so high above ours that there seems little in common between him 
and us:
If we examine the character of the temptation, we will  note that it did not include those 
impulses  and  desires  of  the  flesh  that,  after  the  Fall,  enslaved the  human  essence  with 
animality and crippled it with passions. Such a temptation never came close to the God-Man. 
He remained above it,  being liberated from the hereditary original  sin; He was the New 
Adam, in whom was restored the integral virginity of the first man in his sophianicity.436
For Bulgakov, Christ remained above the worst depravities that threaten weakened man, 
never  experienced  the  horrific  temptations  that  wrack  the  consciences  of  fallen 
humanity. Specifically, Christ does not experience the sexual temptations common to 
the rest of humanity, and hinted at in Genesis 3:7, ‘then the eyes of both of them were 
opened, and they realised that they were naked; so they sewed fig leaves together and 
make coverings for themselves.’
Bulgakov insists that ‘Christ was really tempted.’437 To say otherwise would be docetic. 
Christ’s  temptation  constituted  an  authentic  trial  that  had  to  be  experienced  and 
overcome. Citing St Gregory’s maxim he says
it [the temptation] was absolutely real, for it was the voice of the human nature assumed by 
Christ. This was the first real victory of deification over the human nature.438
His  assertion  is  that  Christ’s  humanity,  being  universal,  was  capable,  through  its 
association with his divinity, of experiencing all human sin through intensification. And 
it is this intensified form of sin that constitutes the manner in which he experienced it.
What happened was that the power of this humanity was immeasurably augmented through 
its deification, which was accomplished even before the definitive  glorification  of Christ. 
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Only the deified humanity of the God-Man had the power to encompass and withstand the  
real  experiencing  of  all  human  sin;  and  the  divine  essence  and  the  divine  will  in  Him 
consented fully to this.439
Despite this insistence, a doubt remains concerning the extent to which Bulgakov’s ‘all’ 
really means ‘all’ in relation to the experiencing of sin. The nature received by Christ 
was  ‘in the diminished state proper to fallen man.’ But he goes on to qualify this by 
saying ‘this reception extended only to “sinless passions,” and the sexual life is not one 
of them. In this respect, Christ was different from the entire human race.’440 So Christ 
was not  capable of experiencing one of the most  common temptations to humanity. 
Bulgakov here admits a doubt as he poses the nagging question, himself:
If He was free of that which, along with hunger, is the most agonising thing for man, then is  
man wholly redeemed, and is the redemptive work fully accomplished?  441
The question must have been agonising for him, for having asked, he never answers it. 
He simply presses on to talk about the ‘sinless’ flesh adopted by Christ.
We must  pause  to  reflect  on this  interpretation  of  ‘sinless/sinful’  flesh.  Concerning 
Romans 8:3 he says,
Jesus is the true Son of Man, even though He is begotten without a human father from His 
Mother; in relation to sinful flesh, however, His flesh, which is free of original sin, turns out 
to be only a ‘likeness of flesh.’442
The diminutive ‘only’ here is being asked to carry a lot of weight. A few lines earlier he 
has said that ‘the “likeness of...flesh” (Rom 8:3; see also Phil 2:7),...is not intended to 
diminish its authenticity,  but rather to indicate that sin, both original and personal, is 
absent from it’. However, there is no further exegesis on this critical verse.
More importantly,  his interpretation of  ‘only a likeness’ is based on the Greek word 
oJmoiwvmati used in Romans 8:3, the exact same word Paul uses earlier in the letter to 
describe our being joined to Christ ‘in the likeness (oJmoiwvmati) of his death, so that we 
might  also  be  [joined  with  him]  in  the  [likeness  of  his]  resurrection’  (Rom  6:5). 
Likewise in Philippians 2:7 where Paul uses the word again referring to Christ: ‘being 
born in the likeness (oJmoiwvmati) of men.’ There is no hint that this is ‘only a likeness’ 
implying  a  difference,  and indeed,  if  there  was,  Paul’s  entire  ontology of  salvation 
unravels.  On the  contrary,  the word is  used  to  describe  complete  identification  and 
speaks of Christ’s participation in the very nature of the sinful human condition (albeit  
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free  from  sin,  itself),  and  not  of  his  only  apparent  likeness.443 The  situation  is 
complicated  because  elsewhere  he  says  that  Christ  does adopt  ‘sinful  flesh.’444 
Nevertheless, despite Bulgakov’s claims to the contrary, his interpretation here carries a 
hint of docetism.445
Furthermore, there is great difficulty reconciling this position with that of the writer of 
Hebrews  (2:16-18),  where  Christ  was  ‘made  like  his  brothers  in  every  way (kata; 
pavnta)... Because he himself suffered when he was tempted, he is able to help those 
who are being tempted.’ The point is precisely that Christ’s experience was exactly like 
ours.  There  is  no  hint  in  this  passage,  or  any  others  in  Scripture,  that  there  were 
temptations or experiences common to humanity that were  not experienced by Christ. 
Indeed, the argument here is that for atonement to be effected Christ’s humanity had to 
be the same as ours.
But it is not just these ‘passionate’ temptations that never tempt Christ. For, despite his 
earlier insistence that the temptations were real, Bulgakov says that even those Christ 
did experience were not really ‘temptations’ as he was never actually tempted by them.
Despite all the reality and power of the temptation, it was absolutely impossible for Satan to  
be  victorious  over  Christ.  Why?  [Because  Christ’s]  human  essence  itself  proved  to  be 
inaccessible to the temptation; it overcame its own natural instability.446
But temptation can only be called such if it is precisely that, tempting, which must at 
least imply the possibility of failure. Otherwise the temptation is docetic, illusory.
If we ask how it overcame this instability, the answer is that Christ assumed the fallen 
flesh that had acquired all the experience of temptation since Adam and was too pure 
and holy in his humanity to be tempted:
Aside from the general tested condition of the man, acquired through trials and temptations, 
Satan  was  also  confronted  here  by  supreme  holiness  and  purity,  as  well  as  by  an 
immeasurable genius  and a fullness  of the  entire human essence that  not  only were not 
inferior to the genius and fullness of the first man whom he had deceived and seduced but  
were far superior to them, since they included the entire experience of the generations of the 
forefathers of the Saviour as the Son of Man.447
It is not at all clear what Bulgakov means by  ‘human essence,’ whether it is human 
nature, or human spirit (nature plus hypostasis), or something else, or how it is capable 
of garnering this ‘experience’ through generations. But there is a fundamental difference 
443 So, eg, Best, Body, p51
444 Bulgakov, Lamb, p351. See discussion on p139
445 See for example, Weinandy TG, In The Likeness of Sinful Flesh, 1993
446 Bulgakov, Lamb, p300
447 Bulgakov, Lamb, p300
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between Christ’s humanity and ours, and for this reason there is a need to include ‘the 
sinful flesh’ of Mary into the fabric of soteriology to make up for that which is absent 
from  Christ’s  own  humanity.  Mary,  notwithstanding  her  highly  elevated  degree  of 
purity and holiness, nevertheless has the potential to identify with our experiences of 
weakness, which Christ does not. However, given Mary’s supposed sinlessness, even 
this identity becomes tenuous since she has never, by definition, experienced weakness, 
although presumably she was susceptible to the real experience of temptation.
The  other  element  in  Christ’s  temptation  that  helps  him  to  overcome  them  is  the 
voluntary subjugation of the human will to the divine will, as part of the work of the 
deification of his humanity.
This  conquest  was  not  unearned,  automatic,  mechanical;  it  was  the  creative  conquest  – 
acquired at the cost of labour and suffering – of the creaturely essence of the flesh in its  
subordination to the spirit.448
Nevertheless, despite its proximity to and consequence upon Christ’s baptism and the 
descent of the Holy Spirit (Mk1:12), there is no mention here of the Spirit’s role in 
Christ’s temptations.
One is  left  wondering  that  if  the  Spirit  was  afforded a  greater  role  in  empowering 
Christ’s humanity to overcome its weakness, as implied in the biblical narrative, a very 
different  view  of  the  nature  of  the  humanity  adopted  by  Christ  might  emerge. 
Dependence on the Spirit, rather than a special version of savrx inaccessible to the rest 
of the human race, would not jeopardise the purity of Christ’s kenotic divinity. But it 
might answer Bulgakov’s ‘agonising doubt.’
The  question  of  the  universality  of  Christ’s  redemptive  work  need  also  not  be  so 
dependent  on  his  assumption  of  a  pre-atomised,  partially  fallen,  sinless  humanity. 
Mary’s  sinless/sinful  humanity  would  become  unnecessary  if  the  benefits  were 
universalised  through  the  gift  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  This  seems  to  be  the  Pauline 
understanding,  rather  than  some  form  of  mechanical  participation  in  an  Ideal 
man/woman. But this exploration must await a later time.
 3.6 The Ontology of the Church
The Church herself, the sacrament of sacraments, is not a particular institution, as each 
of the specific sacraments is. Rather, she is, on the one hand, a sacred fulfilment, the 
448 Bulgakov, Lamb, p301
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fulfilment of God’s original design, of ‘the dispensation of the mystery, which from the 
beginning of the world hath been hid in God’ (Eph. 3:9). On the other hand, she is the 
unique and supreme reality of Divine-humanity, revealed by Christ expressly at the Last 
Supper.
The paradox of the Church is its unity and its multiplicity – ‘that they may be one even 
as we are one’ (Jn 17:11). There is one Church, but there are billions of unique people, 
hypostases, in each of whom dwells the Spirit. How are these many one and how is this 
one  many?  What  constitutes  the  oneness  of  the  Church,  and  is  this  oneness  an 
ontological unity or merely a collective unity? These are questions that have been asked 
since the earliest days of the Church’s existence.
Considering the third volume of his great dogmatic trilogy is dedicated to the ‘Bride of 
the  Lamb’  Bulgakov’s  treatise  on  the  ontology of  the  Church is  surprisingly  short, 
barely reaching 15 pages. This compares with 22 pages on the church as ‘hierarchical 
organisation,’ and 20 pages on ‘grace.’ Indeed, the first instance of the word ‘bride’ 
does not occur until over half way through the volume.
In his section on the ontology, or essence, of the Church he identifies three primary 
descriptions of the Church in the NT: the Body of Christ; the Temple of the Holy Spirit; 
and the Bride of Christ. The first two of these form a dialectic synergy: the male Body 
of Christ, christological, and the female Temple of the Holy Spirit, pneumatological. 
Together  they reflect  the  wholeness  of  the  creaturely  Sophia,  and are  therefore  the 
foundation of creation (8 pages). On the other hand, in an extraordinarily brief section, 
he deals with the image of the Church as Bride, which speaks of the nature of the union 
of Christ with the Church, and thus divinity-humanity,  God-manhood, Divine Sophia 
and creaturely Sophia, the fulfilment of the deification of creation (around 2½ pages).
 3.6.1 The Church as Body of Christ and Temple of the Holy 
Spirit
Bulgakov introduces his discussion on the Church as the ‘body of Christ’ and ‘temple of 
the Holy Spirit’ with reference to 1 Corinthians 6:15,19: ‘Know ye not that your bodies 
are the members of Christ?...Know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy 
Spirit which is in you, which ye have of God, and ye are not your own?’449 The Church 
449 Bulgakov, Bride, p255. However, this difficult passage (1 Cor 6:15-19) is also about marriage, and 
sexual union, not just chastity, as Bulgakov suggests (Bride, p261). Although he does not explore it 
further, it is one of the few passages in the NT outside Ephesians where the descriptions of the  
Church as body, bride, and temple are all logically, theologically and spiritually united (see p187, 
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is made up of members of one body (unity), and each member has different gifts of the 
one Spirit (1 Cor 12, multiplicity). The consideration of the Church as body is used both 
to describe the unity of the Church, i.e. all are members of the one body, and also to 
distinguish those members from each other, i.e. each member has its own place in the 
body, unique to itself. Differentiation and unity are complementary aspects of the one 
being of the Church as ‘body.’
This unity is not something imposed from outside, in the form of an organisation. It 
derives from an inner communion that gives rise to a living body – Bulgakov uses the 
Slavophile word ‘sobornost,’ the ‘idea of inner ecclesial community:’
In these ecclesiological texts it is first necessary to delineate the idea of sobornost, according 
to which the Church is an organism or a body, or generally a living multi-unity.450
The description of the Church as the ‘body of Christ,’ for Bulgakov, is closely linked 
with Christ being clothed with a body of flesh in the Incarnation. But he does not follow 
the usual line of argument in saying that the Church is therefore an extension of the 
Incarnation as Christ’s body on earth. Instead he says that Christ’s assumption of a body 
demonstrates  that  a  ‘body’  is  appropriate  to  God,  not  just  soteriologically  for  our 
salvation,  but  ontologically,  since  it  is  nonsensical  (not  to  say heretical)  to  suggest 
Christ could put on something created in his image that was alien to him. Just as human 
nature is not alien to divine nature (otherwise there could be no Incarnation), the created 
body is correlated to, and an image of, a spiritual body.
Such  a  correlation  presupposes  the  existence  of  two  corporealities:  spiritual  or  divine 
corporeality, which is the Divine Sophia or the glory of God, and human corporeality. The 
existence of the body of Christ is thus a divine-human fact.451
The question therefore arises, what is a body? What is its relation to spirit and to nature? 
The principle of God-Manhood disclosed in the Incarnation forces the conclusion that 
not only is  ‘body’ not alien to spirit, it must in some sense be its self-disclosure, be a 
part  of  the  spirit’s  own  nature.  He  elucidates  this  in  his  paper  ‘Hypostasis  and 
Hypostaticity:’
But what is the body? Is it a lifeless mass of muscles and bones? But one must rid oneself of  
this notion, thinking about the proto-image and essence of the body – spirit-bearing, spirit-
obeying principle. The body is the receptacle and conjointly the revelation, the manifestation 
of the spirit, the body belongs to the spirit, but not vice versa, as it is in the sinful condition 
of man. Christ has the Body-Church, the house of God (1 Tim 3:15).452
below).
450 Bulgakov, Bride, p257
451 Bulgakov, Bride, p259
452 Bulgakov, ‘Hypostasis’, p30
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Bulgakov runs through several of the NT passages where the Church is described as the 
body  of  Christ,  identifying  in  most  a  complementary  description  of  the  Church  in 
pneumatological terms (1 Cor 6, 10, 12; Rom 5, 12; Eph 1, 2, 4). In this understanding 
of the Church  ‘many members are united and diverse gifts are distributed, her living 
unity  being  headed  by  Christ  and  quickened  by the  Holy  Spirit.’453 But  there  is  a 
paradox in the description of the Church as Body and Temple. The Body is ‘of’ Christ 
and the Temple is ‘of’ the Holy Spirit, i.e. not ‘of’ Christ. This is not to drive a wedge 
between the Logos and the Spirit, but is to highlight the antinomy in the description that 
displays a dynamic interrelationship in the being of the Church between the Son and the 
Spirit.
The idea of the unity of the Church as the body of Christ, and also as the temple of the Holy 
Spirit,  contains the obvious antinomy of the one and the many,  of  the identical  and the  
different, of Christ’s and not Christ’s. In this antinomy, thesis and antithesis must have equal 
force; between them there is no logical or static synthesis. Such antinomies can be overcome 
only dynamically, by the churning of life.454
He builds on these two aspects of the Church as Body and Temple to say that they form 
an  inseparable  dyadic  structure.  When  one  aspect  is  mentioned  the  other  must  be 
immediately understood as well: Christ is the head of the Body, which is quickened by 
the Holy Spirit; he is also the chief corner-stone of the Temple, inhabited by the Spirit 
(Eph 2:18-22).
The principal  significance of describing the Church as the Body of Christ  is  that it 
includes both the divine and the human natures, Divine Sophia and creaturely Sophia, 
precisely because Christ’s body does in himself. The Divine Church and the creaturely 
Church (which is in its image and upon which it is founded) are united together in a 
single body (although Bulgakov does not describe the Body of Christ in this context as 
being hypostasised). This is the fundamental concept of the Church for him: the Divine 
Sophia is actually the heavenly or divine church. It is the protological church of which 
the  creaturely  church  (which  includes  the  dead as  well  as  the  living  –  i.e.  not  just 
‘earthly’, or ‘militant’) is its image, and which it will sophiologically interpenetrate in 
the ‘dispensation of the fullness of times:’
The Incarnation of Christ accomplishes the unification of divine and creaturely life, man’s  
deification, which is precisely the power of the heavenly Church manifested in the earthly 
Church...The  Church  is  the  unity  of  the  supra-eternal  Divine  Sophia  and  the  becoming 
creaturely Sophia.455
453 Bulgakov, Bride, p257
454 Bulgakov, Bride, p259
455 Bulgakov, Bride, pp257-258
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The ‘heavenly’ church in this context is not, therefore, the church of the saints in glory 
or the angels. It is the fullness of God’s own being-for-creation; it is the Divine Sophia.
As the eternal God-manhood, the heavenly Church is the life of God, the self-revelation of 
God, the Divine Sophia.456
The creaturely church is then coincident with creaturely Sophia and must be understood 
cosmically – it is the image of God’s own being in creation. It therefore includes the 
living and the dead as well as the angels and those not yet born.
Bulgakov claims this interpretation overcomes the ‘otherwise impossible-to-understand’ 
passage in Eph 1:23, where ‘the Church, which is his body [receives] the fullness of him 
who fills all in all.’ This ‘fullness’ can only refer to the life of God himself, which is the 
heavenly Church, the Divine Sophia, and it is Christ alone that can unite this ‘fullness’, 
this life of God, with the temporal life of those who are  ‘predestined’ (1:11). So the 
Divine Sophia, the ‘fullness of God,’ and the creaturely Sophia, which is in a state of 
becoming,  of  pilgrimage,  are  united  in  the  one Body of  Christ,  that  is  the Church, 
heavenly and creaturely, just as the two natures of Christ are united without separation 
or confusion in the one body of Christ in the Chalcedonian formula.
However, despite the abundance of NT references in this section,  particularly to the 
book of Ephesians, Bulgakov does not refer to the later verse in the same letter (3:19) 
that  seems  to  undermine  this  interpretation.  The  writer  prays  that  the  Ephesians, 
themselves, might be ‘filled with all the fullness of God’ (i{na plerwqh`te eij~ pan` to;  
plevrwma tou` qeou)`. Here it is quite clear that it is not the ‘heavenly church,’ or Divine 
Sophia, that is to be filled,  but the saints being addressed who are the object of the 
prayer.  Indeed such a prayer  for the  ‘heavenly church’ would be meaningless since, 
according to Bulgakov, the heavenly church is coincident with the  ‘fullness of God.’ 
This  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  his  understanding  of  the  ‘heavenly  church’  as 
Divine Sophia, hypostasised by Christ,  and united with the creaturely Sophia, or the 
temporal church, in him, is wrong, but that his argument from Ephesians is weakened. 
The  ‘fullness of God’ must be something accessible, proper even, to created, restored 
humanity,  and is therefore not a necessary reference to the Divine Sophia. It would 
certainly make sense to  understand this  verse sophianically.  That  is,  it  refers to the 
divinisation  of  the  Church,  as  the  creaturely  Sophia  (represented  by the  church  for 
456 Bulgakov, Bride, p257. This is another example of Bulgakov’s lack of consistency since elsewhere 
he states ‘in their totality the holy angels constitute the heavenly Church’ and ‘the holy angels 
constitute God’s creaturely glory, and therefore they will participate in the manifestation of God’s 
glory as the triumph of the heavenly Church.’ (p409)
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whom the Apostle is praying) is deified through grace by the Divine Sophia. However, 
it would still undermine his insistence that a reference to the plevrwma tou` qeou must 
itself be a direct reference to the Divine Sophia.
For Bulgakov the unity of the Church is a substantial, ontological unity (although not an 
empirical unity), based on the unity of God. It is a unity of fullness, or wholeness. As 
the  Triune  God  is  one,  so  the  Body  of  Christ  is  one  as  the  one  revelation  of  the 
trihypostatic life of God. And the Body of Christ, being animated by the Holy Spirit, is 
thus  also  the  self-revelation  of  the  Spirit.  Bulgakov  speaks  of  this  Body  of  Christ 
participating in the divine life of God, and through this participation the divine life is 
revealed through  ‘the ongoing deification of creation.’  The Church  is the divine life 
conferred upon creation.457
Participation in this divine life is accomplished through belonging to Christ’s body, to 
becoming a member of the whole, and being thereby animated by the one Holy Spirit. 
But each person being a member of the body is actually also the whole body, since they 
belong to the whole and the body only exists in its members (1 Cor 12:14).458 Thus each 
person participating  in  this  divine  life  of  Christ  becomes Christ.  But  this  raises  the 
question of the nature of personal identity.
Each of many persons, while remaining himself in his singularity, is a member of the one  
Christ and is animated by the one Spirit. But if each member is Christ when he participates  
in Christ’s life, then what constitutes his own life?459
Bulgakov resolves the issue of the one and the many,  the multi-unity of the Church 
quite simply: the Church is one, as a body is one, by virtue of its one nature. It is many 
or multiple in view of all the human hypostases.460 The multiplicity of the members of 
the body, with the multiplicity of gifts, while different from each other, nevertheless is 
the body by virtue of their being members of it. The members belong to each other, and 
to the whole. Referring back to the Incarnation and the nature of humanity, Bulgakov 
goes on to describe the unity of the body in terms of the unified nature of humanity:
the unity of the body refers to the unity of humanity, first in the old Adam and then in the 
new Adam.461
Likewise, the multiplicity of members in the body refers to the human hypostases, each 
of whom is in the image of the one All-hypostasis and shares in the same human nature 
457 Bulgakov, Bride, p258
458 Bulgakov, Bride, p259
459 Bulgakov, Bride, p259
460 Bulgakov, Bride, p260
461 Bulgakov, Bride, p260
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(i.e. as part of the body) while being a complete human being, themselves (i.e. also 
being the body). Each is a unique member of the genus while representing the genus.
Every  hypostasis  is  a  personal  how of  the  universal  what and,  as  such,  belongs  to  the 
fullness, the pleroma. It is a ray of that divine light about which it is said that it ‘was the true 
Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the World’ (Jn 1:9). 462
Christ, then, is the one who, as the head, is the foundation of the new humanity, who as 
the ‘All-man’ includes the nature of every hypostasis, which, in relation to the body, is 
distinguished from every other by its function as different from other members.  But 
since all hypostases are reflections of his All-hypostasis they are also included in his 
oneness: this is what it means to say that Christ is the head of the body. Thus both the 
nature and the hypostases of all humanity find expression as multiplicity and unity in 
relation to Christ. Unity of human hypostases is found in the All-hypostasis who is the 
head. Unity of human nature exists through belonging to the one body which belongs to 
Christ.  The multiplicity of hypostases are unique rays  of the All-hypostasis,  and the 
multiplicity of unique members are parts of the one body.
Bulgakov  uses  the  same  language  of  ‘multi-unity’  in  talking  about  the  many  gifts 
distributed by the one Spirit. The gifts of the one Holy Spirit are given uniquely to each 
hypostasis (1 Cor 12:4, 11), and so they become a mark of  ‘individualisation,’ which, 
perhaps  surprisingly,  he  equates  with  personhood.  But  the  gifts  are  given  to  each 
hypostasis for the building up of the one body, which belongs to Christ.
The personal principle, the principle of individualisation of humanity, is thus connected with 
the bi-unitary action or self-revelation of the Second and Third Hypostases.463
Thus it is the work of both Son and the Spirit that gives rise to the ‘multi-unity’ of the 
Church: many members (hypostases) in one body (nature) of Christ, many gifts from 
one Spirit. These gifts are given for the nurturing of the whole of humanity, since all are 
made in the image of God and their hypostases are included in that of the Logos, upon 
whom the Spirit reposes.
The cosmic dimension of the Church as body of Christ and temple of the Holy Spirit, 
that is, the creaturely reflection (creaturely Sophia) of the Divine Sophia (hypostasised 
by  the  Son  and  the  Spirit),  leads  Bulgakov  to  ‘affirm  a  certain  panchristism  and 
panpneumatism’  throughout  the  whole  of  creation.  Since  the  Church  is  the  inner 
entelechy of all creation there is nothing that is beyond its limits. And since Christ is the 
462 Bulgakov, Bride, p260
463 Bulgakov, Bride, p260
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All-hypostasis of which every human hypostasis is a unique image, this leads him to say 
that  ‘after  the  Incarnation  and  the  Pentecost,  Christ  is  the  head  of  humankind  and 
therefore lives in all humankind.’464
In summary, then, Bulgakov sees the doctrine of the Church as the body of Christ and 
the temple of the Holy Spirit as formulating a doctrine of humanity’s dynamic relation 
to  the  eternal  God-Manhood,  which  itself  is  humanity’s  foundation,  and  thus  a 
foundation for ecclesiology that precedes any consideration of the church as institution 
or hierarchy.465 The Church as the body of Christ is the manifestation of the creaturely 
Sophia, which is the manifestation of the Divine Sophia’s being as hypostasised by the 
Logos;  the  Church as  the  temple  of  the  Holy  Spirit  is  the  expression  in  creaturely 
Sophia  of  the  animating  principle  (the  Glory)  of  the  Holy  Spirit  within  the  Divine 
Sophia.  The Church in its  wholeness is the combination,  the mutual  indwelling,  the 
perichoresis, of both the Divine and creaturely hypostasised Sophias, of Christ and the 
Spirit.  The  relation  between  the  one  and  the  many  here  is  contradictory  only  if 
considered purely rationally.  When considered dynamically,  however,  it  portrays  the 
relationship between the Divine Sophia (which is one and eternal and belongs to the 
divine triyhypostatisedness) and creaturely Sophia (which is multiple and temporal and 
belongs to the multiplicity of the images of God, which are ontologically transparent to 
the  Proto-image).  The  Church is  a  ‘union of  divine  and creaturely  principles,  their 
interpenetration without separation and without confusion.’466
 3.6.2 The Church as the Bride of Christ
At the outset it  must be said that Bulgakov’s exposition of the Church as  ‘bride’ is 
extremely unclear,  very difficult  to unravel,  and easily misinterpreted,  despite  being 
only two and a half pages long!
The Church is frequently described in the NT as the Bride of Christ, and is taken to be 
the Beloved of the Lover in the Song of Songs in the OT (which he calls the Apocalypse 
of the OT).467 For Bulgakov, the description of the Church as ‘the Bride of Christ and 
the Wife of the Lamb, the Beloved of the Lover,’ refers primarily, but not exclusively, 
to ‘the creaturely aspect of the Church, for which Christ gave Himself.’468 In its relation 
464 Bulgakov, Bride, p261
465 ‘First the Church, then the hierarchy, not vice versa.’ Bulgakov, Bride, p281
466 Bulgakov, Bride, p261, p262
467 Bulgakov, Bride, p264
468 Bulgakov, Bride, p263
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with Christ it is another way of speaking of the same phenomenon of the eschatological 
‘marrying’ of divinity and creatureliness as the Body and Temple images.469
3.6.2.1 The Bride in the New Testament Apocalypse
Bulgakov says that the understanding of the Church as Bride is even more sophiological 
than that of the body and temple. The reason for saying this is that Revelation explicitly 
describes both the heavenly Church and the earthly Church as ‘the Bride.’ Herein lays 
the source of the difficulties. The passages in Revelation 21 that describe the Bride as 
the new Jerusalem coming down out of heaven from God refer to the heavenly Church, 
the  Divine  Sophia.  The  descent  of  the  heavenly  Bride,  of  the  Divine  Sophia,  into 
creation signifies the sophianisation, or divinisation, of creation (Rev 21:2, 9-10).
Likewise, Paul’s reference in 2 Cor 5:1-2 to a  ‘building of God, a dwelling not made 
with hands, eternal in the heavens,’ and for which  ‘we groan, earnestly desiring to be 
clothed upon with our dwelling  which is  from heaven’  refers to  the same heavenly 
Jerusalem, the Divine Sophia, the Bride which abides in heaven.
However, in Revelation 22:17 the Church as the Bride, animated by the Spirit,  calls 
down, summons Christ, while awaiting him and abiding in the world.470
This, then, is the earthly, creaturely Bride. Indeed, Bulgakov speaks of this summoning 
as not a summoning of Christ at all, but a summoning of the new Jerusalem, who is to 
‘come down out of heaven from God.’ Thus the creaturely Bride calls down the Divine 
Sophia, concluding the history of the world.
In  the  [general]  context,  this  manifestation  [of  ‘the  bride,  the  Lamb’s  wife,’  ‘the  holy 
Jerusalem’]  which  concludes  the  history  of  the  world,  as  its  ripe  fruit,  signifies  the 
sophianisation of creation and, in this sense, the Divine Sophia (God’s glory), who descends 
from heaven to earth, into the creaturely world. About her it is said (Rev 22:17):  ‘And the 
Spirit and the bride say, Come! And let him that heareth say, Come!’471
With this unusual interpretation of Rev 22:17, Bulgakov builds a case saying that there 
are two brides – one in heaven and one on earth, with the earthly one calling down the 
heavenly one.
Here we have an intentional doubling [splitting] of meaning, as it were: Chapter 21 speaks of 
the bride-wife, who descends from heaven to earth, while Revelation 22:17 speaks of the 
469 Bulgakov, Bride, p270
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bride with the Spirit who animates her and lives in her; and she abides in the world and 
awaits the coming of Christ in the fullness of divine revelation in the world.472
This overlapping of description, using the same personal noun, bride, to describe the 
eternal,  uncreated  ‘Church’  and  its  temporal,  created  reflection,  underlines  the 
dependence and interrelation between the two brides. That is, that the heavenly Church 
is  the Divine Sophia and the earthly Church is  the creaturely Sophia.  The conjugal 
union of  the two,  which depends on their  difference,  is  the marriage  of  the  (two?) 
Bride(s?) to which Revelation refers.
The Church is the Divine Sophia and the creaturely Sophia united (this union signifying not 
confusion but the penetration of creaturely life by the rays of divinity, their ‘synergism’).473
Nichols interprets Bulgakov’s ‘splitting of meaning,’ the heavenly and earthly brides, as 
referring  to  ‘two  aspects  of  her  [the  Church’s]  life’.  Their  relation  is  achieved  ‘as 
redemption,’ and infers there is one bride who exists both in heaven and on earth (‘the 
Bride descends...she is also on earth’).474 However, the relation between the two is more 
complex  than  he  suggests.  The  heavenly  bride  is  the  Divine  Sophia,  who  is  the 
foundation of the earthly bride, the creaturely Sophia. Bulgakov even goes so far as to 
say that it is God’s life that constitutes the ontological foundation of the one, united 
(creaturely and divine) Church:
The Church is  the unity of the supra-eternal Divine Sophia and the becoming creaturely 
Sophia. Only this eternal unity of God’s life as ens realissimum of the Church is capable of 
explaining all the power and truth of the insistent affirmations of the apostle, constituting the 
very foundation of church ontology.475
Nevertheless, they remain different – precisely because one is created and the other is 
not. They are two entities, not one, however dependent the one may be upon the other,  
separated and joined by the ontological chasm of created/uncreated. Bulgakov describes 
the ‘Church’ as the union of the two in their difference, ‘their “synergism”.’
Quite  why  either  of  these  Sophias  warrants  a  description  specifically  as  ‘bride,’ 
however, or in what way the union of the two can be interpreted as ‘bridal’ in the way 
Bulgakov suggests, remains unclear and unanswered; they do not fit well with his other 
descriptions of Sophia. It is almost as if the scriptural testimony has to be made to fit his 
metaphysical ontology.
472 Bulgakov, Bride, pp263-4
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Some of the confusion here derives from the translation of the original Russian. In an 
important  passage  that  attempts  to  clarify  the  relations  between  the  heavenly  and 
earthly, Jakim translates
The Church, as Sophia, abides in the heavens, is the heavenly Jerusalem..., (‘...our house 
which  is  from heaven’),  which  is  to  descend  to  earth.  And  it  is  by  the  Spirit  that  she 
summons  this  descent,  like  the  bride  (i.e.,  the  earthly,  creaturely  Church)  awaiting  her 
Bridegroom.476
Unusually for Jakim, the translation of the second sentence is very muddy: who is the 
‘she’ that is ‘like the Bride?’ Nichols translates the same passage this way:
As Wisdom, the Church dwells in him; she is the heavenly Jerusalem..., the holy city which 
must descend to earth. But as the Bride awaiting her Bridegroom she is the created, earthly  
Church, herself calling out by the Spirit for the descent.477
Notwithstanding the question of whether the heavenly Jerusalem dwells ‘in him’ or ‘in 
the heavens,’ clearly Nichols’ translation makes much better sense. It also coheres with 
Bulgakov’s earlier comment that the ‘bride’ refers primarily to the creaturely aspect of 
the Church.
Nevertheless, Bulgakov still describes the bride descending from heaven in Revelation 
21 as the Divine Sophia. He bases his interpretation of the existence of two brides, one 
heavenly and one earthly, primarily on his exegesis of Revelation 22:17 for its biblical 
foundation.  Crucially,  it  first  requires that  the summons of the Bride and the Spirit, 
‘Come!’ is addressed in a heavenwards direction, thus implying an earthly location for 
the  callers.  The  context  of  both  the  letter  and  the  passage,  however,  suggests  a 
summons, not heavenwards to Christ (notwithstanding Rev 22:20, ‘Amen. Come, Lord 
Jesus,’ which is not attributed to the Bride but is a prayer uttered by the writer), but 
earthwards to the churches (and specifically to those who thirst for the water of life), 
who are being invited to join the Spirit and the Bride.478 In this case the location of the 
Bride and the Spirit is ambiguous to say the least, although the context of ‘invitation’ is 
more suggestive of an earthly one.
Because the bride exists in two locations at the same time he insists there are two brides, 
and interprets the summons as addressed to the heavenly one by the earthly.
Bulgakov’s interpretation of the heavenly bride as the Divine Sophia is required by his 
theology to satisfy the complementarity of Divine and creaturely Sophias. If there is a 
476 Bulgakov, Bride, p264
477 Nichols, Wisdom, p202
478 See, for example, Rev 11:12; 18:4
153
bride in the creaturely sophia, there must exist a prototypical bride in the Divine Sophia 
of which it is the image, and through which it will be divinised.
However, the natural interpretation of the Scripture suggests the heavenly bride is the 
heavenly Church, i.e. the angels and souls in Paradise awaiting the Second Coming, 
rather than the Divine Sophia. In this case there is one ‘creaturely’ bride that awaits 
completion and fulfilment (cf. 2 Cor 5:1-2; Eph 2:6) and the Divine Sophia is absent 
from the text.
3.6.2.2 The Bride in the Old Testament Apocalypse
He goes on to discuss briefly the Song of Songs, ‘the most New Testament book of the 
Old Testament,’ which, as with the rest of ancient tradition, recognises it as the love 
between Christ and the Church as Bridegroom and bride, with  ‘Love itself or Love’s 
hypostasis, the Holy Spirit, being invisibly present.’ He therefore describes this poem as 
‘a revelation of the Second and Third Hypostases as a conjugal syzygy,’  and thus a 
revelation of the Father, which ‘becomes a figure for the union between Christ and the 
Church.’
This description of the relation between the Second and Third Hypostases as a ‘conjugal 
syzygy’ is extraordinary. However, it is entirely in keeping with his premise that Mary 
is the hypostatic representation of the Spirit. It is therefore no surprise that in the next 
sentence but one he names her as the Beloved in the song.
The Song of Songs is the song of love between God and the world, the Creator and creation,  
the Divine Sophia and the creaturely Sophia, the Son made incarnate by the Holy Spirit and 
the Unwedded Bride, His Mother. This relation is love uniting all the aspects of personal and 
impersonal love, and the mystery of this love is hidden in the heavens, to be revealed on  
earth.479
Although he does not explicitly refer to John 3:16, it is clear that Bulgakov sees this 
poem almost as an exegesis of that verse.
The notion of ‘impersonal love’ is a difficult one as love is a purely personal category. 
It refers partly to God’s love of himself, of Divine Sophia, and hence also to his love of 
creaturely Sophia. Further, it corresponds to the response of non-hypostatic creation to 
the Creator through being true to itself, that is, to creaturely Sophia. Williams explains it 
in this way:
479 Bulgakov, Bride, p264
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God as personal (hypostatic) love, love in action, loves also the fact that self-emptying love 
is what God is. And that ‘what’, which is not simply conceptually identical with any or all of 
the trinitarian hypostases, that eternal object of divine love, is Sophia.480
However, Williams also insists that love can only exist hypostatically and that, at the 
very least, what God loves is the ability or capacity within creaturely Sophia for it to be 
hypostasised.
what is loved is always love itself, but love cannot exist without loving agents, and so when 
God loves the world he cannot but love in it the capacity of the world to be ‘hypostatic’, a 
world of agents and subjects. Thus what God loves is the directedness of the world towards 
the human; God loves the heavenly image or idea of humanity, the ‘Heavenly Adam.’481
Since Sophia is not a hypostasis it cannot be  ‘personal’ in the hypostatic sense. But 
Bulgakov goes beyond this and claims it is capable of responding to God’s love in a 
non-hypostatic manner:
Sophia, like ousia, is inseparable from the hypostases because like ousia it is the spiritual  
essence of God, on which God’s love abides, and which itself responds to this love, although 
non-hypostatic.482
The nature of this response is not explained here but it probably refers to the feminine 
aspect of its hypostaticity,  that is, to its  ‘desire’ to be hypostasised (see Section  3.3). 
However there is another, non-hypostatic or impersonal way in which creaturely Sophia 
responds to God’s love. The clue is found in Psalm 148 and the Benedicite: here non-
hypostatic creation is called upon to sing God’s praise ‘prior to or apart from man.’483
We must recall what we know about non-hypostatic love, that is, the love of creatures for  
their Creator and the praise of the Creator to which they are called by Scripture.484
Since love defines the fabric of relations within God, Bulgakov goes on assign to ‘love’ 
an  ontological  form  of  relation  between  beings  that  has  little  to  do  with  modern 
definitions of the word.
God is love and there exist no other relationships within him, apart from those of various 
forms of love.485
This marvellous and mysterious love clearly presupposes not a psychologism, not an affect  
or an emotion, but an ontology: the reality of the inter-relationship of spiritual realities.486
480 Williams, Bulgakov, p166
481 Williams, Bulgakov, p166
482 Bulgakov, A Summary of Sophiology, p43
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Nevertheless, that the Church is capable of being either the subject or object of the verb 
‘love’  in  the  ontological  sense  means  that  she  has  a  real  existence,  not  merely  a 
collective, nor a metaphorical unity, but a being proper to herself.
This revelation testifies that the Church is, that being is proper to her; as  ens realissimum, 
she is the object of divine love.487
For Bulgakov the Church is a being whose most real property is that she is loved by 
God. This is sufficient to mean that she is. She has a being, a reality, a singularity that 
comprises an object of God’s love, but not necessarily a person, since he has already 
said that there is such a thing as  ‘impersonal love,’ although this refers to the natural 
response of non-hypostatic creation to God’s love. Nevertheless, she is ens realissimum, 
the most real being. Here Bulgakov draws the link between the Church as Bride and the 
Church as Body, for the two descriptions, linked through Genesis and Ephesians, are the 
same.
In this sense [i.e. as ens realissimum], the Church is represented as a ‘body’ or a wife: ‘men 
ought to love their wives as their own bodies’ (Eph 5:28).488
Although  he  does  not  explore  this  relation  any further,  he  has  made  the  clear  link 
between the two: the Church  as the wife of the Lamb is the Body of Christ. For the 
Church,  as Christ’s  body,  to  be an object  of  God’s  love,  it  must  in  some sense be 
capable of receiving that love.  This was a link he had already made in the opening 
paragraph of his earlier book on the Church, The Orthodox Church published in 1935:
Since the Lord did not merely approach humanity but became one with it, Himself becoming 
man, the Church is the Body of Christ, as a unity of life with Him, a life subordinate to Him 
and under His authority. The same idea is expressed when the Church is called the Bride of  
Christ or of the Word; the relations between bride and bridegroom, taken in their everlasting 
fullness,  consist  of  a  perfect  unity  of  life,  a  unity  which  preserves  the  reality  of  their  
difference.489
The Church to which he is referring here is the earthly, creaturely Church, creaturely 
Sophia, not the heavenly Church, the Divine Sophia.
3.6.2.3 The Bride as Soul
There  is  a  further  dimension  to  his  understanding  of  the  Church  as  the  bride  that 
operates at the level of the individual.  This is primarily seen in the Song of Songs, 
which in its first place, Bulgakov suggests, is between Jesus and Mary:
487 Bulgakov, Bride, p265
488 Bulgakov, Bride, p265
489 Bulgakov, Church, p1
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The Song of Songs is also a song about Mary and the Logos, as about every soul seeking its  
heavenly Groom and joining with Him. The Virgin Mary, Mother of God and Bride of God,  
is the image of every soul in its relation to the Logos, in its ecclesialization.
In this case Christ is the husband of every soul, and every soul is his bride.490
Every soul strives for Christ as to its own heavenly bridegroom, wishes to be at one with 
him, in the image of marriage ‘to Christ and to the Church,’ the soul is the bride striving in 
spiritual communion to recognise the heavenly bridegroom.491
Likewise, every soul longs to give birth to Christ in its own heart, for him to have his 
dwelling within:
As the creature, receiving, in humanising the Logos, every human hypostasis thirsts for his  
birth in its own soul and in the manger of its own heart wishes to become for him a mother,  
to  participate  in  the  motherhood  of  God.  ‘His  Mother  is  every  pious  soul’  (Blessed 
Augustine).492
This raises difficulties in the face of his assertion that each human hypostasis can be 
only male or female. But as noted earlier (see Section 3.4.5), although each hypostasis 
must be either male or female this is a matter of degree. Bulgakov claims that each 
hypostasis is a combination of male and female.
The fact of the matter is that hypostatic characters or names are never simple or unitary;  
rather, they consist of two elements, one of which is primary, while the other is an overtone,  
as it were.493
He uses the examples of Logos-Christ, which is a proper hypostasis, and of the Holy 
Spirit  in  Mary  as  indicative  of  the  existence  of  these  ‘dual-unities’  in  a  single 
hypostasis. However in this case he suggests that each human hypostasis comprises both 
male and female components, and in fact these are necessary in each person in order for 
there to be a complete human hypostasis.
The  male  nature  is  hypostasised  in  Christ...  while  the  female  nature  is  hypostasised  in 
relation to Him as the Bridegroom of the Church. There are two relations here: centrifugal 
and centripetal. And both are necessarily united in each human hypostasis; however, they are 
united in different tonalities, with the love of Christ for the Church, or of the Church for  
Christ, being dominant.494
So although hypostases are either male or female, both are present in each with one or 
other being dominant. Each soul therefore oscillates, as it were, between these modes or 
tones, at one time loving the Church, and hence hypostasising the male Christ, and at 
490 Bulgakov, Burning Bush, pp103-104
491 Bulgakov, ‘Hypostasis’, pp36-37
492 Bulgakov, ‘Hypostasis’, p36
493 Bulgakov, Bride, p100
494 Bulgakov, Bride, p100
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other times loving Christ or wanting to give birth to him, thus hypostasising the female 
Bride-Wife-Mother.495
The Church as bride thus exists in two realities – that of the hypostasised individual 
(male  or  female)  soul  that  seeks  to  be  joined  with  Christ,  and  that  of  the  entire 
unhypostasised creaturely Sophia that seeks to be united with the Divine Sophia, which 
finds its hypostasis in the Mother of God.
3.6.2.4 The Bride as Second Eve
Despite  the  title  of  his  volume  on  the  Church,  and  the  long  and  rich  tradition  of 
understanding the Church as the second Eve, Bulgakov is very selective here in his 
ontology.  Although Christ as the second Adam is fundamental to his soteriology,  he 
does not speak of the Church as the Second Eve. He never refers, for example, to the 
Church as taken from the body of the second Adam on the cross or at the last supper. 
Once he refers to Mary as the ‘second Eve.’496
However, he acknowledges that Christ is the head of the Church as the husband is the 
head of the wife (Eph 5:23), for whom he leaves  ‘his father and his mother [to be] 
united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh’ (Eph 5:31). And although ‘this 
mysterious  and  brief  yet  astonishingly  significant  text  is  unique  in  the  apostolic 
epistles,’497 yet  ‘it  has  a  direct  parallel  in  Revelation,  in  the  most  significant  (for 
concluding) work of the last book of the Holy Scripture’ (Rev 21:9-11). But the central 
claim in the Ephesians passage is to the Genesis story of the creation of humanity in  
God’s image.498 Bulgakov’s failure to relate his ecclesial ontology in any way to this 
Genesis story, which has played such an axiomatic role in the rest of his theology, must, 
therefore, be a deliberate omission.
Why has he not acknowledged this link here, or the tradition built on it? It is not an easy 
question to answer. It is partially addressed in The Burning Bush, and almost certainly 
resides in the fact that he identifies the second Eve with Mary, who, with Christ, shares 
in his Incarnation as the ontological origin of the Church. Firstly, the  ‘second Eve’ is 
hypostatically Mary,499 never the Church. Likewise, the primary referent for the concept 
of ‘bride’ is Mary, although she is the ‘incarnation’ of the Church:
495 Bulgakov, ‘Hypostasis’, p37
496 Bulgakov, Bride, p90. However, he does refer to Mary as the Second Eve more extensively in The 
Burning Bush, see below.
497 Although cf. Rom 7:1-4; 1 Cor 6:15-16
498 See Section 4.4 for further discussion on the biblical witness to the nuptial theme.
499 Bulgakov, Burning Bush, p80
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As the representative of the whole creation and more exalted than everyone, she [Mary] is 
the personal incarnation of the Church:  the head of the apostles, the focus of the whole  
creaturely world.500
Secondly, the second Eve is not like the first Eve either in herself, or in her relation to 
the  second  Adam.  The  only similarity  between  the  Eves,  for  Bulgakov,  is  their 
sinlessness before the first Eve fell:
The Virgin Mary is often called the new Eve. Like every comparison this one has force only 
within definite bounds, by maintaining the  tertium comparationis.  But this is exactly  the  
personal  sinlessness of  Eve  (before  the  fall)  and  of  the  Virgin  Mary;  in  all  remaining 
relations the old and the new Eve differ from one another.501
It is clear that Bulgakov considers there to be almost nothing in common between the 
two, for among all the elements of the Genesis narrative, the ‘personal sinlessness’ they 
shared  for  a  limited  time  barely  warrants  the  typology  implicit  in  the  NT,  or 
traditionally assigned by the Church.
In her relation with the new Adam, she is also completely different. The first Adam was 
a creation in the image of the Logos. The first Eve was taken from his side also as a 
creature:  ‘her  origin  proved possible  only in  connection  with  him,  as  his  necessary 
disclosure and complement.’ In this sense they both ‘are wholly the creation of God.’502 
The second Adam, however,  is the Logos,  ‘is very Lord, who assumed flesh, i.e. His 
own creature,’  while  ‘the second Eve is a creature,  a human being belonging to the 
creaturely world.’ She originates ‘from the Second Adam, i.e. from God.’503 This would 
be the place for Bulgakov to relate the  ‘origin’ of Mary as second Eve to the cross, 
baptism and the Eucharist, but he does not. Thus her origin and her relation to Adam are 
as different as the two Adams are from each other.
With  such  a  heavy  emphasis  on  the  historical,  concrete  person  of  Mary  as  the 
ontological  ground  of  the  Church  (since  the  Incarnation  could  not  have  happened 
without her worthiness) it  becomes easier to see why Bulgakov might want to steer 
away from the Genesis narrative in a baptismal and eucharistic context to define the 
origins and nature of the Church. Thus, despite the recognition that the Eucharist is a 
sacrament of the Incarnation, there is no reference in his discussion on sacraments to the 
Genesis narrative or Adam.504 For Bulgakov, Mary  preceded Christ as the necessary 
500 Bulgakov, Burning Bush, p101
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502 Bulgakov, Burning Bush, p80
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hypostatic  response of Creation to  the  Incarnation.  This does not at  all  fit  with the 
Genesis story.
 3.6.3 The Hypostasis of the Church
The Church, for Bulgakov, is the unity of the heavenly Church and the earthly Church 
as  Divine  and  creaturely  Sophia.505 Sophia,  being  a  hypostaticity,  requires 
hypostasisation. The two aspects are hypostasised differently.
3.6.3.1 Hypostasis of the Heavenly Church
We have seen that Bulgakov describes both the heavenly Church (albeit briefly) and the 
earthly Church as bride. The former of these, however, the Divine Church, he is careful 
to ensure is not understood as a hypostasis. To be a hypostasis means to be hypostasised 
by the spirit, and that means to be either male or female, since those are the only two 
modes in which spirit can be hypostasised. The Divine Church, as the Divine Sophia, is 
not a hypostasis, and, even though described as ‘Bride’, is therefore not male or female, 
but is called to hypostasisation, and is hypostasised by the Logos as the divine nature.506
Nevertheless, he makes the link between the heavenly Church as the new Jerusalem and 
the heavenly Bride of the Lamb without any recourse to this issue of hypostasis. The 
description of the heavenly Church as bride carries no hypostatic content for him: it is 
only a hypostaticity, despite it being an exclusively personal category.
Part of the difficulty with his argument here is that, in referring to hypostasis and the 
heavenly Church, he comes back to the categories of male and female in the hypostatic 
spirit. Bulgakov is attempting to address what he calls the ‘excessive spiritualism’ and 
‘excessive romanticism’ that has historically surrounded the notion of the Church as 
bride. He thus wants to remove the ‘feminine’ aspect from the equation that has been 
the cause of these problems. But to do so requires him to ‘de-hypostasise’ the ‘heavenly 
Church,’ since, for him, to be hypostasised necessarily means to be already either male 
or female.
He also wants to ensure that there is no prospect of the Divine Sophia being called a 
fourth hypostasis. He has identified the ‘heavenly bride’ of Revelation 21 with Divine 
Sophia. By his definition this cannot, therefore, be a hypostasis.
505 Bulgakov, Bride, p270
506 See Bulgakov, Bride, p265 and Section 3.4.5, above
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However, by making this identification Bulgakov has tied a difficult knot for himself. 
One is  left  wondering in  what  sense the Divine Sophia is  called  ‘Bride’  or  ‘Wife.’ 
Indeed, he himself  appears to be very uncomfortable with the description for having 
identified  the  heavenly  Jerusalem  as  both  ‘the  Divine  Sophia  (God’s  Glory),  who 
descends from heaven to earth,’507 and as ‘the bride-wife, who descends from heaven to 
earth,’508 he never again refers to the Divine Sophia or the heavenly Church as ‘bride.’ It 
seems that, in this case, despite his repeated castigation of those who reduce biblical 
images  to  the  level  of  allegory,509 he  has  been forced to  do precisely that  with the 
description of the (heavenly) Church as bride.
In the Divine Sophia, the ‘spiritual body’ relates to God’s ousia as hypostasised by the 
Son. The heavenly body is the Divine Sophia as expressly hypostasised by the Logos. 
The temple in the Divine Sophia, on the other hand, refers to the Holy Spirit’s manner 
of  hypostatically  indwelling  divine  body,  the  Divine  Sophia,  as  the  Glory  of  God. 
Bulgakov has much to say about the Holy Spirit as God’s hypostatic Glory. It relates to 
the manifestation of God’s Glory in the Temple in the OT, and upon the Church at 
Pentecost in the NT.510 In both these cases the categories of body and temple have what 
Bulgakov refers to as hypostaticity, that is, they require hypostases to complete them.
3.6.3.2 Hypostasis of the Creaturely Church
If the heavenly Church as the Divine Sophia is hypostasised by the Logos, is the earthly 
Church as creaturely Sophia also hypostasised? In one sense the answer is clearly ‘yes,’ 
since human persons  are the hypostases of the creaturely Sophia. But beyond this, is 
there a unified or single hypostasis that, as it were, utters the free response of creation’s 
love to God’s invitation?
507 Bulgakov, Bride, p263
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3.6.3.2.1 Hypostasis of the Body and the Temple
Bulgakov  has  used  the  singularity  of  Adam  as  a  hypostasis  as  the  foundation  for 
explaining our personal participation in original sin. ‘All were in Adam.’ Indeed, he has 
spoken of the  genus of hypostases that  ‘bears the image of the Holy Trinity, which is 
hypostatically  multiple  in  consubstantiality.’  This  he  refers  to  as  ‘the  perfect 
manifestation  of  the  divine  person,  as  the  Father  and the  Son and the  Holy  Spirit’ 
(italics added).511
From this he postulates a unitary hypostasis in which all humanity participates, which at 
the same time does not extinguish the uniqueness of each person. He asks
Does not the image of the Holy Trinity in man also represent an analogous manifestation of  
the principle of multi-hypostatizedness in the unity of nature, so that individual hypostases  
are different hypostatic aspects of a  certain multi-unitary hypostasis of the integral Adam, 
aspects that are neither identical nor mutually alien, for they are included in the multi-unity 
of the man Adam? (italics added)512
It is specifically the existence of this multi-unitary hypostasis in Adam, analogous to the 
unity  of  human  nature,  which  enables  Christ  to  include  all  hypostases  within  the 
Incarnation. In fact, it is the other way round: Adam’s all-hypostasis is a reflection of 
the all-hypostasis of the Proto-Image – the Logos.513
The answer to the question concerning the hypostasis of the creaturely Sophia is: Christ, 
whose hypostasis is the Logos of God. In the creaturely Sophia the categories of body 
and temple are hypostasised in Christ through the Incarnation – he takes a body, human 
flesh, human nature (as hypostasised by Mary) and is baptised by the Holy Spirit who 
rests upon him as the temple. That is, they derive their fullest meaning and personal 
content through the Incarnation. After the Ascension, in the Pentecost, Christ’s body is 
extended to give rise to the Church, indwelt as the temple by the Holy Spirit. Bulgakov 
actually maintains that Christ’s body was extended to include all creation, all of which 
properly belongs to human nature, by the outpouring of his blood on the cross. This was 
received into the ground, independently of the  ‘communion of  the faithful’  for  ‘the 
Church, the body of Christ, is...also the whole universe in God.’514
Bulgakov’s usage of the terminology of ‘individuality,’ which he develops specifically 
from the Latin, is fraught with inconsistency but there is no mention of the overcoming 
of the ‘bad individuality’ of hypostatic disintegration in the context of the ontology of 
511 Bulgakov, Bride, p185
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the Church.  Although he talks of hypostases  being included in the all-hypostasis  of 
Christ, there is little in this discussion that has to do with restoring the  ‘ontology of 
personality’ or personhood that he has earlier described in terms of mutual relationships, 
of love, being ‘transparent for one another:’
This individuality of personal being is not its supreme and definitive determination. On the 
contrary...this  being  becomes  fully  itself  when it  loses its  individuality.  This  individual, 
qualified ray, which hitherto has shined only in its own color, now begins to shine with the 
light of the pleroma and participates in the wholeness in which God is all in all.515
The whole point of this hypostatic transparency is that it is the restoration of the image 
of God in humanity, into which human beings were called to grow:
The image of God [is]  the image of sacrificial  and self-renouncing trihypostatic love, in 
which each of the hypostases acquires its own personal center not in itself but outside of 
itself, in other hypostases.516
The penetrating exception to all this, however, is Mary, the Mother of God. She is the 
one person who, as creaturely Sophia, perfectly fulfils both forms of this nature (body 
and temple) hypostatically in herself. She is the one who welcomed the Holy Spirit into 
her body at the Annunciation, thus becoming the hypostatic temple of the Holy Spirit, 
the Spirit-Bearer. And in doing so she gave her human nature, her body, to the Son to be 
his body. Bulgakov claims that Christ’s humanity never stopped being her body, that 
she remained joined to Christ himself since he took her hypostasised nature, and in this 
way she, in herself, really is Christ’s body. Since she, then, is both the body of Christ 
and the temple of the Holy Spirit, she is the hypostatic centre of the Church.
Who can represent this Church, its heart, if not the Mother of God? Having given Her Son to 
humankind, the Most Pure Mother of God is, of course, both the hypostatic body of Christ 
par excellence and the temple of the Holy Spirit as the Spirit-Bearer.517
Mary,  with  Christ,  completes  the  male-female  bi-unity  of  humanity  required  for 
salvation.518 She shares Christ’s humanity.  She suffers with him on the cross (‘and a 
sword  shall  pierce  your  own  soul  too,’  Luke  2:35).  And  according  to  Orthodox 
teaching, in her Dormition she is given a resurrected body, translated to heaven, and 
abides with Christ in Glory, ‘more venerable than the cherubim and incomparably more 
glorious than the seraphim.’519 She will therefore also participate in the parousia of her 
Son at the descent of the Holy Spirit in preparation for the coming of the Son.
515 Bulgakov, Bride, p92
516 Bulgakov, Bride, p156
517 Bulgakov, Bride, p411
518 Eg Bulgakov, Bride, p100
519 Orthodox Liturgy
163
In the parousia, which presupposes the revelation of both hypostases, the Spirit-Bearer (that  
is, the Mother of God), the image of the Third Hypostasis, returns into the world with the 
God-man, the incarnate Logos. In this sense, the parousia should be understood as the return 
of Christ and of the Mother of God into the world.520
As she is the perfect human hypostasis capable of being the image (not the incarnation) 
of the Holy Spirit, in heaven she completes the bi-unity of creaturely Sophia with the 
God-man. Therefore creaturely Sophia is completed in her as the one united with her 
Son  in  the  male-female  bi-unity,  imaging  the  Logos-Spirit  bi-unity  of  the  Divine 
Sophia. The body-temple view of the Church is thus hypostasised in one sense solely by 
Christ, in another sense solely by the Mother of God, and in another sense by Christ and 
the Mother of God together.
In the latter case it follows that, if the male-female bi-unity echoes the body-temple bi-
unity of the creaturely Sophia, and this in turn images the modes in which the Second 
and Third  Hypostases  possess  the  Divine  Sophia,  there  is  a  very close  relationship 
between the body-temple and body-bride modes of describing the Church.
3.6.3.2.2 Hypostasis of the Bride
We have seen that heavenly bride is  not a hypostasis, but is called to hypostasisation, 
and is hypostasised by the Logos. But what of the creaturely Bride?
Of the  three forms of  the Church,  body,  temple  and bride,  the one description  that 
already belongs to the personal, hypostatic category, bride, Bulgakov associates with the 
non-hypostatic Sophia. This he achieves through the identity of the bride in Revelation 
21 with the new Jerusalem descending from heaven to earth, which he interprets as the 
Divine Sophia, and the bride who is already on earth, which he therefore interprets as 
the creaturely Sophia, and who, with the Spirit, awaits the coming of her bridegroom in 
Revelation 22.521 Bulgakov’s identity of the bride with Sophia forecloses the hypostatic 
question before it  can be posed. Instead,  he draws the link between body (which is 
nature) and bride (the heavenly version of which he has identified as Divine Sophia). By 
correlation the bride must also be ‘nature:’
As ens realissimum, she [the Church] is [the] object of divine love. In this sense, the Church 
is represented as a  ‘body’  or a wife...(Eph. 5:28). The Church exists in a multiplicity of 
hypostases, as the one body of many members.522
520 Bulgakov, Bride, p409
521 Bulgakov, Bride, p264
522 Bulgakov, Bride, p265
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In this interplay between body and wife, body clearly has the ontological priority: the 
language of  ‘wife,’  as a  singularity,  immediately gives  way to  ‘the one body.’  The 
implication is that the term ‘bride’ or ‘wife’ as related here to ‘body’ is imbued with the 
same content as  ‘body.’ Indeed, in the next paragraph Bulgakov he makes a point of 
correcting the ‘misunderstandings’ surrounding the hypostatic interpretations ‘of Sophia 
as bride, wife, and body’ by de-hypostasising them. His programme here is far from 
clear  for,  having apparently  identified  the  bride with  Sophia,  he  then  empties  it  of 
hypostatic content. But he has already identified the Song of Songs as between ‘the Son 
made  incarnate  by  the  Holy  Spirit  and  the  Unwedded  Bride,  His  Mother’  (italics  
added).523 So we are left  with a perplexing question: who, or what,  precisely,  is the 
bride? Is it Sophia, or is it Mary?
The  creaturely  Church,  as  creaturely  Sophia,  is  called  to  hypostasisation,  is  a 
hypostaticity,  and is  hypostasised  by  creaturely  hypostases.  However,  all  creaturely 
hypostases, all human hypostases, are reflections of, are enveloped and united by, the 
All-hypostasis of Christ, the God-man. In the Incarnation he takes his human nature, his 
createdness, that is, the creaturely Sophia, from his mother, the Mother of God, who is 
his direct connection with creation. It is her hypostasised human nature that she yields 
to  the Holy Spirit.  This becomes  the human nature of Christ,  wedded to his  divine 
nature in the Incarnation. She is therefore the ‘Unwedded Bride,’ who is overshadowed 
by the Holy Spirit to give birth to Christ. She is thus the personal hypostasis of created 
Sophia  that  yields,  gives  her  nature,  her  humanity,  to  the  Logos  that  he  may  be 
incarnated.524
The Church exists in a multiplicity of hypostases, as the one body of many members. The 
primary hypostasis of the Church, the Church’s personal centre, is the Most Pure Mother of  
Christ, the Spirit-Bearer.525
In a  very difficult-to-understand sentence  Bulgakov concludes  his  discussion on the 
hypostasis of the Church, and indeed, his discussion of the Church as the Bride:
The earthly Church is ‘in-hypostasised’ in Christ as the Wife and Bride of the Lamb.526
The  expression  ‘in-hypostasised’  receives  no  further  explanation,  nor  is  it  used 
elsewhere in this volume of his writing. It appears to mean that the human nature of the 
Mother of God (the  ‘Unwedded Bride’), while becoming the human nature of Christ, 
523 Bulgakov, Bride, p264
524 Bulgakov, Bride, p265
525 Bulgakov, Bride, p265
526 Bulgakov, Bride, p265
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the Bridegroom, still remains her hypostasised human nature. Therefore, as she is the 
‘Bride’ who has given herself to the Logos, her hypostasised humanity remains as Bride 
in Christ’s humanity. This makes sense if seen as human nature being wedded to the 
divine nature in Christ, but it is difficult to see how this can be described as the  ‘in-
hypostasisation’ of the ‘Bride of the Lamb’ since Christ is the Lamb.527
This, the Bride, as bride, he appears to say, is not a hypostasis, but is hypostasised by 
the Mother of God as the ‘Unwedded Bride.’ Nevertheless it is difficult to see that there 
is any difference between saying that the Church, as bride, is not a hypostasis but is 
hypostasised by Mary as the Unwedded Bride on the one hand, and on the other that the 
Church, described as bride, is a hypostasis – Mary. Thus, having striven to de-gender 
the Church as bride, Bulgakov re-focuses the personal, hypostatic centre of the Church 
on the Mother of God. This appears to re-create exactly the same situation that he was 
attempting to address. That is, it creates a centre on which ‘excessive spiritualism’ and 
‘excessive romanticism’ can be focussed, and which can controversially be argued as 
the root of many problems in a male-dominated church hierarchy.528
The other important dimension to his understanding of the Church as hypostasised bride 
leads to a further ambiguity. We have seen how he identifies the heavenly Jerusalem as 
the  Divine  Sophia,  called  down  by  the  bride  as  the  creaturely  Sophia  in  Rev  22. 
However, in the closing, and hence most significant, pages of The Bride, discussing the 
parousia of Christ, and therefore also of the Mother of God, he uses the same passages 
to support his view that the descent of the heavenly Jerusalem signifies the descent of 
the Mother of God as the bride of Christ. In other words, the heavenly Jerusalem is no 
longer the Divine Sophia. Instead it is the Mother of God as deified or sophianised, and 
hypostasised, creaturely Sophia.
The parousia of the Son and of the Spirit are inseparable from that of the Mother of God.  
This is the most mysterious and significant aspect of the holy city. The great city, the holy 
Jerusalem,  descending  out  of  heaven  from  God,  the  tabernacle  of  God  with  men,  is 
insistently and repeatedly also called the ‘wife’ or ‘bride of the Lamb.’529
The same idea is expressed earlier where he tentatively suggests that the Mother of God 
descends into the world first and alone, before the actual parousia of Christ as a sort of 
preparation for his coming, since humanity ‘has need of the vision of Her face to soften 
527 However see discussion of the ‘Birth of the Bride’ in Section 5.1.3 where it is argued that the OT 
Bride of Yahweh dies with Christ on the cross in order to be re-born from his side as the New Eve.
528 For example, one of the common arguments for the prohibition of women from the Holy Mount 
Athos is precisely that it belongs exclusively to the Mother of God.
529 Bulgakov, Bride, p525
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its heart.’530 Here again he identifies the Mother of God personally as the bride of the 
Lamb and the new Jerusalem, and her descent as her preparation for the forthcoming 
wedding feast.
By reason of that general approach of heaven to the world which precedes the parousia, a 
particular manifestation of the Most Holy Mother of God in the world before the parousia 
becomes conceivable... The saintliness of the saints, the heavenly Jerusalem, in relation to 
the Unwedded Bride – does Revelation’s symbolic language not refer to the appearance in 
the world of this Spirit-bearing Bride, preparing the way for the Lord?... It should be noted 
that the personal destiny of the Most Holy Mother of God places her outside the action of the 
parousia, for this action was already accomplished in relation to Her in Her Dormition.531
But references to the new Jerusalem are not exclusively references to the bride as the 
Mother of God, as Mary, personally: they can also refer to the transfiguration of creative 
human history. Bulgakov takes the references to the materiality of the city, its mineral 
constituents and its structure and measurable dimensions, to mean that it has an earthly 
origin, and its descent from heaven to mean that it participates in the glorification of 
creation that accompanies the parousia.532
This fluidity in his interpretation of particularly apocalyptic passages adds both depth 
and kaleidoscopic dimensions to his eschatology. However, it also means that his use of 
Scripture  to  support  his  ideas  is,  from a  Western  perspective  at  least,  tenuous.  For 
example we have at least three interpretations of the descent of the new Jerusalem from 
heaven as  1)  Divine  Sophia,  2)  Mary as  the Theotokos,  and 3)  the  glorification  of 
human creative  history.  Each of these interpretations  uses the same texts  to support 
them, although elsewhere he argues that scriptural silence constitutes  ‘dogmatic self-
evidence!’533 Certainly there is no reason why these passages should not have multiple 
interpretations, but they cannot be used as evidence in this way.
Although Bulgakov refers  to  the  symbolic  language  of  the  book of  Revelation,  his 
interpretation of the bride in terms of the Mother of God goes far beyond the symbolic.  
He is quite  certain that these figures refer specifically to Mary,  personally.  Another 
example is where, in the parousia, the Church will be judged, the angels will be judged, 
the rest of humanity will be judged, but the Mother of God will  not be judged. It is 
impossible to say this and maintain at the same time that the language of the ‘Mother of 
God’ is a symbolic reference to the Church.534
530 Bulgakov, Bride, p412
531 Bulgakov, Bride, p413
532 Bulgakov, Bride, p428, p523
533 Eg Bulgakov, Bride, p410
534 As, for example, Professor Louth maintains (personal communication).
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The presence of the Mother of God in the parousia and at the Last Judgement is therefore  
essentially different from the presence of all other participants, without any exception: from 
that of the human beings and even of the angels, for all of them find themselves on this side 
of the parousia and the Judgement. All of them, even the angels, will yet be judged. But the 
Most Holy Mother of God will not be judged.535
There  is  a  deeply  unsettling  aspect  to  the  hypostasisation  of  Mary  in  Bulgakov’s 
treatment of her as the Bride of the Lamb that is difficult to discuss. The faith of the 
Church  rests  upon  the  historical  reality  of  the  incarnation,  death,  resurrection  and 
ascension of Christ. Without these as real historical events our ‘faith is in vain’ (1 Cor 
15:14). The Church has always vigorously defended the physical historicity and reality 
of Christ’s Incarnation against all forms of docetism. This means, too, that Mary was a 
real, concrete and historical person who gave birth to Christ as a woman, as ‘one of us.’
However, much has been done in Church tradition to try to eradicate the humanity of 
Christ’s entry into the world, including, for example, the almost docetic insistence on 
the perpetual virginity of Mary, speaking not just of her ‘spiritual’ virginity, but of her 
physical virginity. The reality of the human relationships into which Christ was born 
means that Mary was actually his mother (‘blessed is the womb that bore you and the 
breasts at which you nursed,’ Luke 11:27). Of course none of this is denied and is, in 
fact, what is portrayed in almost all icons of Mary.536
However, there is a danger of over-spiritualisation. Where Mary is used to personify the 
Church she understandably represents the Church. But beyond that her elevation as a 
real person into the heavenly realms, and becoming personally the Queen of Heaven and 
Bride of Christ seems to translate the reality of her historical personhood into the realm 
of  myth.  Bulgakov  accuses  those  who  do  not  see  eye  to  eye  with  him on  this  as 
suffering from ‘satanic dementia.’537
He sees  her  personal  presence  in  heaven,  as  the  Unwedded  Bride,  as  actually  the 
guarantee that humanity is not obliterated in the presence of divinity and that she is the 
necessary bridge between heaven and earth,538 rather than Christ (which fear is actually 
the  consequence  of  a  weak  christology).  However,  in  the  face  of  historical  human 
particularity, i.e. the fact that Mary is a real person, really was Jesus’ mother, and really 
535 Bulgakov, Bride, p413
536 Excepting the interpretation of the three stars on her headdress as representing her perpetual and 
abiding virginity.
537 Bulgakov,  Bride,  p460.  His over-elevation of  Mary was one of  the grounds  on which he was 
criticised in 1935 by St John Maximovitch, who stated ‘Although Mary is a chosen vessel, still she 
was  a  woman  by  nature,  not  to  be  distinguished  at  all  from  others.’  
http://orthodoxwiki.org/Sergius_Bulgakov (15 July 2011)
538 E.g. ‘But for the human race, She [Mary] is the living bridge that connects it to Her Son and God, 
conducting to heaven those who are on earth.’ Bulgakov, Bride, p460
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was wedded to Joseph, such assertions adopt an Oedipal aspect that cannot just be swept 
aside as irreverent. To say these are simply figures for speaking about spiritual forms of 
relations and cannot therefore be compared with earthly ones is to undermine them.539 
Not only is the spiritual the ontological ground of the earthly (see Eph 5:31-32), but 
Mary really is Christ’s earthly mother – that is precisely why she is given the title. If we 
are to say, with the Athonites as well as Bulgakov, that Mary, as the real human person, 
is personally the hypostatic Bride of Christ at the same time as being his Mother, we 
need to be very careful what this says concerning the nature of human relationships. 
They cannot be so easily divorced from each other.
But there is also a disconcerting exclusivity to the elevation of this young Jewish girl (or 
middle-aged Jewish woman) to heaven. Although Bulgakov has referred to the fall as 
the  disintegration  of  the  perichoresis  of  humanity,  he  has  not  said  much  about  its 
restoration. Christ is the All-hypostasis who therefore includes every human hypostasis 
within himself,  and all  humanity is  included in the Jesus-Mary conjunction  through 
baptism. Nevertheless his exclusive treatment of the Mother of God (her presence in the 
parousia  is  ‘essentially  different’  from that  of everyone else) implies  that  there is  a 
hierarchy of  holiness  that  remains  after  the  parousia.  Mary will  not  stop  being  the 
Theotokos after the parousia, nor will she cease, personally, from being the ‘wife of the 
Lamb.’ The nature of the rest of humanity’s participation in this relationship remains 
unexplored  by Bulgakov.  He does  say that  each  soul  both seeks  after  Christ  as  its 
bridegroom, and seeks to give birth to Christ as his mother. But these are pre-parousia 
categories that will no longer be meaningful when Christ is everywhere present as the 
light of the city.
 3.7 Conclusion
The Church is the fulfilment of God’s eternal plan concerning creation and the salvation,  
sanctification,  glorification,  deification,  and sophianisation of  creation.  In  this  sense,  the 
Church is the very foundation of creation, its inner entelechy.540
The Church lies at the centre of the cosmos: it is that which gives being and future to the 
whole  of  creation.  It  is  impossible  to  overstate  the  importance  of  the  Church  in 
539 Eg. ‘The Church applies very different terms like “Mother” and “Bride” to Mary as the personal 
incarnation of the Church. Of course, these terms are incompatible if one translates them in the  
language of sex and sexual relations, but this incompatibility is eliminated in spiritual relations.’ 
Bulgakov, Burning Bush, p103
540 Bulgakov, Bride, p253
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Bulgakov’s theology. And it is accomplished through the salvific work of incarnated 
Christ in the Holy Spirit.541
The three principal images of the Church as body, temple, and bride are, for Bulgakov, 
three interrelated aspects ontologically describing the same reality.
According to the New Testament doctrine, the Church as the mystical body of Christ, the  
temple of the Holy Spirit, and the Bride of the Lamb is God-manhood, eternal and historical,  
heavenly and earthly, divine and creaturely, in the Chalcedonian union of the two natures in 
Christ. The whole of christology and pneumatology watches over this idea of the Church.542
In each of these descriptions the different aspects of Idea and Nature are conjoined, not 
in synthesis, but in antinomy in such a way that the creaturely aspect is not destroyed, 
but required. This contrasts starkly, for example, with the eclipse of the primary vehicle 
of  historical  ontology in  the  eschaton in  both  Congar  and Balthasar:  the  hierarchy. 
Bulgakov is able to maintain the historical alongside the eternal because he locates it in 
action of the Spirit in constituting the Church as Spirit-filled people, not in a temporary 
hierarchy. Both the institution and the constitution of the Church are the dyadic work of 
the Logos  and the Spirit,  the ‘two hands of God’. This is  why he insists  ‘First  the 
Church, then the hierarchy, not vice versa.’543
The  Church  as  body  is  the  Church  as  Christ’s  nature,  ‘eternal  and  historical’, 
hypostasised by him and male in the creaturely Sophia. The Church as temple is the 
Church as the dwelling of the Holy Spirit,  ‘heavenly and earthly’, and female in the 
creaturely Sophia, hypostasised by Mary as the Spirit-bearer. Together the Church as 
male body and female temple, as Jesus-Mary, in the creaturely Sophia corresponds to 
the hypostatic bi-unity of the Son and the Spirit as the revelation of the Father in the 
Divine Sophia. In this sense the Church is the  ‘all-sacrament’ as being, herself, God-
manhood.  She is  ‘the Incarnation and the Pentecost of the Spirit,  with their  abiding 
power.’544
The Church as  bride,  ‘divine and creaturely’,  is  the  union of  Divine and creaturely 
Sophias, the two natures of Christ, but also is creaturely Sophia hypostasised by Mary 
to  be  united  with  Christ,  and thus  participate  as  creature  in  the  communion  of  the 
Trinity.
541 Bulgakov, Bride, p255
542 Bulgakov, Bride, p270
543 Bulgakov, Bride, p281
544 Bulgakov, Bride, p273
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The restoration of life in the Church means that the life of Christ as the new All-man 
becomes the life of each person. Thus humanity is united in Christ: the life of each 
person is also the life of Christ and therefore extends to the life of all.545
Hypostatically, humanity is created and called to be the image of the kenotic, but tri-
hypostatic, God in creation. Specifically this means to answer God’s call in love, and 
thus to find itself, not through self-love or knowledge, but outside the self – through the 
hypostatic ‘other:’
The image of God [is]  the image of sacrificial  and self-renouncing trihypostatic love, in 
which each of the hypostases acquires its own personal center not in itself but outside of 
itself, in other hypostases.546
This  life  not  only extends  throughout  each member  of  the  entire  human  race,  past, 
present and future, uninterrupted by death, but also all the angels and, through human 
nature which is an intrinsic part of creation, to include the whole of creation, which ‘has 
been groaning together in the pains of childbirth until now’ (Rom 8:22).
In the Church man thus becomes a universal being; his life in God unites him to the life of all 
creation by the bonds of cosmic love.547
This extensive unity finds its ground of being in, and is a reflection of, God’s own being 
as tri-hypostatic unity.
The Church is...an all-embracing unity, as a life unique and integral, as universality, after the 
pattern of the oneness of the three Persons of the Holy Trinity.548
Dangerously,  but  refreshingly  and  boldly,  Bulgakov  insists  that  personal  creativity, 
gifts, missions, inspirations etc. comprise the authentic manifestation of the Church of 
the NT. Institutions and hierarchy (referring to the Church in both the East  and the 
West)  ‘appear(s)  not  to  exist  at  all  in  the NT or in  other  canonical  writings  of  the 
Church’ and that this ‘free ecclesiality was established by God himself.’
This organic and creative life of the Church ontologically precedes the hierarchical principle. 
In  an  organised  form,  this  principle  appears  in  the  Church  only  later.  This  life  is  the 
ontological prius for the principle (and not vice versa) or, at least, the condition of its being,  
as its necessary medium.549
But the hypostatic centre of the Church is the transfigured historical person of Mary, the 
Mother of God. She is the bride of the Lamb. The signification of the Church as the new 
545 Bulgakov, Church, p5
546 Bulgakov, Bride, p156
547 Bulgakov, Church, p6; Bride, p525
548 Bulgakov, Church, p5
549 Bulgakov, Bride, p262
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Jerusalem and the bride finds its  fulfilment  in both the union of the Christ  and the 
Church, and of Christ and his Mother. Speaking of this ‘agglomeration’ of images in the 
Apocalypse he asks
Does it express the great, final mystery of Christ and of the Church, and then of Christ and of  
the Mother-Virgin, the Unwedded Bride, in the revelation of the final accomplishment and of 
the glory of the world?550
In the culminating passage of The Bride, Bulgakov asks rhetorically if the Church does 
not find its own personal fulfilment in Mary, that she will return as the ‘tabernacle’ in 
whom the presence of God dwells in its glory as the resurrected and glorified Spirit-
Bearer.551
For him, Mary is the hypostatic centre of the Church, already resurrected, elevated and 
glorified.  If  we ask  him,  ‘Is  the  Church a  person?’  he answers,  ‘No.  But...it  has  a 
personal centre in Mary.’ Nevertheless, we are left with an ambiguity in the postulate of 
the  ‘all-person’ that comprises the whole of humanity. Bulgakov reflects that this all-
person is the image of the tri-hypostatic person ‘God.’
Bulgakov’s discussion specifically relating to the restoration of humanity in his writing 
on the nature of the Church is in intensified when his description of the creation of 
humanity  is  considered.552 Humanity  is  the  ‘fourth’  hypostasis,  created  out  of  the 
ecstatic movement of the kenotic love of the ‘three hypostases,’ called as the creaturely 
response of creation to communion with God. For Bulgakov this hypostatic response is 
given jointly by Christ and by Mary, the Mother of God, who remains united to her Son 
as the ‘Unwedded Bride.’ Jesus provides the male response, Mary provides the female 
response, and together they form the response of the ‘fourth’ hypostasis.
But  the  question  remains:  If  the  hypostasis  of  Christ  is  the  Logos,  the  Second 
Hypostasis,  can  he  also  form  part  of  the  free  response  of  the  ‘fourth,’  created 
hypostasis?
In conclusion, Bulgakov, by uniting the dyadic Logos and Spirit in the institution and 
constitution of the Church, has come much closer to establishing the ontological space 
necessary for Creation to respond freely in love to the Creator’s invitation.
550 Bulgakov, Bride, p525
551 Bulgakov, Bride, p526
552 Bulgakov, Bride, p89, pp92-93
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He  has  also  developed  a  central  place  for  the  personhood  of  the  spirit,  whose 
manifestation  is  bodily.  The  whole  of  Creation  is  therefore  caught  up  into  the 
redemption of the world through the materiality of the Incarnation.
The kenotic nature of Christ’s love is a manifestation in the economy of the nature of 
love  in  the  Trinity.  Identity  of  personhood in  the  Godhead is  received,  rather  than 
defended as in Balthasar’s conception. Likewise, the redemption of personhood in the 
economy is achieved through the reversal of the atomisation of humanity resulting from 
the fall. Instead each person is fulfilled, not through their individual union with God, but 
in becoming one with Christ and so shining with their unique hue of the pleroma of 
God. Humanity, itself, is united with God in Christ and thus becomes divinised. Each 
person becomes transparent, not in the sense of ceasing to exist,  but in the sense of 
imaging  the  love  of  God,  a  note  of  harmony  in  the  symphony  of  the  transformed 
universe.
However, while his sophiology allows him to include the whole of creation in Christ’s 
redemption  by making  it  an  image  of  God’s  own being  for  the  world,  Bulgakov’s 
resulting  ecclesiology  is  nevertheless  fraught  with  tension.  The  two  principal  NT 
images of the Church with which he is most comfortable, the Body of Christ and the 
Temple of the Holy Spirit, fit very well with his insistence on the dyadic nature of the 
Revelation of God. Each is a description of the way in which the Second and Third 
Persons, as hypostases, possess the creaturely Sophia. The Logos possess the creaturely 
Sophia in Christ as his Body. The Spirit inhabits her through Mary who is the Temple 
par excellence.
Yet  neither  description  is  a  hypostatic  one  – they remain  descriptions  of  creaturely 
Sophia as such, not the Church. In this sense they fail to reflect the essential nature of 
the relations of the Son and the Spirit  as hypostases,  either with each other or with 
creaturely hypostases. That is, they fail to describe the hypostasised Church in the same 
way that a description of Divine Sophia as ‘Glory’ fails to describe the hypostasised 
Godhead.
The greatest tension in his ecclesiology, however, is in his interpretation of the Church 
as ‘Bride’. Despite this being the only potentially hypostatic description of the Church 
of his three NT images, he defines it precisely as unhypostasised Sophia, both Divine 
and creaturely. Since divinisation of creation is accomplished through the uniting of the 
two, Bulgakov speaks of them as two brides that are to be wedded to each other!
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This  forced  interpretation  destroys  the  one  description  of  the  Church  that  naturally 
speaks of her as a hypostasis in her relation to God. Instead, his gender-constrained 
system of hypostatically imaging the Revelation (of male Logos and female Spirit) in 
the economy (male Christ and female Mary) means that ‘bride’ cannot be interpreted in 
a hypostatic manner, since it potentially destroys this imagery.
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Chapter 4 Chavasse and the Biblical  
Background to the Bridal Metaphor
 4.1 The Spouse and Body of Christ
At the same time that Bulgakov was working on the last volume of his Great Trilogy, 
The Bride of the Lamb, in Paris, Claude Chavasse published  The Bride of Christ: An  
Enquiry into the Nuptial Element in Early Christianity (1940).553 The purpose of his 
book was to inspire the Liturgical Movement of the Anglican Church at that time to 
return  to  a  richer,  and  at  the  same  time  more  primary  (and  more  primitive), 
understanding of the ontology of the Church as Christ’s Bride.554
Chavasse’s  method,  typical  of  his  time,  is  historical  and theological.  He begins  by 
undertaking a survey of the notion of marriage in the religious thought and practices of 
the ancient near east, especially Hebrew thought and prophecy. He goes on to look at 
the bridal language of the Gospels, followed by St Paul’s development of Christ as the 
second Adam and the Church as the new Eve, his bride. He argues that the metaphor of 
the Church as the body of Christ is derivative from this understanding. After looking at 
the  book  of  Revelation  he  briefly  outlines  the  interpretation  of  the  great  Church 
doctrines of atonement, salvation, redemption, baptism, incarnation, and eucharist in the 
light of this understanding of the Church.555
He then turns to  trace  the historical  development  of  this  doctrine  through the early 
church  fathers  in  both  the  East  and  the  West,  to  Augustine,  in  whom he  finds  its 
zenith.556 He believes that for Augustine the Church is almost always body and bride, 
both of which are equivalent terms referring to Christ’s marriage to the Church. But the 
real high point of Augustine’s doctrine is the recognition that the bridal chamber in 
which the marriage takes place is the Virgin’s womb: the marriage is primarily about 
the  Incarnation,  the  union of  divinity,  the bridegroom,  with humanity,  the bride,  in 
553 It is extensively referred to as the main exposition of the bridal metaphor, including by Congar.
554 Chavasse, p222. In this his legacy appears to be a spectacular failure: the only references to the 
Church as ‘bride’ retained anywhere in Common Worship are: one mention in the marriage service; 
a version of the creed based on Revelation 22; the prayer for Psalm 45; four psalm canticles (34,  
69,  70,  72);  and  readings  drawn  from Revelation  21  and  22.  This  compares  with  the  routine  
description of the Church as the Body of Christ throughout Common Worship.
555 Chavasse is supported in finding reference to Church as bride or woman throughout the NT by 
Preston, who says ‘Practically all the books of the New Testament reflect it in some form.’ Faces, 
p78
556 Chavasse, Bride, p135
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Christ.557 Although  Chavasse  does  not  question  Augustine,  this  interpretation  is 
challenged in Chapter 5 of this study.
From this point on, he claims, there is a decline in the understanding of the Church as 
bride brought about by two developments: one through individualistic spirituality; the 
other through liturgical development.
The first  of these,  Chavasse contends,  was due to the spiritual  individualism of the 
monastic movement of the East arriving in the West through Jerome and Rufinus and 
popularised  in  the  West  by  Ambrose  in  the  late  4th Century.558 With  the  arrival  of 
monastic  spirituality  comes the notion  of  the  soul as  the individual  bride of Christ, 
rather than the Church. Although this idea was present in Tertullian and also Cyprian, it 
was  from  the  teachings  of  Alexandrian  neo-Platonism  in  the  East  that  it  gained 
popularity through Origen559 and thence into monasticism through Macarius of Egypt,560 
and on into Gregory of Nyssa in his commentary on the Song of Songs.561
Chavasse believes that, alongside this development, arose the parallel notion that Mary 
as an individual,  rather than the Church, was the second Eve, and consequently co-
redemptrix with Christ, and thus the royal Queen of heaven. This was argued first by 
Irenæus,562 and later by Cyril of Alexandria at the Council of Ephesus (431AD).563 As a 
consequence of this official sanction of Mary as the Theotokos liturgical development 
took place that led to her replacing the Church as the bridal presence in heaven, and she, 
personally, became at once Christ’s mother and his bride.
It is probable that Chavasse is being over-simplistic, particularly in his analysis of the 
role  of  Mary,  who  rather  became  a  figure  for  the  Church  than  its  replacement. 
Nevertheless,  the  intense personalising of  Mary’s  place in  soteriology as found,  for 
example, in Bulgakov, does lend some weight to his ideas.
He goes on to claim that these two developments,  one populist,  the other liturgical, 
ousted and eclipsed the Church’s place as the Bride and second Eve throughout much of 
the rest of the Church’s history in both the East and the West. This was especially so in 
the  Middle  Ages,  although  with  one  or  two  notable  exceptions,  at  least  until  the 
Reformation  when  it  was,  to  a  degree,  re-instated.  Thus  in  the  Anglican  Book  of 
557 Chavasse, Bride, pp152-3
558 Chavasse, pp177-8
559 Chavasse, pp173-6
560 Chavasse, p176. He quotes from Macarius’ Spiritual Homily 4.
561 Chavasse, p177
562 Chavasse, pp162-3
563 Chavasse, p164
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Common Prayer the introduction to the marriage service refers explicitly to the union of 
Christ and the Church as the ground for Christian marriage. In the ordination of priests 
the Church is twice referred to as ‘the spouse and body of Christ.’564 In the Communion 
service references to ‘abide’ and ‘dwell’ in Christ, being ‘very members incorporate in 
the Mystical Body’, coming to the ‘heavenly Feast in the marriage garment’, not being 
‘absent from the Marriage of the King’s Son’, all demonstrate the re-integration of the 
primitive notion of the Church as the bride and body of Christ, rather than the soul or 
Mary. Likewise, the edited chapter headings for many of the psalms and the nuptial 
passages in Isaiah are, in the Authorised Version of the Bible, specifically attributed to 
the Church as Christ’s bride.565
Apart from the Reformation, Chavasse refers to an entry under ‘Marriage, Mystical’ in 
the (Roman)  Catholic Encyclopædia, dated 1910, to demonstrate the almost complete 
absence of any concept of this subject relating to the Church, instead focussing almost 
exclusively on the marriage of the soul to Christ. The nuptial relationship had come to 
relate  almost  exclusively to  the mysticism of  an individualistic  personal  spirituality, 
coupled with the idea that Christ has many brides.566
He goes  on  to  demonstrate  that  liturgically  in  the  Roman  Church  the  royalty  that 
originally belonged to the Church has been exhaustively handed over to Mary as the 
Queen of Heaven.567 Likewise in the Russian church, for whom he takes Bulgakov as 
his  authority,  Mary  is  identified  liturgically  as  the  heavenly  bride  of  Christ,568 an 
interpretation also found in this study of Bulgakov’s work, although nuanced to identify 
her as the personal centre of the Church.
His appeal is that we return to the corporate understanding of the Church as the personal 
bride and body of Christ,  thus recovering the rich antidote to individualism and the 
inclusivity of the bridal ‘I’ of prayer in the psalms, and salvation of humanity in bridal 
flesh of Christ.
Before going on it is worth recapitulating, and occasionally developing, some of the 
biblical ideas on which Chavasse draws to demonstrate that the bridal motif was central 
to the early church’s self-understanding. The purpose of this is not to critically review 
all  the  biblical  evidence  or  the  historical  origin  and  development  of  the  nuptial 
564 Cf. Common Worship. See footnote 18.
565 Chavasse, Bride, pp76, 108-9, 216-221
566 Chavasse, Bride, pp211-4
567 Chavasse, pp214-6
568 Chavasse, pp165, 214, footnotes
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metaphor,  but rather to indicate  its importance both to Israel and hence to the early 
Church. There is much that could be debated in his assessment, and indeed, elaborated, 
but Chavasse’s thesis is robust enough, even after 70 years, to demonstrate that this is 
an often overlooked because not overt, but central,  theme in the biblical narrative of 
God’s relationship with humanity.
 4.2 The Bride as Metaphor in the Old Testament
Chavasse’s  approach  to  the  OT nuptial  references  is  to  show that  they  are  not  an 
incorporation of pagan fertility rites from neighbouring religions, mainly on the grounds 
of Israel’s monotheism. Although these elements were undoubtedly present in Israel it 
was this pagan religious activity that was described by the prophets as ‘adulterous,’ the 
‘prostitution’ of the nation instead of its fidelity to Yahweh.
He identifies the emergence of the first true nuptial idea with Moses, through whom 
God makes a covenant with his chosen people. From here on they are considered the 
Bride of Yahweh, and are forbidden to enter into the nuptial fertility rites associated 
with the surrounding tribal nations.569 The bridal metaphor is contained in all the major 
and many of the minor prophets but reaches its zenith in Hosea (8thC BC, which is the 
first biblical prophet to have compared, explicitly and systematically, the relationship 
between God and Israel to a marriage)570, Psalm 45, and the Song of Songs.571 In the 
case of the latter two, a Messianic interpretation began to be observed in which  ‘the 
Bridegroom was understood as the Messiah.’572
The  point  of  his  survey of  the  OT is  to  demonstrate  that  the  nuptial  metaphor  ‘in 
primitive Christian thought is a legitimate inheritance from the Old Testament,’573 and 
the  notion  that  the  Messiah  was  understood  to  be  the  bridegroom  was  already  in 
existence.
569 Chavasse, p23
570 Satlow ML, Jewish Marriage, p42
571 Chavasse, pp27-45
572 Chavasse, p44. Although Best considers the evidence slight (Body, p169), more recent scholarship 
has confirmed the messianic interpretation, especially found in the targum. See De Moor, Love of  
God, 1993.
573 Chavasse, p49
178
 4.3 The Bride in The Gospels
John the Baptist, in John’s Gospel, without any explanation,  refers to himself as the 
‘friend of the bridegroom,’ Christ as the ‘bridegroom’, and Israel (or, given that this is a 
Gospel, the Church) as the  ‘bride.’574 From the beginning  ‘Bridegroom’ is the natural 
and primary metaphor  for  speaking of  the  Messiah,  and the Baptist  is  described as 
understanding his own role in terms of the preparation for the great marriage between 
Israel  and  Yahweh.575 Similarly  in  the  Synoptic  Gospels,  the  prophecies  cited 
concerning  John the  Baptist  can  be seen  in  the  context  of  Yahweh coming  for  his 
bride.576 That the coming of the Messiah is heralded in the Gospels in this way requires 
the nuptial metaphor to be taken as the guiding and primary interpretive background.
Furthermore, the importance of ceremonial baptism and washing in the Jewish marriage 
rite,  mikveh, implores a little-considered dimension to the meaning of baptism and the 
ministry of John the Baptist. Preston points out that baptism is explicitly interpreted as 
mikveh in Ephesians 5:26.577
In the Synoptic Gospels, when Jesus is challenged about John the Baptist’s disciples 
fasting while his do not, he responds by referring to himself as the Bridegroom and his 
disciples  as  the  ‘sons  of  the  bridechamber,’578 a  specific  group  of  friends  who 
accompany the  bridegroom to his  wedding.579 Jesus  refers,  on  several  occasions,  to 
Israel  as  an  adulterous  generation,  echoing  the  common  theme  of  OT  prophets’ 
understanding of the Covenant as the marriage of Yahweh with Israel.580 In a footnote 
Chavasse observes that the Songs of Songs forms the background to the parables of the 
husbandman and the vineyard,581 and wonders in another footnote if the cleansing of the 
Temple is a ‘sign’ of the coming marriage between Christ and the Church.582 In the great 
parable  of the marriage  banquet  Jesus likens  the Kingdom of  Heaven to the king’s 
wedding feast for his son, a clear reference to the Messiah.583 These references to a 
divine marriage are so natural and casual, incidental, almost, to the immediate point of 
the parables,  Chavasse argues, that people must have already been familiar  with the 
574 John 3:25-9
575 Chavasse, Bride, pp50-51
576 Is 40:3-4; Mal 3:1
577 Chavasse, pp50, 51, 53
578 Mark 2:19, not ‘wedding guests’ as translated in the ESV or ‘guests of the bridegroom’ in the NIV. 
See also Matt 9:14-15 and Luke 5:33-35
579 Chavasse, Bride, p54
580 Chavasse, Bride, p53; Mark 8:38; Matt 12:39, 16:4
581 Chavasse, Bride, p53, fn 2; Matt 21:33-45; Mark 12:1-12; Luke 13:6-9, 20:9-19
582 Chavasse, Bride, p50, fn 2
583 Matt 22:1-14. See also Luke 14:7-11 and 12-24
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reference to this as the relationship between the coming Messiah and the ‘Daughter of 
Zion’. Certainly it was never one that aroused any comment as being unusual, even by 
those most fastidious of critics, the Pharisees.584
The royal  wedding of  Psalm 45 forms the background to Jesus’  parable  of  the  ten 
virgins,585 where Jesus comes closest to explicitly mentioning his  ‘holy Bride,’ since 
‘the virgins are her companions, not his.’586 He goes on to point out that this parable is 
set  in the context  of Holy Week, two days  before the Passover587 and just  after  the 
triumphal  entry and the cleansing  of  the  Temple,588 when  ‘the  air  was vibrant  with 
expectation. The Messiah had already ridden into Jerusalem to conquer and to claim his 
Bride,’ as both Matthew and John make explicit in quoting Zechariah 9:9.589
In  the  first  of  Jesus  ‘signs’  in  John’s  Gospel,  which  of  course  takes  place  at  a 
wedding,590 Chavasse sees Jesus’ reply to Mary, not so much as a personal rebuke (he 
points out that she certainly doesn’t take it as such), as an address to humanity and a 
reference to his own forthcoming ‘hour,’ on the cross – the ‘hour’ of his own wedding. 
The implication is that after  ‘his hour’ he will have to do with  ‘Woman.’591 Chavasse 
does not build much on this interpretation and could have made more of the location of 
the  ‘first  sign’  and its  determinative  place  in  the  Gospel,  linking  it  directly  to  the 
cleansing  of  the  temple  as  the  bride  (or  possibly  bridal  chamber),  which  follows 
immediately.592 However, he does go on to note that Jesus takes the water of purification 
and turns it into the wine of Marriage, in anticipation of his own ‘hour of glory.’593
Chavasse sees the entire Passion narrative in terms of the marriage between the Messiah 
and the Church. Focussing primarily on the Fourth Gospel he identifies the Last Supper 
as the solemnisation of the Marriage. He states
Essentially the Passover itself was nuptial. The foundation of the Marriage between Yahweh 
and his People was the Covenant between them. That Covenant was made and ratified by the 
Passover.594
584 Chavasse, Bride, pp50, 51, 53
585 Matt 25:1-13
586 Chavasse, Bride, p56
587 Matt 26:2
588 Matt 21:1-17
589 Chavasse, pp57, 60; Matt 21:5; John 12:15
590 John 2:1-11
591 Chavasse, Bride, pp59-60
592 See Barker M, Temple Themes, pp53-54
593 Chavasse, Bride, p63
594 Chavasse, Bride, p60
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He then notes several  features about the supper that ceremonially reflect  a wedding 
feast, including the preparation of the house, hand-washing and benediction, the cup of 
wine and the blessing. However perhaps the most important element to which he draws 
attention is the content of Jesus’ Farewell Discourse in the context of the wedding feast. 
Chavasse  uses  this  context  as  a  foil  for  interpreting  Jesus’  speech,  but  the  whole 
probably makes more sense in the context of a betrothal  feast,  the first stage of the 
wedding, where the bridegroom addresses his bride to be. His opening words  ‘In my 
Father’s house are many rooms... And if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come 
again and will take you to myself, that where I am you may be also’595 make sense only 
in this context.
Satlow has demonstrated that the Palestinian rabbinic tradition, with which Jesus and 
his  disciples  would  have  been  familiar,  located  Jewish  marriage  firmly  within  the 
context of Genesis 2, the creation and bringing together of Adam and Eve by God. He 
also shows that the betrothal feast is the setting for the ‘groom’s blessing,’ which again 
is  explicitly  based on Genesis  2.596 The primal  marriage  of Adam and Eve and the 
marriage relationship of God to Israel thus form the context in which these events are 
located.
Seen in this light, the Last Supper and many of the major themes of John 14 to 16, such 
as those concerning love, God as Father, not leaving the disciples as orphans, making 
homes,  vines  and fruit,  abiding,  coming  from and going to  the  Father,  the  coming 
‘hour,’ all make sense in a coherent manner. This context of betrothal and marriage also 
provides the background continuity between Jesus and Paul for the future development 
of Paul’s more explicit theology of the Second Adam, Christ’s Body, and the Bride, as 
well as John’s bridal language in Revelation.
Chavasse  interprets  the  crucifixion  as  the  consummation  of  the  marriage  after  the 
marriage feast. Using St John’s approach to the cross as the glorification of Christ, he 
sees the ascent of Christ bearing his own cross to Golgotha (John 19:17) as the royal 
bridegroom of the 45th psalm going to his wedding. The ransom paid by Hosea for his 
bride prefigures the ransom Christ pays for his Church (Hosea 3:2-3, Mark 10:45). And 
as Hosea foresees the Temple sacrifices being superseded through his marriage (Hosea 
3:3-4) so it is fulfilled as the veil of the Temple is rent asunder (Mark 15:38). All this is 
in the context of the Passover.597 However, it would make more sense of Christ’s own 
595 John 14:2-3
596 Satlow, Marriage, p61ff
597 Chavasse, Bride, pp64-65
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teaching, especially in relation to his departure and subsequent return, to see this as part 
of the same betrothal event as the Passover meal.
 4.4 The Bride in St Paul
Chavasse, like Satlow, identifies in Paul’s writings a fully developed nuptial theology 
built  on the OT idea of marriage between God and Israel and the marriage myth of 
Genesis 2.598 Chavasse attributes the introduction of the ‘type’ of the Edenic marriage as 
applying to that between Christ and the Church to Paul. However Satlow has shown that 
the Edenic marriage was already being utilised in the Qumran community as the basis 
for understanding contemporary marriage: it was not, therefore, so great a step to link 
the Edenic marriage to the marriage metaphor between Christ and the Church.599
Nevertheless, Chavasse traces a development in Paul’s nuptial theology from an early 
dependence on the Prophetic tradition of the marital metaphor (for example, Gal 4:21-
31) to a comprehensive Adamic interpretation. He observes that, although the theology 
is  never  centre-stage,  it  is  an  assumed  given,  known  to  Paul’s  readers,  and  he  is 
constantly using it to give context to his arguments, for example on Christian unity, 
against fornication, love in family life, spiritual constancy, the pre-eminence of Christ 
over all creation.600 Paul’s theology of Christ as the Second Adam, prefigured by the 
First (Rom 5:14), naturally extends to Eve prefiguring the Bride of Christ, which he 
identifies explicitly in 2 Corinthians 11:2-3.601 This is an important point: Paul’s use of 
Adam as ‘type,’ particularly in the context of the fall, must include Eve implicitly, since 
she is central to the story. 2 Cor 11:3 is simply the verification of that fact.
Once  it  is  identified,  Chavasse  easily  finds  this  nuptial  theology throughout  Paul’s 
theology of the Incarnation, in which Christ’s body is extended to give rise to the Bride 
in the same way that Adam’s was extended to give rise to Eve. Thus, references to 
Christ’s  ‘body,’  and Christ  as  ‘the  head of  the  body,’  should be  understood in  the 
context of Genesis 2:23:  ‘bone of my bones, flesh of my flesh.’ Indeed, it is this that 
underlies ‘the whole elaborate doctrine of the Church as the Mystical Body of Christ.’602 
Furthermore, this marriage of Christ and the Church is the archetypal marriage from 
598 Satlow, Marriage, pp48-49
599 Satlow, p60
600 Chavasse,  Bride,  p66: 1 Cor 12:27; 1 Cor 6:15-20; Eph 5:22ff;  2 Cor 11:2; Eph 1:22-25. Best  
admits as much when speaking of Eph 5:22ff., Body, pp172-173
601 Chavasse,  Bride,  pp68-69. Best  notes that in this passage the marriage has not yet  taken place  
although the betrothal has. Body, p171
602 Chavasse, Bride, pp70-71: e.g. Rom 12:4-5; 1 Cor 6:13-20; Eph 4:4-5; Col 1:24; Col 3:15
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which all  human marriages  derive their  significance.  This is  the point  of  Ephesians 
5:22ff.603 And this  background then requires  the  theological  interpretation  of  Paul’s 
discussion on the relationship between husbands and wives to be seen as a discussion 
about  Christ’s  relationship  with  the  Church  –  husbands  and  wives  are  types,  not 
genders, since there is ‘neither male nor female in Christ.’604
Chavasse goes on to point out that in the Hebrew Bible (and in the Septuagint) Eve is 
‘built’ from Adam’s rib in Genesis 2:22, a point that both later rabbinic midrash and 
Augustine also develops.605 He claims that Paul uses the exact same language to speak 
of the Body of Christ being ‘built up,’606 and that this may also form the prophetic link 
between  the  Bride  and  the  city  of  Zion,607 which  later  in  Revelation,  is  the  New 
Jerusalem, where the two are explicitly equated (Rev 21:9-10).
Christ’s death on the cross is thus prefigured by Adam’s sleep, and the new Bride, who 
replaces the old Bride (Israel) widowed through the death of the Law, is prefigured by 
Eve being built up from his side. However, the notion of redemption and reconciliation 
in the OT prophets shows that the nuptial idea is not enslaved to a rigorous single line of 
thought, but an amalgam of several different, but related, strands: the Bride is both old 
and new.608
Nevertheless, Chavasse believes Paul has broken away from the prophetic tradition in 
three ways:609
1. The prophets spoke of the Church as a fallen wife restored to honour. For St 
Paul she is a new Bride.
2. The prophets called her a mother of children. St Paul says that Christians are 
members or parts of her.
3. For the prophets the Nuptial Idea is only an allegory. For St Paul it is the great 
reality.
The first point is not beyond dispute: there is evidence that Paul sees the Bride of Christ 
as  continuous  with  the  restored  remnant  of  the  Bride  of  Yahweh.  For  example  in 
603 Chavasse, Bride, pp72-75
604 Chavasse, pp76-77; Gal 3:28
605 Satlow, Marriage, pp62-63; Augustine, The City of God, XXII.17
606 A point fully supported by other scholars, eg Best, Body, pp160-161
607 Chavasse, pp77-78; eg 1 Cor 6:19; Eph 2:20-21, 4:12-16,29; Col 2:7,19
608 Chavasse, pp79-81. It is not something Chavasse considers but in John’s Gospel the opening three 
events in Jesus’ ministry of wedding, Temple cleansing, and being born again (Jn 2-3) co-inhere 
and make integral  sense when considered in terms of the Bride of Yahweh being ‘born again, ’ 
complemented by the nuptial washing in Jn 13.
609 Chavasse, p82
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speaking of the restoration of Israel in Romans 11:26-27, just after he has spoken of the 
Gentiles being grafted on to the olive tree of Israel, Paul quotes the beginning of the 
great passage in Isaiah (59:20-62:12) which can be read in the light of Isaiah 61:10-11 
and 62:2-5 as the nuptial celebration between God and Israel. Furthermore, the Bible 
can happily refer to a ‘bride’ as a ‘wife’ and vice versa.610 Thus the new bride is the one 
tree comprising Israel and the Gentiles.
Chavasse, however, prefers to see a development in Paul’s thinking as he moves away 
from the prophetic idea in his earlier  writings (Galatians,  Corinthians,  although also 
present in Ephesians, which he attributes to Paul) towards the Edenic and Adamic in his 
later writings, but the evidence is not compelling. For example in Romans 9 (vv24-29) 
Paul  uses  Hosea  and  Isaiah  to  make  the  point  that  Jews  and  Gentiles  are  brought 
together to become God’s ‘beloved,’ and ‘sons of the living God.’
Chavasse identifies the marriage of the individual soul to God as possibly being found 
in some of Paul’s writings as a secondary dogma.611 However, even here the primary 
referent  is  still  the Church rather  than the individual.  But a careful  exegesis of,  for 
example,  1  Cor  6:13-20  (especially  vv15-17)  demonstrates  that  the  only  coherent 
interpretation is not that of individual souls joining to Christ, but that of the catholicity 
of each person. A person is both a ‘member’ of Christ’s Bridal body (v16), but also the 
whole Bride resides in each single concrete body (v17), since Christ, himself, is united 
with the prostitute (v15, and thus by implication, in the context, so is the rest of his 
‘body’)  through  the  individual’s  actions.  Paul  moves  freely  between  the  singular 
catholic body (v18) and the singular corporate body (v19, = temple, which follows on 
from 1 Cor 3:16-17 in which ‘you’ (pl.) are ‘God’s temple’ (sing.)), identifying the two: 
being joined to the Lord means being one spirit with him, and therefore there is one 
body – physically single and yet corporate, and so catholic.612
610 Eg Mary is referred to as Joseph’s wife even though they are only betrothed (Mt 1:24), and the 
heavenly  Jerusalem is  the  both ‘wife’ and  ‘bride’ of  the  Lamb in  the same verse  (Rev 21:9) 
although the wedding has yet to take place.
611 Chavasse,  Bride,  pp83-85: eg Gal 2:20, 1 Cor 6:16; Rom 7:4;  2 Cor 11:2.  However Muirhead 
insists  there  is  no  basis  in  the  NT for  this  understanding.  He  states  ‘In  the  NT the  Bride  is 
collective, never the individual Christian. The mystical marriage of the believer to Christ has no 
basis in the NT and it must be regretted that its extravagant language has done a great deal to bring  
into disfavour the proper NT symbolism.’ The Bride of Christ,  175-187. Cf. Best who believes 
Rom 7:4 is precisely about the marriage of the individual to Christ (Body, p53).
612 See, eg. Bulgakov,  Bride, p255 and Volf’s discussion in Likeness, pp142-143. See also p187 and 
footnote 627, below.
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 4.5 The Bride in Other New Testament Writings
Chavasse finds further signs of the  ‘Nuptial Idea,’ as he terms it, in Hebrews, which 
opens with the nuptial Psalm 45, and in the epistles of Peter and James, including the 
themes  of  living,  growing,  buildings  and  begottenness,  dwelling,  vines,  fruitfulness 
etc.613 He also devotes a full chapter to the book of Revelation.614
Acknowledging the diversity of imagery and genre within this apocalyptic writing he 
describes  the  overarching  picture  as  one  of  a  contest  between  two groups  of  three 
characters: one on the side of Righteousness, the others being caricatures on the side of 
Evil. On the side of Righteousness are God with his angels, Jesus the Lamb, and the 
Bride, the New Jerusalem; opposite these are Satan with his demons, the Beast, and the 
Whore,  Babylon.  Without  going into the detail  of his  interpretation  of  the imagery, 
which he bases on the work of Henry Goudge,615 he identifies the Mother of Christ in 
Revelation 12:1-6, which is clearly Israel, with the Heavenly Bride in Revelation 19:6-
9, the Church.616 This identification is far from obvious, especially as he also equates the 
Babylonian Whore with Israel, or  ‘the Jewish Church,’617 although he does justify the 
identity between the Mother and the Bride by noting that  ‘the Christian Church is the 
“Faithful Remnant” of the Jewish Church.’618 Thus there are two women: the fallen 
Bride  of  Yahweh,  Babylon,  the  unfaithful  Jewish  nation,  eventually  destroyed  and 
devoured by the Beast upon which she rode (Rome);619 and the new Bride, called out of 
Babylon  (Rev  18:4),  the  faithful  remnant,  she  who  gave  birth  to  Christ,  the  New 
Jerusalem, the Church.620 The idea of the faithful remnant being identified with the new 
Bride has strong echoes with Paul’s theology of the salvation of the Jews in Romans 11 
(see above).
He concludes by interpreting the closing scenes Revelation 21 and 22 as the Pauline 
vision of the New Eden, with the New Adam and the New Eve, in the garden in which 
are  the  Water  of  Life  and  the  Tree  of  Life,  but  no  longer  with  the  Tree  of  the 
Knowledge of Good and Evil.621
613 Chavasse, pp85-88
614 Chavasse, Ch 4, pp89-98
615 Oxford Regius Professor of Divinity, 1923-39
616 Chavasse, p96
617 Chavasse, Bride, p93
618 Chavasse, p95
619 Chavasse, pp93-94
620 Chavasse, pp96-97
621 Chavasse, p98
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In the following section of his work, Chavasse seeks to identify nuptial themes in each 
of the major Christian doctrines: atonement, salvation, redemption, baptism, incarnation 
and eucharist.622 In particular, the Eucharist is the consummation of Christ’s marriage 
with his Church, the true communion between Christ and his Bride, not the adultery of 
fellowship with demons that provokes jealousy (1 Cor 10:20-22). He finds support for 
this  understanding  in  several  prayers  and  exhortations  in  the  Book  of  Common 
Prayer.623
 4.6 New Testament Scholarship
Perhaps Chavasse’s  work is  so old that  modern  NT scholarship no longer  needs  to 
consider his findings.624 However, in the past several studies have attempted to discount 
his  thesis,  notably  those  of  Best  and  Batey.625 Best’s  is  the  earliest  and  most 
comprehensive. Batey simply agrees with Best, who writes:
Chavasse deduces the description of the Church as the Body of Christ from the nuptial idea 
as found in both Old and New Testaments. The Church ‘is only the Body of Christ because 
she is primarily the mystical Bride of Christ’ (p71). If this is so, then it is difficult to explain  
why Paul put so much emphasis on the former idea and so little upon the latter. The two 
ideas  are  only related  in  his  last  Epistle  (if  for  the  moment  we  assume  Paul  did  write 
Ephesians). It is much easier to suppose that the two metaphors were connected after each 
had been used separately rather than that either was the cause of the other.626
However, this dismissal is not quite so complete and satisfactory as has been assumed. 
For  example,  it  ignores  all  the  rabbinic  nuptial  teaching  based  on  Adam,  which 
understood marriage in terms of ‘becoming one flesh’ and ‘bone of my bones.’ If Paul 
is interpreting Adam as a forerunner and type of Christ, the link between Adam and Eve 
and Christ and his Bride is already there. If Chavasse is right, the contrast in emphasis 
between the body and bride metaphors described by Best is a false one: references to 
Church  as  the  Body  of  Christ  are  references  to  the  Church  as  Bride  –  the  bridal 
metaphor, which is by far the older, is the boat in which the body metaphor sails. The 
greater  use  of  the  body metaphor  is  just  a  product  of  the  occasional  nature  of  the 
622 Chavasse, pp99-109
623 Chavasse, pp108-109
624 Eg. JDG Dunn’s 800 page monograph on The Theology of Paul the Apostle (1998) does not have a 
single reference to Chavasse, or even to the Church as bride. Neither do NT Wright’s  The New 
Testament and the People of God  (1992), D Wenham’s  Paul: Follower of Jesus or Founder of  
Christianity (1995), or B Witherington III’s  Paul’s Narrative Thought World (1994). However, 
neither does the much earlier,  but shorter, Pauline theology of CK Barrett, despite its focus on 
Adam (1962), From First Adam to Last.
625 Batey RA,  ‘Jewish Gnosticism and the  ‘Heiros Gamos’ of Eph V:21-33’, 1963; Batey RA,  ‘The 
Mia Sarx of Christ and the Church’, 1967
626 Best, One Body in Christ, p92
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epistles:  it  has  more  ethical  applications  relating  to  the internal  relations  within the 
Church than the bridal one, which is more eschatological, and therefore ontological, in 
nature.  However,  when  issues  of  false  worship  arise,  which  is  what  threatens  the 
Church’s relation with God, and hence its ontology, it is often the bridal metaphor to 
which recourse is made, as it was in the OT.627
In particular, Paul, in writing to the Corinthians to elucidate the ontological significance 
of bodily activities in our relation with Christ, explicitly links the OT prophetic bridal 
metaphor of idol worship as nuptial adultery with the body metaphor of Genesis 2 (1 
Cor  6:15-20).  Most  commentators  consider  this  passage  to  simply  refer  to  civil 
prostitution or promiscuity,  and therefore treat it only from the perspective of sexual 
morality. They are left with rather perplexed, uncertain and lame explanations for the 
references to ‘food’ and ‘stomach’ in v13.628
However the passage must refer to temple prostitution, for under what other conceivable 
circumstance would Paul describe a man as becoming a ‘member of a prostitute,’ i.e. a 
woman, through an act of sexual union, in contrast to a ‘member of Christ.’ In all other 
cases where this Edenic metaphor is used, the woman becomes a member of the man – 
the bride becomes the body of the husband who is the head, and thus the two are ‘one 
flesh.’ In this case, however, the reverse happens, and the man takes the place of the 
woman, becomes the female, as it were, becomes one of her members. God is always 
the male in the prophetic nuptial descriptions and the creature always the female. Christ 
is the male in this passage, and yet the men (and they are men here) being addressed are 
considered as female in the metaphor – both in relation to Christ and to the prostitute. 
The prophetic  metaphor is  most  often used when speaking about  Israel’s  fidelity to 
Yahweh in  the  context  of  worship:  the  nuptial  metaphor  is  a  description  of  divine 
worship.  In  this  case  the  man,  through  sexual  union,  becomes  a  member  of  ‘the 
prostitute’  rather  than  the  temple  deity  because  ‘we know that  an  idol  has  no  real 
existence’ (1 Cor 8:4, see also Brueggemann on the OT usage of this metaphor, e.g. 
Theology, p360). So Paul has used the combined prophetic and Edenic descriptions of 
the nuptial relationship to speak of the whole body participating in worship, and thus 
becoming  one  with  the  deity  being  worshipped.  And  he  has  done  so  without  any 
background explanation being required: the inner workings of the metaphor are just 
assumed common knowledge.
627 Eg 1 Cor 6:15; see p184, above. Eg also 1 Cor 10:6-22 (esp vv 8-9, 14-22), 2 Cor 11:2, although cf 
Col 2:19.
628 Eg Best, referring to koilija (stomach) says ‘presumably it is therefore something whose nature is 
entirely physical.’ Body, p74
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This then also makes sense of the body, united with Christ through the presence of the 
Spirit, being described as the temple of the Spirit in this context (1 Cor 6:19). The Spirit 
is  the betrothal  gift  given to the bride,  thus joining the bride to  Christ,  and who is 
therefore no longer her own person having been  ‘bought with a price’ (1 Cor 6:20) – 
precisely  the  point  made  in  the  following  passage  concerning  the  relation  between 
husbands and wives  (1 Cor 7:4).  Thus the notions  of  ‘temple’  and  ‘bride’  are  also 
identified with each other, again making sense of the Jewish notion of Eve being ‘built 
up’ from Adam, the bride being ‘builded’ from the husband, the two together forming 
‘one building,’ one flesh.629
Furthermore, this exposition of the divine marriage also forms the introduction to the 
next two chapters on human marriage and idolatry, including a discussion on the moral 
implications,  but  ontological  unimportance,  of  eating  food  offered  to  idols,  which 
ontology Paul has already dismissed in one line in 1 Cor 6:13 in his introduction to the 
section. These are, as shown, both intimately related to, and expressions of, the divine 
marriage.  Thus the whole central  section of this  letter  to the Corinthians has,  as its 
theological  entelechy,  the  conjoined  notion  of  the  OT prophetic  and  Edenic  bridal 
images.
Paul also speaks of the  ‘joining’ between  ‘members of Christ’ and Christ in terms of 
nuptial (or sexual) union in this passage, again based on Adam in Genesis 2 – a point 
made by Best, himself. Best concludes that this being ‘joined’ to Christ means that his 
(Christ’s) members ‘form rather one person,’ which is the point of Paul’s argument in 
referring it to Genesis.630 Furthermore, he notes the similarity of language interchange 
between swm`a and savrx in this passage and the great nuptial passage in Ephesians 5.631 
He even concedes that Paul might see the Church as the second Eve:
The reference to Eve in 2 Cor 11:3 suggests the possibility that Paul regarded the Church as 
the second Eve, just as he regarded Christ as the second Adam; as God presented Eve to 
Adam, so Paul presents the Corinthian Church to Christ,632
However, he concludes by saying that, because Paul cannot be said to have ‘begotten’ 
the  whole Church, he cannot present the whole church to Christ.  In consequence he 
must be addressing only the Corinthian church and ‘we cannot therefore accept the idea 
that  the [whole]  Church is  the second Eve,’  and later  ‘if  Eve is  identified  with the 
629 Cf Eph 2:21 where the saints ‘grow’ into a temple. See Chavasse, Bride, pp77-78
630 Best, Body, p76
631 Best, Body, p177
632 Best, Body, p171
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Church, she is identified with the local congregation and not with the whole Church.’633 
Best’s line of reasoning leaves unanswered alternatives, including the possibility of Paul 
seeing himself as a type of the Forerunner as the apostle to the Gentiles, a point made by 
Chavasse, supported by Augustine,  and unaddressed by Best.634 More importantly,  it 
demands that Paul conceives the individualisation of congregations into a multiplicity of 
virgins, each of which has been betrothed to Christ by its founder, and each of which 
will be presented to him as a bride. Thus Christ must have many brides since there are 
many churches. Perhaps we are supposed to think of Christ as a type of Solomon but 
with an almost infinite harem!635 Such a conception of the Church is wholly at odds with 
Paul’s  theology  as  expressed  elsewhere  (e.g.  1  Cor  12:13).  If  this  is  a  serious 
proposition a similar argument ought to be advanced that Christ must also have many 
bodies,  but  not  even  Best  suggests  this.636 To  insist  that  Eve  should  therefore  be 
identified with a  single congregation  but the Body of Christ  is  the whole church is 
inconsistent  logically,  theologically,  and ontologically.637 Given this evidence,  Best’s 
easy dismissal of Chavasse’s understanding seems a little premature.
Later Best tackles Chavasse’s arguments more systematically, although the proposition 
he addresses concerns the extent to which, in Ephesians 5:22ff, Paul is more reliant on 
the prophetic tradition or Genesis.638 It is worth considering the more important of these 
objections because they are not quite as robust as they might appear, and Chavasse’s 
notion that the body metaphor is derivative from the bride, and that this underlies much 
New Testament and Early Church ecclesial ontology, is, again, not so easily ruled out.
Best  lists  six  arguments  made  by Chavasse  in  support  of  his  idea  that  the  nuptial 
metaphor in Ephesians 5:22-33 depends more on Genesis than the prophetic tradition. 
The point of the debate is that the Genesis tradition sees the union of husband and wife 
as the creation of one flesh, one body, of which the husband is the head, thus linking the 
body and bride metaphors. Nowhere in the prophetic tradition of Yahweh and his bride 
is the union envisaged in this way: indeed it would have been considered blasphemous 
to speak of Israel as the  ‘body’ of Yahweh, although parallels between Paul’s use of 
633 Best, Body, p180
634 Chavasse, Bride, p69
635 Indeed,  St Francis  of Sales (1567-1622) sees in Solomon a figure of Jesus’ marriage to a vast 
number of souls, Treatise on the Love of God, Book X, Ch IV.
636 Although  see  Volf  who  argues  that  each  local  church  is  indeed  the  body of  Christ,  but  in  a 
nonorganic sense, Likeness, p 142
637 See,  for  example,  Dulles’  comment  ‘According to the New Testament...it  would be out of the 
question for Christ to have several bodies, several brides, or for there to be several Temples or new 
Israels,’ Models, p131
638 Best, Body, pp180-181
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Eve’s disobedience (2 Cor 11:3) and the frequent description in the prophetic tradition 
of Israel’s infidelity have been noted.639
Chavasse’s argument does not depend on which tradition was pre-eminent, since both 
were obviously used by the early church. His point is that the Edenic tradition became 
metaphorical  rather than merely allegorical,  and thus ontologically definitive for the 
early church. This Edenic tradition already existed in Judaism and was taken up by the 
Church, so the ‘body’ metaphor was naturally derivative for Paul. However, Best wants 
to demonstrate that the prophetic tradition was being used because there is no  ‘body’ 
associated with that tradition and therefore ‘body’ and ‘bride’ must come from different 
sources.
He begins by denying Chavasse’s claim that Gen 2:24 lies at the heart of this Eph 5 
passage. Instead, he believes it is only an OT quotation introduced  ‘to corroborate an 
argument which has already been established.’ But he has himself already said that ‘the 
subjection of the Church to Christ and its relationship to him as wife is assumed as 
known’ at the beginning of the passage. An argument is established, in v23, whereby 
the husband is head of the wife even as Christ is the head of the church, his body. But 
on what is it based? The ‘given’ is that ‘Christ is the head of the church, his body’ is a  
bridal metaphor. This understanding is not defended: it is simply a statement of what 
everyone already knows to be the case. From where does this metaphor come? Best 
offers no explanation. It is just assumed. This is precisely Chavasse’s point – the Edenic 
bridal metaphor that links the body and the bride forms the backdrop, is part of the 
‘presupposition pool’ of the early church to which the Ephesians letter is addressed. The 
argument is not  ‘finally clinched’640 by the quotation from Genesis 2: it is the natural 
ground of all that has gone before, the vocalisation of the assumed background. As Best, 
himself, concedes it refers ‘to the general thought of the whole passage’ (vv22-33). That 
is because it is the theological idea underpinning it.
Best’s next point concerns doubts over whether Paul does identify the church with Eve 
in 2 Corinthians 11:2-3, and in any case  ‘if Eve is identified with the Church, she is 
identified with the local congregation and not with the whole Church.’ As discussed 
above,641 if we are to consider a degree of consistency in Paul’s thinking and ontology 
of the Church, Best’s argument is unacceptable.
639 Batey, Paul’s Bridal Image, p177
640 Best, Body, p179
641 p188
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The  third  point  relates  to  whether  the  body  metaphor  is  dependent  on  the  bridal 
metaphor  (Chavasse),  or  they  are  independent  of  each  other  but  combined  in  this 
instance (Best,  supported by Batey642).  Best rejects  Chavasse’s argument  because he 
believes the reasoning in Ephesians 5:22-33 runs thus:
from the nuptial metaphor the author sees Christ and the Church as husband and wife; but 
the Church is also his Body; therefore she must be his Body; therefore the two are one; and 
he clinches the matter with the quotation of Gen 2:24.643
But this logic is simply not in the text. The opening line of the argument (v23) is that 
Christ is the head of the Church, his body: in the same way the husband is the head of 
the wife. The logic is just that to be a husband is to be the head, to be the wife is to be  
the body. Right from the outset husband and wife, Christ and his Church, are head and 
body, and this is just assumed, not explained. There is no linear reasoning here, but, as 
previously explained, the whole passage is an exposition of a presupposed doctrine.644
The main point of Best’s last argument appears to be that
the essence of Chavasse’s argument boils down to the statement that Paul works from the 
divine marriage to the human, and not vice versa. That must be admitted as true. Does it  
necessarily  follow,  however,  that  the  divine  marriage  is  not  allegory  but  reality?...it  is 
permissible to alter a metaphor but not to change reality. Thus we conclude that in Eph 5:22-
33 we are not faced with reality but with metaphor or analogy.
Elsewhere  he  uses  a  similar  line  of  reasoning  to  dismiss  reality  on  the  basis  of 
metaphor.645
The contention that reality and metaphor are mutually exclusive has been shown to be a 
fallacy.646 Furthermore,  if  there  was  no  ontological  basis  to  the  description  of  the 
Christ’s relationship with the Church as groom and bride, vv31-32 become devoid of 
any meaning or content, and the whole passage loses its integrity – it becomes mere 
moralising.
 4.7 Conclusion
In  conclusion,  the  objections  raised  against  Chavasse’s  interpretation  of  the  bridal 
metaphor  are  not  without  their  own  serious  difficulties.  There  remain  compelling 
reasons to suppose that, at least in broad outline, he was correct. Indeed, there has been 
642 Batey, Mia Sarx, p270 n3
643 Best, Body, pp180-181
644 pError: Reference source not found
645 Best, Body, p101
646 Eg. Gunton, Actuality of Atonement, 1988
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renewed interest  recently,  both  theologically  and biblically,  confirming  his  premise, 
with  Tait  quite  explicitly  weakening  Best’s  rejection  and  arguing  in  favour  of 
Chavasse.647 The most significant detail where Chavasse is perhaps too hasty is in the 
over-realisation of his nuptial eschatology. Best and Batey are right in pointing out that 
for Paul the wedding has not yet happened – only the betrothal has taken place:648 the 
bride, although bought with a price and endowed with the earnest-money of the Spirit,  
is still being ‘built up.’
This recognition, that the combined OT prophetic and Edenic bridal metaphor forms the 
theological background to much New Testament imagery, in turn opens up a plethora of 
possible allusions to it, as recognised by Tait. Language referring to being ‘washed’ and 
‘sanctified,’  ‘belonging  to  Christ,’  ‘paid  for,’  ‘faithfulness,’  provoking  God  to 
‘jealousy,’ ‘fellowship,’ ‘household,’ ‘being clothed in righteousness,’ for example, can 
all be readily and illuminatingly interpreted in this light. Indeed references to the law 
and the covenant will resonate more strongly in the context of the nuptial metaphor, 
since this was one of the primary means of interpreting the covenant in Israel. There is 
therefore much work still to be done in sounding these themes and metaphors in the 
light of this nuptial ontology.
647 Eg Volf, Likeness, 1998, p243; Tait, ‘The Two shall become One’, 2008
648 Although Tait notes a fluidity in the language of bride/wife that probably depends on the degree of 
eschatological realisation required in the force of the argument, ‘The Two shall become One’, p86
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Chapter 5 Towards A Personal Ontology Of The 
Church
“And our mouth shall show forth thy praise.” (sic)
One of the fundamental questions of ecclesiology relates to the who of the Church.
Bulgakov’s description of the her as body and temple appertain to the hypostasis of the 
Logos  and the  presence  of  the  Spirit.  Some  prominent  theologians  believe  there  is 
nothing else to say. Zizioulas, for example, insists that Christ, and Christ alone, is the I 
of  the  Church.  For  him,  the  Church is  entirely  somatic  –  it  is  the  Body of  Christ, 
gathered around him in communion. To say otherwise would endanger the identity of 
the catholicity of Christ and the overcoming of individuality. For this reason he never 
refers to the Church as Bride.649
But this  means  that  the free response of  Creation  to  God’s  invitation  has not  been 
answered. The Logos and the Spirit  issue the Invitation from the Father. The work of 
the  Word  and  the  Spirit  within  Creation,  in  the  kenotic  love  of  the  Incarnation, 
Crucifixion,  Resurrection  and Pentecost,  enable  and empower it  to  respond through 
Baptism and Eucharist.  But, with reference to Rublev’s icon, they are already seated 
around the table – the eternal perichoresis of the Holy Trinity has never been, could 
never be, disrupted. There is no need for them to answer the Invitation. The Invitation, 
then, which was issued in the very act of creation, is to the Other. It is not the Logos, 
who is the hypostasis of Jesus Christ, that needs to respond: it is that which was created 
by God in freedom and called to respond to God in love. That is the whole point of the 
bridal image throughout Scripture.
But do we participate as many, or as one?
 5.1 Incarnation, Baptism, and the Birth of the Bride
The conversation with Congar and Bulgakov has, to a great extent, revolved around the 
nature of the relationship between the Son and the Holy Spirit in the immanent and 
economic Trinity on the one hand, and between God and creation on the other. Since the 
Church  is  born  out  of  the  work  of  both  the  Son  and  the  Spirit  in  creation,  an 
understanding of the nature of these relationships is crucial to understanding the nature, 
649 See McPartlan P, ‘Who is the Church’
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and hence ontology of the Church. In particular, the question arises as to whether the 
Church can be considered to have, in any sense, a hypostatic existence over and against 
that of Christ that answers ‘Yes’ to his invitation to the wedding banquet, or whether the 
‘Thou’ of the Church is already included in the hypostasis of Jesus, himself.
There  are  two key events  in  the life  of  Jesus in  which both these relationships  are 
fundamentally exposed: the Incarnation and the baptism of Jesus. Speaking of Jesus’ 
baptism, Irenæus brings them together:
For inasmuch as the Word of God was man from the root of Jesse, and son of Abraham, in 
this respect did the Spirit of God rest upon Him, and anoint Him to preach the Gospel to the  
lowly (Is 61:1).  But inasmuch as He was God, He did not judge according to glory,  nor 
reprove  after  the  manner  of  speech...For  He  called  all  men  that  mourn;  and  granting 
forgiveness to those who had been led into captivity by their sins, He loosed them from their  
chains...Therefore did the Spirit  of God descend upon Him, [the Spirit] of Him who had 
promised  by  the  prophets  that  He  would  anoint  Him,  so  that  we,  receiving  from  the 
abundance of His unction, might be saved.650
For Irenæus both the Incarnation and the baptism of Jesus were soteriological events in 
which the Word and Spirit were active, but they fulfilled different functions which were 
manifested at his baptism. The Word became flesh through the Spirit (‘inasmuch as He 
was God’) in order, not to judge according to glory, but to grant the forgiveness of God 
to humanity (Is 11:1-5). But in his baptism his flesh, his humanity (‘inasmuch as He 
was man’), received the anointing of the Holy Spirit that the rest of humanity might 
receive restoration and new life in the Spirit (Is 61:1-3). Thus, in his divinity Jesus faces 
the world, offering God’s forgiveness from among us. In his humanity he faces God 
with us, receiving the gift of God – the Holy Spirit,  God dwelling in man that man 
might dwell in God – that we too might receive.651 So in the person of Jesus God and 
man face each other, as it were, divinity and humanity brought into communion in a 
single hypostasis. And the incarnating agent in both cases is the Holy Spirit.
 5.1.1 Incarnation – Augustine and the Bride
The Incarnation, through the work of the Holy Spirit, unites the Word of God with the 
flesh of humanity. Bulgakov notes that Theodore of Mopsuestia describes the union of 
the two natures of Christ as a marriage.652 Disappointingly, and somewhat inexplicably, 
650 Irenæus, Against Heresies, III.9.3
651 Irenæus, Against Heresies, III.19.1; III.20.2
652 Bulgakov, Lamb, p38
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however, he never explores Augustine’s rich and pervasive nuptial theology anywhere 
in his trilogy, which is exactly an exposition of this theme.653
For Augustine, as Chavasse points out, the great marriage spoken of in the Gospels is 
the wedding of divinity with humanity,  which takes place in the Incarnation.654 The 
location  of  this  wedding,  its  union  and  consummation,  takes  place  in  the  bridal 
chamber, which is the womb of the Virgin Mary:
The nuptial union is that of ‘the Word,’ and the flesh. The Bridechamber of this union, the 
Virgin’s  womb.  For  the  flesh  itself  was  united  to  the  Word:  whence  also  it  is  said,  
‘Henceforth they are not twain, but one flesh.’ The Church was assumed unto Him out of the  
human race: so that the Flesh itself, being united to the Word, might be the Head of the 
Church: and the rest who believe, members of that Head.655
This  marriage,  in  which  the  Word is  the  bridegroom and  humanity  the  bride,  is  a 
marriage of natures. Although Augustine speaks of the Word as the bridegroom, which 
is a hypostasis, the flesh he unites with himself in the bridal chamber becomes  ‘one 
flesh’ with him, such that there is one person, not two, ‘henceforth they are not twain.’ 
There remains one person, Jesus Christ. That Augustine is speaking about human nature 
is made clear by the fact that he always goes on to speak of Christ as the head of the  
body in an organic, albeit mystical, sense. The rest of humanity becomes clothed with 
the flesh of Christ’s humanity, and in this way they become his body of which he is the 
head. For example:
For the Word was the Bridegroom, and human flesh the bride; and both one, the Son of God, 
the same also being Son of man. The womb of the Virgin Mary, in which He became head of 
the Church, was His bridal chamber.656
The Church is joined to Christ’s flesh, his human nature, and thus becomes his body – 
but  the  marriage,  itself,  is  between the  two natures  of  Christ.  Augustine  bases  this 
interpretation  on  the  passage  from  Isaiah  in  which  one  person  speaks  as  both 
bridegroom and bride, an interpretation which he probably takes from Tyconius’ First 
Rule with which he was so impressed:657
For he has clothed me with the garments of salvation; he has covered me with the robe of 
righteousness, as a bridegroom decks himself like a priest with a beautiful headdress, and as 
a bride adorns herself with her jewels.658
653 He is, however, quite ready to criticise Augustine’s doctrines of original sin, human freedom, and 
predestination. (see Bride, eg. pp166ff; pp204ff; pp212ff)
654 Chavasse, Bride, pp152-153
655 Augustine, Hom. Ps, XLV.3; see also Hom. Ps, XIX.6; Hom. 1 John, I.2
656 Augustine, Tract. John, VIII.4
657 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, III.31.44
658 Is 61:10
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Thus he interprets the bride and the bridegroom as a single person, but with two natures: 
the bridegroom is the Word of God in his divinity while the bride is the humanity (the 
‘Flesh’) to which he joins himself in the person of Jesus.
There are at least three difficulties with Augustine’s interpretation of the marriage as 
between the divine and human natures of Christ. Firstly, the union is seen as between 
two different  natures.  Secondly,  in  Genesis  the union refers  to  persons not  natures. 
Thirdly, the marriage has already been consummated and completed in Mary’s womb, 
leaving no place for the eschatological dimension prevalent in the New Testament.
5.1.1.1 The Union of Natures
Firstly,  the unity of which is spoken in the passage in Genesis 2:24, from which he 
continually quotes, does not refer to two different natures, but one common humanity. 
The union only exists as ‘one flesh’ precisely because, as Adam says in the preceding 
verse,  ‘This at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh’ (Gen 2:23). The union 
derives from the fact that the female is taken from the male (Gen 2:21-22) – they are of 
the same nature and thus belong together. For Augustine’s interpretation to make any 
sense of this context the ‘female’ that is united to the ‘male’ to create the one flesh must 
derive, be taken from it. That is, the ‘humanity/flesh’ (female) must be taken from the 
‘divinity’ (male) in order to be re-united with it to make the one flesh. Otherwise the 
two becoming  ‘one flesh’ makes no sense. While Bulgakov might make sense of this 
understanding  with  his  concept  of  God-manhood,  Divine  and  creaturely  Sophia, 
Augustine does not. Instead, he transfers this aspect of the passage to refer to the cross.
Augustine interprets the phrase ‘Therefore shall a man leave his father and mother and 
hold fast to his wife’ (Gen 2:24) as referring to the Word, who leaves the Father in 
heaven, and his mother, the Jewish church, to be united to the Church in his flesh:
He left His Father, not that He forsook or departed from His Father, but that He did not  
appear unto men in that form in which He was equal with the Father. But how did He leave 
His mother? By leaving the synagogue of the Jews, of which, after the flesh, He was born, 
and by cleaving to the Church which He has gathered out of all nations.659
However, when he refers to the previous verses in which Eve is created from the rib of 
Adam he translates the scene to the piercing of Jesus’ side on the cross:
659 Augustine, Tract. John, XIX.10
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Adam sleeps, that Eve may be formed; Christ dies, that the Church may be formed. When 
Adam sleeps, Eve is formed from his side; when Christ is dead, the spear pierces His side,  
that the mysteries may flow forth whereby the Church is formed.660
The Church, for Augustine, however, is already formed in the Virgin’s womb, the bridal 
chamber in which the marriage has already taken place. The bride is Christ’s ‘flesh,’ his 
humanity is the Church:
For all the Church is Christ’s Bride, of which the beginning and first fruits is the flesh of  
Christ: there was the Bride joined to the Bridegroom in the flesh.661
This formation on the cross, therefore, is not the origination of the bride, but merely her 
extension as the ‘flesh’ of Christ who, in his own flesh, is the first fruits of the bride.
Augustine has thus both reversed the ontological order of Genesis and, at the same time, 
introduced into it an ontological hiatus. First, humanity, ‘flesh,’ is married to divinity in 
Mary’s womb such that they become ‘one flesh’ in Jesus (Gen 2:24). The bride, ‘Eve,’ 
the Church, is  subsequently formed (Gen 2:21-22), or more correctly, extended, from 
Christ’s pierced side on the cross. The Church is then formed from this flesh through 
the Eucharist as the organic, but mystical, body of which he is the head. The context and 
ontological  flow,  the  ‘Therefore,’  of  Genesis  2:24  has  become  incomprehensible. 
Furthermore,  the  description  of  the  Church  as  Bride  is  entirely  dependent  on  its 
participation  in  Christ’s  ‘flesh,’  that  is,  as  an  extension  of  his  Body.  The  proper 
ontological description for the Church in Augustine’s theology is the Body of Christ: 
the Church is ‘bride’ only insofar as she partakes in Christ’s ‘body:’
For the Church is His body, as the apostle’s teaching shows us; and it is even called His 
spouse.662
Second, in describing the heavenly marriage as the union of divine and human natures, 
Augustine has introduced an ontological chasm into the midst of the Genesis story, for 
human nature can in no wise be described as the  ‘bone of my bones and flesh of my 
flesh’ of divine nature. Furthermore, in both cases ‘Eve’ is not a person but a metaphor 
for speaking of renewed human nature in Christ. This brings us to the next difficulty.
5.1.1.2 The Union of Persons
Secondly, the marriage in Genesis 2 is a union of hypostatic persons, not just of natures. 
A man and a woman come together to form one flesh. The woman is created from the 
660 Augustine, Tract. John, XIX.10
661 Augustine, Hom. 1 John, II.2
662 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, I.16.15
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man’s side to be his friend, helper, and lover. These are personal actions and categories,  
not abstract or conceptual ones. Perhaps it is for this reason that Bulgakov never refers 
to Augustine’s nuptial imagery. For while the union of the two natures of divinity and 
humanity in Jesus  may be a valid referent for the heavenly marriage in a theological 
treatise (although see above), it is certainly not the referent either in the Gospels or in 
the rest of the New Testament literature. The union of the two natures of Christ is a 
theological construct to explain both the full humanity and the full divinity of Christ 
existing in one person, which has become church dogma. But it was only developed 
through a long and painful history over several hundred years. The heavenly marriage in 
the NT had another referent that grew out of both the ‘prophetic’ and Edenic traditions 
already present in the Judaism of the First Century: that between Yahweh and Israel, 
which later developed into that between the Messiah and the Church. Certainly this was 
the way it was interpreted by the NT writers.
The Bride, for Augustine, however, is never a hypostatic person, even when he assigns 
to her personal pronouns: these are merely allegorical tools to fit within the imagery he 
is using.663 Thus, for Augustine, the heavenly marriage is not an ontological reality, in 
the sense that there is no union between hypostases: without hypostases, persons, there 
can be no ontological marriage.
One of the principal contributions Bulgakov makes to theology is the insistence that 
creation is hypostasised by humanity. He draws this out as the implicit meaning in the 
creation story of Genesis 2:
The Lord God formed the man of dust from the ground and breathed into his nostrils the 
breath of life, and the man became a living creature.664
It is the presence of God’s ‘breath’ in the dust of creation that distinguishes humanity 
from the rest of creation, which is created solely by God’s  ‘word;’  ‘And God said...’. 
This  ‘spirit’ combined with  ‘nature’ is what makes a hypostasis, a person. The spirit 
comes from God, is God-breathed, and is thus the only thing in creation that is capable 
of  responding  personally to  God’s  ‘Thou.’665 This,  perhaps,  is  one  of  the  most 
remarkable  aspects  in  all  creation,  that  a  human  person,  creaturely,  temporally  and 
663 Even where he appears to treat the bride as over against Christ, this must be modified to understand 
his insistence that Christ is both bride and groom, eg. ‘Ye know the Bridegroom; it is Christ. Ye 
know the Bride; it is the Church. Pay honour to the Bride, pay honour to the Bridegroom. If ye pay 
due honour to them both, ye will be their children.’ Augustine, Sermons, XL.6
664 Gen 2:7
665 Bulgakov, Bride, p115
198
spatially constrained, is competent to address the infinite and eternal God, that is, in 
some sense is created equal to the hypostatic task of answering God, as an ‘I.’666
From this  Bulgakov goes  on to  insist  that  there  is  no such thing as  non-hypostatic 
human nature. For this reason he gives to Mary the special significance of the one who 
gives  herself, not just her nature, to Jesus and is therefore included in the matrix of 
soteriology with Christ. However, to use a hypostatic category, marriage, to describe a 
non-hypostatic action, the co-existence of the two natures in Christ, as Augustine does, 
is to confuse inappropriately subject and predicate.
5.1.1.3 The Eschatological Wedding
Thirdly, it is difficult to see how there is any eschatological dimension to Augustine’s 
concept of this marriage if it has already taken place and been consummated in Mary’s 
womb. In commenting on the wedding feast at Cana in Galilee (Jn 2) he refers to Christ 
dying to give his blood for his bride:
What wonder if  He came to that  house to a marriage, having come into this world to a  
marriage? For, indeed, if He came not to a marriage, He has not here a bride. But what says  
the  apostle?  ‘I  have  espoused  you  to  one  husband,  to  present  you  a  chaste  virgin  to 
Christ.’ ...Thus has He here a bride whom He has redeemed by His blood, and to whom He 
has given the Holy Spirit as a pledge. He has freed her from the bondage of the devil: He  
died for her sins, and is risen again for her justification. Who will make such offerings to his 
bride? ...For if one should give his own blood to his bride, he would not live to take her for  
his wife. But the Lord, dying without fear, gave His own blood for her, whom rising again 
He was to have, whom He had already united to Himself in the Virgin’s womb.667
The passage continues with the quote in which he elucidates the marriage as between 
the Word and the flesh.
It is difficult to obtain a coherent picture of Augustine’s thinking on the Church as the 
bride here. On the one hand he refers to Paul’s second letter to the Corinthians (11:2) 
which speaks of an eschatological  wedding that has not yet  taken place,  and on the 
other, that the marriage has already been consummated: ‘whom rising again He was to 
have, whom He had already united to Himself in the Virgin’s womb.’ The address to the 
Corinthian church presupposes that they have not yet been given and that they are to be 
presented to Christ as his bride. That is, that Christ, here, is the bridegroom and not the 
bride.  This  is  despite  the  fact  that  they  already  are  Christ’s  body,  by  Augustine’s 
definition, since they have been baptised and partake in the Eucharist, and that Christ, 
himself, is both bridegroom and bride.
666 Bulgakov, Bride, p91
667 Augustine, Tract. John, VIII.4
199
Furthermore, it is difficult to see in what way Christ’s blood is being given for the bride, 
who, as Augustine says in this passage, is his own ‘flesh’ or humanity:
the  Lord...gave His  own blood for  her...whom He had already united  to  Himself  in  the 
Virgin’s womb.
This makes sense in the context of Christ’s sacrifice and redemption of humanity, but in 
the context of his bridal imagery, what does it mean? He gave his blood for himself? 
There seems to be a distinct lack of internal coherence or logic that appears to derive 
from  mixing  allegory  (the  union  of  the  natures  in  Christ  is  like  a  marriage)  with 
metaphor (humanity is  a person – the bride).  In any case the marriage  is  not in an 
eschatological future, despite the Spirit being given as ‘a pledge.’ The pledge pertains, 
not  to the consummation  or fulfilment  of the marriage,  but  to  safe passage through 
judgement.
Augustine tends to associate the eschatological wedding feast of the Gospels with the 
Day of Judgement. For example, commenting on the parable of the wedding feast in 
Mat 22:11 he says,
Keep then that ‘wedding garment,’ put it on, and so sit down in security, when He comes to 
inspect.  The Day of Judgement  will  come;  He is  now giving a long space, let  him who  
erstwhile was naked now be clothed.668
He does also refer to the future presentation of the Church by Christ to himself in the 
context  of  justifying  present  sufferings,  yet  even this  is  dependent  on the Church’s 
primal definition as his body:
His body, then, which has many members, and all performing different functions, He holds 
together in the bond of unity and love, which is its true health. Moreover He exercises it in 
the  present  time,  and  purges  it  with  many  wholesome  afflictions,  that  when  He  has 
transplanted it from this world to the eternal world, He may take it to Himself as His bride, 
without spot or wrinkle, or any such thing.669
Even when commenting on the passage in Revelation that speaks of the new Jerusalem 
as the heavenly bride (Rev 21:2) he makes no reference to her.670 There is no sense, for 
Augustine, that the bride has an eschatological reality or presence as bride.
For  both  Bulgakov  and  Congar,  however,  the  Church’s  description  as  ‘bride’  is 
primarily  an  eschatological  one,  and  eschatology  is  ontologically  definitive.  As 
Bulgakov claims:
668 Augustine, Sermons, XLV.7
669 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, I.16.15
670 Augustine, The City of God, XX.17
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[Eschatology]  is  the  last  word  of  Christian  ontology  and  can  be  expounded  only  in 
connection with the latter.671
And as Congar states:
The union that should be consummated in one spirit (or Spirit) is still imperfect. The Church 
must also experience an Easter event of death and resurrection in the power of the Spirit. Her  
wedding will only be perfect eschatologically.672
It  is clear,  therefore,  that both in the New Testament  and for Bulgakov and Congar 
eschatology plays  a  defining  role  in  ontological  reality.  This  ontology exists  in  the 
present through the Spirit, which is why the Spirit is the ‘guarantee of what is to come’ 
(2 Cor 1:11, 5:5; Eph 1:14).
5.1.1.4 Conclusion
These three weaknesses  in  Augustine’s  nuptial  theology (the union of two different 
natures;  the  non-hypostatic  character  of  the  marriage;  and  the  absence  of  a  robust 
eschatology) ultimately undermine the personalness of his soteriology. His primary, and 
ontological, category for describing the Church is ‘the body of Christ,’ a category that 
has almost completely obliterated the memory of the  ‘bride’ from the Church’s self-
understanding,  especially  in  recent  years  (e.g.  Common  Worship).673 This  is  seen 
particularly in the somatic theology of Congar’s  Mystery of the Church, but even in 
Balthasar’s nuptial theology, where the hierarchy defines the visible Church as Christ’s 
body because it extends from his Incarnation apneumatically. The bridal metaphor, as 
an ontological category, is relegated to the level of the individual.
One of the most significant difficulties to which this gives rise is that, by defining the 
Church metaphorically  as the organic body of Christ,  there is  no affirmation of the 
hypostatic persistence, either of each person, or of the Church as a whole. Instead, each 
person is defined in terms of their organic relation to each other, to the rest of the body, 
and also to Christ. As Bulgakov rightly insists, nature is not the same as hypostasis, and 
‘body’ is a category of nature, which,  while capable of being hypostasised,  is not a 
hypostasis. As a consequence the Church’s relationship with Christ is primarily defined 
in organic terms in which there is no ontological place for freedom, creativity,  even 
love, which are exclusively personal, and hence hypostatic, actions. For these to exist 
671 Bulgakov, Bride, p379
672 Congar, I Believe, Vol.2, p56
673 See Footnote 81
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the Church’s  relationship  with Christ,  and hence relations  with each other,  must be 
defined hypostatically.
A danger  arises  from an overbearing  emphasis  on non-hypostatic  relations  between 
Christ and the Church, and consequently within the Church. They will lead, on the one 
hand, to predominantly functional relations in the institution (seen for example in the 
hierarchical  source  of  unity  in  the  Roman  Catholic  Church,  and  in  the  growth  of 
‘management’ or  ‘business’ models and practices in the Church of England). On the 
other, they will give rise to a deep spiritual individualism as people struggle to express 
their own personhood (as validated, for example, by Congar, and seen in all forms of 
Protestantism, especially Evangelicalism). None of these developments is competent, or 
worthy, of bursting into the hypostatic joy and delight envisaged by Bulgakov’s cosmic 
vision of redemption and transcendence.
Bulgakov insists, on the other hand, on the role of the Spirit, particularly in settling on 
Mary,  as the agent of incarnation.  Accomplishing this activation and enabling is the 
self-emptying kenoticism of the Logos as he descends to partake of Mary’s humanity.
In this reading, the Logos becomes all but invisible to the world, in keeping with the 
way he is portrayed in the Gospels. His actions and activities, his wisdom and authority, 
are all the derivative on his obedient, spirit-anointed humanity, not his divinity, which 
in any case was only read back into his life post-Pentecost.
Understanding  the  Holy  Spirit  in  this  way,  as  the  incarnating  agent  leads  to  the 
recognition and affirmation that he is also the enhypostasising agent (Gen 2:7). Christ 
was enhypostasised in Mary by the Holy Spirit (Lk 1:35). If the role of the Holy Spirit  
in Creation and the Incarnation is enhypostasising, then so too, in the New Creation, his 
role is no different. The Spirit is the One who gives life (Rom 8:11). To live is to love (1 
Jn 4:7) and to be known by God (1 Cor 8:3), that is, to be a ‘person’. If the Church is  
born from the flesh of Christ, given life by the Spirit, called to love and is known by 
God, she must be something more than simply a ‘body’, even if ‘of Christ’.
 5.1.2 Baptism
Jesus’ baptism has afforded a multitude of interpretations over the centuries, from the 
descent of Christ into Jesus in the 2ndC.,674 to a simple empowering for mission in the 
674 E.g. Irenæus, Against Heresies, I.26.1
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20thC..675 But  the relation  of  the Spirit  to  Jesus,  and specifically  to  his  divinity  and 
humanity, is vital to understanding its relation with the Church.
To a certain extent the role given to the Spirit in the act of incarnation already defines 
the relationship between the Word and the Spirit  in the world and especially in the 
interpretation  of  Jesus’  baptism.  If  the  Spirit  is  understood  as  the  agent  of 
hypostasisation (Gen 2:7) this  will  translate  into a more dynamic role  for the Spirit 
working through Jesus’ humanity in his subsequent ministry. The greater the emphasis 
placed on Jesus’ divinity as the agent of his earthly ministry, the less space there is to 
acknowledge  the  work  of  the  Spirit.  The  result  tends  towards  a  church  that  is 
hierarchical  and institutionally heavy,  since the authenticity and continuity of Jesus’ 
ministry is located in his direct commissioning; and a Lord that is regal and remote. The 
Church is more naturally understood in relation to him as an extension of his body on 
the one hand, and there develops a pastoral need for a more intimate intermediary on the 
other – usually Mary.
Conversely, the more Jesus’ divinity is understood in kenotic terms, the more is given to 
the Spirit  as the hypostasising agent of Jesus’ ministry,  working through the  ‘sinful 
flesh’ of his humanity with his divinity remaining hidden, the greater the constitutional 
role of the Spirit in the Church. The result is a Lord who is much more approachable  
and a church, which, while instituted by him, has a more dynamic relationship with him. 
In this case the Church can be more easily seen as creatively responding to Christ in 
hypostatic love and freedom: as bride.
The role assigned to the Spirit in Jesus’ incarnation, baptism and subsequent ministry 
thus has a determinative effect on the ontology of the Church.
5.1.2.1 The Anointing Spirit
The  effect  can  be  discerned  in  Congar’s  ecclesiology,  throughout  which  there  is  a 
hierarchical  relationship  between  the  Word  and  the  Spirit  based  explicitly  on  the 
subordination of the Spirit to the Son, as expressed in his interpretation of the filioque. 
Congar’s understanding of the gift of the Spirit as  arrha, or earnest-money, however, 
opens  up  the  Pauline  theme  of  the  eschatological  nature  of  the  Church  and  the 
constitutive role of the Spirit in its existence.676 The place of baptism in the life of Jesus 
675 E.g. Menzies RP, Empowered for Witness, 1994
676 Congar, I believe, Vol.1, p16
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is, for him, one of the primary reasons for the Incarnation – so the gift of the life-giving 
Spirit might be given to humanity for its enlivening. However, the Spirit always remains 
at the level of ‘enlivening,’ never ‘constituting.’
The result is that the Church, for Congar, despite his denial, is primarily an extension of 
the Incarnation of Christ, instituted by him, embodied in the apostolate, but animated by 
the Spirit.677 For this reason the Church is identical with Christ, first as his visible, then 
as his Mystical body, understood almost exclusively in an organic sense.
This  is  seen  most  clearly  in Mystery,  where  the  Spirit’s  involvement  in  the  Son’s 
mission  (and  hence  in  the  Church)  derives  from  Christ’s  baptism,  rather  than  his 
Incarnation (in which the Spirit’s involvement was all but absent), reflecting the order 
of procession defined by the filioque. This led to a separation of Word and Spirit that 
followed through into the apostolate and the Spirit.
In I Believe, Congar argues for an involvement of the Spirit in the Incarnation as well as 
Christ’s baptism, but with distinctive roles in each. He would undoubtedly agree with 
Bulgakov  concerning  the  soteriological  necessity  of  the  Son’s  kenosis  in  the 
Incarnation.  Indeed, he gives a greatly enhanced and visible role to the Spirit in the 
Incarnation as the agent enabling the Word to take human flesh to himself. However, he 
sees a change in the role of the Spirit pre- and post-incarnation from one of external 
activity in Creation to internal activity within human souls.678
Here  is  a  fundamental  distinction  between  the  pneumatology  of  Congar  and  of 
Bulgakov.  For  Congar,  the  difference  for  the  Spirit’s  relationship  with  the  world 
between pre- and post-incarnation lies in its relation with the interiority of the individual 
soul. For Bulgakov, the difference lies in the glorification of creation since creation has 
now been united to divinity in the two natures of Christ: Creation is now the receptacle 
of the Spirit and has therefore returned to the path of deification.
The commencement of this latter or new mission of the Spirit,  for Congar, is Jesus’ 
baptism.  The Church therefore still  remains  a  function of  the Word as  the body of 
Christ,  in keeping with the  filioque, but interiorly animated by the Spirit,  who is its 
principle of unity, i.e. which joins the body together and to Christ.
677 A  point  precisely  made  by  Bulgakov  who  criticises  the  consequent  ‘one-sidedness’  or 
‘christocentrism’ of the Roman Catholic Church , e.g. Bulgakov, Comforter, p131-132
678 Congar, I believe, Vol.1, p16
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Right  at  the  heart  of  Congar’s  earlier  ecclesiology  is  a  fundamental  difficulty  in 
allowing the Church any existence over against Christ: the description of the Church as 
‘bride’  is  not  compatible  with  a  hierarchical  order  that  derives  its  esse from  the 
authority of Christ as its head. This naturally leads to the description of the Church in 
terms of his organic body.
If the filioque is understood in a mutually constitutive sense, rather than hierarchical, in 
keeping with the identity of the Spirit as the hypostatic bond of love between the Father  
and the Son, these difficulties tend to evaporate. In the act of spiration the Father, as it 
were,  lovingly  ‘breathes’  the  Word.  Thus  the  Word  and  the  Spirit  ontologically 
together, inseparably and yet unconfusedly, proceed from the Father, as a word is the 
content of, but different to, a breath. The Word thus constituted returns that hypostatic 
‘Breath’ in love. In doing so the Son constitutively names the Father as such. The Spirit  
can thus be understood as the love proceeding from both the Father and the Son, while 
yet  all  three persons are mutually,  and non-hierarchically,  constituted by each other, 
albeit with the Father as the ontological ajrchv.
In this case there would be no difficulty in understanding the Church as Christ’s ‘body’ 
in the nuptial sense, that is, hypostatically constituted by the Spirit, taken from Christ’s 
body.  The  historical  continuity  of  the  Church  hierarchy  becomes  of  secondary 
importance  since  it  is  the  Spirit  who  ‘takes  what  is  mine  and  declares  it  to  you’ 
(Jn16:14-15), not the hierarchy, as Bulgakov advocates. But, most importantly, God’s 
dealing with creation, its ontological salvation, redemption, and divinisation, becomes a 
free, hypostatic and personal response in love – an impossibility if the Church remains 
nothing more than an extension of Christ’s body.
Even in Congar’s later theology where the Spirit is given a constitutive place in the 
Incarnation, the anointing by the Spirit at Jesus’ baptism is for a new mission of interior 
sanctification, which he contrasts with the ‘old disposition’ of exterior activity.679 The 
anointing for us, the sending of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost, therefore remains at the 
level of interiority of an already constituted body.
Nevertheless, his ecclesial pneumatology in Vol.2 of  I Believe demonstrates a radical 
reversal in his ontology of the Church. Referring to Irenæus and Augustine he comes 
much closer to Bulgakov in prioritising the Spirit over the apostolate:
679 Congar, I believe, Vol.1, p16
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it is not because there is one body that there is only one Spirit – it is rather because there is 
only one Spirit of Christ that there is only one body, which is the Body of Christ.680
However, he does not build on this reversal, and it stands in opposition to his statements 
in Vol.1. Congar’s ecclesial ontology therefore ultimately fails to provide a place for the 
hypostatic response of creation to the love of God: the only personal response to God 
remains at the level of the individual.
However,  the  anointing  of  Jesus  by  the  Holy  Spirit  did  not  happen  at  some 
inconsequential location, but precisely at his baptism, the foreshadowing of his death. 
This  event,  accomplished  for  us,  marks  the  dividing  line  in  Jesus’  life.  Before  his 
baptism the Kingdom of Heaven had not come, afterwards it had: ‘Behold, the Spirit of 
the Lord is upon me...’ (Lk 4:18).
Anointing  by  the  Spirit  accompanies  baptism,  but  not  just  for  inner  sanctification. 
Baptism is passing through death and into the life of the Spirit. It therefore ushers the 
eschatological Kingdom of God into the world, through the death and resurrection of 
Christ,  in  the  life  of  the  one  being  baptised.  Anointing  by  the  Spirit,  then,  is  the 
bestowing of the eschatological life of the risen Christ – it is  the constitutive act. The 
presence of the Spirit in the Church must, therefore, be constitutive of life – that is the 
Spirit’s gift, in all its different guises.
5.1.2.2 The Constituting Spirit
For Bulgakov, Christ’s baptism is different again. In the Incarnation the Word and the 
Spirit descend hypostatically together, the one being incarnated, the other incarnating. 
They abide together  ‘without separation and without confusion.’ However the abiding 
of the Spirit is with the divine Logos, not with his human nature: this only receives the 
Spirit in stages, and finally, hypostatically at Jesus’ baptism, which  is  not adopted by 
the Father until then.681
Bulgakov  therefore  recognises  two  modes of  descent  of  the  Spirit.  First,  in  the 
Annunciation, it descends upon the humanity of Mary. Second in the baptism of Jesus it  
rests on him and he ‘becomes Christ, i.e. the Anointed by the Spirit, the Spirit-Bearer.’ 
This is Christ’s Pentecost. Prior to this time only the grace of God rested upon Jesus’ 
humanity  in  increasing  degree  (Luke  2:40,  52)  and  the  Spirit  ‘overshadows  Jesus’ 
human essence only.’ Whatever the merits of this extraordinary distinction between the 
680 Congar, I believe, Vol.2, p15
681 Bulgakov, Comforter, p249
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Spirit’s relation with the divinity and the humanity of Christ, the point remains similar 
to  Congar’s:  the  descent  of  the  Spirit  upon  Jesus  at  his  baptism  is  in  some  way 
ontologically definitive for the descent of the Spirit upon the rest of humanity.
The consequence of Jesus’ baptism is twofold. Firstly, it prepares and enables creation 
to bear the  ‘fiery tongue’ of the Spirit’s presence without being consumed by it. The 
initial descent of the Spirit at Jesus’ baptism, and subsequently at Pentecost, are kenotic 
descents,  in  which  the  Spirit,  who  is  the  glory  of  God,  remains  hidden,  only 
occasionally revealed at events such as the Transfiguration. The parousia of Christ is the 
end  of  the  hiddenness  of  both  the  Son  and  the  Spirit,  and  is  accompanied  by  the 
transfiguration of the world by the Spirit, who participated in the creation with the Son.
Here, we must remember all that we know about the action of the Third Hypostasis at the 
creation of the world.  The life-giving Spirit  clothes the Word, by whom all  things were  
made, in being and reality; and It thereby clothes the world in beauty: ‘Let it be’ and ‘it was 
good.’682
Referring to Jesus’ baptism and its fulfilment at the parousia he relates both of these to 
the Incarnation through the Spirit, in which the ground is prepared for the coming of the 
Spirit.
Both this reception and the sending down of the Holy Spirit into the world depend upon the 
Incarnation,  upon the profound,  radical  transformation of  the  world’s  natural  being:  The 
flesh of the world became the flesh of Christ in His humanity. Therefore, the world became 
capable  of  bearing  the  Pentecost,  of  receiving the fire  of  the  Holy Spirit  without  being 
consumed by it.683
Secondly, Jesus ‘accomplishes this [entire] ministry as one filled by the Spirit,’ which 
‘inevitably  culminates  in  Golgotha,  where  “through  the  eternal  Spirit,  [he]  offered 
himself without spot to God” (Heb 9:14).’684
Thus, in the days of His earthly ministry, Jesus is the Spirit-bearer; He has upon Himself the  
anointment  of  the  Holy  Spirit...He  Himself  grounds  His  ministry  and  His  working  of 
miracles on the fact that He has the Holy Spirit, as is attested by the Forerunner (Jn 1:33).685
This anointing by the Spirit is far more than an anointing for ministry, however. It is the 
presence of the Father with Jesus during his earthly ministry:
the Father who is in heaven abides with the Son (who has descended to earth) in the Holy 
Spirit...the Holy Spirit is this union of the Father and the Son.686
682 Bulgakov, Bride, pp418-419
683 Bulgakov, Bride, p419
684 Bulgakov, Comforter, p250
685 Bulgakov, Lamb, p308. See also pp324-325
686 Bulgakov, Comforter, p252
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The Spirit thus enables Jesus to do the Father’s will, which, in turn, leads his humanity 
towards deification through the Spirit:
By the Holy Spirit, Christ works miracles and preaches the good news, does the will of the 
Father, and is thereby Himself sanctified and deified in His humanity.687
Bulgakov’s interpretation of the role of the Spirit  here,  particularly in its  relation to 
Christ,  is very different  to that  of Congar.  In Bulgakov’s anointing there can be no 
action  ‘proceeding  direct  from  Christ’  that  is  not  mediated  by  the  Spirit,  since 
everything Jesus does,  he does through the Spirit.  His divinity has been kenotically 
diminished such that there is no discernible activity of the Word, as such, in his earthly 
ministry. This is the direct consequence of the procession of the Spirit through the Son 
(economically) or upon the Son (immanently), rather than from (in a subordinate sense) 
the Son.688
The consequence of all  this  is  that the activity of the Spirit,  precipitated at  Christ’s 
baptism, is as constitutive for the Church as it was for Jesus humanity:
With  the  coming  of  Christ  on  the  earth,  by  virtue  of  His  anointment  in  His  personal 
Pentecost  which is His baptism,  the anointment becomes accessible in Him to the entire 
world, although as yet in a particular and limited manifestation.689
Christ’s incarnation, the Father’s presence with him, his entire ministry, including his 
obedience to the Father, his resisting of temptations, his teaching, his acts of healing and 
miracles, his holy living, his passion, death and resurrection, even his institution of the 
Twelve, are all accomplished through the presence of the Spirit. This was not the case in 
the OT Church, where the divinely-instituted priesthood did constitute the church:
The Old Testament hierarchism effectively arises as God’s direct institution, as a law given  
on Sinai. The Old Testament Church is instituted through this hierarchism, whereas, in the 
New Testament,  hierarchism arises  in  the  Church  and through the  Church.  The  Roman 
conception of hierarchy as vicariate, adopted also by the Eastern Church, approaches in its 
‘juridicism’ the Old Testament order.690
The kenotic divinity of the Word was precisely that – kenotic. All Jesus did, he did 
through his humanity in the strength and power of the Spirit.  The only place in the 
Gospels where we can, perhaps, catch a glimpse of his divinity is in his forgiveness of 
sins. But even here the Spirit, as the presence of the Father (and after the resurrection 
also the Son), is the agent of forgiveness (Jn 20:22-23).
687 Bulgakov, Lamb, p309
688 Bulgakov, Lamb, pp307-308
689 Bulgakov, Comforter, p250
690 Bulgakov, Bride, p280
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So too for the Church, her establishment, her constitution, the presence of the Father 
and  the  Son,  the  benefits  of  Christ’s  life,  death  and  resurrection,  the  ministry  of 
sacraments, the forgiveness of sins, new life in God, her holy living, in short  all that 
was Christ’s are given to the Church through the Spirit (Jn 16:14-15) in her baptism, 
Pentecost. This, also, is the role given to the Spirit in the writing of St Paul.
The great weakness in Bulgakov’s theology of baptism is the absence of any notion of 
death. Instead he associates baptism exclusively with the Incarnation and being clothed 
with  Christ.691 But  the  entire  ritual  associated  with  cleansing  and  baptism in  First-
Century Judaism, in the New Testament, and in church liturgy describes baptism as a 
type of death, albeit a passing through death from one form of life to another. Jesus 
described his death as a baptism (Mk 10:38), and baptism as being born again from 
water and the Spirit in the context of his death (Jn 3:3,5,14).
This link between Christ’s death/resurrection and the Spirit in baptism forms the core of 
biblical soteriology. Jesus has taken our sin into his  ‘sinful flesh’ and died, cursed on 
the tree. The resurrection is the first fruits of the new creation that has grown out of the 
old seed that died. Our baptism is the same as Christ’s baptism – where we receive the 
Spirit  of life who will  take us through death.  The baptism of Christ  in the Spirit  is 
precisely our baptism into and through his death, to his resurrection.
Do you not know that all of us who have been baptised into Christ Jesus were baptised into  
his death? We were therefore buried with him through baptism into death in order that, just  
as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, we too might walk in 
newness of life.692
The Spirit is the one sent by the  Father to the Son at his baptism before his death to 
enable him to bring the life of new creation into the old creation (the kingdom of God) 
and thus carry him (Jesus) through death into the resurrection of new creation.  The 
Spirit  is then sent back by the  Son from the other side of the abyss of death at our 
baptism for exactly the same purpose. He (the Spirit) is the guarantee that as we, too, 
participate in Christ’s death, so we will be resurrected to new life. The giving of the 
Spirit,  which  is  conjoined  with  baptism (Jn  3:3,  Acts  10:47),  is  thus  the  arrha or 
earnest-money, the betrothal promise of the gift of new creation through death, which is 
then a sleep, to be presented to Christ as his bride (Rom 7:4). But the reality and horror 
of death, itself, is highlighted if we ask the question, what if the Spirit is not received?
691 See discussion in Section 3.4.7, above.
692 Rom 6:3-4
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However,  Bulgakov’s  view  of  death  as  ‘a  transcensus into  another  life,’693 which 
necessarily derives from the immortality of the spirit, appears not to give due weight to 
the full force or the horror of death that he describes as being ‘ontologically inseparable 
from human nature.’694 So for him baptism is about restoration, healing the weakness 
introduced by original sin through being clothed with Christ’s humanity.
 5.1.3 Birth of the Bride
Amen, amen. I say to you unless one is born again he cannot see the kingdom of God.
Amen, amen. I say to you unless one is born of water and the Spirit he cannot enter the 
kingdom of God.695
And you shall be called by a new name that the mouth of the Lord will give.
You shall be called My Delight Is In Her, and your land Married.696
The empirical relationship between ‘the bride of Yahweh’ and ‘the bride of Christ’ has 
been fraught with a confused and ambivalent history. This history has been justified at 
each  turn  by  the  Church  through  recourse  to  a  theology  of  blame,  castigation  and 
rejection  at  one  time,  and  of  inclusion  and  continuity  at  another.  How  are  we  to 
understand this relationship?
Chavasse interprets, in the book of Revelation, two distinct and separate brides, one of 
which has a future. The other, the harlot who rides the Beast (Rev 17), does not. This 
latter, he says, is the ‘tragic’ fallen bride of Yahweh:
On the one side there is ‘The Bride,’ who becomes the ‘Lamb’s Wife,’ the Spouse of Christ. 
On the other, there is that most tragic character in the drama, who is called  ‘Babylon the 
Great, the Mother of Harlots, and of the Abominations of the Earth.’...She is none other than 
the beautiful, pure, and holy Bride of Yahweh, the Jewish Church, but utterly and hopelessly 
fallen since ‘the kings of the earth committed fornication with her.’697
Without going into a detailed exegesis of the book of Revelation, this interpretation has 
great difficulties, with both internal and external evidence, and theologically. Firstly, in 
v18 of this same chapter John explains that  ‘the woman you saw is the great city that 
has dominion over the kings of the earth.’ This, patently, is not the ‘Jewish Church.’
Secondly, when John does refer to the ‘Bride of Yahweh’ he does so in an unmistakable 
way, and in very positive terms:
693 Bulgakov, Bride, p349
694 Bulgakov, Bride, p353
695 Jn 3:3, 5
696 Is 62:2, 4
697 Chavasse, Bride, p93
210
A woman clothed with the sun, with the moon under her feet, and on her head a crown of 
twelve stars...she gave birth to a male child, one who is to rule the nations...and the woman 
fled into the wilderness,  where she has a place prepared by God, in which she is  to be 
nourished for 1,260 days.698
This is the ‘Jewish Church,’ although she is better described, with Bulgakov, as the ‘Old 
Testament Church.’699 She is  attacked by the dragon ‘with seven heads and ten horns’ 
(12:3) such that she has to flee into the wilderness – the same beast upon which the 
harlot named Babylon rides (17:3). These are not the same characters.
Thirdly, as Chavasse notes, Hosea and Ezekiel only foresee one bride who is redeemed, 
not the two brides that he believes John has described. This, he acknowledges, ‘creates a 
difficulty’  since  the  ‘Christian  Church’  ‘is  the  “Faithful  Remnant”  of  the  Jewish 
Church,’ in which Jesus was both born and raised.700 However, he offers no solution as 
to the origin of the second (faithful) bride or of her relation to the first.
Fourthly, Paul’s attitude towards the ‘Jewish Church,’ which he describes in much the 
same terms in Romans 9:5, is completely incompatible with Chavasse’s interpretation. 
This means he must be restricting his theology of the relations between the OT and NT 
churches  exclusively  to  Revelation.  To be fair,  he is  exegeting  Revelation,  but  this 
incompatibility nevertheless represents a grave weakness.
Chavasse’s understanding of the relation of the two brides is not at all clear. From his 
exegesis  it  would appear to be one of parallel  discontinuity,  as it  were,  where both 
brides exist at the same time. The ‘Faithful Remnant’ bride, who gives birth to Christ, 
goes up to heaven to await his second coming, while the  ‘Bride of Yahweh’ ends up 
being destroyed by her false lovers (Rev 17:16).701
However,  in his  ‘very tentative  hypothesis’  on Paul’s  theology he suggests that  the 
Bride of Yahweh is now widowed since ‘the Law died (Rom 7:1-6)’ when Christ came. 
She is thus free to marry again. The implication in his thesis is this happens through 
Christ’s death and passion. He, as the Second Adam, falls asleep and the new Bride is 
built up (Eph 2:16; 4:24; Col 3:10) from his rib (Col 1:22, 27). She ‘may thus be said to 
have slept and woken (cf. Rom 13:11; Eph 2:1-6; 5:14) again with the new Adam.’702 It 
would appear that the new Bride is somehow the same as the Bride of Yahweh, who 
goes through a marriage/creation event.
698 Rev 12:1, 5, 6. cf Song of Songs 6:10
699 Bulgakov, Bride, p254
700 Chavasse, Bride, p95
701 Chavasse, Bride, p94
702 Chavasse, Bride, p79
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Quite what is going on in the second interpretation is difficult to gauge for he offers no 
further explanation, but the idea that the Bride of Yahweh was married to ‘the Law’ is 
an interesting reading of Romans 7. The principal difficulty with his interpretation is not 
that it refers to the Bride of Yahweh (in the context it refers to fallen humanity), but that 
he has the wrong person dying. It is not the Law that dies, but the bride who has died 
through the body of Christ dying.
The question still remains, however, of the nature of the relationship between the two 
‘brides’  of  the  Church.  The  presence  of  the  genealogies  in  the  Gospels  should  be 
sufficient to dispel notions of ‘opposition’ or ‘displacement’ of the Bride of Yahweh by 
the Bride of Christ: some other relationship must exist.
Chavasse found the central point of connection between the two in Paul’s letter to the 
Romans (Rom 7:1-6), but his interpretation did not make sense of the context. Paul’s 
line  of  argument  in  this  passage  is  notoriously  difficult  to  follow.703 However  it  is 
interpreted, though, it nevertheless contains a crucial concept concerning sin, the world, 
Christ’s death and the Church.
The crux of the logic revolves around the first part of v4, ‘Likewise, my brothers, you 
also have died to the law through the body of Christ, so that you may belong to another,  
to him who has been raised from the dead.’ This astonishing verse carries an enormous 
weight of theology, for in it the whole nuptial process is summed up. The illustration of 
marriage sets the scene (vv1-3). For a marriage to be dissolved one partner has to die. 
Regardless of who is what in the illustration, in v4 fallen humanity is joined with the 
body of Christ in his death so that it is released from its marriage to sin (Rom 6:20-23). 
But this fallen humanity,  which dies to sin through being joined to Christ’s body, is 
released from this marriage in order to be presented to Christ as his bride. This is the 
bride, humanity, being joined to Christ in his death, so being released from her previous 
marriage to sin, and being born again from the Spirit (v6) through Christ’s resurrection. 
The first marriage bore fruit for death (v5); the second marriage is to bear fruit for God 
(v4).
This understanding sheds light on much else of Paul’s description of our relationship 
with  Christ  and  the  way  in  which  his  death  and  resurrection  relate  to  Jesus’  self-
description as bridegroom. It also opens up a way for understanding the relationship 
between the Bride of Yahweh and the Bride of Christ – that in Christ, because he is 
703 So, e.g., Best, Body, p52
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born and raised a Jew, the Bride of Yahweh joined to him dies and is born again as his 
bride, thus receiving a new name (Is 62:2, 4). This is the point of baptism. They are one 
and  the  same,  just  as  Christ  is  one  and  the  same  before  his  death  and  after  his 
resurrection. But the Bride of Yahweh, which was always intended to be a blessing (i.e. 
the first-fruits) for all nations, is, in Christ’s body, extended to include the world. This is 
why Paul, with reference to Israel, can talk about the first-fruits of the dough and the 
root of the olive tree being holy,  both of which refer to Christ (cf. Rev 22:16), into 
whom all else (i.e. the world, Rom 11:15) is joined or grafted (Rom 11:16ff).
Christ is both the first-fruits and the one through whose death and resurrection the world 
has  been reconciled  to  God (e.g.  2  Cor 5:19).  Nevertheless,  it  is  clear  from Paul’s 
discussion, for example in Rom 11, that the process of appropriating this reconciliation, 
for both Jews and Gentiles, and thus for all creation (2 Cor 5:17),704 is ongoing.
In Edenic nuptial language this means that the bride, as hypostasised, reconciled world, 
is still in the process of being born again (Rom 8:22),705 not in the sense of multiple 
births, but in the sense of being built up, of becoming, from the side of Christ, from 
which flowed the water (baptism) and the blood (eucharist).706 This is the purpose of the 
sacraments of baptism (cleansing from sin through death and rebirth), and Eucharist (the 
building  of  the  bride  from the  Adamic  body and  blood)  accomplished  through  the 
zephyr of the Spirit.
Thus  Augustine’s  interpretation  of  the  cross,  seeing  it  prefigured  in  the  creation  of 
Adam and Eve, makes sense of Paul’s nuptial theology of baptism and Christ’s death:
For at the beginning of the human race the woman was made of a rib taken from the side of 
the man while he slept; for it seemed fit that even then Christ and His Church should be fore-
shadowed in this event. For that sleep of the man was the death of Christ, whose side, as He 
hung lifeless upon the cross, was pierced with a spear, and there flowed from it blood and 
water,  and these we know to be the sacraments  by which the Church is  ‘built  up.’  For 
Scripture used this very word, not saying ‘He formed’ or ‘framed,’ but  ‘built her up into a 
woman;’ whence also the apostle speaks of the edification of the body of Christ, which is the 
Church. The woman, therefore, is a creature of God even as the man; but by her creation 
from man unity is commended; and the manner of her creation prefigured, as has been said,  
Christ and the Church.707
704 lit. ‘so if anyone is in Christ: new creation – the old has passed; behold, the new has come!’
705 Strictly,  Paul’s view here is that Creation is the mother, groaning as she gives birth to the new 
creation through the Spirit. Furthermore, that we are part of that groaning creation giving birth,  
having the first-fruits of the Spirit, which will be the redemption of our bodies (Rom 8:23), all  
through Christ’s body; another example of his ‘now and not yet’ eschatological perspective.
706 Augustine, Tractates on John, CXX.2
707 Augustine, The City of God, XXII.17
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Augustine  also  sees  in  the  blood  and  the  water  the  presence  of  the  two  revealing 
hypostases of the Father, acting to build the bride. The blood signifies the Son who was 
made incarnate, and through whom we receive the remission of sins; the water signifies 
the Spirit, in whom we are given the water of life.708
Thus the transformation of the Bride of Yahweh into the Bride of Christ is the work of 
both the Son and the Spirit. The re-birth of the bride is prefigured in the ‘birth’ of Eve. 
But where, then, is the Bride of Yahweh prefigured in the Genesis narrative? In one 
sense she is not. But that is because the Genesis story is a story of creation, not re-
creation, of the first creation that prefigures the new. Jesus, although the second Adam, 
is not made like the first Adam, directly from the soil and without (human) parents: he 
was born of a virgin and the Holy Spirit. However, having died the resurrection of Jesus 
is like the birth of Adam. For Adam was born of the earth and the spirit. Likewise, the 
New Adam is born from the womb of the earth (the garden tomb, Rom 8:22) by the 
Spirit (Rom 8:11). Thus the Genesis story is not a blueprint, but a true myth, one that 
opens up and reveals the cosmic significance of Jesus’ death and resurrection; like the 
stories of Noah and Jonah, that also prefigure rebirth through the waters of death, and to 
which Jesus alludes in his conversation with Nicodemus (and castigates him for not 
recognising).
In another sense, though, the Bride of Yahweh is already embodied in Jesus, in the same 
way that Eve was embodied in Adam before being built from his side. The genealogies 
in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke make the point  in extremis that not only is the 
Bride of Yahweh specifically included in his humanity (Matthew), but the whole bride 
of creation (Luke).
What of the hypostasis of the Bride of Yahweh, if we are to conceive of such? How are 
we to understand her in relation to Jesus’ life, death and resurrection? What happens to 
her hypostasis in and through his  ‘event?’ This question is difficult to answer, but no 
more or less difficult than understanding in what way  all hypostases are included in 
him. The all-hypostasis of the bride is a broken and disrupted hypostasis, resulting from 
the disintegration of the perichoretic communion of hypostases that give rise to her. Yet 
despite this, God still calls to her, calls her to  be, still makes promises to her, in the 
Psalms and the Prophets, and most profoundly in the Song of Songs.
708 Augustine, Contra Maximinum, Lib. II.C.22.3 in Homilies on 1 John, X
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It  is exactly this, the image of God in humanity,  which Christ came to restore.  The 
genealogies, precisely as names, testify to the inclusion of all hypostases in Jesus. So to 
the extent, and in the same way, that all hypostases are included in Jesus, even though 
they are  other than him, the all-hypostasis of the bride is included in him. Thus, the 
bride, too, must be re-born from water and the spirit, that she may be one, even as the 
Father and the Son are one.
 5.1.4 Summary
Incarnation –  the  Holy  Spirit  is  the  agent  of  incarnation  and  hypostasisation.  It 
establishes personhood in bringing the Son to birth in Creation.
Baptism – the Holy Spirit is the one that brings life out of death, carries life through 
death,  enabling  participation  in  the  Son’s  humanity  and  constituting  new life:  new 
creation.
Bride – Jesus, as a Jew, takes the flesh of the bride of Yahweh to the cross. As the 
Second  Adam  he  dies  and  rises.  The  Second  Eve  is  drawn  from  his  side  in  the 
sacraments.
This is the work of the Holy Spirit – to hypostasise and give life.
 5.2 The Ontology of the Bride
So God created man in his own image,
in the image of God he created him;
male and female he created them.709
‘This at last is bone of my bones
and flesh of my flesh;
she shall be called Woman,
because she was taken out of Man.’
Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother and hold fast to his wife, and they shall 
become one flesh.710
Holy Father, keep them in your name, which you have given me, that they may be one, even 
as we are one.711
Whatever  else  we say about  the  ontology of  the  Church,  the  language  of  oneness, 
which, like the image of the bride, runs from the opening pages of the Bible to the 
closing, is always a way of speaking about the communion of persons, names, about 
709 Gen 1:27
710 Gen 2:23-24
711 Jn 17:11
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love, which is the essence of God, and out of which and for which he creates. For this, 
organic  and somatic  metaphors  are  wholly inadequate  bearers  of  ontology,  however 
useful they might be for explaining praxis. Worse, when understood autonomously or 
independently they are deceptive and destructive for they deny an ontological place for 
freedom, love,  response,  and joy.  It  is  only in the context  of an ontologically  prior 
metaphor of hypostatic relations that the organic or somatic metaphor can provide life.
One of the attractions of Bulgakov’s approach to ontology is that, despite, or perhaps 
because of, the influence of German Idealism and particularly Russian sophiology, it 
makes  sense  of  much  of  the  biblical  narrative.712 The  result  swells  into  the  cosmic 
response of an orchestrated symphony of fathomless harmonies that re-sound the glory 
of God in a free and temporal creation founded on the eternal kenotic love of God, 
beckoned into the communion of the Holy Trinity as the ‘Fourth’ hypostasis. But can it 
be said there is a Fourth?
Much  depends  on  the  definition  employed  for  a  ‘person’.  For  Congar,  following 
Balthasar, it is to be ‘a spiritual centre of consciousness of free and rational acts.’ While 
this shares something of Bulgakov’s ‘hypostasis’  it  is,  nevertheless,  a Cartesian-type 
definition with its emphasis on rationality.
For Bulgakov a ‘person’, or spirit, is a hypostasis with its nature. This is true for the  
persons of the Godhead as it is for created persons. Thus God is three hypostases with 
one nature. This nature is love; it is God’s essence. This ousia of God, which is divine 
love, is the Divine Sophia. It is God’s nature hypostasised by the tri-hypostatic godhead 
of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Hypostasis is the personal centre of self-consciousness 
and gives to the nature its personhood.
So if  the  Church is  to  be,  in  some sense,  a  ‘person’  in  Bulgakov’s  terms,  it  must  
comprise both a ‘nature’ and a ‘hypostasis’.
 5.2.1 Nature
The account of creation in Genesis 2 describes humanity as bipartite – soil and spirit, 
humus and breath (Gen 2:7). Bulgakov understands the soil to refer to humanity in its 
created aspect; that is, its physical body, its psycho-corporeal characteristics, its entire 
‘nature:’
712 Bulgakov, Bride, p426. Although this is weakened by several important aspects of his theology, in 
particular his definition of Jesus’ ‘flesh,’ his gendered soteriology which requires the inclusion of 
Mary,  and his theology of death which fails to take seriously the NT emphasis with its related 
soteriological events, the cross and the sacraments of baptism and Eucharist.
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man by his composition is not only spiritual but also psycho-corporeal or natural. In him 
there lives not only his spirit, but also his nature; and the latter also lives by its own life.713
The  reference  to  man’s  nature  living  ‘by  its  own  life’  draws  from  the  ancient 
understanding that humans are animated by a soul, yuchv, as well as a spirit. The soul is 
not hypostatic, not personal, nor immortal, unlike the spirit that is. If this were not the 
case  ‘nature’  would  be  an  inanimate  construct.  However,  ‘nature’  is  not  static  and 
lifeless for  ‘God did not create death.’714 This phrase is one of Bulgakov’s favourite 
quotations,  used  at  least  seven  times  in  The  Bride.  The  same  principle  extends 
throughout all creation. Thus creation has its own animating principle by which life is 
lived  and  replicated  throughout  the  plant  and  animal  dominions.  But  not  only  the 
obvious forms of life;  every aspect of creation,  Bulgakov maintains,  even inanimate 
creation, does not contain anything ‘not alive’ for ‘God did not create death.’ There are 
only degrees of life. This ‘life’ that drives the existence of creation he calls ‘the world 
soul.’
The ‘world soul’ is not hypostatic life, that is, not personal life. It is the pulsating exuberance 
that manifests in a billion different life forms, continually forming, shifting and changing,  
dying  and being  reborn.  The  world  itself  is  in  the  process  of  becoming,  of  growing in 
complexity (contrary to the laws of the physical universe), following the entelechy of its own 
inner reality, the creaturely Sophia.
This capacity of even inanimate creation that carries the potential to participate in life 
holds the key to understanding the notion that all creation is the periphery of man’s 
body. This is the point of the Genesis creation narrative, confirmed in Genesis 3:19, ‘for 
you are dust and to dust you shall return,’ and the fact that it is the earth that bears the 
curse of humanity’s fall (Gen 3:17).
The intimate connection between the earth and humanity means that humanity shares in 
the fabric of the whole of creation,  and reciprocally,  creation shares in the being of 
humanity. Bulgakov’s point is not that this is an interpenetration of species, as it were, 
that  humanity and the rest  of creation mutually  co-inhere in each other’s existence. 
Rather, that humanity was created to be the hypostatic presence of creation before God.
This  universality  must  necessarily  extend  from  man  and  for man.  Man  does  not  exist 
separately from the universe. On the contrary, he is its heart and centre, a ‘microcosm,’ and 
human nature includes all of creaturely nature.715
713 Bulgakov, Lamb, p92
714 From the Apocryphal book, Wisdom of Solomon 1:13
715 Bulgakov, Bride, p267
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Thus humanity is a microcosm of the whole universe – animated stardust: man’s body 
cannot be defined in terms of molecular or physical boundaries. What is true physically,  
or atomically, holds for all  ‘creaturely nature.’ This is the realm of creaturely Sophia, 
including the ‘world soul,’ which extends as the living principle, including the realm of 
psychology,716 throughout all life, and thus all matter, since ‘God did not create death.’
It  follows  from  this  that  in  some  sense  the  whole  universe  must  be  involved  in 
humanity’s  fall,  and  is  affected  by  it.  Bulgakov’s  definition  of  sin  refers  to  the 
disruption of the correct balance or relationship between nature and spirit. In the case of 
original sin, spirit, through disobedience to God, becomes subject to nature rather than 
its lord. Nature becomes a blind leader, following its own entelechy, which, without the 
guidance of the spirit, leads no longer towards deification.717
Since  God’s  hypostatic  communion  with  creation  is  through  spirit,  which  resides 
exclusively  in  humanity,  this  disruption  necessarily  affects  the  whole  of  creation’s 
relationship with its creator. The corollary is that the universe needs restoring if it is 
ever to fulfil its potential of deification, or sophianisation, which restoration can only be 
accomplished  through  its  hypostatic,  that  is,  personal,  existence.  The  universe, 
therefore, in all its fullness, is the object of the Incarnation.
The  humanity  taken  by  the  Word  from  Mary  thus  includes  the  extension  of  that 
humanity to its very limits – an extension that, as Bulgakov states, is limited only by the 
power of the Word and the Spirit,  the Incarnation and Pentecost. The assumption of 
humanity  by  the  Word  reaches  to  the  limits  of  his  creation.  Likewise,  the  Spirit’s 
descent at Pentecost is limited to that which was incarnated. These limits comprise the 
limits  of the Church. Thus the Church, as the eschatologically restored work of the 
Word and the Spirit, has the same ontological limits as the Incarnation and Pentecost.
The domain of the power of Divine-humanity coincides with the limits of the Church. More 
correctly, these limits do not exist at all, for the whole universe belongs to the Church. The  
universe is the periphery, the cosmic face of the Church.718
The  nature of the Church, therefore, is the creaturely Sophia – the universe in all its 
createdness, to which baptism and the Eucharist are the attestation. However, in saying 
this, is there the danger of the discussion becoming meaningless? As Bulgakov puts it:
716 Bulgakov, Bride, p223
717 Bulgakov, Bride, p173
718 Bulgakov, Bride, p267
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But, in such a definition of the catholicity of the Church, all dissolves in limitlessness. It  
gives too much, and therefore too little.719
He goes on delimit the Church through a discussion of the institutional structures of the 
Church  as  ‘sacramental  and  hierarchical  organisation,’  limits  that  ‘distinguish  the 
Church (and the churches) as an institution of grace from the rest of the world that lies 
outside the Church, ‘in darkness and in the shadow of death’ (Ps. 107:10).’720
Is  such  a  distinction  warranted?  Does  the  cosmic  limit  of  the  Church  dissolve  its 
existence into a meaningless description? Must we be forced so quickly into defining 
institutional boundaries that speak of an inside of light and an  ‘outside in darkness?’ 
Perhaps one of  the  dubious  benefits  of  being a  national  church  means  that,  for  the 
Church of England, within the constraints of its nationalism, these boundaries do not 
exist, unless they are erected by others who wish to exclude themselves.
The early Second Century Letter to Diognetus is helpful here because it works with 
similar  categories  to  those  of  Bulgakov,  but  reflects  more  of  Jesus’  focus,  not  on 
boundaries, but on permeating the world, with his parables of salt and light.721
Notwithstanding the Platonic idea of  ‘imprisonment of the soul,’ the Epistle is quite 
extraordinary  in  its  soteriology  of  the  world:  ‘Christians  are...the  preservers  of  the 
world.’ Although it uses similar language to Bulgakov, its content is very different. In 
the Epistle ‘soul,’ in referring to Christians, relates to restored hypostases. The ‘world’ 
refers  to  everything  else  –  unrestored  hypostases  and  the  rest  of  creation.  The 
‘boundaries’ between Church and world here, however, serve, not to delineate the limits 
of light and darkness, but rather to describe a life-giving relationship that reflects John 
1:4-5:
In him was life, and the life was the light of men. The light shines in the darkness, and the  
darkness has not overcome it.
Thus,  far  from  ‘giving  too  much’  by  describing  the  cosmic  limits  of  the  Church’s 
nature, it rather sets an agenda for bringing life, a task that has no limits, to which there 
is no  ‘outside.’ There is no place in the cosmos from which the Spirit is absent (Ps 
139:7-12), and as Irenæus says,
For where the Church is, there is the Spirit of God; and where the Spirit of God is, there is  
the Church.722
719 Bulgakov, Bride, p268
720 Bulgakov, Bride, p268
721 Epistle to Diognetus, 6
722 Irenæus, Against Heresies., III.XXIV.1
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It is apparent from all this that the ‘nature’ adopted by Jesus must be the very nature of 
which the universe is constituted, and not some other pre-existent or unique nature. That 
is, it must be nature in all its fallenness, human ‘flesh’ in all its sinfulness. Bulgakov’s 
reluctance to admit the reality of the temptations for Jesus (i.e. they weren’t tempting), 
and his denial that certain types of temptation could affect him (such as sexual desires), 
mean  that  a  different nature  was  adopted  by  Jesus  than  the  one  with  which  fallen 
humanity,  and  the  cursed  universe,  struggles.  And  if  that  is  so,  then  ‘what  is  not 
assumed is not saved.’
To say such things while insisting on Jesus’ sinlessness and divinity requires careful 
definition of terms such as  ‘sinful nature’ and ‘original sin.’ Bulgakov, himself, is far 
from clear  in  his  own terminology,  or  consistent  with his  definitions,  which  makes 
discussion difficult. However, his high Mariology, and its derivative ‘holy’ flesh, seems 
to interfere unduly with his keen insights into the kenoticism of the Incarnation itself. 
Unfortunately space precludes such a discussion here other than to make the assertion 
that the flesh adopted by Jesus was nothing less than the full, fallen, sinful flesh with 
which we all struggle, and that the temptations he faced were real, which must mean he 
struggled with them. Such a struggle implies the possibility of failure, as we see in the 
struggle in Gethsemane. Yet these were overcome through obedience in the strength of 
the Holy Spirit. It is this presence of the Spirit, upon which Paul’s theology so heavily 
relies, which contains the key.
This, then, is the ‘nature’ that is baptised into Christ’s death and resurrection. This is the 
‘nature’ of the Church, of the Bride, that is born again from the Holy Spirit and water, 
built from the side of Christ, in the new creation.
 5.2.2 Hypostasis
The hypostasis  is  the  personal  centre  of  a  personal  being.  But  what  comprises  this 
‘personalness’? What makes someone a ‘person’?
5.2.2.1 Personhood
‘Who is the Church?’
Balthasar’s question presupposes the possibility that the Church might, in some sense, 
be a person, a hypostasis. Balthasar, Congar and Bulgakov all share the German Idealist 
axiom  of  ‘self-consciousness’  as  an  essential  aspect  of  ‘spirit’  or  ‘person’.  The 
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enormous difficulty with this definition is that only the subject, themselves, can know if 
they are self-conscious. Do certain animals, for example, display self-consciousness and 
even act in ‘rational’ ways? Who is to decide whether a chimpanzee, then, is a person? 
As  biological  and  neuroscientific  knowledge  increases,  non-theological  experience-
based definitions become less and less satisfactory.
The Incarnation defines human being in the image of God. It also reveals God as triune.  
Our definition of a ‘person’ must, therefore, take Jesus Christ as its starting point.
Among  several  possibilities,  the  definition  central  to  Jesus’  testimony  is  a  being’s 
relation to the verb ‘love’, either as subject or object. ‘Love the Lord your God...Love 
your neighbour...’. More fundamentally, it means being the object of God’s hypostatic 
love since ‘God is love,’ (1 Jn 4:8): it means to be ‘named’ by him. This ‘naming’ by 
God as a ‘Thou’, being loved by him, is what constitutes ontological personhood.723
It is difficult to underestimate the importance of the name in the biblical narrative. From 
the opening passages of Genesis, where Adam (not God) ‘names’ the animals, to the 
angelic forenaming of Jesus and John the Baptist, to the closing passages of Revelation 
where the Rider on the White Horse bears the name ‘King of kings and Lord of lords’,  
names have acted,  not  just  as  signifiers  of  relationality,  but  as bearers  of ontology. 
Christ has been exalted and ‘given the name that is above every name, that at the name 
of Jesus every knee shall bow’ (Phil 2:9-10).
And you shall be called by a new name that the mouth of the Lord will give.
You shall be called My Delight Is In Her, and your land Married.724
The prophetic testimony of Isaiah looks forward to a time when the bride is given a new 
name by God, that is,  called into new life.  For the Church to be so named by God 
means, therefore, that she must have a real existence, not merely a collective, nor even a 
metaphorical unity, but a being proper to herself.
To be a ‘person’ in the ontological sense, she must not only be named by God, but be 
the object of his love. As Bulgakov states,
This revelation testifies that the Church is, that being is proper to her; as  ens realissimum, 
she is the object of divine love.725
The revelation to which he refers is the Song of Songs, in which the Church is called the 
Beloved of the Lover, and is both a loving Subject and the Object of God’s love, or 
723 Which is why people are ‘named,’ given Christian Names, at baptism.
724 Is 62:2, 4
725 Bulgakov, Bride, p265
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more specifically, the Son’s love. That the Lover is, and has been for virtually all the 
Church’s existence, identified as the Second Person of the Trinity means that at least 
one of the parties in the song has a concrete hypostatic existence. That the song is a 
song of love, of which it is said that ‘God is love,’ therefore also means that God is also 
present in the song as  act. For this reason Bulgakov says that the Holy Spirit is the 
invisible presence throughout the song.
So  we  have  a  song  in  which  both  the  subject  and  the  verb  are  real  and  concrete 
hypostases.  The song is  thus  metaphorical  in  the  ontological  sense,  referring  to  the 
Second and Third Hypostases of the Trinity. We are not permitted, therefore, to say that 
the song is pure allegory. The object of the song must also be ontologically hypostatic, 
must be competent to partake in this dance as a hypostasis, delighting in, receiving and 
giving love. For, unless the song is to be individualised, it is otherwise devoid of any 
concrete meaning: love cannot be an allegory of love.
This marvellous and mysterious love clearly presupposes not a psychologism, not an affect  
or an emotion, but an ontology: the reality of the inter-relationship of spiritual realities.726
This brings us to the question of participation. If we are to consider the Church as a 
‘person’, a hypostasis, what is her relation to us as ‘persons’? Are we many individual 
brides,  as Congar and Balthasar maintain,  or do we lose our own personhood being 
swallowed up in some greater entity? Is this person ‘Church’ some tertium quid that is 
other  than  us,  other  than  the  humanity  of  the  Incarnated  Son?  Essentially  these 
questions revolve around the nature of personal identity and freedom.
5.2.2.2 Participation
The  question  of  individualisation,  so  abhorrent  both  to  Zizioulas  and  to  Bulgakov, 
relates directly to the nature of hypostatic existence. Again, however, language is an 
issue.  For  Zizioulas  the  word  ‘individual’  specifically  means  a  disintegrated  and 
unconnected form of hypostatic being. Bulgakov sometimes also uses it to refer to the 
particularity  of  natural  (non-hypostatic)  being,  that  which distinguishes  one form of 
living being from another in a sophiological sense (although it can also be used both 
positively  and negatively  in  a  hypostatic  sense).  The direct  opposite  of  ‘individual’ 
(negative) is ‘person’ or ‘hypostasis’ (positive).
726 Bulgakov, Bride, p265
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In The Lamb Bulgakov states ‘Persons must be transparent for one another: all in all and 
everyone in all. That is the ontology of personality.’727 Here he sets out the nature of the 
fall and thus sets the agenda for the primary work of the Incarnation. It is a theme that  
he picks up in  The Bride where he identifies  what  Zizioulas  would describe  as  the 
‘catholicity’ of personhood as the image of the tri-hypostatic Triune God:
The image of God [is]  the image of sacrificial  and self-renouncing trihypostatic love, in 
which each of the hypostases acquires its own personal center not in itself but outside of 
itself, in other hypostases.728
This image is obscured in the fall. In consequence, hypostases seek their centres inside 
themselves.729 This ‘individuality’ is, in The Bride, precisely what is to be overcome by 
humanity on its journey to deification. The process was begun in Eden, but interrupted 
in the fall.
To explain how everyone shares personally in Adam’s guilt, Bulgakov postulates Adam 
as  an integral  hypostasis  in  which  everyone  participates,  while  still  recognising  the 
uniqueness of each person. Trying to make sense of Paul’s theology (and the Church’s 
doctrine) of original sin in Romans 5, he describes each human hypostasis as belonging, 
not to a series of disconnected occurrences, but to a genus that shares one nature, and 
for whom the world is one. In language reminiscent of Zizioulas, and criticised by Behr, 
he says this genus bears the hypostatic image of the Trinity, and thus corresponds to the 
‘trihypostatizedness [which] is  the perfect manifestation of the divine person, as the 
Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.’ But for Bulgakov, unless this correspondence 
exists, Christ could not have born the sins of every person that has been or will be.730
In the original creation, Bulgakov maintains, this ‘multi-unity’ was not ‘given’ but was 
rather a task. He relates John 17:21-22, ‘That they may all be one, just as you, Father, 
are in me, and I in you...that they may be one, even as we are one,’ as the task of this 
original creation. Thus, the Incarnation, itself, is about a restoration of process, not state. 
Here, then, are also the seeds of eschatology, wherein the entelechy finds its purpose 
and fulfilment, that fulfilment being the image of God in humanity, that is, where each 
hypostasis finds itself kenotically in ‘the other.’ The end envisaged by the process is the 
hypostatic  reflection of the Trinitarian  God in the creaturely Sophia – a multi-unity 
hypostasis in which the fullness of God’s pleroma permeates and saturates creation in 
its otherness, without consuming it:
727 Bulgakov, Lamb, p204
728 Bulgakov, Bride, p156
729 Bulgakov, Bride, p92
730 Bulgakov, Bride, pp185-186
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This individual, qualified ray, which hitherto has shined only in its own colour, now begins 
to shine with the light of the pleroma and participates in the wholeness in which God is all in 
all.731
This process is restored in Jesus, through his death and resurrection. Although Bulgakov 
postulates the need for a single multi-hypostatic  nature,  for Paul it is simply by the 
Spirit in baptism that we are joined to Christ in his death and resurrection (Rom 6:5, 1 
Cor 12:13). Through baptism in Christ we  have died to sin, so that we  will be raised 
with  him (Rom 6:5),  again,  through the  Spirit  (Rom 8:11).  In  between  times,  it  is 
through the one Spirit that we partake of the one body (1 Cor 12:13), the body that is 
being formed of Christ and will be united to Christ as his bride (Rom 7:4). The Spirit is 
the one through whom God’s love is poured into our hearts (Rom 5:5). It is therefore 
through the Spirit that the process of kenotic hypostasisation, learning to love in the 
image of God, that is, in the image of the Christ, proceeds.
Congar echoes this idea in Vol.2 of  I Believe where he understands the Spirit as the 
catholicising agent:
God dwells in us and we dwell in him. There is no confusion of persons. This is the way in  
which there is a realisation of the mutual interiority of the whole in each which constitutes 
the catholic sense: kath’ holou, being of a piece with the whole. The Spirit enables all men to 
be one and unity to be a multitude.732
Through the Spirit-imbued Gospel sacraments of baptism and Eucharist the bride grows 
and  is  built,  coalesces,  as  it  were,  into  a  single  multi-hypostasis,  who  is  already 
eschatologically named. This happens as each free hypostatic centre, or person, journeys 
towards life ‘in the Spirit:’ to love, to serve and so become truly free,733 thus bringing 
creation,  through  their  bodies  and  the  Eucharist  and  extensively  beyond,  into  the 
communion of God. In the Liturgy we learn to sing and speak ‘with one voice,’ and our 
hypostases  become  transparent  as  we  sing  the  ‘I’  of  the  Magnificat  or  the  Nunc 
Dimittis.
Deification thus means that, through the process of kenotic love, undertaken in the Son 
and through the Spirit, as the single hypostatic voice of the Church responds in freedom 
and joy to the invitation for the whole of creation to join the communion of God, so the 
pleroma of God will permeate the universe, revealing the new creation.
731 Bulgakov, Bride, p92
732 Congar, I Believe, Vol.2, pp17-18
733 Cf. ‘O God...whose service is perfect freedom,’ Second Collect, Morning Prayer, Book of Common 
Prayer, Church of England
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The reading of the Song of Songs (and indeed the Psalms), then, can be undertaken with 
either a ‘bad’ individuality or as the eschatological all-hypostatic ‘I.’ And although for 
Congar the Song can only be sung ontologically as an ‘I’ at the level of the individual, 
for Zizioulas and Bulgakov this would be anathema. ‘Would be’ because it is not certain 
how Zizioulas would sing it at all, for who would be the subject or the object?
5.2.2.3 Identity
So we return to the question, who is ‘The Church?’
For Congar the answer remains unclear. Sometimes it is the ‘I’ of Christ, sometimes the 
‘I’ of the Spirit. However, he is certain it is not another  ‘I.’ The great difficulty with 
these answers lies in Christ’s own identity. Who is Jesus? The answer to this question 
has long been given:
His human hypostasis, that of Jesus, ‘the son of Joseph and Mary,’ ‘the son of a carpenter,’ 
having an earthly parentage, is the hypostasis of the Logos.734
If the hypostasis of Jesus is the Logos of God, the Second Person of the Trinity, the Son 
of the Father, those who insist he is also the ‘I’ of the Church face an insurmountable 
ontological difficulty. He cannot also be Creation’s free and loving response to his own 
invitation. To do so would be an ontological denial of God’s own being as expressed in 
creating Creation. That God’s kenotic love freely results in the ecstatic movement that 
creates the  ‘Other’ as free to love, necessarily means that the freedom to respond to 
God’s love is the ontological foundation of creation’s existence. The invitation of God 
to Creation, to be drawn into deification, cannot be answered by God, himself. It can 
only be answered by the  Other,  by that  which  is  created  by the  Second and Third 
Hypostases in their image, that is, by the ‘fourth’ hypostasis.
To the question, then, who is  ‘The Church?’ the answer can only be  ‘The  “Yes” of 
Creation.’ And this Answer must be both hypostatic and other than the Logos. This is 
the  inescapable  consequence  of  the  identification  of  the  hypostasis  of  Jesus  as  the 
Logos. Furthermore, it means that describing the Church ontologically as the Body of 
Christ, without its corresponding nuptial qualifier, is both a denial of the ontological 
freedom of creation, and thus of God’s love (since the hypostasis of the Church is then 
the Logos). It is therefore a denial that the fundamental relation between God (through 
Christ and the Spirit) and his Creation is personal and hypostatic.
734 Bulgakov, Lamb, p233
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Such a claim, far from being a denial, is an affirmation of the axiomatic centrality of the 
New Testament’s,  and the Church’s,  teaching about  Christ.  It  fully affirms both his 
humanity and his divinity, his soteriological centrality, the dependence of Creation upon 
his redemptive work, as both source and telos of new creation, as the Alpha and Omega, 
as the new Adam who restores that which was lost by the first Adam. The Genesis story 
of the first Adam, and his Eve, in their creation as well as their fall, forms the narrative 
soil out of which the story of the second Adam, and his Eve, grows (cf. 2 Cor 11:2-3).735
Zizioulas’  concern  that,  according  to  McPartlan,  to  consider  the  Church  as  bride 
necessarily means to individualise Christ, seems to forget an important principle: the 
hypostasis  of  Jesus  is  the  Logos.  Is  it  possible  to  individualise  Jesus?  Only  by 
individualising the Logos. But to do this would be to break the communion of the Holy 
Trinity. In what way, then, is it possible to individualise Jesus?
We cannot turn him into an ‘individual’, whatever we do, because as he says ‘I am in 
the Father and the Father is in me’ (Jn 14:10,11). The Logos is never, can never be, an 
individual in isolation – he is always, even in the depths of Gethsemane or in the darkest 
hour of the cross when abandoned by God, still  constituted through his perichoretic 
communion with the Father and the Spirit, still the Son.
If we consider Jesus from the perspective of his humanity, we can only regard him as an 
individual in abstraction from his hypostasis. But even here, as the bridegroom giving 
his life and flesh from which his bride is fashioned, he cannot be separated from her in 
the new creation, even if the unity of the ‘one flesh’ of husband and wife, the ‘image of 
God’, can be ‘put asunder’, in the present. Christ and his bride are one, not the same, 
but together.
So to consider the Church as Bride, far from individualising Christ, is to speak of the 
gentle hand of the Son guiding his bride into the eternal dance of the Holy Trinity:  
‘Love took my hand, and smiling did reply...’736
5.2.2.4 Of the Name
This answer to the question of the Church’s identity as Creation’s ‘Yes,’ however, will 
not suffice on its own, simply for the reason that it not a Name. That is, it has not been 
named by God as such. The name given by God in Isaiah is ‘My Delight Is In Her’ – the 
735 See Ch 4
736 George Herbert’s poem, Love III
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name of the bride.737 Inseparable from her is the rest of Creation, for Isaiah continues 
‘and your land “Married.”’ The Church’s identity as a person is the bride of God.
The obvious name given to the bride in both the East and West is Mary.
However, for Bulgakov the image of the Church associated with Mary is ‘Temple’, not 
‘Bride’, since she is indwelt by the Holy Spirit. It complements the Church’s description 
as  Christ’s  ‘Body’  since  it  is  to  the  Logos  we are  joined.  This  complementarity  is 
required by his soteriology in which both Christ and Mary are co-redemptors. Hence 
Body and Temple belong necessarily together. In this scheme there is no obvious place 
for the bride.
‘Body’ and ‘Temple,’ however, can both be understood as biblical descriptions of the 
‘Bride’, depending on the latter for their interpretation.738 In Genesis 2:23 we find the 
bride  being  formed  from  the  body  of  Adam  (who  thus  becomes the  groom),  and 
affirmed as a metaphor for the Church in Ephesians 5:23. In Genesis 2:7 we find the 
man as the dwelling of the breath of God – the temple of the Spirit, and in 1 Corinthians 
6:12-20 body and temple are presented as the basis of the nuptial union between Christ 
and his bride.739
Congar is interesting in this respect for he rarely talks about Mary in the context of the 
bride.  In fact,  Mary is distinctly quiet  in his ecclesiology in general.  Some Catholic 
theologians, who have recently been advocating the nuptial metaphor as the primary 
identity of the Church, are abrasive in their advocacy of her.740 Congar is more content 
to  use  biblical  data  to  develop his  dogmatics.  Mary,  for  him,  is  representative  and 
typical in the defining sense. He describes her as ‘the first and even fundamental type,’ 
and of the Church as ‘imitating’ and ‘prolonging’ the attitudes originating in her. This is 
much more gentle and participative language than the functional structuralism evident 
in others.741 For him, she remains the cynosure of salvation as one of us, responding to 
Christ who remains the focus of adoration, praise and worship. At the risk of suffering 
from  ‘satanic dementia,’742 this hypostatic openness is not unique to Mary, but is the 
entelechy of all hypostases, is the realisation of the image of God in humanity.
737 Is 62:2, 4
738 See Barker M, Temple Themes, p53
739 See Section 4.6, above
740 E.g. Calloway C, ‘Bridegroom Christology’, 2003
741 Congar, ‘La personne’, p629
742 Bulgakov, Bride, p460
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Biblically, this should be apparent from the fact that, while Luke’s Gospel focuses on 
the kenotic response of Mary to the angel’s visit, Matthew focuses entirely on Joseph 
and his equally kenotic response (Mt 1:24-25). For The Gospels the Incarnation took 
place within a family,  within the context of a betrothal relationship that required the 
costly consent of both the husband and the wife.743
The work of the Spirit is to infuse Creation with the work of Christ (Jn 16:14). This 
means  appropriating  Christ’s  death  on  the  Cross  and  bringing  the  new  life  of 
resurrection. In this the becoming of deification is restored, although not, apparently, in 
an  observably  progressive  manner  for  the  Church,  as  Congar  observes.  The gift  of 
personhood, by the Spirit at baptism, to each person is the promise of eschatological 
fulfilment  in which each will  be transparent  for the other,  without losing their  own 
lustre, and Creation will be imbued with the brilliance of God.
The Name of the bride is therefore an eschatological name, in which God will be all in 
all.  Can she be named with the name of any  one, historical person? Will there be a 
‘hierarchy of holiness’ within the bride, crowned by one who will give her name? Will  
some shine with greater brilliance than others? We do not know. We do know that ‘God 
does not show favouritism,’744 but that whatever has been built will be tested by the 
Spirit (1 Cor 3:13). We have seen Bulgakov is strident, aggressive even, not in naming 
the Church ‘Mary,’ but in identifying the historical virgin mother Mary as the personal 
bride of Christ. Congar will not name the Church other than to say Christ and the Spirit  
are her hypostatic centres, but sees in Mary the forerunner and archetype of the response 
that is the Church. Mary, undoubtedly, has a very special place in the Church. Indeed, 
we participate in her hypostatic ‘I’ every evening in the Magnificat. And perhaps this is 
the foretaste of the eschatological transparency of circumincession and love.
But perhaps it is best to leave her name as  ‘Hephzibah,’  ‘My Delight Is In Her’ (Is 
62:4).
743 Bulgakov denies Joseph any particular special status, e.g. Friend, pp177-188
744 Mt 20:1-16; Acts 10:34; Rom 2:11; Eph 6:9; Col 3:23-25
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Chapter 6 Conclusion
“My soul doth magnify the Lord, and my spirit hath rejoiced in God, my Saviour.”
Does the Church have an identity? What is the nature of her relation with the triune God 
and the World?
Worsening global economic, environmental, and societal crises, corporate domination, 
violence,  and  unparalleled  inequality,  indicate  a  deep  malaise  in  our  conception  of 
human relations with God, the world and each other, with our identity as humanity.
The Church maintains humanity is made in the image of the triune God by the Logos 
through the Spirit.  Genesis describes the communion of man and woman, bride and 
groom, husband and wife together as the invitation to be the icon of God. The creation 
of humanity is spirit-imbued soil, deified dust, invited to be God’s presence in creation 
and to be creation’s personal communion with God. It goes on to speak of the disruption 
in all three sets of relations by human wantonness, sin. The New Testament presents the 
incarnation, death, resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ as God’s response to this 
disruption, and the renewed possibility of answering the threefold invitation. The result 
is the Church.
The question of the Church’s identity, then, has a degree of urgency, recognised by the 
focus of Vatican II on the Church. Lumen Gentium describes her as the People of God, 
the Body of Christ, and the Temple of the Holy Spirit. The overriding difficulty with 
each of these primary descriptors is that none of them is personal. They cannot give 
ontological  space for the  Church’s response of love to  God’s invitation;  ‘love’ is  a 
personal and ontological category. They are not.
 6.1 Congar and Bulgakov – a Summary
The  exploration  of  the  ecclesial  ontologies  undertaken  here  demonstrates  marked 
similarities and differences. Both Congar and Bulgakov display the deep influence of 
German Idealism. Bulgakov is more explicit in this language; Congar’s is mediated by 
Möhler. Both grapple with the issue of the relation between the visible and the invisible, 
history and experience, matter and spirit. While remaining unhesitatingly committed to 
their Traditions, both, certainly in their later writings, speak of the priority of the Spirit  
over institutional authority. Both identify the ontology of the Church as eschatologically 
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conditioned, in which institution is not present. And both, to a greater of lesser extent, 
understand the destiny of each person in terms of the catholicity of transparent love.
Nevertheless,  the  ecclesiology and ontology of  salvation  that  arises  from each take 
divergent forms. Both are conditioned by their Traditions and the difference in their 
creeds, notably the  filioque  clause. Within the context of his tradition, Congar begins 
both his ecclesiology and his soteriology in the Gospels, with the ‘mission’ of Christ. 
He identifies this mission primarily in terms of interior renewal. Consequently the focus 
is more  ‘spiritual’ in the platonic sense. Ultimately for him, salvation consists in the 
uniting of souls with God, of which the nuptial metaphor is the crowning depiction, and 
Mary the first example. His principal metaphor of the Church is the Body of Christ. In 
his early ecclesiology the visible Body as Institution exists prior to, and for the purpose 
of building up, the Mystical Body as ‘saved souls’. It derives directly from Christ and 
therefore carries his immediate authority. Drawing on the filioque, he subordinates the 
activity  of the Spirit  to  the authority  of  the Institution,  although this  relationship  is 
ambiguous in his later pneumatology. The result is that the Church has two strands – 
one institutional, hierarchical, and causal but temporary,  the other mystical, personal, 
resultant  but  eschatological.  The  visible  Body,  as  keeper  of  the  sacraments,  is  the 
mediator  between God and the  soul.745 The Mystical  Body is  vivified  by the  Spirit 
working through the sacraments. The unity of the eschatological Body is the unity of 
loving souls that derives from being united with Christ through the Spirit. Christ, or the 
Holy Spirit, is the ‘I’ of the Church. She does not have an answering ‘I’ of her own. Due 
to  the  focus  on  interiority  there  is  little  in  his  ecclesiology  or  his  soteriology  that 
explicitly relates to the rest of Creation.
For Bulgakov, on the other hand, soteriology and ecclesiology are defined by creation. 
The principal task of humanity is to become the image of the Trinitarian God through 
the  process  of  learning  to  love.  Taking  Genesis  2:7  as  axiomatic,  soteriology  of 
necessity includes materiality,  ‘nature’ in its essential sense. Deification is therefore a 
cosmic process accomplished through humanity. Because he sees the act of creation as 
the exercise of the kenotic love of the Trinity,  it is created in freedom to respond in 
love. The image of God therefore corresponds to kenotic love in humanity, the telos of 
which is hypostatic transparency;  that is, personal hypostatic freedom to love and be 
loved. Thus the entelechy of creation is towards hypostatic multi-unity, through which 
745 So also for Balthasar and of Scola, another Catholic theologian developing the nuptial metaphor of 
the Church in an attempt to reconcile these  ‘Petrine’ and  ‘Marian’ ontologies,  but nevertheless 
whose  principal  description  of  the  Church  is  ‘intrinsic  medium.’  A  Scola,  ‘The  Theological 
Foundation’, 2007
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the  pleroma  of  God  will  imbue  the  whole  of  creation.  The  Incarnation  is  the 
continuation of the task given to Creation. Through participation in Christ the path to 
deification is restored. The Church, then, is the realisation of this entelechy, in which 
Creation becomes united with God through Christ as his Bride (personified in Mary), in 
the Spirit: Bulgakov’s vision of the Church is cosmic and eternal. The Church exists 
prior to the hierarchy, which effectively forms the temporary ‘backbone’ of the spirit-
filled community.
Where, for Congar the Church is the Body of Christ, for Bulgakov this description is 
incomplete without the balancing Temple of the Holy Spirit. The two descriptions refer 
to the Church’s relation with the Logos and the Holy Spirit in the Divine Sophia on the 
one hand, and with Christ and Mary, respectively, in the creaturely Sophia on the other. 
The biblical description of the Church as ‘bride’ refers purely to the (unhypostasised) 
Divine and creaturely Sophias.
Both Congar’s and Bulgakov’s ecclesiologies have brides, plural. For one it is souls, for 
the other, Sophias. Neither is adequate. However, in terms of offering an ontological 
response to the identity of the Church, Bulgakov has more to say. Briefly summarising 
and building  on this,  we can  sketch  an  outline  towards  a  personal  ontology of  the 
Church.
 6.2 Towards an Ontology of the Bride
God is spirit – personal and hypostatic: three persons, Father, Son, Spirit; one God. The 
revelation of God in the New Testament at Christ’s baptism is that the Three mutually 
and kenotically constitute each other.
The creative ecstasis of the Father’s love through the Logos (as content) and the Spirit 
(as  act)  gives  birth  to  creation  out  of  nothing.  Humanity  is  created  as  free  and 
hypostatic,  as  spirit  embedded  in  nature,  invited  to  bring  Creation  into  perichoretic 
communion  with  God  through  the  free  and  joyful  response  of  kenotic  love.  The 
communio of male and female in Adam and Eve is thus an emanation of the communio 
of God with Creation,  specifically  through humanity.  The union of Adam and Eve, 
‘they shall become one flesh,’ is epistemologically and substantially grounded in the 
union of the Logos and his bride, hypostasised Creation. Calloway summarises it thus:
Within the first three chapters of the book of Genesis the theme of nuptiality serves as the 
basis of both creation and salvation. As the overflow of divine love, creation is given from a 
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God who expresses himself as a divine communio personarum, that is, ‘us’ (Gen 1:26). Since 
man is made in the image of God, the interpersonal communion of the Triune God as nuptial 
‘we’ is  placed in man as a fundamental  given.  What this reveals is  that  man,  male  and  
female, has been made for communion, communion with God and with one another.746
What he omits in this summary, typical of so much western (iconoclastic) theology, is 
the participation of the rest of creation in this drama through humanity’s relationship 
with the soil.
The  ‘image  of  God,’  humanity,  is  created  in  freedom  and  love  to  be  kenotically,  
mutually constitutive, a multi-hypostasis, a single voice with a single name, like white 
light  comprising  the  spectrum of  human  hypostases,  of  which  the  primal  marriage 
between Adam and Eve, the ‘one flesh,’ is the prolepsis. Each ray realises its own hue, 
paradoxically, as it becomes transparent to all others, learning to love. This becoming is 
the work in Creation of humanity and the Spirit.  Because it is the fulfilment of the 
image of the Triune God, it is the ontology of humanity, hypostasised Creation.
The communion of man and woman is located within the Garden of which they are a 
part. They are invited to be God’s presence in his Creation, tending and caring for their 
own  extended  bodies  –  The  Gardeners.  The  ontology  of  Creation  is  therefore  the 
ontology of the Church, multi-hypostatic and cosmic.
For hypostasised Creation, love is not a necessity but a possibility. Love is both the path 
and the  destination,  for  God  is love,  the  fulfilment  of  which  is  the  image  of  God, 
deification, life. The invitation is thus at once the way, the truth and the life. Jesus is the 
invitation, the eternal incarnated Logos of God, in whose image we are made.
The invitation of God extends through humanity to the whole of creation: humanity is 
nothing other than enspirited humus. This invitation is to join the nuptial communion of 
the Three, as the ‘Fourth.’ As spirit, God communes with spirit, somehow breathing the 
Name of the creature as a ‘Thou’ without obliterating it, for only a ‘thou’ can commune 
with the ‘We.’ The ‘Thou’ is therefore hypostatic – a oneness of being: in the eyes of 
God, a ‘person.’
The fall is the turning away from God, the Source of life, which results in death. It is the 
nuptial promise between the ‘one flesh’ of man and woman, and God, broken. It is the 
atomisation of humanity and the destruction of the path to perichoretic communion. The 
nuptial relation between them (Gen 2:25) disintegrates (Gen 3:7). God’s blessing upon 
them (Gen 1:28), becomes a curse. Not only their relationship with each other, but the 
746 Calloway, Bridegroom Christology, p15
232
very ground from which they have come has to bear the curse (Gen 3:16-19). And yet  
the redemption of Creation is foretold to be the fruit of this disrupted nuptial relation 
(Gen 3:15). The entire narrative concerns the fabric of perichoretic relations between 
humanity, its nature, and God, of which marriage is the metaphor.
In  the  OT narrative  God  calls  to  himself  a  bride  from  humanity.  Marriage  is  the 
metaphor  of  worship.  Through her  he  will  restore  the  road  to  koinwniva  for  all  of 
humanity.  The promise is given in terms of the blessing of creation,  ‘a land flowing 
with milk and honey.’ The curse on the land is to be broken. And the Bride of Yahweh 
will give birth to the promised Messiah of David (Rev 12:1-6).
The Father sends his Son, the Christ,  the Bridegroom of God, who takes the human 
nature of the Bride of Yahweh in ‘the likeness of sinful flesh’ as God took the dust of 
the  earth.  Not  the  unlikeness,  not  a  ‘special’  nature,  not  a  privileged  or  a  different 
nature,747 but an identical nature, in all its weakness and depravity, taken from one who, 
like  all  of  us,  had  ‘sinned  and  fall(en)  short  of  the  glory  of  God’  (Rom 3:23).748 
Humanity and the rest of creation are not saved through any special endeavours on our 
part, no matter how difficult, incomprehensible, or distasteful the theology. This is the 
Gospel, however much the Church tries to protect God from our worst vices –  ‘that 
which is not assumed is not saved.’
The Logos  embodies the Bride of Yahweh, unites  this  depraved human nature with 
divine nature to redeem it and rescue it from death, through death. This embodiment is 
not the wedding, as Augustine suggests, but its prolepsis. The Logos baptises it with the 
Spirit, the breath of God, while still in its ‘sinful nature’ before death. In the strength of 
the Spirit he faces anew the temptations of divinisation through the flesh to which the 
first Adam succumbed, without sinning. It is precisely through the Spirit’s presence and 
life, uniting Jesus with the Father, that the temptations are overcome. This is why the 
same Spirit, given to us, enlivens us to follow in his footsteps, to become like him. That 
is, to become persons that love kenotically, whose hypostases becomes transparent to 
each other, to God, and to Creation.749
Jesus takes the ‘sinful nature’ to the cross and dies. On the cross he sleeps, like the first 
Adam, his body broken, the blood and water flowing from his side signifying it given to 
form his bride. In resurrection Christ is  ‘born again’ from the womb of the earth, like 
747 Cf. Bulgakov, Lamb, pp298-299
748 How could Rom 3:9-12 possibly be more explicit? Cf. Bulgakov, Lamb, p243
749 In this regard it is interesting how frequently the theme of friendship with the animals is regarded 
as a sign of holiness in the hagiographies of saints.
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the first Adam, but reborn as spiritual (1 Cor 15:42-49). The Resurrection is witnessed, 
first by Mary Magdalene who thinks he is The Gardener, the Second Adam, and then by 
a cloud of witnesses, some of whom are named, many of whom are not. At Pentecost 
the  Holy Spirit  is  given to  all  who are  present,  not  just  the apostles,  as  the down-
payment for the marriage that is to come – Christ’s presence in his absence. The Spirit 
baptises, breathes the breath of God into the dry bones and body taken from Christ’s 
side – and creates the community, the koinwniva of his disciples in the upper room. So 
the Bride of Yahweh is born again of water and the Spirit as the Bride of Christ; multi-
lingual and multi-hypostatic at her first appearance, yet one.
The flesh Christ united to himself  was born again from the womb of the earth, and 
‘birthed’ as a spiritual body by the Spirit. This ‘spiritual body’ is not some ‘other’ body. 
The new creation is not a replacement for the old. Rather it is the old creation ‘groaning 
together in the pains of childbirth until now’ to reveal the spiritual glory of the creation 
that was created ‘very good.’ It is the removal of the veil, as witnessed by Moses with 
the burning bush and at the Transfiguration – the spiritual ontology of creation imbued 
with the Glory (Holy Spirit) of God. The extraordinary testimony of Scripture is that 
this will be accomplished through humanity reborn in the image of Christ.
Who is the bride? Firstly, she cannot, ontologically, be the body of Christ, even though 
she is taken from his body, clothed in his flesh, and nuptially becomes his body.
Why? Because the Invitation cannot be the Response. ‘Love bade me welcome...’750 The 
Invitation is from God, is of God, and is God. The invitation is ontological. What, then, 
is  lacking?  ‘A guest,  I answer’d,  worthy to be here.’  The guest is  not the host, the 
created other than the Creator. The Logos is the invitation, his guest the unworthy, but 
ontological, other. This is the requirement of an ontology of freedom and the gift of 
love. ‘Love took my hand, and smiling did reply...’ The Lover and the Beloved are two, 
not  one,  are  to  become  one.  Yet  both  creation,  ‘Who  made  the  eyes  but  I?’,  and 
redemption,  ‘And know you not, says Love, who bore the blame?’, are undertaken by 
the same One, the Logos, who therefore includes the other antinomically in himself in 
his death. ‘You must sit down, says Love, and taste my meat; So I did sit and eat.’ The 
eschatological  wedding  banquet  is  proleptically  celebrated  at  each  Eucharist:  the 
presence of the Spirit is the future present. It is also the historic present. The Spirit is 
therefore the bearer of ontology.
750 The lines are taken from George Herbert’s poem, Love III.
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The act of re-creation of the bride is instituted in the single dyadic event of Incarnation-
Crucifixion-Resurrection-Pentecost of the Word and Spirit. But it continues through the 
work  of  the  Spirit  and  the  Word  in  the  Gospel  sacraments,  and  beyond,  until  the 
Parousia. At every baptism she is united with Christ in his death and given her new 
name as she rises again to life. At every Eucharist she continues to be built up from 
Christ’s body, through hypostatic renewal in the Spirit, that she may be eschatologically 
‘one flesh’ with him, and thus together form the Temple of the Spirit (1 Cor 6:17). She 
is thus constituted through the Spirit and the Word.
The  question  that  remains  concerns  the  nature  of  unity.  Is  the  bride,  as  Congar, 
Balthasar and others maintain, really a multitude of brides, of souls united to God, who 
consequently  become  transparent  to  each  other?  Is  she  Augustine’s  singularity  of 
‘humanity’ united to divinity in the Incarnation, but thereby non-hypostatic? Or if she is 
to be allowed her own ontology, is this some tertium quid, neither Christ, nor the Holy 
Spirit, nor us?
If Creation is to sing with one voice, whereby ‘our mouth shall shew forth thy praise’, 
the Bride must  be other than a multitude of souls united with God. Her unity must 
derive from her deified createdness, rather than God’s own substantial unity, although 
that is its origin since she is created in its image. Her unity is entirely derivative on 
being  clothed  in  the  flesh  of  Christ’s  new  creation  and  the  gift  of  the  Spirit  who 
quickens life and love. And yet, once reborn, it must also be a unity of loving response. 
Therefore she must be other than Augustine’s union of divinity and humanity in the 
Incarnation.  But neither  can she be something other than  us,  created  humanity.  The 
promise of Jesus is that each one is known and loved by the Father, more precious than 
many  sparrows.  The  answer  must,  therefore,  lie  in  the  real  unity  of  the  restored 
koinwniva of humanity,  itself,  through the Spirit-enabled process of love resulting in 
kenotic hypostasisation.
This process of kenotic hypostasisation, learning to love and growing in holiness, is the 
adorning and beautifying of the bride. It commences formally in baptism, in which a 
hypostasis, an enfleshed person, dies to self as a hypostatic fragment and is raised in 
Christ through the Spirit as the hypostatic Church. One plus one still equals one. Thus 
all believers are eschatological priests and Christ is present wherever there is koinwniva. 
In dying and rising in Christ the bride is ‘built.’ As each person grows in kenotic love, 
so the bride grows in beauty.
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The formal expression of the Church, her order and her sacraments are not her ontology, 
which is defined eschatologically. They are all temporally circumscribed and will cease 
at  the  Parousia.  They  exist  in  the  time  between  times  as  the  representation of 
eschatological hypostatic generation (sacraments) and transparency (orders), which are 
only effective through the operation of the Spirit who makes Christ present. Ordination 
exists, not as the representation of Christ to his bride, let alone as hierarchical authority, 
but as the representation of the kenotic and hypostatic unity of the bride to Christ.
The new Eve, formed from the body and blood of the new Adam, grows into his loving 
likeness  to  be  presented  to  him  as  his  bride  (cf.  2  Cor  11:2-3),  so  the  two  will 
eschatologically come together as  ‘one flesh’, head and body, the prolepsis of which 
Paul so often describes.  At the Passover meal  Christ blesses the bread and the cup, 
covenanting himself in the nuptial engagement, giving his body to form his bride. This 
giving washes and purifies her, which is itself an image of death and resurrection, in 
preparation for the marriage. The Eucharist is thus both the building of the bride from 
his body, and the eschatological celebration of the marriage.
Who is she? Revealed names describe relations: Father, Son, Spirit. The bride’s name is 
given by God in Isaiah simply as  ‘Hephzibah,’  ‘My Delight Is In Her.’ And yet we 
already speak with the voice of one, share her hypostasis, ‘My soul doth magnify the 
Lord.’
This, then, is the one invited to the empty space at the table in Rublev’s icon.
(99,995 words)
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